













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 






Political Party Learning in the European Free Alliance: 















PhD in Politics 





I declare that this thesis was composed by myself, Judith Sijstermans, and that 
the work contained herein is my own except where explicitly stated otherwise 
in the text. I declare that this work has not been submitted for any other degree 



























Chapter One: Building a Political Party Learning Framework………..….21 
1.1 Conceptualizing the Domestic Political Party………………………22 
1.2 Conceptualizing the Transnational Political Party…………………24 
1.3 Conceptualizing Learning in the TNP Network…………………….38 
1.4 A Political Party Learning Framework………………………………45 
Chapter Two: Research Design…………………………………...………..…59 
2.1 Qualitative Comparative Research and Case Selection ……..…..60 
 2.2 Data Collection and Analysis……………………...…………………67 
2.3 Conclusion……………………………………….…………………….83 
Chapter Three: The Role of the European Free Alliance in Member Party 
Learning……………………………………………………………………………85 
3.1 What is the European Free Alliance?..............…………..….……..86 
3.2 Member Parties in EFA ………………………………...…………..108 
3.3 Individual Party Members in the EFA Context……………………123 
3.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………126 
Chapter Four: The Frisian National Party………………………………….129 
4.1 Introducing the Frisian National Party …………………………….130 
 4.2 Contextual Factors and the Frisian National Party………………132 
4.3 Transnational Interactions…………………………..……..……….139 
4.4 Learning in the Frisian National Party……………………………..145 
4.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………159 
Chapter Five: l’Union Démocratique Bretonne ……………………….….163 
5.1 Introducing the Union Démocratique Bretonne ………………….164 
 5.2 Contextual Factors and the Union Démocratique Bretonne ……167 
4 
 
5.3 Transnational Interactions…………………………..……..……….174 
5.4 Learning in l’Union Démocratique Bretonne …...…………….…..181 
5.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………196 
Chapter Six: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya …………………..…..201 
6.1 Introducing Catalan Autonomist Parties………......………………202 
 6.2 Contextual Factors and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya….205 
6.3 Transnational Interactions…………………………..……..……….211 
6.4 Learning in Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya…………….….220 
6.5 The Role of TNP Membership in Transnational Relationships…230 
6.6 Catalan Institutional Diplomacy and Learning …………………...237 
6.7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………242 
Chapter Seven: The Scottish National Party…………...……………..…..245 
7.1 Introducing the Scottish National Party……………………………246 
 7.2 Contextual Factors and the Scottish National Party………….….248 
7.3 Transnational Interactions…………………………..……..……….259 
7.4 Learning in the Scottish National Party………….…………….….275 
7.5 Scottish Institutional Diplomacy and Learning……………………287 
7.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………293 
Chapter Eight: Discussion…………………………....…………………..…..295 
8.1 Key Findings……………………………………….…………………296 
 8.2 Reflecting on Contextual Factors and Extent of Learning...…….313 
8.3 Beyond and at the Boundaries of Learning………..……..………327 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion…………………………… …………………..…..337 
9.1 Summary of Findings………………………………………………..336 
9.2 Limitations of Research……………………..………………………341 
 9.3 Avenues for Further Research………………………………….….345 
9.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………349 
Appendix One: List of Interview Respondents……………………………353 




List of Tables and Figures 
Table 1.1 Party Learning in the Transnational Party Network…………………49 
Table 2.1 Contextual Factors Across Cases……………………………………65 
Table 3.1 Growth in EFA Member Parties Over Time………………...………..86 
Figure 3.1 EFA Structure………………………………..…………...…………...87 
Figure 3.2 Map of European Free Alliance Member Regions………………...88 
Table 3.2 The European Free Alliance and EP Groups Over Time.………….92 
Table 3.3 Members of the European Parliament in the EFA EP Group.……..94 
Table 3.4 Members of the EFA Secretariat………………..…………………....98 
Table 3.5 Members of the EFA Bureau……………………………….…….....101 
Table 3.6 Members of the EFA Youth Bureau………………………………....103 
Table 3.7 EFA Party Electoral Results/Governing Responsibility…………...113 
Table 3.8 EFA Member Parties’ left-right ranking……………………………..115 
Figure 4.1 Map of Friesland in the Netherlands……………………......……..131 
Table 4.1 FNP Electoral Results Over Time…………………………………..133 
Figure 4.2 FNP Transnational Relationships Visualization…………………..141 
Figure 5.1 Map of French administrative regions……………….………….....165 
Figure 5.2 Map of Regional Languages in Brittany……………...……………166 
Table 5.1 UDB Electoral Results Over Time………………………………......168 
Figure 5.3 UDB Transnational Relationships Visualization………….………177 
Table 6.1 ERC Electoral Results Over Time……………………..…………...206 
Figure 6.1 ERC Transnational Relationships Visualization………………….212 
Figure 6.2 ERC/JERC Transnational Relationships Visualization………….213 
Figure 6.3 Catalan Transnational Relationships (incl. PDeCAT)…………...235 
Table 7.1 SNP Electoral Results Over Time……………………………….…..249 
Figure 7.1 SNP Transnational Relationships Visualization…….……………261 
Table 8.1 Identified Instances of Learning……………………………………..296 
Table 8.2 Cases of Learning and Issue Contestation………………………..307 




This thesis would not exist without the kindness of my interview respondents, 
who welcomed me into their lives, workplaces and friendships. Thank you to 
them for their patience and candor. 
Thank you to my supervisory team, Professor Nicola McEwen and Dr. Alan 
Convery. Both have provided invaluable guidance, not only on this PhD but 
beyond. I am grateful to have them in my corner.  
Many University of Edinburgh staff have provided support and guidance in my 
career throughout the years: Dr. Eve Hepburn, Professor Elizabeth Bomberg, 
Professor John Peterson, Dr. Carmen Gebhard, Dr. Meryl Kenny, and 
members of the Territorial Politics Research Group. They say it takes a village 
to raise a child. Thank you for being my village.  
Thank you to my friends and cohort who indulged me in coffee breaks. To Emily 
Mann, Cat Wayland, and Elisabeth Cuenod for their radical gentleness and 
donuts. To two generous and supportive mentors: Charlotte Snelling and Coree 
Brown Swan. 
Thank you to those who kept me grounded in life outside of this process. To 
Andrew Dickie, whose kindness is only outmatched by his humor. To Rachel 
Heydecker, whose sense of adventure and thoughtfulness make her an 
amazing friend. And especially to Lauren Reay, who has been the best friend 
for the last 13 years and the next forever. 
Finally, I am indebted to my family.  
For my omas and opas: I hope that their strong sense of community and hard 
work radiate throughout these pages. 
To my stepdad Henri, for always making me laugh. To my stepmom Wendy, 
for her advice.  
To my mom, who has made me brave and set me free through her 
unconditional warmth and support. Thank you for raising me right. 
To my dad, who taught me never to settle and showed me that work can be an 
immeasurable and lifelong pleasure. Thank you for holding us all up. 
Finally, and most of all, to my siblings: Marloes, Bill, Miles and Mia. There is 




Recent years, and high-profile events such as the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum and 2017 Catalan referendum, have shown that stateless 
nationalist and regionalist political parties remain relevant political forces in 
European politics. Scholars have long studied these political parties 
comparatively, but autonomist movements have not developed in a vacuum. 
This thesis explores the interconnectedness of nationalist and regionalist 
parties. Relationships between these parties can most tangibly be traced 
through taking the European political party of the European Free Alliance (EFA) 
as a starting point. Stateless regionalist and nationalist political parties have 
coalesced under EFA as their transnational political party for more than 35 
years.  
This thesis seeks to understand how relationships between EFA member 
parties affect them. In particular, I focus on one possible consequence: 
learning. I ask, do interactions between regionalist and nationalist parties in the 
European Free Alliance generate member party learning? If so, why and how? 
If not, why not? In order to explore learning, I first develop a political party 
learning framework. This framework builds on existing approaches to political 
parties, transnational political parties, and policy and organisational learning 
literatures. I propose three stages of learning: information acquisition, 
interpretation, and implementation. I also identify five contextual factors that 
might condition party learning: electoral success, governing responsibility, 
party centralization, key entrepreneurs, and issue contestation.  
I apply this party learning framework to four EFA member parties: the Frisian 
National Party, the Union Démocratique Bretonne, Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, and the Scottish National Party. These cases studies are 
constructed predominantly through elite interviews, complemented by 
ethnographic observation, and documentary analysis. I find that some political 
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parties in EFA do learn from their interactions with other member parties. 
Learning occurs on issues ranging from technical renewable energy solutions 
to altered electoral strategies. I also identify cases of non-learning and stalled 
learning. The most influential factors determining patterns of party learning are 






















Sub-state nationalist and regionalist parties are political parties that mobilize 
around issues of territorial autonomy and representation within the state. 
Europe’s nationalist and regionalist parties range from parties seeking full 
independence to those seeking to protect a regional language or culture. These 
parties coalesce in the European Parliament under a European political party: 
the European Free Alliance (EFA).   
Under the auspices of EFA, nationalist and regionalist parties interact at 
multilateral events, through virtual means, and in bilateral meetings. This thesis 
explores one consequence of these interactions: learning. I ask: do member 
parties of EFA learn from their interactions with one another? If so, why and 
how? If not, why not?  I have developed a theoretical framework to study 
political party learning. This framework considers that political party learning is 
best studied as a process. The proposed party learning process would follow 
three stages: information acquisition, interpretation, and implementation.  
To test my proposed political party learning framework, I chose four EFA 
member parties: the Frisian National Party, the Union Démocratique Bretonne, 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, and the Scottish National Party. These 
parties are studied through elite interviews, observation of EFA events, and 
analysis of relevant documents.  
I find that political parties in EFA do learn from other member parties, on policy 
issues ranging from environmental sustainability to electoral strategies. 
Learning is often driven by parties’ efforts to expand their policy platforms or 
achieve more electoral success. However, some parties do not learn, and 
others do not complete the process of learning. A number of factors contribute 
to this variance between members of EFA. I find that the most influential factors 
























Recent years have shown that Europe’s stateless nationalist and regionalist 
political parties1 are no longer relegated to the periphery. The Catalan 
independence movement, including two main political parties and two large civil 
society organisations, has mobilized millions of supporters each Catalan 
National Day since 2012. The movement reached its apogee on the 1st of 
October 2017, when a Catalan independence referendum resulted in a tense 
stand-off with the Spanish Government. The sustained success of the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) led the Scottish Government to hold a referendum on 
independence in 2014. The party’s apparent ‘failure’ in that referendum has 
only spurred an unprecedented membership increase. The SNP has become 
the second largest political party in the United Kingdom by membership and 
the third largest party in the UK’s House of Commons.  
Beyond these most prominent cases, nationalist and regionalist parties have 
proliferated across Europe. In 2015, thirteen regionalist and nationalist parties 
participated in regional and national governments including in Flanders, 
Corsica, and six different Spanish regions (EFA Press Release, 2.2.16). The 
2017 French elections put significant pressure on the French Government 
when a nationalist and regionalist coalition won 56.5% of votes in Corsica 
(Willsher, 2017). Journalists have, in an often embellished manner, warned of 
the ‘rumble of secessionism,’ the ‘siren call of separatism,’ and the possible 
independentist ‘contagion’ across Europe (Zaretsky, 2015; The Economist, 
2018; Daftary, 2014; MacDonald and Taylor, 2014). 
A rich tradition of scholarship on regionalism and nationalism has emerged 
alongside political developments, not least from the University of Edinburgh 
                                                          
1Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘nationalist and regionalist party’ as a shorter form of stateless 
nationalist and regionalist party. Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties are based at a sub-state 
level and emphasize sub-state territorial interests (Hepburn, 2009: 495).  
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where I have written this PhD. Much of this scholarship has been comparative 
between European nationalists and regionalists. This thesis also takes a 
comparative approach. However, these political parties do not emerge from a 
vacuum in each domestic context. Rather, there are, and have long been, 
relationships between nationalist and regionalist parties in Europe. This thesis 
undertakes an exploration of that interconnectedness. 
This is most tangibly traced by taking the European political party structure of 
the European Free Alliance (EFA) as a starting point. Stateless regionalist and 
nationalist political parties coalesce under EFA as its transnational political 
party. EFA unites parties in the European Parliament (EP), but also acts far 
beyond the EP. EFA has existed for more than 35 years, although its name 
and composition has changed. Under the European Free Alliance, most of 
Europe’s regionalist and nationalist political parties attend joint events and 
assemblies, develop joint policy projects, and sit together in the European 
Parliament.  
My interest in the relationships between Europe’s nationalists and regionalists 
stems from my previous personal and professional experiences. Working in 
Scottish politics, I experienced transnational relationships between political 
parties on a grassroots level. In the run up to the Scottish independence 
referendum, the Yes campaign was joined by Welsh Plaid Cymru activists. On 
one particularly memorable afternoon, campaign letters were folded to the 
dulcet tones of half a dozen Welsh activists. The day before the 2014 
referendum, I greeted enthusiastic Catalan visitors in the Yes Edinburgh 
campaign headquarters. They asked excitedly where the street parties would 
be—after all, they had become accustomed to this mass mobilization in 
Barcelona. Cultural and strategic differences did not hinder European 
nationalists’ enthusiasm for the Scottish cause. It became clear to me that 
many of Europe’s regionalists and nationalists saw their causes as tied 
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together. This interconnection was so meaningful that activists would travel 
significant distances of their own volition and at their own cost to be involved.  
These experiences led me to consider what happens when these transnational 
independentist activists return home and to question the prevalence of 
transnational nationalist relationships. This thesis is the result of those 
questions. I seek to systematize and understand the relationships that Europe’s 
regionalists and nationalists have to one another. I focus on one possible 
consequence: learning. I ask: do interactions between regionalist and 
nationalist parties in the European Free Alliance generate member party 
learning? If so, how and why? If not, why not?  
I have chosen to understand this practice through interviews in order to reflect 
the voluntary, agential, and embodied nature of transnational party 
relationships. Interview respondents spanned from youth activists to retired 
party members to Government ministers. Fieldwork was conducted in 
Scotland, Friesland, Catalonia, Brittany, Silesia, Bavaria and Brussels.  
Across these two years of data collection, I found that the European Free 
Alliance and its active members were not only constructing their own regions 
and nations. EFA and its members actively develop an alternative vision of the 
European Union. This is most succinctly depicted by EFA’s slogan and 
hashtag: #AnotherEurope. Another Europe is, of course, a purposefully vague 
concept which takes into account the diversity of views within EFA. Parties’ 
perspectives on the EU range from seeking statehood within the EU to seeking 
to minimize the role of states altogether. Nonetheless, the EFA vision of 
Another Europe boils down the promotion of supranational Europe that is less 
tied to its component states. Another Europe, they posit, would rather reflect a 
‘Europe of the Peoples.’ Understanding transnational relationships in the 
European Free Alliance thus reflects both on regionalist and nationalist parties 
and on the nature of the European Union.  
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The concept of the transnational political party (TNP) in Europe emerged from 
the European Parliament but the TNP has since gone on to develop extra-
Parliamentary bodies. To outline the purpose of transnational political parties, 
it is useful to return to the Maastricht Treaty’s earliest conceptualizations of a 
political party in the EU. The original text noted that: “Political parties at the 
European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They 
contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will 
of the citizens of the Union.”  
In his chapter on the integration of transnational parties, Johansson concluded 
that, “Clearly, [European political parties] fulfil a coordinating function: they 
promote the sharing and exchange of information, knowledge and experience; 
and they play an important role in facilitating and institutionalizing networks” 
(2009: 163). This thesis considers the consequences of transnational 
exchange of information between domestic parties, facilitated in this case by 
the European Free Alliance. 
Stateless nationalist and regionalist parties are a particularly useful case when 
considering transnational relationships in the European Union. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, structures such as the European Parliament and EFA, the 
Committee of the Regions, Structural Funds, and the Committee of the Regions 
and Local Authorities in the Council of Europe incentivized nationalists and 
regionalists to develop pro-European ideologies and to invest in relationships 
at the EU level (Keating, 2004: 376-378). Since this time, theoretical 
explorations of the conceptual relationship between the state, region, and 
supranational and empirical research on regionalist mobilization in the EU has 
spurred a ‘minor scholarly industry’ (Keating, 2008: 629). The term “Europe of 
the Regions” emerged to describe and drive the phenomenon of regionalist 
and nationalist mobilization at the EU level.  
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The consolidation of the European Free Alliance occurred during the height of 
the Europe of the Regions (Elias, 2008: 558). EFA member parties became 
more ‘internationalized’ and accepting of the EU during this time (Hepburn, 
2009; Lynch and DeWinter, 2008). However, by 2004, it was clear that the 
envisioned Europe of the Regions would not deliver on what was promised. 
The Committee of the Regions was perceived as a powerless talking shop, EU 
enlargement to the East did not benefit the regions, and EFA had a 
disappointing performance in the 2004 EP elections (Lynch and DeWinter, 
2008: 596-597).  
The Europe of the Regions concept quickly became less useful to parties, 
because it was not genuinely implemented at the EU level (Elias, 2008). 
However, regional engagement at the EU level remains (at least) “an important 
side-strategy” for regionalist parties (Swenden and Bolleyer, 2014: 397). 
Regional actors have continued to seek decentralization within their states, to 
develop offices in Brussels, to lobby the EU institutions through collective 
organisations, and, through these means, to be relevant actors in European 
integration (Elias, 2008: 487). 
Despite setbacks in the Europe of the Regions vision, the European Free 
Alliance continues to facilitate transnational communication between 
nationalist and regionalist parties. The EU also provides space for regional 
power and lobbying. As one EFA EP policy adviser said: “Having the EU, which 
has been created by states, is the best way to reconstruct our nations. It has 
not been done for us, but paradoxically it’s good for us. The only way to 
recreate our natural exchanges in Corsica with Sardinia, Italy, Catalonia, is 
through the EU. It was not created in such a way, but it is done through the EU” 
(Interview 37). To exploit these opportunities, many nationalist and regionalist 
parties invest time and resources into the EFA’s structures of cooperation.  
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More than state-wide parties, nationalist and regionalist parties rely on their 
transnational political party to access EU institutions. Most EFA members do 
not have state-level governing power. Only one EFA member is in state-wide 
government: the Flemish Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA). State governments 
are the most influential actors in the EU, through their role in the European 
Council and power to nominate members to the Commission. Nationalist and 
regionalist parties’ lack of governing power means that EFA members are 
unable to access these roles. They are thus more likely to use EFA to gain 
influence in Brussels. In addition to the rise of regionalist and nationalist parties 
over recent years, the European Free Alliance’s small size and parties’ 
commitment to transnationalism make it an ideal case to study in this thesis. 
EFA’s Director Gunther Dauwen stated:  
“We only have an impact because we are a family, a synergy, a group, 
a consistent view. Each time we push parties who do matter in size and 
in numbers and try to push them to take certain things on board. It's 
difficult to put your finger on what exactly...it's always about some points 
in commas, some few words here and there that are erased and added.”  
This thesis pulls together three strands addressed in this introduction and in 
Dauwen’s quote. First, nationalist and regionalist political parties, involved in 
some of Europe’s most dramatic political moments of the last five years, have 
transnational relationships. In many cases, respondents refer to their EFA 
partners as ‘family’ or ‘sister parties.’ However, these parties have thus far been 
studied comparatively rather than considering interdependently. In this thesis, 
I explore the concept of learning as one of the possible consequences of 
parties’ interactions in EFA. This helps to highlight that party decision making 
is not entirely distinct. 
Second, transnational parties are an understudied component of the EU. 
Transnational political parties, first called ‘political parties at a European level,’ 
contribute to the shape of EU politics. This is particularly relevant in the run up 
to the 2019 European elections and in the context of concerns about the EU’s 
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‘democratic deficit.’ EFA’s frequent call for ‘Another Europe’ and promotion of 
a Europe of the Peoples model shows that transnational political parties can 
contribute to political conceptualizations of what the European Union is and 
should be.  
Third, and predominantly, this thesis emphasizes the movement of information 
across borders, through political parties and activists. In Dauwen’s words, I 
seek to ‘put my finger on’ what is pushed, acquired, and taken on board when 
nationalist and regionalist parties interact with one another.  
To do so, I take four case studies: the Frisian National Party (FNP), the Union 
Démocratique Bretonne (UDB), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), 
and the Scottish National Party (SNP). The next two chapters of this thesis 
justify the choice of a learning lens to approach the European Free Alliance 
and put forth a framework to structure the concept of political party learning. I 
develop a three-stage process of party learning and identify five possible 
contextual factors that affect parties’ experiences of learning. Each political 
party case study is examined through this party learning lens. These cases, 
when compared to one another, allow me to develop preliminary conclusions 
about the nature of party learning in the EFA network, as well as reflect on the 
concept of party learning.  
I find that party learning is particularly concentrated on electoral strategies and 
vote-seeking, often with specific interest in the model of the Scottish National 
Party. Less successful political parties are more likely to learn, although they 
may struggle to do so. More successful political parties are less likely to learn 
from the European Free Alliance, and instead seek information on new policies 
and political strategies through institutional means and para-diplomacy. 
Findings also reveal patterns of relationships in the European Free Alliance. 
They show that EFA’s relationships are strongly affected by differential 
electoral success and governing responsibility. EFA is also comprised of 
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numerous sub-groups which organise around cultural, geographical, and 
ideological similarities.  
These findings allow me to reflect on the proposed party learning framework 
and to open up space for further refinement of the framework. Further 
theoretical work could seek to clarify the relationship between government and 
party learning or to more deeply consider the role of ‘time’ and the transnational 
level in learning. 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter One considers the role of the political party domestically and then 
moves on to the role of transnational political parties in the European Union. I 
argue that existing studies of transnational political parties over-emphasize the 
European Parliament and narratives of further integration. Then, I propose 
considering the transnational political party as a network of political parties. 
Taking forward the networked concept, I propose that learning can best help 
us understand what passes between domestic political parties in a 
transnational political party. The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the 
learning literature which recognizes its interdisciplinary roots. Bringing the 
different dimensions of learning together, I propose a party learning framework 
and five relevant contextual factors.  
Chapter Two sets out the comparative research design of this thesis. I justify 
the use of a small sample qualitative comparison and my case selection. The 
remainder of the chapter elaborates on the process of data collection and data 
analysis. I particularly emphasize the benefits and difficulties of using 
qualitative interview and observational data. This chapter also reflects on my 
positionality in doing this research. 
Chapter Three considers the role of the European Free Alliance as a structure 
that brings together regionalist and nationalist parties and as a case of a 
transnational political party. I elaborate on each of the different parts of EFA in 
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order to provide contextual information and to clarify how a transnational 
political party works in practice. The second part of this chapter considers the 
role of domestic member parties in the European Free Alliance. It particularly 
isolates one part of the research question: interactions between political parties 
and disaggregates different types of interactions which occur within EFA. 
Finally, this chapter considers the role of the individual actor within the member 
party and EFA.  
Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven each study a different EFA member 
party, in order: the Frisian National Party, the Union Démocratique Bretonne, 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and the Scottish National Party. These 
chapters follow parallel structures. First, I introduce each party. Second, I 
consider how each performs on the five contextual factors identified in Chapter 
Two. Third, I map each party’s relationships in the European Free Alliance and 
beyond, if applicable. Finally, I conclude whether and what the party has 
learned from the European Free Alliance or, in some cases, why the party 
hasn’t learned. Chapter Six compares two Catalan political parties: Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya and Partit Demòcrata Català, to investigate the role 
of EFA membership in shaping transnational relationships. 
Chapter Eight will synthesize the thesis’s findings by conducting cross-case 
analysis and reflecting on the theoretical framework employed in this thesis. I 
review the main cases of learning identified in Chapters Four through Seven. I 
consider key findings about each stage of the learning process. I further reflect 
on the learning framework theoretically by delineating the boundaries of the 
concept. 
Chapter Nine reflects on the thesis and concludes. I consider the theoretical 
and methodological difficulties faced by this study and also propose routes to 
further explore the concept of political party learning. Finally, I consider what 
the findings of this thesis mean for three strands of political phenomena: the 
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increasingly globalized movement of information, transnationalism and the EU, 






















Chapter One: Building a Political Party Learning 
Framework  
Even before the development of the European Parliament or the European 
Free Alliance, there were transnational connections between Europe’s 
stateless nationalists and regionalists. In 1974, the Breton, Welsh, Galician, 
Irish, Catalan, Basque and Sardinian movements signed a charter of solidarity 
(Schrijver, 2006: 212). In 1979, the European Free Alliance was further 
formalized through the Declaration of Bastia (Kernalegenn, 2013: 29). 
However, EFA’s institutionalization through the European Parliament and EU 
regulations has regularized interactions between Europe’s nationalists and 
regionalists.  
Domestic political party interactions within the framework of the transnational 
political party (in this case EFA) are the starting point of my thesis. This chapter 
reviews existing theoretical approaches to domestic political parties and 
transnational political parties. I propose that a learning approach is an 
appropriate lens through which to study the relationship between domestic 
political parties in a transnational political party (TNP). 
The ‘political party at the European level’ has received an increasingly 
important role in the European Union. In 2004, a new transnational political 
party regulation (Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003) came into force to give a clear 
legal personality to TNPs as well as to more clearly define criteria for funding. 
The 2004 regulation led to a clear separation of the EP party group and the 
extra-Parliamentary TNP staff. The EU’s transnational parties thus began to 
develop a clearer legal personality and organisational structure outwith the 
European Parliament legislative environment (Lightfoot, 2006: 308-309). In 
2014, the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political 
Foundations was established for registering, controlling and imposing 
sanctions on European Political Parties and European Political Foundations. 
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The process of developing the TNP has embedded it within EU politics. As it 
gains permanence, the transnational political party requires more sophisticated 
analysis. The TNP has too long been studied through the lens of the European 
Parliament and European integration. There is not sufficient understanding of 
its effect on domestic party politics.  
This thesis emphasizes the relationship between the transnational party and 
domestic party choices by asking whether and how interactions between 
domestic member parties in the TNP generate domestic party learning. In this 
chapter, I review literature on the three key elements of this question: the role 
of the domestic political party, the role of the transnational political party (TNP), 
and the concept of learning. The first section of this chapter gives a broad 
overview of theories about political party change and situates this thesis in 
discussions of intra-party debates on policy. The second section reviews 
existing conceptualizations and terminology around transnational political 
parties and argues that the TNP can be considered a network. In the third 
section, I justify my choice of a learning approach, explore the interdisciplinary 
nature of the learning literature, and the various dimensions of learning. Finally, 
I conclude by proposing a political party learning framework.  
1.1 Conceptualizing the Domestic Political Party 
Political parties are theorized as an essential part of modern democracies. 
Parties both separate (partire) the electorate from one another and allow 
voters/interest groups to take part in politics (Sartori, 2005: 4). In other words, 
parties structure a political ‘clash of ideas’ and represent the electorate’s ideas 
(Allern and Bale, 2012: 8). In this section, I review existing understandings of 
political party change to show the diverse range of influences on party choice. 
The rest of this chapter and thesis will propose that learning from transnational 
interactions would be one possible influence on party choice. Learning would 
specifically affect elite intra-party debate.  
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Most theories of political party positioning stem from the Downs model. This 
model characterizes parties as rational, vote-maximizing organisations playing 
a zero-sum electoral game with other parties (Downs: 1957: 137). Vote 
maximization leads parties, in a two party system, to converge on the median 
voter’s position. Understanding parties as vote maximizers leads to the 
organization of parties along ideological scales (most often left-right). The vote 
maximizing model produces a further rational choice logic to explain how 
parties are electorally motivated to differentiate themselves along this scale 
(Adams, 2001: 123). Many adjustments and critiques of the Downs model have 
been developed (Meyer, 2013: 18-20). For example, scholars have noted that 
parties may be driven by other goals such as office or policies or seek to 
incorporate the role of party uncertainty and ideology (Müller et al., 1999; 
Budge, 1994). These competitive explanations are important and dominant 
narratives in explaining party choice. However, Meyer notes that the picture of 
party policy shifts is more complicated, because both voters and party 
organisations must accept policy changes (2013: 22-27).  
Furthermore, one of the early theorists of political learning noted: “Politics finds 
its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty-men collectively wondering 
what to do” (Heclo, 1974: 305). This idea of a positive, policy-seeking approach 
means that scholars must move beyond competitive narratives to look at the 
intra-party level of decision making.  
This thesis is based at the intra-party level. I consider how transnational 
interactions alter parties’ internal decision making and negotiation processes. 
While voters and party competition may spur policy change, political parties 
contemporaneously develop internal debates. Intra-party debates reflect 
parties’ role as interest aggregators, integrators and mobilizers. In their theory 
of party change, Budge et al. emphasize internal party factionalism and 
conclude that ‘party policy is shaped more by internal considerations than 
electoral calculations’ (2010: 785). Political parties adapt their behaviour based 
24 
 
on deliberation and debate with other political parties and with one another. 
Parties negotiate competing ideas about what the party is and should do; this 
ideational process ties closely into the process of learning.  
Who engages in intra-party debates? Political parties are comprised of many 
different parts: the ‘party in public office,’ the ‘party on the ground,’ and the 
‘party in central office’ (Katz and Mair, 1994: 408-409). Of these parts, the party 
in public office (i.e. elected officials) has strengthened in recent years. The 
central office staff of the party also have a key role to play due to its ability to 
connect the party to civil society actors. The increased role of Parliamentarians 
(those in office) and professional staff is enhanced by processes of 
professionalization. Professionalization alters the staff structures of parties, 
often resulting in increased stature for ‘expertise’ in parties (Kolodny and Webb, 
2006). Professionalization is a particularly relevant concept for the regionalist 
and nationalist parties studied in this thesis; their attempts to professionalize 
will emerge in the empirical chapters. As such, despite the development of 
intra-party democracy and narratives of political party democratization, “the 
large majority of parties seem relatively unconcerned about their memberships 
and are instead much more focused on reaching out to the wider public through 
professional campaigning and marketing techniques” (Van Biezen et al., 2011: 
39).  
Intra-party debate is thus dominated by party elites and the estimated one in 
seven party members that are active. Furthermore, these active party members 
emulate the characteristics of political elite. They are older, better off, better 
educated, and associated in other organisations such as churches and unions 
(Van Biezen et al., 2011). While some have proposed that the rise of the 
internet will democratize political parties, the picture is mixed. Mainstream 
political parties in the UK and US have used the internet for ‘topdown 
information provision’ while some smaller parties like the Green Party in the UK 
have ‘more genuinely interactive uses of technology’ (Römmele, 2003: 15). 
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Relationships between political parties across borders is more likely to tie into 
elite intra-party debates. Transnational political parties, due to the resources, 
time and expertise required, are often elite dominated. Furthermore, “unlike 
national political parties, the electorate, the membership, the rank-and-file and 
other actors cannot compete with the leadership, as these party components 
do not exist at the transnational level” (Van Hecke, 2010: 398). As such, this 
thesis specifically looks at how transnational party interactions affect intra-party 
elite decision making. It considers whether elites learn from their transnational 
interactions.  
The learning approach has previously been seen as relevant to parties’ policy 
making. For example, prominent scholars have argued that political parties are 
possible agents of learning (Stone, 1999: 55; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 10). 
Through a study of British economic policy making, Hall showed that political 
parties play a part in the domestic process of social learning (1993). The 
interview-based nature of my research allows me to further clarify the effect of 
learning on intra-party negotiations. In the empirical chapters, I note, where 
relevant, when party learning is constrained or complementary to other 
influences on party decision making (such as party competition).  
Transnational political party interactions are in their nature an elite activity. I 
consider how transnational interactions influence domestic party decision 
making. As such, this thesis emphasizes the role of intra-party dynamics on 
party choice and change. I specifically explore how active, elite individuals in 
party organisations introduce, defend, and debate ideas. The rest of this 
chapter conceptualizes the role and nature of the transnational political party 
and how these interactions might affect intra-party negotiations of interests and 
information.  
1.2 Conceptualizing the Transnational Political Party  
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Domestic political parties are considered essential elements of a state’s 
democracy. Internal party politics is thus often the subject of news and 
speculation. The same cannot be said for the place of transnational political 
parties in the European Union. The TNP has often taken a back seat, even to 
already second-order European news. Rather than studying transnational party 
activities, scholars often assume that in the EU “political party influence goes 
via the national government” (Gaffney, 1996: 15). Theoretically, the study of 
parties at the EU level is “‘caught’ within the state-centric paradigm” (Van 
Hecke, 2010: 402).  
Transnational political parties are also caught in a normative discussion around 
the EU’s democratization and integration. Books on political parties in the EU 
ask, for example: “Might there be a connection between future EU integration 
and the organizational development of transnational parties?” (Hix and Lord, 
1997: 167). This argument often takes ideological terms. For example, 
‘idealists’ believe that European political parties can contribute to a truly 
transnational democracy while ‘realists’ hold that the national party will always 
dominate (Day, 2014). Hix and Lord make recommendations to allow 
transnational parties to fulfil the five criteria of ‘party democracy’ (1997: 214-
220). Transnational parties are thus often tested against the standards of 
domestic democracy and found insufficient.  
In this thesis, European political parties are neither tested against the power of 
the state nor seen as a measure or arbiter of EU democratization. The 
transnational political party and its contemporary form is the focal point of my 
research. As such, I now first review existing literature on the transnational 





Transnational political parties are an ill-defined object. This lack of definition is 
so deep that many studies of TNPs begin with scepticism about the ‘reality’ of 
the transnational party. For example, Johansson says, “to some extent 
Europarties are actors in their own right…yet they have seldom been treated 
as independent actors carrying ‘agency’” (2015: 2). Others conclude that the 
term ‘political party’ is a misnomer in the case of the Europarty (Sigalas and 
Pollak, 2012: 23). A back and forth on the ‘question of existence’ has 
dominated the literature on TNPs (Van Hecke, 2010: 408). This contested 
conceptualization has meant that ‘Europarties remain under-researched (and 
seemingly underestimated)’ (Johansson, 2016: 80).  
This debate is worsened by a lack of clear terminology. In EU regulations, ‘the 
political party at EU level’ has a defined status which allows it to receive 
funding.2 The political party at the EU level is ‘an organisation following a 
political programme, which is composed of national parties and individuals as 
members and which is represented in several Member States’ (European 
Parliament). This term is useful because it recognizes the status of European 
political parties as aggregating member parties, developing programmes for 
EP elections, and behaving on a European scale. Acting ‘at EU level,’ shows 
that the TNP works both above (supra-nationally) and across (transnationally) 
the member state. However, ‘political party at the EU level’ quickly becomes 
too cumbersome and too vague (Bressanelli, 2014: 2; Van Hecke, 2010: 397; 
Hix and Lord, 1997: 13-14).  
The most substantial area of disagreement on terminology stems from the 
‘existence’ debate. If transnational political parties are not truly parties, should 
they be termed something different? Early work especially argued that TNPs 
“cannot be regarded as ‘parties’ in the traditional sense, rather as loose 
coalitions of national parties” (Marsh and Norris, 1997: 155). The most common 
                                                          
2 Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003 of the European Parliament.  
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alternative to the term ‘party’ is federation; in some cases, the two terms are 
used interchangeably (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2011: 32). The term federation 
draws on Niedermeyer’s 1983 classification of transnational parties into 3 
stages: contact, cooperation and integration. Federations sit at the cooperation 
stage. The move to become a ‘party’ at the integration stage would then be 
determined by the amount of sovereignty that is transferred from national 
member party to TNP (Dietz, 2000: 202). Federation connotes that TNPs bring 
together multiple national political parties yet do not have full coercive powers 
(Van Hecke, 2010: 397-398). ‘Federation’ is mostly used in studies of the 
development of TNPs over time. My research puts aside questions of 
development over time and of integration. I avoid the use of the term 
‘federation,’ given that it is so closely tied to judgments of a TNP’s 
developmental stage.  
Another specification occurs in applying the term of ‘European,’ which 
highlights the distinctly EU-linked nature of the transnational political party 
development. No other international body in the world has developed a similar 
level of transnational political activism (Van Hecke, 2010: 397). However, it is 
not theoretically necessary to restrict our conceptualization of transnational 
parties to Europe. Empirically, the boundaries of transnational political parties 
are often blurrier than they seem. For example, the European Free Alliance 
has close relationships to activists and politicians in Quebec and Kurdistan; it 
receives interest from parties as far abroad as California and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Transnational party co-operation is not limited to the borders of Europe.  
Rather than using the term ‘European’ I distinguish transnational parties from 
their national counter parts through the term transnational. The concept of 
transnational relations in the EU refers to “regular interactions across national 
boundaries where at least one actor is a non-state agent” (Risse-Kappen et al., 
1995: 3). The term is vague, but it makes an important point that political 
activism has moved beyond state-to-state international relations. Considering 
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the transnational aspects of the 
EU also emphasizes the 
“transnational cooperation, 
communication, socialization 
and policy transfer of functionally 
transnational actors below the 
EU level” (Kaiser and Starie, 
2005: 10). The European 
Union’s transnational political 
parties are a prime example of 
these cross-border non-state 
centric relations. As such, I will 
call the ‘political party at the European level’ a transnational political party 
(TNP) (also adopted by Hanley, 2008).  
The study of the transnational political party has also suffered from confusion 
over the name of each component part. Early on, there were three dimensions 
of transnational activity: the Euro-Parliamentary, the party-organisational, and 
the national party (Pridham and Pridham, 1981: 278). The party-organisational 
arena includes TNP central staff and secretariat. Confusingly, this TNP party-
organisational component has also been called the ‘party federation’ (Bardi, 
2004: 20; Lightfoot, 2006: 310).  
The secretariat, as it will be called in this thesis, is the central TNP hub of 
coordination. Secretariats communicate with all member parties, not just those 
with elected MEPs. Each secretariat also reports to a bureau, comprised of 
political elite, who can be seen as a programmatic steering group that set TNP 
priorities. The 2004 European regulation incentivized the creation of the extra-
Parliamentary secretariat.  
Figure 1.1: Organisational Structures in 
Transnational Parties (TNP) 
 EP party group: MEPs and EP 
group staff 
 Secretariat: organizing staff 
 Bureau: programme steering 
group   
 Associations: related youth, 
student, women’s groups 
 Political foundations: political 
think tanks linked to each TNP  
 Member parties: national parties 




Meanwhile, the EP party group is comprised of elected Members of the 
European Parliament, their personal Parliamentary assistants, and the EP 
party group staff. Since 2008, there have been sectoral associations linked to 
the TNP, such as youth groups, women’s groups, and political foundations tied 
to each TNP (Day, 2014: 7). The terms I use for each part are summarized in 
Figure 1.1. This will be further clarified in Chapter Four, when each term is 
unpacked in relation to the case of the European Free Alliance.  
(2) Existing Knowledge about TNPs  
Having settled on the term TNP, it is now important to consider what we know 
about TNP behaviour and its effect on member parties. There are two clear 
strands of enquiry: one into the development of the TNP over time and one into 
the behaviour of the EP party group. The latter narrative focuses studies of the 
TNP on the European Parliament and considers whether the EP party group 
conditions the behaviour of MEPs. The former borrows from European 
‘integration’ narratives and considers whether TNP’s member parties have 
become more cohesive and integrated over time. Neither of these approaches 
adequately considers the multi-level nature of the TNP, because they over-
emphasize the supranational and Brussels-based effects of the TNP. 
The Parliamentary strand of inquiry into TNPs is the most empirically 
developed. Drawing on EP roll call vote data, scholars have interrogated EP 
party group cohesion and considered whether systematically, EP party groups 
fall along competitive ideological lines (Hix et al., 2005; Lindberg et al., 2008; 
Hix, 2008; Meserve et al., 2017). They find that party group cohesion is 
increasing, despite more national and ideological diversity within EP party 
groups. Studies conclude that “European party groups are able to have a 
disciplining effect on their national member parties” (Hix et. al, 2005: 231). The 
TNP may thus generate adaptation (such as learning) by member party elites. 
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However, the data used to develop this is too focused on the behaviour of 
MEPs, who may be marginal to the behaviour of domestic political parties.  
The reliance on roll-call vote data means that these findings can only reflect on 
the nature of European Parliament groups. Since the changes in TNP 
regulations, the TNP has expanded to have significantly more functions and 
organisational bodies, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. The over-emphasis on the 
EP group is in part because this work was done before the expansion of TNP 
structures. Hix and Lord’s book Political Parties in the European Union (1997) 
dedicates three chapters to the functions of the European party group and only 
one chapter to TNP functions beyond Parliament. The emphasis on 
Parliamentary functions also reflects that the development of the concept of 
transnational political party structures stems from the first elections to the 
European Parliament (Hix, 1998: 309-310).  
Prior to the 2004 change in regulations, TNPs relied on their party group for 
funding and a structural institutional role (Lightfoot, 2006: 305). However, since 
these regulations, the separate TNP secretariat has begun to play a more 
important role in TNP behaviour. The secretariat coordinates relationships 
between member parties and develops ‘vision’ documents, which guide EP 
party group decisions in the short and medium-term policy areas (Gagateck 
and Van Hecke, 2011: 3). Member parties’ relationships to the transnational 
political party do not only flow through the MEP or European Parliament. As 
such, a more comprehensive approach to studying TNP effects on member 
parties is required.  This thesis explicitly seeks to move academic 
understandings of the TNP beyond the European Parliament.  
The other dominant narrative in studies of TNPs is the attempt to classify 
different types of transnational political party, often along different stages of 
development. The most comprehensive attempt is Day’s 2005 analysis of the 
Party of European Socialists (PES). Using the PES case, Day identifies three 
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types of transnational political parties: (1) those that facilitate national party 
leader relationships to one another; (2) those that act as a ‘meta-network,’ 
fulfilling tasks not relevant to the domestic party; and (3) those that act as 
representative mass-parties connected directly to the ‘demos’ (Day, 2005: 63). 
Each stage is more integrated than the one before. Day’s 3 stages of the TNP 
relate to three ‘generations’ of legal regulation of parties: those predating 2004 
reforms, 2004 to 2009, and post-2009 (2014: 6-7). In 2004, the Party 
Regulation increased funding opportunities offered by the European 
Commission, for Secretariats able to meet the criteria. The 2009 European 
Parliament election offered the first opportunity for TNPs to campaign, which 
was prohibited before 2007, but these campaigns were ‘underwhelming’ 
leading to increased frustration and scepticism about TNP potential to integrate 
further (Day, 2014: 15). Politically and theoretically, TNPs “remain in a state of 
becoming” (Day and Shaw, 2006: 162). While this is an important part of the 
literature, it is not the focus of this thesis which studies one TNP over a short, 
contemporary period of time rather than studying its development over the 
longer term.  
While the literature on TNPs is often critical and sceptical of TNP’ importance, 
scholars have begun to consider their influence on policy outcomes, for 
example on EU treaty negotiations (Johansson, 2016; Van Hecke, 2012). A 
2004 book by Delwit, Kulachi and Van de Walle aims to analyse TNPs’ policy 
influence on the European Union, even though they recognise that TNPs “do 
not encompass a reality, or a conceptual abstraction, similar to parties that 
evolve at national level” (10). This thesis proposes that, regardless of one’s 
opinion on the ‘reality’ of the TNP, it is possible and important to study the 
influence of transnational political parties. In this thesis, I particularly focus on 
the effect of the TNP on internal outcomes, specifically the choices of its 
member parties. To understand how TNPs affect their member parties, I argue 
that it is most apt to characterize the transnational political party as a network.  
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(3) Transnational Political Parties as a Network 
The emphasis on transnational political parties’ development over time and on 
their Parliamentary behaviour stems from scholars’ reliance on domestic party-
political approaches. A party scholar would struggle to approach a TNP from 
any other perspective; this “is to conceive of something of which we have no 
real-world experience” (Mair and Thomassen, 2010: 24). I seek to study and 
conceptualize the transnational political party using an approach suited to the 
multi-level politics of the European Union: networks. I argue that the 
transnational political party can be characterized as a network of member 
political parties. I draw on policy, transnational activist and inter-organisational 
network approaches to substantiate this conceptualization. 
The ‘network’ concept emerges in numerous academic disciplines including 
comparative politics, public administration, organization theory, and economic 
sociology. It even extends to neurology, ecosystems and technology (Ansell, 
2000: 303). In social sciences, a network is most generally be defined as a set 
of non-hierarchical, interdependent relationships between actors who 
exchange resources to reach a common goal (Börzel, 1998: 254). Network 
thinking is underpinned by the proposition that no one body centrally controls 
decisions, intelligence, information, or resources (Kenis and Schneider, 1991: 
26). The European Union’s dispersed power and decision-making process 
make it “a 'hot house' for policy networks precisely because its processes are 
so fluid, and policy-outcomes depend - more than in most other systems of 
governance - on informal bargaining” (Peterson, 1995: 390).  
As Peterson notes, in studies of the European Union, policy networks are the 
predominant form. Policy networks are comprised of formal and informal 
linkages between the government and non-state actors, based around a 
common belief or policy goal and based in interdependence (Rhodes, 2006: 
426). Another definition emphasizes the “mediation of interests of governments 
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and interest groups” which occurs when “clusters of actors representing 
multiple organisations interact with one another and share information and 
resources” (Peterson, 1995: 391) Policy networks emphasize 
interdependence, the presence of state and non-state actors, and the effect of 
networks in a particular policy sector.  
These last two criteria mean that the policy networks approach is not directly 
applicable to TNPs, which work across policies and act in a non-state capacity. 
However, network thinking has also been applied more widely in the EU. For 
example, the behaviour of transnational political parties can be related to the 
concept of transnational political activism (in political parties, NGOs, think tanks 
or social movements). In order to develop in a cross-border manner, these 
activist organisations mobilized in networked ways. Transnational activist 
networks are stimulated by the “vertical experience” of being part of an 
international organisation like the EU. International organizations have “helped 
to produce the ‘horizontal’ formation of transnational coalitions through the 
networks of activists that form around them” (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 9).  
Transnational political parties and their member parties share characteristics 
of a policy network: (1) interdependent relationships at the EU level, (2) co-
operation underpinned by a common goal, and (3) action aimed at a mutually 
agreed outcome. They also resemble transnational activist networks, because 
their cooperation is incentivized by their participation in the ‘vertical’ EU which 
then allows them to strengthen and expand their horizontal connections to one 
another. The networks approach is often flexibly applied in order to emphasize 
a relational process. To emphasize the relational, cooperative nature of the 
TNP and its member parties, I consider the TNP as networked.  
Stemming from work on economics, sociology and business, the literature on 
inter-organisational networks has two additional insights to add to the 
conceptualization of the TNP as networked. Inter-organisational networks are 
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multi-level and emphasize performance rather than policy goals. An inter-
organisational network is: “a particular form of organizing, or governing, 
exchange relationships among organisations” (Ebers, 1999: 3). Ebers defines 
the inter-organisational network as “recurring exchange relationships among a 
limited number of organisations that retain residual control of their individual 
resources yet periodically jointly decide over their use” (1999: 3). This definition 
is suitable to the ways that domestic political parties join a transnational political 
party. Member parties predominantly maintain their own resources and, as 
Day’s (2005) classification shows, the TNP does not have coercive power. 
However, parties do choose to cooperate to access joint resource (through the 
EU). Furthermore, they choose to contribute some of their own resources to 
the TNP in order to be full members.  
Inter-organisational networks are a particularly useful concept because it 
recognizes that networks often have three distinct levels: (1) the network level; 
(2) the organisational level; and (3) the individual level (Knight, 2002: 436). The 
transnational political party has three distinct levels of actor: the TNP (Brussels 
based bodies), the domestic member party, and the individual party 
member/elite. Policy networks focus on behaviour at ‘a meso-level’ between 
interest groups and the government, without differentiating the level at which 
actors are interacting (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 202). As such, the inter-
organisational network model provides an additional insight to show how the 
TNP is networked, in a multi-level context. Transnational political parties have 
been characterized as “a network of relations (formal and informal), weaving 
links between the different levels of vertical (European, national, regional) and 
horizontal powers” (Delwit et al., 2004: 10).  
Furthermore, in the inter-organisational network model, the outcome of interest 
is not policy but improved ‘performance’ (Leseure et al., 2001; Dodds et al., 
2003). A systematic review of inter-organisational studies highlighted that 
outcome variables of interest were predominantly power/control, prevalence 
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and success (Oliver and Ebers, 1998: 565). In the chapters that follow, it 
becomes clear that the European Free Alliance, its member parties, and elite 
actors have strong ‘performance’ goals: getting votes, receiving funding, 
growing membership, gaining recognition, and legitimacy. These performance 
goals may include achieving ideological goals, but they are not exclusively 
based in these policy aims.  
I characterise the transnational political party as a networked body that reflects 
characteristics of policy, transnational activist, and inter-organisational 
networks. It comprises of member organisations (political parties) in 
interdependent relationships that cooperate based on both a common belief 
system and seek a common goal of increased performance (predominantly 
electoral success). The TNP network bridges vertical levels of decision making 
(the EU, the state, the region) and types of actors (the transnational party, the 
member party, individual members).  
The term ‘network’ has previously been used when referring to TNPs. For 
example, TNPs have been called ‘meta-networks’ (Day, 2005); ‘Europarty 
networks’ (Speht, 2002: 186), and ‘party networks’ (Dunphy and March, 2013). 
They have been shown to engage in networked behaviour around venues such 
as the Convention on the Future of Europe (Van Hecke, 2012). The term has 
also been proposed by the TNPs themselves. Perhaps most prominently, the 
Party of European Socialists (PES) launched a “Network Europe” project in 
1998 to develop stronger communication across the local and European 
elements of socialist parties in the EU. The Director of the European Free 
Alliance noted that the ‘intangible’ element of EFA is the ‘possibility of synergy, 
contact, networking.’ Considering the TNP as a network helps to emphasize its 
relational nature, with both formal and informal elements.  
There have been numerous critiques of the network concept which argue that 
networks lack explanatory value. Networks, critics argue, better describe the 
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static shape of policy making processes than how actors reached specific 
outcomes (Dowding, 1995; Rhodes, 2006: 436). In this thesis, the network 
concept is not used to provide an explanation for the decision making in the 
TNP or member parties. Given the ill-defined nature of transnational political 
parties, the network approach is a useful way to describe the relationships 
between political parties in a transnational political party. It is thus “an analytical 
model, a framework of interpretation, in which different actors are located and 
linked in their interaction in a policy sector and in which the results of this 
interaction are analysed” (Börzel, 1998: 259).  
As such, it is necessary to move beyond conceptualizing the nature of the TNP 
as a networked entity. The main question of this thesis is concerned with what 
is exchanged within the TNP. These internal exchanges require further 
analysis. Whether in policy or organisational network literatures, ‘it is incumbent 
on the researcher to provide an explanation of the underlying process or, in 
other words, to supply the theory’ (Zaheer et al., 2010: 63). To supply the theory 
to network approaches, scholars can consider the internal consequences of 
the network (its effect on members, structure, changes over time) and/or the 
external consequences (its effect on policy). In this thesis, I have chosen to 
focus specifically on the internal effect of relationships within the TNP network 
on member parties.  
Networked relationships facilitate negotiation and exchange between 
members. The objects of exchange are resources, information, and ideas. The 
communication of information within networks is not ‘trivial’; information 
exchange is essential to the behaviour of actors, negotiation of outcomes, and 
creation of alliances (Leifeld and Schneider, 2012: 731-732). Information is 
particularly relevant to studying transnational political parties. Members of a 
transnational political party participate in a voluntary manner and resource 
exchange is minimal. One study of transnational advocacy networks argued 
that due to their horizontal and voluntary nature, “modern networks are not 
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conveyor belts of liberal ideals, but vehicles for communicative and political 
exchange, with the potential for mutual transformation of participants” (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1999: 100).  
One such transformation of network members, spurred by information 
exchange, is learning. Learning has often been connected to transnational 
networks. Networks are seen as spaces that engender ‘strategic learning’ by 
actors by encouraging the sharing of best practice (Marsh and Smith, 2000: 9; 
Maggetti, 2014: 498). Scholars have applied learning to recognise that 
“members of a network share consensual knowledge and collective ideas and 
values…pursuing their goals, advocacy and discourse coalitions do not resort 
to strategic bargaining but rather rely on processes of communicative action” 
(Börzel, 1998: 264). Transnational networks are particularly conducive to 
learning because they require members to “build alliances, share discourses 
and construct consensual knowledge” (Stone, 2007: 560). A network first builds 
the relationships which conduct information across borders and then, by 
developing a shared goal, encourages members of the network to share 
information. The next section of this chapter further conceptualizes how 
learning might occur specifically within the transnational political party 
framework.   
1.3 Conceptualizing Learning in the TNP Network 
As noted in the previous section, I am particularly interested in the way that 
information flows between members of a transnational political party. While 
there are some resource transfers (from the EU to the TNP, the member party 
to the TNP), the major work of the transnational party is informational. At the 
Brussels level, the TNP’s central bodies share information about the goals and 
work of the TNP members or its EP Group to external actors. At a national 
level, TNP member parties exchange information with one another, often based 
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around common interests. Information is exchanged from member party to 
member party, often facilitated by the TNP’s central staff.  
To understand how information exchange may affect member parties, I 
propose a learning approach. In this section, I first differentiate learning from 
similar approaches, argue that it is the most appropriate approach, and then 
define how learning will be used in this thesis. I emphasize the way that TNPs 
bring together individual and collective learning and argue that in this case a 
process-focused understanding of learning is more apt than a behavioural, 
outcome-focused understanding.  
(1) Differentiating Policy Diffusion, Transfer and Learning 
Three main terms have been developed to trace the movement of information 
across space and time: policy diffusion, transfer and learning. Policy diffusion 
emerges from the International Relations discipline and studies the movement 
of policy across large sample studies, often quantitatively. Diffusion studies 
tend to focus on structural processes and conditions for the movement of 
policy, using larger quantitative data sets (Marsh and Sharman, 2009: 270). 
For example, the recent Party Policy Diffusion Study used manifesto data to 
show that parties respond to incumbent parties in neighbouring countries. This 
study can only “imply that parties are motivated to learn” rather than identifying 
specific mechanisms (Böhmelt, et al, 2016: 11). More qualitative research 
could investigate ‘linkages between party organizations’ rather than links 
between manifesto commitments (Böhmelt, et al, 2016: 12). Making linkages 
between organisations and individuals requires thinking at a lower level of 
analysis than diffusion. 
Policy transfer describes how “knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in 
another time and/or place” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 344). While diffusion is 
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focused on broader structures, transfer is focused on the 
object/idea/knowledge that has moved. Given its broad remit, transfer 
encompasses multiple processes including: learning, competition, coercion, 
mimicry, and socialization (Marsh and Sharman, 2009, 271). This breadth 
‘makes it difficult to disentangle from many other processes of policy making’ 
(James and Lodge, 2003: 183; Evans, 2009: 238). Given my thesis’s empirical 
breadth, I seek to use a more specific analytical approach: policy learning.  
Learning is the most useful term to study political parties. Learning occurs when 
an individual updates their beliefs or behaviours based on ‘lived or witnessed 
experiences, analysis or social interaction’ (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013: 599). 
In this thesis, I also incorporate organisational learning. An organisation learns 
when “an organization’s members actively use data to guide behaviour in such 
a way as to promote the ongoing adaptation of the organization” (Edmondson 
and Moingeon, 1998: 12). As opposed to policy diffusion and transfer, learning 
is an agential, ‘action-oriented’ perspective with a focus on actors and their 
intentions (Stone, 2001). An actor-centred approach is appropriate to the focus 
of this thesis: political parties, their elites, elites’ interactions, and the outcomes 
of interaction. In the following two sections I unpack the theoretical roots of 
learning and two key dimensions to understanding the learning process.  
(2) Theoretical Roots of Learning  
Having chosen learning as the analytical tool to understand interactions 
between members of the transnational political party, I unpack the term 
‘learning’ further. I will draw together three theoretical perspectives on learning: 
educational psychology, organizational/management learning, and policy 
learning. These threads have all contributed to political science understandings 
of learning. Zito and Schout note that “scholars working at the intersection of 
organization studies, psychology, political science and public administration 
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and sociology initiated the pioneering work in political studies’ learning theory” 
(2009: 1106). 
Educational psychology emphasizes that learning is a contributor to the many 
stages of human development (childhood, education, job training, counselling). 
For psychologists, learning is ‘a change in an individual's behaviour or ability 
to do something,’ stemming from their experiences (Shuell, 1986: 412). This 
initial definition at the individual level allows us to understand how individual 
agents within political parties learn through transnational interactions. 
However, in order to understand collective party learning, I emphasize 
organizational learning literatures.  
Theories of organizational learning are rooted in the disciplines of sociology, 
psychology, management, and cultural anthropology (Easterby-Smith, 1997: 
1086-1087). An organization learns if “an organization’s members actively use 
data to guide behaviour in such a way as to promote the ongoing adaptation of 
the organization” (Edmondson and Moingeon, 1998: 12). However, learning in 
organizations may go beyond individual initiative. Organisational adaptation 
may lead to new ‘routines’ that encode learning more deeply (Levitt and March, 
1998: 320). Levitt and March (1998) emphasize ‘ecologies of learning,’ which 
recognise the interaction between individual and collective processes in 
organizational learning.  
Political science contributions to studies of organizations are ‘underestimated’ 
but, for those interested in policy making, the process of learning has always 
been present (LaPalombara, 2003: 141). Political science studies both the 
learning of individuals and collective learning. The former is often expressed in 
terms of the process of political socialization. Political socialization, for 
example, developed from the research into the education of children; its 
application to politics and children’s socialization into politics rose in the 1960s 
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(Cook, 1985; Sapiro, 2004: 3). This older, socialization literature thus focused 
primarily on individuals.  
Collective learning studies in political science are concentrated in the 
administrative and policy development literature. From a policy perspective, the 
learning approach emerged as a ‘useful corrective’ to more conflict driven 
understandings of policy making (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 288). As Heclo 
famously said: “Politics finds its sources not only in power but also in 
uncertainty—men collectively wondering what to do” (1974: 305). One way that 
this collective wonderment can occur is through policy learning. Thirty years 
later, in policy and international relations disciplines, learning had “recently 
become a growth industry” (Meseguer, 2006: 38). She defines learning in the 
psychological sense, as “a change of beliefs in the light of the experiences of 
others” (Meseguer, 2005: 72). Policy learning can be seen as a rational, often 
governmental process in which actors reflect on their policy options by 
considering detailed ‘cause and effect’ descriptions of others’ previous 
experiences (Rose, 1993: 27). However, policy learning may also be less 
instrumental and tied into a more social process (Checkel, 2001). 
To bring together these three various strands of learning, I will review two 
important dimensions of learning that emerge from each discipline: individual 
v. collective learning and process v. outcome. Dunlop and Radaelli (2016) 
conclude that the binary questions associated with the learning literature (Is 
this learning or not? Is an actor able or unable to learn?) are limiting and make 
the concept of learning difficult to test (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2016: 108). To 
avoid this kind of binary thinking, my framework takes into account the 
complexity of political party learning. I integrate the process/outcome of 
learning and individual/collective learning, while keeping an openness to varied 
types of information that may be exchanged in learning processes.  
(3) Individual and Collective Learning 
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The move from considering individual processing of information to considering 
group information processing is linked to the ‘information age’ (Hinsz et al., 
1997: 43). In a time of increased information, information processing requires 
more individuals to work together. In studies of political and organisational 
learning, the study of ‘micro’ individual learning and ‘macro’ organisational 
learning have often been kept separate. However, “all learning takes place 
inside individual human heads; an organization learns in only two ways: (a) by 
the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members who have 
knowledge the organization didn't previously have” (Simon, 1991: 125). It is 
important to thus clearly understand how the learning in individual party 
members’ heads can be translated to the learning of a political party as a 
collective body.  
The micro/macro distinction in learning is widespread. For example, micro-level 
political socialization research stems from the psychological tradition; macro-
socialization on the other hand considers how institutions socialize their parts 
(Checkel, 2005). Rather than artificially separating the two, organizational 
theorists reckon that learning occurs across different levels of analysis. Within 
the same context, individuals, small groups, organizations, and networks can 
all display learning. Different levels of learning are linked by social processes 
of knowledge creation and dissemination (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 486). 
That is, “what is stored in any one head in an organisation may not be unrelated 
to what is stored in other heads” (Simon, 1991: 125). Individuals thus play a 
role in organisational learning. However, it is only through collective 
interpretation and decision making that a party can collectively implement 
learning (Crossan et al., 1999: 525). My study bridges the ‘micro-level’ 
(individual actors’ information processing), the ‘meso-level’ (the increase of 
knowledge within organizations), and the networked level (movement of 
knowledge between organizations) (Moyson et al., 2017: 162). 
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I recognize that learning cannot be immediately extrapolated from the individual 
to the party (Dodgson, 1993: 384). Organizations are important in information 
interpretation and integration due to their ability to ‘preserve knowledge, 
behaviours, mental maps, norms and values over time’ (Daft and Weick, 1984: 
285). Whereas an individual interprets information into their own cognitive 
maps, an organization integrates competing individual and sub-group 
interpretations; members negotiate interests in order to come to a common 
interpretation (Choo, 1996: 337-338). Political party learning thus progresses 
along a process of negotiation from the individual to the organizational level. 
Information becomes collectivized to the party level, and ultimately to the 
transnational party level. The following section argues that this processual, 
stage wise approach is the most useful way of studying learning in 
transnational political parties. 
(4) Processes and Outcomes of Learning 
There is a division between those who see learning as a process and those 
who see it as an outcome. In this thesis, I emphasize the process of learning 
and see explicit change as simply one possible outcome of a learning process. 
By doing so, I recognise that learning may result in an altered outcome but 
does not have to produce a “end” or observable action (Bomberg, 2007: 263; 
Radaelli, 1995: 162). A process-based understanding of learning provides 
scope to recognise non-learning, arrested learning, and non-explicit learning.  
I argue that detailing the process of information exchange provides more 
convincing evidence of learning than focusing on behavioural change. A study 
of behavioural outcomes in parties would struggle to avoid ‘false positives,’ 
when policies become more similar without learning and information exchange 
(Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 485). Learning may occur without easily observable 
lessons, particularly in political parties which have relatively few ‘position 
documents’ to show change over time. Outcomes that look like learning—the 
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convergence of policies, for example—might occur but not reflect knowledge 
acquisition and adaptation. In these cases, false positives may occur 
(Biegelbauer, 2016: 130).  
Outcome-focused approaches to learning emphasize the ‘measurable’ 
outcomes of learning (Akbar, 2003: 2001). In a political party context, outcomes 
could be observed as changed policies or strategies in policy programmes or 
public statements. However, interactions within EFA may affect parties in less 
observable ways. For example, party learning may lead to new skills, increased 
certainty in an existing policy, avoidance of a choice (negative learning), or a 
delayed policy change. Many of these consequences of interactions in EFA are 
best captured by focusing on the process of information exchange rather than 
behavioural outcomes of learning. 
This explicit understanding that learning can be both an active process (verb) 
and a consequential outcome (object) ensures that the study of the ‘lessons’ 
does not overtake the study of ‘learning’ (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013: 600). This 
thesis is primarily a study of learning, the verb, rather than learning, the object. 
To identify whether learning occurs in the transnational party network, I trace 
the process of information exchange between individuals and member parties 
in the TNP. This is the most appropriate approach to answering my question, 
because the question emphasizes the complex consequences of interaction 
rather than assuming a singular object or policy area. 
1.4 A Political Party Learning Framework  
In this chapter, I have reviewed the difficulties of defining transnational political 
parties and employed a network approach to emphasize the relational, 
heterarchical nature of the TNP which reflects insights from policy, 
transnational advocacy, and organisational network literatures. Drawing on 
existing literature linking learning and networks, I proposed that the process of 
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learning provides a useful way to analyse information exchange within the 
transnational political party. As such, my question is:  
Do interactions within the European Free Alliance network generate 
nationalist and regionalist party learning? If so, to what extent? If not, 
why not?  
Learning in this case will be defined as both an individual and collective 
endeavour and it will be conceptualized predominantly as a process of 
cognition. This progresses through three main stages: information acquisition, 
interpretation, and implementation. Each stage also progresses information 
from the individual towards the collective. In this section, I will first describe 
each stage, before providing a table to summarize this political party learning 
approach.  
(1) Stages of Learning 
I separate the process of learning into three steps. The identification of a 3-
step pattern has been prevalent in both political and organisational learning 
literature. For example, Rose’s (1993) lesson drawing moves from ‘searching’ 
to ‘modelling’ to ‘emulating,’ Sabatier’s policy-oriented learning (1988) moves 
from ‘research’ to ‘analytical debate’ to ‘implementation,’ and May’s (1992) 
definition of political learning moves from ‘experience’ to ‘evaluation’ to ‘policy 
change.’ Huber’s analysis of organisational learning suggests four steps: 
acquisition, distribution, interpretation, and storing of information (1991: 90). 
Dunlop and Radaelli identify the acquisition, translation and dissemination of 
information (2016: 111). Bringing together these various conceptualizations, I 
identify three steps to the learning process: information acquisition, 
interpretation, and implementation.  
Information acquisition occurs at the point of “supply” of information which 
policy makers process (Workman et al., 2009). The supply of information may 
come through an active learning process of ‘searching,’ but it may also occur 
47 
 
more passively, for example as part of a socialization process which inducts 
actors into the norms of a community (Rose, 1993: 3; Checkel, 2005: 804). 
TNP member party elites may actively seek out other parties with expertise on 
a specific policy area. However, they may also pick up information through 
collective social interactions (at annual General Assembly, for example) or 
through more distant means (Twitter, Facebook). In the initial transmittal of 
information, it is important to recognize that there are both ‘exporters’ and 
‘importers’; learning may be induced by either or both (Bomberg, 2007: 256).  
Information interpretation is “the process through which information is given 
meaning” (Daft and Weick, 1984: 294). In the case of learning, this means 
giving the information meaning both in its original context (for example, 
considering its context, success, aims, etc.) and adapting that piece of 
information to the learner’s context. The interpretative process is often 
characterized by a bounded rationality, in which policy makers rely on cognitive 
short cuts and are limited by their pre-existing biases (Meseguer, 2006: 40). 
Psychologically, the individual’s interpretation of information allows them to 
rectify a ‘discontinuity in self’ caused by a proposed new way of thinking or 
behaving (Boyd and Fales, 1983: 111-112).  
Organisationally, the move from individual to collective interpretation is “the 
process of translating events and developing shared understandings” (Daft and 
Weick, 1984: 286). One piece of information may be given one or many 
interpretations by an organization and its members (Huber, 1991: 102). The 
collective process of interpretation is a process of negotiation, made necessary 
because parties have dispersed power. Rather than the ‘raw exercise of 
power,’ to substantiate a change in party policy, strategy or norms, elites must 
convince others of their position (Sabatier, 1988: 152). Huber argues that 
learning becomes more extensive when “occurs when more of the 
organization's components obtain this knowledge and recognize it as 
potentially useful” (1991: 90). As such, in this party learning framework I 
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consider that individual interpretation is a step further along the learning 
process than acquisition, and then again that collective learning is again one 
step further.   
Information implementation occurs when a decision is made that draws on 
information from the preceding stages. This decision may have a behavioural 
outcome or may simply be about a way of thinking, arguing, or understanding. 
That is, “learning may result in new and significant insights and awareness that 
dictate no behavioural change” (Friedlander, 1983: 194). In the case studies 
that follow this theoretical framework, information implementation has myriad 
faces. Implementation of learning may alter policy or strategy choices, their 
framing or argumentation on an issue, or a party’s strategy or policy stance. 
Individuals may implement information in their personal behaviour/choices 
within the party and the party may also change its collective policy/strategy to 
implement acquired information. Notably, implementation is not the ‘ultimate’ 
end of learning. Rather, learning is a process that occurs along all three stages.  
Finally, there is a fourth step, institutionalization, but this will not play a role in 
this study. Institutionalization occurs at the network/systemic level. It would 
occur when the transnational political party routinizes certain behaviours, 
beliefs and norms/values (Marsh and Smith, 2000: 6). Given the focus of my 
question on the TNP’s member parties rather than its supra-national entity, this 
institutionalization step will not be discussed further. However, in order to show 
the complete range of processes that occur in organisational and political 
learning processes, it has been included in the party learning framework below. 
Drawing on Crossan et al.’s 1999 table on the organizational learning 
processes, I have integrated each stage of learning with the actors that take 
part in each. This can be seen in Table 1.1 (below). This transnational party 
learning framework will structure my investigation of whether member parties 
learn in the TNP network. The table considers the interaction and transition 
49 
 
from individual to collective learning, the stepwise nature of information 
processing, and the output of each stage of learning. This table is proposed as 
a preliminary framework of the political party learning process which will be 
refined through this thesis.   
Table 1.1 Party Learning in the Transnational Party Network  
Actor  Stage of Learning Output   
Individual Information Acquisition  New piece of information 
retained. 
 Interpretation Integration of information 
into own beliefs/context.  
Party  Collective Interpretation  Shared understanding of 
information and its 
meaning in party context.  
 Implementation Change of 
behaviour/belief. 
Transnational Party  Institutionalization  Routinization of member 
parties’ learning through 
TNP behaviours, policies, 
and norms/values. 
 
This processual, multi-level framework will provide structure to this thesis. It 
allows me to question whether and to what extent political parties learn in the 
transnational party network. It privileges understanding the diversity of learning 
outcomes above a succinct ‘yes or no’ understanding of whether learning 
happens.  
However, there are some remaining questions about the shape of political party 
learning in the TNP network: Which parties are more likely to learn/teach? How 
might different types of parties learn in different ways? Why do some parties 
not learn?  These questions will be unpacked through the identification of key 
contextual factors.  
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Variations in the process of learning could be based in the characteristics of 
individual actors, parties, relationships (ties) between parties, and the structure 
of the network. This builds on the foundations of learning reviewed in this 
chapter and also tap into a thread of literature about why individuals and 
organizations struggle to learn (Easterby-Smith, 1997: 1089). I identify five key 
contextual factors which would affect learning: electoral success, governing 
responsibility, party centralization, key entrepreneurs, and issue contestation.  
(2) Electoral Success  
A party’s electoral success is relevant to whether a member party learns, 
because it shapes what information is valuable and worthy of exchange. In 
organisational learning, social hierarchies lead to an emphasis on the 
knowledge of those with more power (Bunderson and Reagans, 2011: 1189). 
Studies of policy learning recognise that there are ‘exporters’ and ‘importers’ of 
learning and that this differentiation is dependent on power. A networked policy 
process might be more heterarchical, but interactions between actors ‘often 
reflect some of the same competitive struggles and disparities as do traditional 
modes of policy-making’ (Bomberg, 2007: 263). In addition to the perceived, 
social success of an actor, specific policy choices may be seen as successful. 
Policy success and the clear demonstration/perception of that success 
facilitate policy learning (Shipan and Volden, 2008: 842).  
Electoral results are a useful measure of success in the transnational political 
party network. In organisational networks, the main outcome of interest is 
performance. For political parties, performance is tested in elections. In one 
study of policy learning, which has both a political and policy component, 
political outcomes were measured by looking at electoral support (Gilardi, 
2010). Electoral support often carries other associated types of power, such as 
‘epistemic power’ (the ability to develop technical or strategic knowledge) 
(Sikkink, 2009: 240). As such, when a political party is electorally successful, 
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its partners may perceive that party to have useful knowledge. As such, 
electorally successful parties are likely to be perceived as useful transmitters 
of information. Organisations experiencing failure are more likely to actively 
earn than those experiencing success (Levy, 1994: 305). 
However, electorally successful parties may also have less incentive to receive 
information from other parties in the TNP network. Electorally successful 
parties are likely to have less dependence on outside resources, such as those 
offered by the TNP. Electoral success conveys resource independence and 
informational resources in networks (Brass and Burkhardt, 1993: 446). 
Furthermore, electorally successful parties are also less likely to have other 
parties to look up to. On the other hand, less electorally successful parties are 
incentivized to seek information because observed failure of existing policies is 
also likely to spur a process of experimentation and information seeking (Hall, 
1993: 291). As such, I expect those parties with less electoral support to learn 
from those with more electoral success. I also expect parties with high electoral 
success to be less likely to learn.  
(3) Governing responsibility 
Governing responsibility may intervene in the relationship between the party 
and the transnational political party. Becoming a party of government offers 
political elites alternate routes to European level information and increases 
domestic resources. Furthermore, being in Government increases political 
constraints which may make it more difficult to alter policies. 
As noted in the introduction, for EFA members, relationships within the EFA 
are often one of the best ways to access the EU institutions due to their inability 
to access state-wide resources. When a party achieves a governing position, 
they may be able to access some European institutions without EFA. For 
example, regional offices in Brussels offer regions (and the political parties who 
control them) a chance to seek information from the Commission and other 
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Brussels-based actors, to lobby and to compete for resources. Through 
Brussels offices, regional policy makers can contact other regional offices 
directly (Hooghe and Marks, 1996: 86). Regional representations are 
“formidable information gatherers” and in this role, they feed sub-state 
governments that are ‘hungry for’ information (Marks et al., 1996:  182-183). 
Governing responsibility also gives parties more domestic informational 
resources. Political parties have become increasingly close to the state. 
Gaining governing responsibility enhances this closeness to the state by 
providing parties with more staff, funding, and methods to communicate with 
the public (Katz and Mair, 1994: 11). Being in government enhances access to 
state resources. Parties in government can give direction to civil servants, and 
hire advisory staff, as well as spreading information through the official modes 
of communication of their regional government/assembly. Party elites see 
public office roles as highly valuable places and seek to progress their political 
careers by accessing these resources and roles (Müller, 2000). With access to 
public office and the resultant staff and informational resources, political party 
elites may have less need for the TNP network as a way of finding or 
disseminating information.   
Power in the regional government may also increase parties’ domestic political 
constraints. Engagement in the TNP may initially be politically legitimizing 
(DeWinter and Cachafeiro, 2002: 494). However, after gaining governing 
responsibility, TNP membership may be a liability. TNPs bring together a wide 
range of actors and governing parties may be negatively affected by some 
members. The European Free Alliance is mostly composed of centre or centre-
left parties. However, it has included parties with more right-wing ideologies 
(for example, the Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie, the Lega Nord, or Süd-Tiroler 
Freiheit). To avoid reputational consequences, TNP members with governing 
responsibilities may distance themselves.  
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Governing responsibility will be indicated by the position of the member party 
in the regional government, although the level of devolution to the region is 
varied across cases. Parties may be the single governing party or a coalition 
partner in a regional government. Some EFA parties also have no governing 
responsibility and sit in opposition or have no elected members regionally. I 
expect that, given increased party resources and domestic constraints, parties 
with significant governing responsibility will be less likely to learn in the TNP 
network. Parties with little or no governing responsibility will be more likely to 
learn from other TNP member parties.  
(4) Party Centralization  
Information interpretation and negotiation within the political party conditions 
the process of moving learning from the individual to the collective. As such, I 
consider the internal structure of the political party as a contextual factor. It is 
notable that there is no ‘optimal’ structure for learning (Crona and Bodin, 2006). 
Rather than a direct relationship from network centralization to learning, 
centralization and decentralization lead to different types of learning outcome. 
The differences depend particularly on the way that information is distributed. I 
argue that there are three general types of political party structure: 
decentralization, structured decentralization, and centralization. 
In the case of information flows, information is more easily disseminated in a 
centralized network (Schilling and Phelps, 2007: 1118). Ease of information 
exchange within a political party should ease development of collective 
interpretations and decision making. Organisational centralization occurs when 
“decision-making power is concentrated at the top levels of the organisation” 
(Caruana et al., 1998: 18). Concentrated decision making thus often reflects 
hierarchy in a party. Centralization increases the organisation’s integration and 
its ability to perform tasks, but it may decrease the legitimacy if decisions are 
seen as too top-down (Sandström and Carlsson, 2008: 510, 517). When 
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moving learning from individual to collective interpretations, a party must reach 
an agreed collective interpretation. Information exchange and centralized 
control is likely to ease such processes of negotiation. As such, I expect that 
centralized parties will be more likely to develop collective interpretations and 
thus progress through the process of party learning. 
However, organisational decentralization encourages individual autonomy and 
task specialization (Carroll and Burton, 2000: 323-324). Task specialization 
encourages information seeking and allows for the cross-fertilization of ideas 
which can contribute to innovation (Pierce and Delbecq, 1976: 27-28). The 
differentiation of tasks also provides opportunities for less elite actors to be 
involved and contribute new ideas to a party (Shane, 1992: 32). Decentralized 
networks incorporate party members who are less well-connected but who, 
through their marginality, may generate policy change (Freeman, 2006: 373). 
A decentralized network provides for more individual autonomy, specialization, 
and novelty/marginality. By allowing more individual distinctiveness, I expect 
that decentralized parties are more likely to have individuals who acquire new 
information.    
Centralization and decentralization are not absolute categories. If a party’s 
decentralized nature is differentiated by design, it is more likely to transmit 
information across its sectors (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011: 1128). Parties 
may design their structures to be decentralized to specialize sub-groups based 
around territories or policy areas. When tasks become more complex, 
disaggregation and decentralization allow organisations to efficiently seek and 
process information. ‘Smaller, self-contained units’ deal with complexity, but to 
lead to policy outcomes these units must be integrated (Carroll and Burton, 
2000: 332). This disaggregation of decision making to specialized sub-groups 
and the centralization of macro-level decisions has been described by 
innovation researchers as the balance between ‘local density’ and ‘global 
efficiency’ or the trade-off between ‘specialization’ and ‘integration’ (Schilling 
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and Phelps, 2007: 1124; Waterman et al., 1980: 19). Structured 
decentralization may allow for the balance between the discovery and 
acquisition of new information and the integration of those ideas by central elite. 
Parties’ centralization will be analysed both through a section of each interview 
which asks respondents to describe the party’s decision-making processes and 
by triangulation of this information with parties’ official structures. Formal 
decision-making procedures may be preceded or overruled by informal 
decision-making forums; as such, it is important to consider individuals’ 
experiences of party decision making. In centralized parties, decisions are 
likely to occur in small executive boards or be driven by a small group of elite 
actors. Structured decentralized parties will disaggregate decision-making 
processes into smaller sub-groups, perhaps by policy area. In decentralized 
parties, individual party members will have a large amount of input into policy 
making.  
(5) Key Entrepreneurs 
Previous factors focused on the role of the member parties’ structure or 
characteristics. However, as previously emphasized, individuals play an 
important role in learning. The cognition and skill of an individual is needed to 
begin the learning process by acquiring information. Each actor may have a 
different ‘cognitive style’ which alters their acquisition, interpretation and 
organisation of information (Hayes and Allinson, 1998: 851). I identify the 
presence of key ‘policy entrepreneurs’ as a possibly influential factor the 
learning process.  
Policy entrepreneurs are people who seek to initiate policy change through 
activities such as “identifying problems, shaping the terms of policy debates, 
networking in policy circles, and building coalitions” (Mintrom and Vergari, 
1996: 423). These individuals are usually envisioned as part of a public policy 
network. However, promoting policy change, building networks, and defining 
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problems are also roles taken by members and elites of political parties. 
Hanley, in his 2008 study of transnational political parties, identified 
‘entrepreneurs’ as the ‘pace-setters’ of the TNP. It is important to note that the 
key entrepreneur for party learning in a TNP would play an active, progressive 
role both in their own region and in the TNP network, thus bridging both venues.  
The presence of key entrepreneurs in a political party would contribute to 
learning by seeking out new policy ideas, which they may draw from 
transnational sources. Policy entrepreneurs are involved in idea generation, 
most of which is developed from a ‘scanning of the environment’ (Roberts and 
King, 1991: 159). Although based in the member party (at the state level), the 
entrepreneur would use transnational networks to seek out policy innovations, 
to gain credibility, and to develop arguments used to convince policy makers 
(Mintrom, 1997: 739). Entrepreneurs may also play a facilitating role in later 
steps of learning. The individual entrepreneur’s ability to understand the 
breadth and political climate of the network may improve information 
interpretation in cases where information is diffuse or uncodified (Henneberg 
et al., 2010: 355-357). Their leadership in the domestic political party may also 
allow them to negotiate and encourage a collective interpretation.  
The presence of a key entrepreneur will be indicated by self-reported level of 
engagement, other respondents’ reports about an individual’s role, and 
ethnographic observations of individuals in multilateral environments. I expect 
that parties with a key entrepreneur in the TNP network would be more likely 
to learn while parties without active entrepreneurs are less likely to learn.   
(6) Issue Contestation  
Finally, I consider the contextual factor of issue contestation which taps into the 
ideological dimension of learning. Issue contestation affects the object, the 
‘what’ dimension of learning. Issue contestation is the extent to which an issue 
is debated, undecided, and contentious in a political party. In policy areas with 
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a high level of uncertainty, whether as a result of conflict, new developments, 
or absence of evidence, policy makers may “look to experiments elsewhere” 
(Stone, 1999: 54). The search for policies from elsewhere may thus be spurred 
on by dissatisfaction with existing policies, the emergence of new issues, or 
intra-party disagreement over policy position.  
The opposite may also be true. Lack of issue contestation is likely to lead to 
lack of learning. Where a belief is deeply embedded in a political party, what 
Sabatier calls a ‘core belief,’ it is likely to be protected by members of the party. 
Core beliefs often trigger “ego-defense, peer-group and organizational forces 
[that] create considerable resistance to change even in the face of 
countervailing empirical evidence or internal inconsistencies” (Sabatier, 1988: 
147). Hall (1993) differentiates between the ‘means’ and ‘ends’ of a policy. He 
argues that the underlying policy goal is less likely to change whereas 
instruments or strategies to achieve that policy are more likely to display 
elements of learning (Bennett and Howlett, 1992: 285). The more core or deep 
the belief, the less likely that belief will be altered by learning. 
The issue of uncertainty is what Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) call problem 
tractability. They argue that tractability also affects the extent and character of 
learning that occurs. Problems with low uncertainty may occur through more 
“technical or technocratic approaches” while those that have a high level of 
uncertainty may affect “‘contested boundaries’ that become ultimately political” 
(Dunlop and Radaelli: 2013, 602). Levels of uncertainty around a policy will be 
measured through a section of the interview which asks respondents about 
their party’s priorities and policy development. Core and contested policy areas 
for each party will also be further identified through analysis of parties’ 
manifestos and secondary sources such as newspaper articles. 
These contextual factors are not mutually exclusive. For example, a more 
successful party is more likely to have governing responsibility. A party with 
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centralized structures is more likely to have low issue contestation across all 
policy areas. However, it is still useful to consider these dimensions separately. 
Disaggregating the dimensions allows us to see how different aspects of 
member party engagement in the TNP could affect learning: the characteristics 
of the party, its elites, its policy platforms, and patterns of success within the 
TNP. I hope to clarify which variables are more influential on learning outcomes 
by studying several different European Free Alliance member parties.  
In each empirical chapter, I consider how the party performs on these 
contextual factors before considering whether or not they learn. This will allow 
me to highlight the differences and similarities between parties that do (or do 
not) learn. Theoretically, I return to these contextual factors and the three-stage 
framework of party learning in Chapter Eight. After applying the framework to 
four different parties, I will conclude this thesis by reflecting on theoretical 













Chapter Two: Research Design 
In the previous chapter, I developed a political party learning framework that 
brought together existing literature on transnational political parties, networks, 
and learning. I posited that political parties can learn from one another through 
three steps of information processing. In a transnational party network, like the 
European Free Alliance, information moves from one party to another and then 
from individual to collective knowledge within that receiving political party. I also 
incorporated five contextual factors and proposed that these factors would 
condition how different parties experience the learning process. The rest of this 
thesis will seek to test the party learning framework by applying it to four 
different cases. In this chapter, I set out the process through which the 
framework is tested including the choice of comparison, case selection, and 
data collection and analysis.  
I employ a qualitative comparative research design. The comparison between 
different member parties of the European Free Alliance allows me to test 
whether and to what extent EFA’s member political parties learn from each 
other. By comparing different parties’ experiences, I can delve into how 
contextual factors specific to each party affect their patterns of learning. I study 
parties through semi-structured elite interviews, ethnographic observation, and 
relevant primary and secondary source documents.  
The first section of this chapter justifies the use of a small sample comparison 
and explains the choice of these specific political parties as cases from the 
European Free Alliance. Four member parties of EFA from different regions in 
Europe are used as the main cases: the Frisian National Party (FNP), the Union 
Démocratique Bretonne (UDB), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), 
and the Scottish National Party (SNP). A fifth regionalist and nationalist party, 
the Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT) in Catalonia acts as a within-
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region comparative case. I compare PDeCAT with ERC and focus on the role 
of the TNP, because PDeCAT is not a member of EFA. 
The second section of this chapter reviews my methods of data collection and 
analysis. I discuss the process of conducting elite interviews, which are my 
main source of data. This discussion includes a justification of the choice of 
interview data, consideration of the difficulties of this method, and a detailed 
explanation of the choices made in doing interviews. I also conducted four 
ethnographic observations and collected primary and secondary source 
documents as a method of triangulation. Finally, I discuss how I analyzed the 
resultant data using non-coding qualitative content analysis and social network 
analysis.   
2.1 Qualitative Comparative Research and Case Selection  
Using a comparative approach to the party learning framework ensures that I 
can capture the full range of experiences of learning and non-learning. Rather 
than focusing solely on the binary question of learning (do they learn?), 
comparison between the cases also allows me to explore the conditions under 
which parties are more or less likely to learn. Conditions that are likely to affect 
information exchange in parties have been theorized as contextual factors in 
Chapter One. In this section, I contextualize my research within the realm of 
comparative political research and then justify my choice of four EFA member 
parties. 
(1) Qualitative Comparison  
This thesis follows the comparative tradition of using contextualized, qualitative 
comparison of empirical cases to generate, test, and revise theory. Theory 
building from qualitative case study research may initially yield findings that 
seem overly complicated due to the amount of detail and data generated. 
However, theory generation from cases also allows for more creative insight, 
measurable concepts, and empirically valid theory (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546-
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547). Privileging creativity and theory generation over parsimony is appropriate 
in this thesis given the explorative nature of my topic. In this thesis’s conclusion, 
I suggest avenues for future research and possible conceptual adjustments to 
further streamline the theoretical framework.   
In this thesis, I perform both a within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons. Within-case analysis requires careful description of each case 
which “allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators 
push to generalize patterns across cases” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). This within 
case storytelling, in this thesis, particularly allows me to argue whether or not 
and to what extent each political party displays learning from their EFA 
partners. Tracing the learning process within the four different cases leads to 
clearer abstraction. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) argue that, “multiple 
cases create more robust theory because the propositions are more deeply 
grounded in varied empirical evidence” (27). Multiple cases allow for 
‘theoretical elaboration’ which is particularly useful in these early explorative 
stages of developing the learning framework.  
I pair within-case explorations of the transnational party networking and 
learning process within cross-case analysis. Cross-case analysis allows me to 
reflect on how party-specific factors alter party learning process. Each case is 
analysed in individual structured empirical chapters. These follow a parallel 
format. Each empirical chapter introduces the party, examines how they 
perform on the five contextual factors, shows their relationships in EFA, and 
asks whether parties display the three stages of the party learning framework. 
In my concluding chapter, I compare the experiences of party learning in the 
four case studies to reflect on each proposed contextual factor.  
(2) Case Selection 
Comparison requires identifying one or multiple cases. A case is “an intensive 
study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) 
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units” (Gerring, 2004: 342). The question of this thesis is: do interactions 
between regionalist and nationalist parties in the European Free Alliance 
generate member party learning? The unit of analysis is thus the domestic 
political party. The universe of cases is clearly defined by membership of the 
European Free Alliance. There are 36 full member parties of EFA that could 
serve as cases. However, I ultimately choose a small sample size (four cases) 
to analyse in this thesis.  
Small sample, qualitative case studies are useful, because of “their detailed 
knowledge of processes…considered as particularly useful for the discovery of 
social mechanisms” (Della Porta, 2008: 211). Qualitative studies thus allow me 
to trace the social process of party learning. Furthermore, small N case studies 
are more able to bridge levels of analysis, from individual to international. The 
level of detail provided by studying relatively few cases is essential in studying 
political parties in the European context (Coppedge, 1999: 474) 
There is debate over how many cases are useful for theory generation 
(Eisenhardt, 1991; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). In qualitative, comparative 
research, it is important to balance the quality of data with the ability to control 
for variations between cases. In this research, the quality of the ‘stories’ told is 
privileged. This thicker qualitative comparison allows for creativity in the initial 
stages of developing the party learning concept. However, as Lijphart argued, 
“any enlargement of the sample, however small, improves the chances of 
instituting at least some control” (1971: 686). Given the number of contextual 
factors identified in Chapter One, I seek to identify as large as possible a 
number of cases to study variation across these factors within the scope of this 
thesis. I identified that it would be possible to sufficiently study four cases within 
the word count and time span (3 years) of this PhD.  
I chose four cases from four regions and member states of the European 
Union. These are the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland, the UK; 
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Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) in Catalonia, Spain; the Fryske 
Nasjonale Partij or Frisian National Party (FNP) in Friesland, the Netherlands; 
and the Union Démocratique Bretonne or Breton Democratic Union (UDB) in 
Brittany, France.  
In order to reduce complexity and interconnectedness, I chose four parties that 
act in different states and regions. Too many interconnections between cases 
may lead to confusion and overstatement of conclusions (Snyder, 2001: 95). 
The focus of this thesis is on interactions between parties acting in different 
states, at the transnational level, rather than within states.  
I also chose parties that had sufficient similarities and differences. The 
similarities allow me to consider commonalities in the process of learning. 
These four parties are similar in some important ways: they are all established 
sub-state nationalist and regionalist parties and members of EFA. These 
parties have been consistently active domestically and longstanding members 
of the European Union and of EFA. The parties were founded in 1934 (SNP), 
1931 (ERC), 1964 (UDB), and 1962 (FNP). They have established structures 
and clear positions in their domestic party system. The parties joined EFA in 
1981 (FNP), 1987 (UDB) and 1989 (SNP, ERC). Their time as part of the EFA 
network is analogous. All parties have taken part in EFA throughout its period 
of professionalization and deeper integration. As such, when studying whether 
and how parties learn, their length of membership or establishment shouldn’t 
be an intervening factor in the findings. 
Another factor which is relatively consistent across the four cases is their socio-
economic policies. All parties are all centre-left to left wing parties along the 
left/right ideological scale. We can compare their relative positioning using 
Massetti and Schakel’s 2015 classifications of parties’ positioning in regional 
election years. Their three-class categorization of parties’ positioning shows 
that the UDB is a clearly left party (2.00), the FNP is a left-leaning centrist party 
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(3.30), ERC is a left party (2.56), and the SNP is a left party (2.67) (Massetti 
and Schakel, 2015: 876-877).  
The parties do differ on their autonomy goals. The SNP and ERC are actively 
independence-seeking parties, whereas both the UDB and the FNP are 
seeking more power for their regions short of independence. Despite 
heterogeneity, some scholars have argued that that parties’ claims for 
autonomy and self-government underpin the ‘party family’ (Gomez-Reino, 
2017: 5; Dandoy, 2010). Massetti and Schakel have classified sub-state 
nationalist and regionalist parties dichotomously, distinguishing between 
moderate and radical claims (2016: 63). As these accounts suggest, sub-state 
nationalist and regionalist parties are joined by a commitment to 
decentralization, but these claims are heterogeneous.  
Studying these parties through the lens of the European Free Alliance provides 
an interesting answer to the problem of their heterogeneity on autonomy policy. 
EFA defines itself by its commitment to self-determination and party staff 
explicitly recognise that this term refers to a spectrum of policies rather than 
one unified policy goal. As Hepburn argued, most “stateless nationalist and 
regionalist parties have interpreted the principle of self-determination to mean 
different degrees of autonomy. This can be seen as a pragmatic response to 
the political spaces created by changing state and supranational opportunity 
structures” (Hepburn, 2009: 484). While the extent of parties’ autonomist claims 
differs, all the parties in this thesis agree on an underpinning value of territorial 
empowerment. Whether or not one agrees that these parties form a cohesive 
‘party family,’ their membership within EFA creates a de facto unity which 
requires some interaction (at the very least at annual General Assemblies).  
Parties also vary in significant ways. These variances add a valuable 
dimension to my exploration of learning. I have selected these parties in order 
to understand how different party characteristics affect learning. As reviewed 
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in Chapter One, the contextual factors I am particularly interested in are: 
electoral success, governing responsibility, party organisational centralization, 
presence of key entrepreneurs, and issue contestation. These factors are not 
dichotomous. Furthermore, they may vary within a party over time or in different 
aspects of decision-making or policy areas. The table below provides a brief 
summary of how each party performs on the contextual factors. These 
contextual factors and parties’ positioning will be explored in a more nuanced 
way in each empirical chapter. 











SNP High High High Low Low 
ERC High High Medium High Low 
UDB Low Low Medium Medium Medium 
FNP Medium Medium Low Medium High  
 
I have sought to select cases which allow me to explore the effect of these key 
contextual factors. For example, two cases (ERC and the SNP) are among the 
most electorally successful and responsible parties in EFA, whereas two are 
less successful and have limited governing responsibility (UDB and FNP). 
Table 2.1 shows the varied constellations of characteristics for each party. 
These variances across the cases will provide for fruitful exploration of the 
effect of party context on their interactions within and learning from EFA.  
I remain open minded to other dimensions of variation between the cases that 
were not been identified prior to the analysis that might affect learning. Through 
a grounded and open perspective on the cases, if other differing factors affect 
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the learning process, I will seek to identify them through a thick descriptive 
analysis of the cases.  
In addition to the four main cases, in the Catalan case, I also more briefly 
examine a fifth case, the Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català or Catalan 
European Democratic Party (PDeCAT). This allows me to consider how 
membership of EFA shapes parties’ interactions at the European level. My 
question makes an implicit assumption that member parties of EFA will interact 
with one another and that they will be more likely to interact with one another 
than with members of other transnational political parties. By studying 
PDeCAT, I examine this assumption. 
PDeCAT is a stateless nationalist party seeking the independence of Catalonia. 
However, PDeCAT (and its predecessor party) has long been a member of 
another transnational political party: the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE).3 The predecessor to PDeCAT, Democratic Convergence of 
Catalonia (CDC), was very briefly a member of the European Free Alliance 
from 1981 to 1987. However, the CDC/PDeCAT has been a member of ALDE 
since 1987. The length of PDeCAT’s relationship to ALDE is analogous to the 
time that my cases have been members of the European Free Alliance.  
I compare PDeCAT’s transnational relationships to ERC’s relationships. ERC 
and PDeCAT both act within Catalonia and have a number of similarities, 
including the independence goal. They work together in the Catalan 
Government and have run on joint electoral platforms. Given their similarities, 
by comparing their transnational relationships, I can analyse whether their 
respective TNP membership affects interactions between European political 
parties. 
                                                          
3 On October 27, 2018, ALDE voted to expel PDeCAT. Given this is after the fieldwork and research 
period of this thesis, it does not substantively change my findings. However, PDeCAT respondents’ 
discomfort with the ALDE group is addressed in Chapter Six.  
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These cases thus vary sufficiently to allow me to study multiple facets of 
political party interaction and learning in the European Free Alliance. Beyond 
these theoretical dimensions of interest, the four regions and five parties that I 
have chosen to study are also practically feasible to explore within the three-
year time span of this PhD. They are accessible from Edinburgh, which allowed 
me to visit most regions twice. Both Catalan parties and the SNP have 
significant secondary literature which complemented interview data. The 
Frisian and Breton parties, albeit less well studied, were forthcoming in 
providing documentary data. A timely and deeper analysis was eased by my 
ability to read and speak Dutch, French and English. Furthermore, this thesis 
thus provides both additional information on high profile parties and contributes 
to scholarly understanding of some smaller stateless nationalist parties.  
This section has justified the use of a qualitative, small sample size case study. 
I argue that this approach allows me to consider each party within its own 
context before analysing across cases and seeking generalizations. The four 
cases selected have sufficient similarities to be comparable but also differ 
significantly. These differences will be useful when exploring the effect of 
parties’ context on their learning and relationships in EFA. 
I provide a contextualization of the party being studied in each chapter.  Before 
enumerating their relationships in EFA and whether/how they learn, I introduce 
the party and discuss how it performs on the identified contextual factors. This 
contextualized, in-depth knowledge stems from qualitative data, including 
interviews, ethnographic observation, and documents.  
2.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
There is no perfect source of data, particularly when studying a relational and 
often private process such as learning. As emphasized in the last chapter, 
learning is both a process and outcome, both collective and individual, and has 
many different disciplinary facets. The methods used to study learning can be 
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equally diverse. Bennett and Howlett wrote: “Policy studies that wish to explore 
the extent and effect of learning have a dilemma: to analyze historical cases 
and rely on a written, and inevitably, selective record; or to study contemporary 
cases and rely more on elite interviewing, with all its attendant problems” (1992: 
290). In this thesis, I choose the latter and use elite interviews with members 
of EFA parties as my main source of data.  
This choice of method should be guided not just by theory but by the subject at 
hand. As described in chapter one, transnational political parties are elite and 
parties’ relationships are often informal. The TNP is a relatively recent 
phenomenon and many parts of the TNP have only become more powerful 
since the changes to regulations in 2004. Relatively few documents are publicly 
available to study the TNP and the secondary literature is correspondingly 
sparse. Since the object of study is not well documented, informal, and 
contemporary, I chose to use interviews with contemporary EFA and EFA 
member party elites as the main source of data. In this section, I justify the 
reliance on interview data and detail how I undertook the data collection. I also 
review the two complementary sources of data used in this thesis: participant 
observation and documents (primary and secondary). Then I describe the way 
that data was analyzed qualitatively and using a social network analysis 
approach.  
(1) Elite Interviews 
Interviews are the most appropriate way to study learning, particularly in 
political parties which do not publicly document their policy making processes. 
Even in cases where policy decision making is public (i.e. in conference 
debates), the learning process may precede or be obscured from these forums. 
Learning is often ‘hidden from the eye of the observer,’ which necessitates an 
in-depth, limited case study (Biegelbauer, 2016: 130). Furthermore, I study 
learning as a process. Processes underpinning party policy choices are much 
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less likely to be documented in public documents such as party manifestos or 
speeches. They can only be understood by speaking directly with party elites 
who can express the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of party change (Paterson and Sloam, 
2006: 41).  
I conducted 53 semi-structured interviews. Of these, 52 respondents are 
catalogued in Appendix One at the end of this thesis. One respondent asked 
to remain entirely anonymous and is thus not included in this appendix. All 
quotations throughout this thesis have been anonymized. I interviewed 9 
members of the FNP, 10 members of the UDB, 10 members of ERC, 5 
members of PDeCAT, and 15 members of the SNP. I also interviewed four EFA 
staff members and two non-party affiliated Catalan civil society members.4  
The number of respondents necessary in a qualitative study is contested and 
often linked to the concept of saturation. In this case, I sought to achieve data 
saturation, which is the point at which interviews no longer provide new 
variations on the theme being studied (Guest et al., 2006: 65). In more general 
terms, the concept of saturation asks: does conducting more interviews lead to 
more or new insights? The number of interviews conducted was guided by this 
principle, and by the time and resource constraints of the study. Although there 
are always further insights to be gleaned depending on how fine-grain the 
analysis conducted is, I found that 8 to 10 interviews per political party was 
sufficient. In the case of the SNP, I conducted more than this saturation point. 
My base in Edinburgh eased the interview process. Furthermore, the SNP is 
by far the largest party of the cases. More interviews were needed to get a 
wider and representative range of perspectives.   
With the exception of one interview, all conversations were conducted face to 
face. It is undeniably more efficient to speak to interview respondents using 
tele-conferencing methods. I travelled to Friesland, Brittany, Catalonia, 
                                                          
4 Some individuals are members of more than one party or category listed here.  
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Brussels, and across the United Kingdom to conduct interviews. This required 
significant time and resources. Additional fieldwork funding was provided by 
UACES, the academic association for Contemporary European Studies.  
Despite the cost, conducting interviews in person was important to build up 
trust. One scholar noted that similarities between the respondent and 
interviewer may facilitate phone conversations (Stephens, 2007: 207). In my 
case, the exact opposite was true. Respondents often differed from me in age, 
language, culture, and status. Furthermore, respondents differed from one 
another in these dimensions. This meant that each of my interviews required 
significant adjustments in my approach. As such, I found that face-to-face 
interviewing was necessary in this project. Primarily, a face-to-face interview 
“affords the interviewer the opportunity to continually re-mould the interaction 
to their needs and interests through visual cues and small utterances” 
(Stephens, 2007: 211). I also worked across a number of political cultures in 
the Netherlands, France, Spain and the United Kingdom. Harvey (2011: 435) 
has argued that cultural differences are more easily bridged in person. Meeting 
respondents in person also allowed them to show me their places of work or 
activism. Often the respondent and I built up a rapport as they guided me 
through this space, whether it be their legislature or ordering in a different 
language at a restaurant. Respondents also often drew on documents (articles 
or books) in their offices to illustrate points.  
Interviewing in-person made multi-lingual interviews easier to conduct. I did 
interviews in Dutch, French, and English. Interview respondents frequently 
drew parallels for me based on their understanding of my ‘insider’ position in 
their culture. In French interviews, for example, respondents assumed a basic 
understanding of the ‘central’ French state based on my time at a Parisian 
university. In Dutch interviews, respondents often drew parallels between 
Friesland and the peripheral Dutch region where I was born. Conducting 
interviews in a respondent’s primary language allows respondents to express 
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themselves as clearly and accurately as possible. To maintain this accuracy, 
interview transcription and analysis were also done in the original language. 
Interview respondents’ words were only translated when directly quoted in this 
thesis; all translations were done by me. Alternately, I had more difficulty in 
interviews with Catalan respondents, which were conducted primarily in 
English (with one in French). Unfortunately, limited resources hindered me from 
hiring interpreters in the Catalan case. Furthermore, “the presence of an 
interpreter may inhibit some interviewees from giving honest answers” (Mikecz, 
2012: 489).  
All interviews, except for two, were recorded for later transcription. This allowed 
me to rely less on my handwritten notes and to be more present and engaged 
in the interview. Transcriptions also provided scope for later analysis of detailed 
elements of the interview. For example, transcriptions were used to count 
references to other political parties for later use in social network analysis 
diagrams. Interviews lasted an average of 46 minutes per interview. The length 
of interviews ranges from 20 minutes to 1.5 hours. This variation in length was 
largely dependent on respondents’ availability. In my experience, elected 
members often block their time in one-hour slots; I felt it important to limit the 
interview process to one hour to ensure access. 
Odendahl and Shaw (2001) ask the important question on how ‘elite’ is defined 
and how elite respondents are selected in interview-based research. As they 
note, the category of elite is varied. While elites can be determined based on 
quantitative rankings, it is important to understand that the category is 
dependent on both social patterns of power and the theoretical perspective of 
the researcher. In my research, when selecting interview respondents, I paid 
attention to those who are central to the bodies I’m studying: domestic political 
parties and the European Free Alliance. I sought to achieve a sample of 
respondents who reflect the breadth of individuals in a political party and whose 
experiences are relevant and appropriate to the question.  
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To speak with a broad range of individuals in parties, I selected respondents 
from two key elements of parties: the “parliamentary party” and the “party 
organization.” As discussed in chapter one, despite the apparent 
democratization of political parties, the Parliamentary group and party 
organizational staff are still the key spaces within which policy processes and 
negotiation occur (Gauja, 2013: 19).  
From the ‘parliamentary party’ side, in each case, I interviewed elected 
members and staff members working at different levels of government: local, 
regional and state-wide legislatures. I also emphasized speaking to party 
members/elected members that were central to key internal decision-making 
bodies. These bodies (variably named the ‘bureau,’ ‘hoofdbestuur,’ ‘national 
executive’) are central parts of the party’s organisational functions. Where 
accessible, I also sought to interview parties’ central staff members who are 
involved in policy making and manifesto drafting. Finally, to recognize the 
breadth of the party organisation, I interviewed at least one youth member from 
each political party studied in this thesis. Selection of interview respondents 
was also conditioned by access; not all politicians were responsive to requests 
for interviews. Nonetheless, I believe that the breadth of interviews across the 
EFA network ensures that a variety of perspectives are accounted for.   
It is also important to consider respondents’ appropriateness to my question. 
As such, I sought out a number of interview respondents who had previously 
shown interest in EFA and European politics. For example, I interviewed 
elected members who had served on the Foreign Affairs/European 
Committees of their legislatures, party staff who had previously worked in 
international affair, or parties’ international spokespeople. At the TNP level, the 
European Free Alliance staff and organizational leadership is quite small. As 
such, it was possible to interview both the Director of EFA, its political adviser, 
and its Secretary General. However, I also spoke to respondents who did not 
interact at a European level. This was important to understand the breadth of 
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experiences in each party. The absence and presence of knowledge about the 
transnational level in different parties was instructive about the role of EFA 
domestically. My research asks how information from European partners is 
used in domestic party choices. As such, I mainly sought to speak to individuals 
from each member party who were involved in European affairs and/or internal 
party decision making forums.   
Interviews were semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are open-ended 
“interview strategies in which the wording or order of the questions on the 
schedule can be altered in real time by the researcher” (Davies, 2001: 76). This 
flexibility allowed me to build a rapport with respondents by ensuring that I was 
an active and responsive participant. Semi-structured interviews tend to be 
more conversational. Analytically, this conversational nature allows the 
researcher to “get at the contextual nuance of response and to probe beneath 
the surface of a response to the reasoning and premises that underlie it” 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 674). Allowing respondents to delve into this 
underlying reasoning is important when researching learning, because learning 
is not only about the decision but why and how a decision was reached. 
I began each interview by asking respondents to explain their own path into 
politics, their career progress, and motivations for being involved in their 
political party. This question serves two purposes. First, it allows the 
respondent to feel comfortable since “people find talking about themselves 
about as fascinating as any subject they know” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 
675). Second, it allows me to reflect on the role of individuals’ characteristics 
in the learning process (particularly important in considering the role of 
entrepreneurs in the EFA). Then, respondents were asked to describe the 
priorities of their own party and its policy and strategy decision-making 
processes. Respondents were then asked about their relationship to other 
political parties in Europe and prompted to list their closest and most distant 
political party partners. Finally, I asked about their own experiences with the 
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European Free Alliance and how these affected them. While each interview 
included these elements, the order and emphasis of each part varied 
depending on the respondent.  
There are difficulties with elite interviewing as a method. In this thesis, there 
are two main concerns with the interview method: the (dis)honesty of the 
respondent and concerns about the possibility of finding ‘objective’ truth 
through interviews. The first of these concerns is about what Morris calls the 
‘dishonest respondent.’ This concern questions the accuracy of the data 
collected and builds on the assumption that the respondent will use an 
interview to promote themselves and in doing so, alter the narrative (Morris, 
2009: 211-212).  
The problem of the dishonest or self-aggrandizing respondent has been 
addressed in this research in two ways: by interviewing varied people from 
each party and by seeking additional documentary or observational data. 
Interview data “must be reinforced by other forms of empirical data or must be 
based upon a broad sample of interviews, all conducted with those who 
enjoyed equal access to the event or activity” (Lilleker, 2003: 212). For each 
case, I conduct a broad range of interviews with elites. While not all 
respondents hold the same level or responsibility, I also sought to interview 
multiple people from each category (i.e. two staff members, two elected 
members). I interviewed multiple respondents working on the same project or 
activity (for example, the FNP’s sustainability project or the SNP’s relationship 
with Catalonia). The empirical chapters compare respondents’ perspectives 
and discuss how respondents’ positioning might affect their experience of 
transnational networking/learning. 
The second concern is about the difficulty of and questions about the ability to 
find ‘truth.’ That is, can interview respondents ever give us an ‘objective’ picture 
of the policy process? To what extent can interview data produce a truthful 
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picture? However, I argue that interviews will always produce a subjective 
account of events and subsequently argue that “elite interviewing should not 
be conducted with a view to establishing ‘the truth’, in a crude, positivist 
manner” (Richards, 1996: 200). I achieve a picture of how elites perceive party 
decisions, transnational interactions, and learning. I critically question 
respondents’ claims of learning throughout the empirical chapters by 
interrogating these learning claims by cross-referencing sources of data, 
breaking learning down into different stages, and understanding the role of 
symbolic learning and emulation. I also understand learning as only one part 
of a policy decision making process. I seek to be explicit about the limits of 
‘truth’ that can be achieved through interviews, but also believe that elites’ 
perceptions and representations of their policy choices are important in 
themselves. 
(2) Ethnographic Observation 
In addition to interviews, I conducted ethnographic observations at four 
European Free Alliance organised events: the 2017 and 2018 EFA General 
Assemblies, the observation mission to the 2017 Catalan independence 
referendum, and a conference on sustainable energy in regions (co-organised 
with the FNP). Conducting observations allowed me to collect data without 
individual respondents’ ‘distorting lenses,’ which make it difficult for them to 
accurately describe their social relationships (and other sensitive subjects such 
as power) (Becker and Geer, 1957: 30-31). Given that my question starts from 
the interaction between parties, it is important to experience and observe 
relationships in multilateral spaces.  
Ethnography has previously and prominently been used in studying policy and 
political networks. Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes wrote Understanding 
Governance (1997) and Governance Stories (2006) in order to propose a more 
decentred way of studying politics. They promoted ethnography as a method, 
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particularly in studying networks. Ethnography allows researchers “to explore 
the beliefs and actions not only of politicians, civil servants, public sector 
managers, but also street-level bureaucrats, non-governmental actors and 
citizens. Ethnographers reconstruct the meanings of social actors by 
recovering other people’s stories” (Bevir and Richards, 2009: 11).  
By conducting ethnographic observations, I access not only the visible and 
institutional actors in the EFA network but also those members that are more 
peripheral or informally engaged. I witnessed dynamics that are not explicitly 
named by interview respondents. For example, through observation, I was able 
to specifically understand the barrier implemented by linguistic and cultural 
differences that separate Eastern and Western European members. Through 
ethnography, I do not claim to provide a more objective story but rather a more 
contextualized and relational story. My interview respondents often acted as a 
guide through this space, but I was also able to build connections with 
members of EFA outside of my cases. This allowed me to get a better sense 
of EFA’s wider reach, and how the cases I study here fit into that network. 
Two of my ethnographic observations were conducted at General Assemblies 
(GAs). The GA is seen as the key place for EFA networking, both through 
policy-oriented sessions and through informal networking. One EFA staff 
member noted: “Sometimes the motions and declarations are just the alibi for 
some to talk in the corridors on other topics” (Interview 10). The General 
Assembly brings together many different types of TNP actors in formal and 
informal interactions. It is organised by the EFA secretariat, political foundation 
(the Centre Maurits Coppetiers), and EFA youth board (EFAy). Each party must 
send a voting representative. As such, the GA is an ideal place at which to 
observe globally the dynamics of interactions within the TNP.  
The Catalan referendum and the FNP sustainable energy conference 
meanwhile offered two alternate types of events. The first was more ad hoc, 
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politically charged and high visibility. Although there was an EFA-organised 
mission, there were also a lot of overlaps with events organised by the Catalan 
Government and organised in a more ad hoc manner through informal 
networks (WhatsApp groups, in particular). The second was more technical 
and the result of a longer-term collaborative and policy-oriented project. It 
incorporated both EFA members and policy-interested actors from Friesland. 
In each observation, my role as a researcher was emphasized both by myself 
and by event organisers (for example, through an announcement at the 
opening of the General Assembly). All interactions witnessed in these 
situations will be imparted with a high level of anonymity. Few quotes are used 
from these observations, although some are drawn from fieldnotes. Rather than 
individual statements, the focus of observations was on structural and relational 
characteristics of the TNP network. I took notes throughout the observations in 
both formal and informal spaces. Reflective notes were also taken at the end 
of the day.  
Ethically, I have ensured a high level of anonymity to individuals at each event. 
Policy makers and politicians are not generally vulnerable subjects, especially 
when observed in professional and public spaces like conferences. However, 
the Catalan referendum observation included more sensitive observations, 
such as moments of violence and intimidation. These incidents were not highly 
relevant to the subject of this thesis. Given the conflict that occurred, findings 
from the Catalan referendum observation are limited and more highly 
anonymized.  
(3) Primary and Secondary Source Documents  
Triangulation, as defined by Davies (2001) and Lilleker (2003), is the process 
of cross-referencing information received from interviews by comparing it with 
data available from first-hand accounts and secondary source material. These 
sources serve as data triangulation (adding ‘analytic density’) (Thurmond, 
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2001: 254). In order to study learning as a part of the policy process, documents 
are insufficient on their own. However, they may provide corroborating 
evidence of party choices or policy/strategy debates that confirm and reinforce 
data collected through interviews.  
Party documents will be used in this thesis when necessary to provide context 
or background. This includes party manifestos, policy statements, elite 
speeches, press releases, and websites. Furthermore, I will also incorporate 
documents with direct relation to TNP interactions. The European Free Alliance 
has a number of publications, blogs, and news items that will be incorporated 
into the wider analysis of the behaviour of TNP interactions. Secondary sources 
will also be drawn on to substantiate contextual claims and understand the way 
that politicians present their policies and strategies to the public. These 
secondary sources are primarily newspaper articles which allow for 
corroboration and further evidence of the claims being made by interview 
respondents.  
(4) Positionality  
It is important to reflect on my position, particularly in the process of conducting 
interviews and observations. A researchers’ position in relation to their subject 
is often phrased in terms of insider versus outsider status. The insider shares 
“the characteristic, role, or experience under study with the participants” 
whereas the outsider does not (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009: 55). The former is 
seen to provide access and build trust but may also make the researcher 
presumptuous; outsider status then is associated with allowing the researcher 
to be more clear-eyed (O’Connor, 2004: 169). Like others who have reflected 
on their positionality in elite interviewing, I found that one’s position in the field 
often fluctuated. Positionality is conditional and contingent and can vary even 
within one interaction (O’Connor, 2004: 175). As one scholar eloquently stated, 
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“the research itself had also positioned me within the process, dismantling any 
preconceived notions of insider/outsider” (Desmond, 2004: 263).  
My ability to move within the European Free Alliance network was never as a 
pure ‘participant’ nor as pure observer. My clear designation as a researcher 
gave me a certain outsider position. Furthermore, my American accent allowed 
me to avoid instant pigeon-holing within any of EFA’s member parties. It often 
emerged as a point of difference and discussion.  
As most of my research focused on the ‘mother’ party of EFA (rather than on 
EFA Youth), my age also tended to differentiate me from my subjects. 
Numerous scholars have considered the role of age and gender in their 
research (for example Mukherjee, 2017; Tarrant, 2014; Figenschou, 2010). 
Experiences are very dependent on the subject of research and cultural 
context. However, researchers often note that gender and youth facilitate 
access by providing an image of ‘agreeability’ and a non-threatening 
positionality (Figenschou, 2010: 973). I found this was the case in my 
interviews as well. Although I sought to interview women in each of my cases, 
only fifteen of fifty-three interviews were with women. This reflects the 
persistent gender imbalances in Western European politics. When combined 
with my ‘insider’ knowledge, my youth, gender, and cultural positioning meant 
that people were often eager to explain their experiences to me.  
However, my interviewing also built on some ‘insider’ characteristics. I shared 
some of their experiences, having worked at the Scottish Parliament for a 
Scottish National Party politician. I began fieldwork in June 2016 and continued 
interviews until late 2018. My familiarity with members of the EFA network grew 
over time. This affected my positionality and the openness of my respondents.  
As Rhodes explained about his work in Whitehall, “My aim was to remain the 
outsider, but for lengthy on-site visits and extensive repeat interviews, you have 
to have a conversation and relate to the people around you. You are sucked 
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into events” (Rhodes, 2005: 22). I built up stronger networks in various sub-
groups of EFA, particularly those that were senneing as fitting my personal 
position and characteristics. I developed closer personal relationships with 
young EFA members and those from the ‘Celtic’ and UK-based 
representations.  
Walking the line between insider and outsider is a necessary trade off of the 
thick, rich description that one achieves through ethnography and extensive 
elite interviewing. Awareness and regular reflection on the insider/outsider 
positionality and its social context were a part of my analytical work in addition 
to triangulation with multiple sources of interviews and documentary sources. 
(5) Qualitative Content Analysis 
Qualitative data collection yields a significant amount of text, in the form of 
interview transcriptions, documents, and notebooks full of field notes. This data 
is “in detailed and micro form (e.g. accounts of experiences, descriptions of 
interchanges, observations of interactions, etc.)” and must be made coherent 
by the researchers (Spencer and Ritchie, 2002). In order to add coherence this 
data, I analyse the information through a non-coded qualitative content analysis 
(QCA).  
Through QCA, I seek themes and patterns within each case and also conduct 
cross-case comparisons. Qualitative content analysis is a method of 
understanding the content and context of text. It “goes beyond merely counting 
words to examining language intensely for the purpose of classifying large 
amounts of text into an efficient number of categories that represent similar 
meanings” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005: 1278). Content analysis identifies 
themes or patterns within qualitative sources to break them down into more 
manageable, interpreted sets of data.  
I have chosen not to formally code the data. In part, my choice of data and the 
open-ended approach to interviewing affect this choice of a qualitative, non-
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coded analysis. The semi-structured nature of my interviews means that the 
data resists a strict coding mechanism. When conducting open-ended 
interviewing and analysing the resultant data: 
“the absence of closure limits one's capacity to impose powerful analytic or 
structuring techniques on the data. Unless responses are carefully coded 
to minimize information loss, the transformation of highly verbalized 
information into quantitatively useable data will lead to a sizeable missing 
data problem since even with a uniform stimulus people often talk about 
different things or use different frameworks” (Aberbach et al., 1975: 3). 
My interview data was semi-structured. It was also cross-cultural and multi-
lingual. Interviews were conducted in 3 different languages, in which words and 
concepts are not directly interchangeable, and four different political contexts. 
This variation in the content and context of data make it difficult and reductive 
to develop coding schemes.  
I analysed the interview transcripts, ethnographic notes, and documents 
relevant to each chapter on a case by case basis. Although I have a large 
number of cases (four regions, five parties), for each case, I had between 10 
and 15 interviews which averaged around 45 minutes in length. A more open-
ended form of analysis was feasible due to this clearly delineated number of 
documents per chapter.  
On first reading, I first considered the data holistically. This included drawing 
out any novel findings or interesting statements. This process is the ‘sense-
making’ stage of qualitative analysis. This sense-making is important, because 
“no insights or theories can spring forth from the data without the researcher 
becoming completely familiar with them” (Elo and Kyngas, 2008: 109). It 
allowed me to see the data as a whole, and to understand the data as it is 
contextualized within the experiences of each interview respondent. 
I then took a more detailed approach, reading the transcripts numerous times 
in order to identify cases of transnational information transfer. To identify 
information transfer, I sought signs of each of the three stages of learning and 
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highlighted where contextual factors came into play. This allowed me to 
develop a picture of whether and how party learning occurs. Within-case 
analysis of party learning was then complemented by a cross-case analysis. 
Cross case analysis allowed me to capture patterns across all the cases and 
also enhanced the likelihood of novel findings (Eisenhardt, 1981: 541). Cross-
case analysis particularly allows me to reflect on more general findings about 
patterns of learning and the effect of various contextual factors. These cross-
cutting findings are reviewed in the conclusion of this thesis, Chapter Eight.  
(6) Social Network Analysis 
Finally, interview data is used to generate social network analysis (SNA) data. 
I used respondents’ reflections on their party relationships to visualize ego-
centric networks. The ego-centric network or personal network “indicates how 
an individual is tied to an outside social world” (Wu et al., 2016: 260). Ego-
centric networks are biased towards close ties (Marsden, 1990: 439). This may 
be especially true in the way that I collected data, since individuals were asked 
in interviews to name those political parties in Europe to which they felt closest. 
This is an ‘unaided recall’ method, rather than one which provides a specific 
list for respondents to reflect on. The choice to ask for an unaided recall of 
parties reflects the purpose of the question in measuring truly close and salient 
relationships (Marsden, 1990: 441-2). SNA visualizations of individuals’ 
relationships should be understood as limited. They can only show 
respondents’ self-reported understanding of and attitude towards other political 
parties.  
In each chapter, I provide a visualization of which political parties’ interview 
respondents positively mentioned. In EFA, other regionalist parties are often 
colloquially referred to by their region (i.e. ‘the Basques’ instead of Eusko 
Alkartasuna). In some cases, respondents mentioned relationships with 
regions rather than parties. This was ‘read’ as mentions of the corresponding 
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member party of EFA. Positive mentions were understood as any reference to 
another party which suggested a positive interaction with or feeling towards the 
party. The coding of interview transcripts thus excluded mentions of parties 
which the respondent saw as different or distant.  
These visualizations are ultimately descriptive and limited. They only provide 
information about the relationships of my interview respondents and cannot 
capture the full network of any party. However, by providing these graphic 
descriptions of respondents’ relationships, I hope to provide the reader with a 
foundational understanding of the EFA network before analysing the data 
qualitatively. 
2.3 Conclusion  
I have chosen to conduct a small-n qualitative comparison of four similar parties 
within the European Free Alliance. This contextualized, qualitative approach 
allows for an exploration first (within-case) whether learning occurs between 
EFA member parties. Then, through cross-case analysis and identification of 
differing contextual factors, I explore which factors and contexts might make 
party learning within the TNP more likely. To capture learning, I use interview 
and observational data, triangulated with documentary analysis. Interviews and 
observations are also multi-lingual, ensuring the closest relationship to the 
contexts within which political parties make decisions.  
Comparison could have been structured differently, for example comparing two 
TNPs to one another. However, this would have led to different theoretical 
outcomes, for example, by exploring party learning from a more transnational 
level, rather than digging into the process of learning at a domestic party level. 
For the purposes set out in this thesis, the qualitative, small-n comparison set 
out in this chapter allow for an initial exploration of the concept of party learning 
in a TNP. In Chapter 9, I reflect further on methodological difficulties and 





















Chapter Three: The Role of the European Free Alliance 
in Member Party Learning 
Having reviewed how transnational political parties are theoretically 
understood, this chapter introduces the European Free Alliance, its 
organisational structure, and the role and nature of member parties in EFA. 
The first section describes EFA’s component parts (the EP group, the 
secretariat, EFAy), how they work together, and how they have developed. The 
second section introduces EFA’s member parties, considering how they vary 
on the contextual factors introduced previously. It also discusses different types 
of member party interaction under the umbrella of EFA. Finally, the third section 
touches on the individual members of each EFA member party and discusses 
the role of individual agents in EFA.  
This chapter draws on four participant observations. I observed EFA at two 
consecutive General Assemblies (2017, 2018) and two different more specific 
events: one policy oriented (Environmental Sustainability Conference) and one 
political (Catalan referendum). Individuals quoted or referenced from these 
observations will be anonymized. This chapter also draws on interviews with 
senior EFA staff members, in the party’s organizational headquarters and in 
the EP group.  
Through these sources, I examine the role of the European Free Alliance in 
member party interactions and seek to illustrate the dense network of 
structures and interactions that comprise the European Free Alliance. I review 
the three different levels of EFA’s structure (TNP, member party, individual). 
First, I provide an overview of EFA’s formal structure and the individuals that 
take institutional roles in organising EFA. Then, I consider EFA’s member 
parties, their diversity, and the formal/informal personal interactions they have 
with one another. Finally, I briefly discuss the characteristics of the individuals 
that are most engaged in EFA. By showing the varied levels and types of 
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interactions in EFA, I provide a base from which we can, in the following 
chapters, consider whether party-to-party interactions generate learning.  
3.1 What is the European Free Alliance?  
The European Free Alliance is a transnational political party comprised of 36 
full member parties and 8 observer parties5 from across Europe. As the map in 
Figure 3.2 shows, parties are distributed across Europe. Appendix Two of this 
thesis includes a list of EFA member and observer parties, alongside a list of 
abbreviations for each. EFA member parties vary in size, level of autonomy, 
party development, and left-right ideology. However, parties unite to promote 
self-determination, which can take the form of “linguistic or cultural rights, 
devolution, expanding regional or federal powers, demanding autonomy, 
achieving independence through a referendum” (EFA Manifesto 2019). The 
number of EFA member parties has expanded significantly over time, as shown 
in Table 3.1, although membership has stabilized in recent years.  
Table 3.1 Growth in EFA Member Parties Over Time 






Source: Kernalegenn (2013: 4)  
At a transnational level, EFA’s organisational structure can also disaggregated 
into multiple different bodies, including:  
 EP Group: including MEPs and staff 
 Secretariat: central organizing staff 
                                                          
5 According to the EFA Articles of Association (Article 5), a party must be an observer member for at 
least a year before being accepted by the General Assembly as a full member. Observer members 
must meet the criteria of a full member party.  
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 Bureau: programmatic steering group   
 Associations: most prominently EFA Youth (EFAy) 
 Political foundation: Centre Maurits Coppetiers (CMC).  
To show the overall relationships between these different bodies, EFA has an 
organigram of its internal relationships (Figure 3.1). This notably leaves 
member parties out. If one were to insert the member party into this 
organisational diagram, they would have influence through their votes in 
General Assemblies as well as through their discussions with the bureau and 
secretariat. The omission of member parties shows how many dynamics in the 
transnational political party are more informal than official, requiring a more 
qualitative and grounded approach. The structure also leaves the EP Group 
out of the decision-making process. This reflects the division between the 
transnational political party and EP group after the 2004 revisions to TNP 
regulations.   
Figure 3.1 EFA Structure as defined by the party  





Figure 3.2 Map of European Free Alliance Member Regions  
Source: EFA Website http://www.e-f-a.org/whos-who/member-parties/ 
When considering ‘what’ the European Free Alliance is, it is important to look 
beyond its organisational structures and to consider how it has been 
understood as an object in existing scholarly research. However, as reviewed 
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in Chapter Two, very little has been written on the nature of the transnational 
political party as a whole. Even fewer studies have focused on the relatively 
small and marginal European Free Alliance. Literature on TNPs has 
predominantly taken the Party of European Socialists (PES) as a case. Key 
research on EFA occurred in the early 2000s, as part of wider research on the 
‘Europe of the Regions’ and nationalist and regionalist positions on European 
integration.  
EFA was seen as one of a wider array of ‘territorial lobbies’ that conceptualized 
the ‘Europe of the Regions’ idea and promoted the Committee of the Regions 
in 1992 (Lynch and DeWinter, 2008: 583; Keating et al., 2006: 450). Parties’ 
lobbying at the EU level led to studies of a ‘regionalist turn’ towards the EU. 
This interest in stateless nationalist and regionalist parties’ positions on the 
European Union was no doubt aided by the high profile turn in the Scottish 
National Party towards an ‘Independence in Europe’ platform in the early 
1990s. Jolly (2007) argued that the ‘Europhile fringe’ created by stateless 
nationalist and regionalist parties was aided by a ‘viability logic.’ That is: the EU 
makes independence more viable by encouraging greater economic 
integration and giving small states an equal footing at negotiations. Along this 
viability logic, the EU could be seen as an ‘external support system to 
statehood’ (Keating, 2009: 208).  
However, as soon as the concept of a ‘Europhile’ turn was introduced, scholars 
sought to point out the diversity and complexity of nationalist and regionalist 
parties’ responses to the EU (Hepburn, 2008; Elias 2008). Massetti (2009) 
argued that the Europhilia was in the past. Later, he argued, nationalist and 
regionalist parties took a turn towards more ambiguous and Eurosceptic 
policies occurred during (and as a result of) the ‘constitutional and neo-liberal’ 
phase of the EU in the early 2000s. He also noted that prior studies may have 
overstated the pro-European stances of stateless nationalists and regionalists.  
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Beyond the focus on how nationalist and regionalist parties adjusted their 
ideologies, there were a small number of studies looking at the organisational 
effect of Europe on nationalist and regionalist parties. DeWinter and Gomez-
Reino Cachafeiro sought to understand how Europeanization, through 
institutions like the European Free Alliance, affected the nationalist and 
regionalist party family. They noted that EFA was “characterized by main 
ideological differences and problems of collective action and cooperation. 
Weak institutionalization is a defining feature of this party family” (DeWinter and 
Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, 2002: 485). They find that this weak 
institutionalization reduces the effect of EFA’s ideological influence. However, 
they did find signs of organizational change, at least at an elite level, driven by 
European elections and the new role of MEPs. 
Lynch and DeWinter (2008) also argued that the European Union provides 
political opportunity structures for EFA’s member parties. For example, EFA 
can help parties mobilize in the European Parliament (regardless of whether 
they have an MEP but especially in the case of an MEP), aligns parties to one 
another in the Committee of the Regions, and provides support for local 
development of parties. However, the article centres on the 2004 European 
Parliament elections, in which EFA lost half of its MEPs. This period led to a 
loss of organisational strength for EFA not only due to its poor electoral results. 
EFA and the regionalist Europeanist project also suffered due to the perceived 
irrelevance of the Committee of the Regions, EFA’s failure to draw new 
members from the Eastern European enlargement countries, and the neglect 
of minority nationalist voices in the European constitutional process.  
As such, by the mid-2000s, both the ideological convergence between 
regionalism and pro-Europeanism and the political opportunities of the EU 
seemed to have waned. Scholarly attention to the European Free Alliance and 
stateless nationalists waned in parallel.  
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Beyond this ‘Europe of the Regions’ moment, the European Free Alliance has 
also been included within wider studies of transnational political parties in the 
EU. However, in this literature, discussions of EFA are usually incorporated 
into analyses of the Greens-EFA group in the European Parliament. In these 
cases, the Green Party element of the group is emphasized, given its larger 
size. In the next section, I review the role and nature of the EP group and argue 
that it is over-emphasized in existing literature on transnational political parties. 
These earlier studies on the European Free Alliance and its member parties 
provide valuable information on the formation and purpose of EFA, particularly 
providing background for the role of the TNP in the 1990s and early 2000s. My 
research departs from this existing literature. First, my research focuses 
exclusively on the contemporary shape and politics of the European Free 
Alliance. Its depth comes from the span of regions/parties studied rather than 
from the span of history it covers. This revisiting of EFA is timely as the party 
has become more institutionalized and established since the TNP regulations 
changed in the mid-2000s.  
Second, my research does not see the EFA structures as incidental or marginal 
to a wider research project (i.e. EFA as one part of a study of ideological 
change in nationalist and regionalist parties). Rather, I focus predominantly on 
EFA and the transnational interactions between EFA member parties. In order 
to provide a foundation for this thesis, the rest of this section will break down 
the different parts of the European Free Alliance to provide a basis for the 
subsequent analysis. 
(1) The EFA EP Group 
The 1979 European Parliament elections drove the creation of the European 
Free Alliance (EFA). The European Parliament incentivizes transnational party 
coalitions, due to the system of committee and funding allocation. EFA was 
originally called the Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe – European 
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Free Alliance (DPPE-EFA). DPPE-EFA’s first General Assembly was held in 
1981. In its early years, the DPPE-EFA was centered predominantly at the 
European Parliament. Organizationally, in these years, EFA was comprised 
largely of the group and its staff. However, from 1995 onwards, DPPE-EFA 
developed itself as a European political party and grew slowly in members. 
After the 2004 reforms in TNP regulations, a more structured division 
developed between the EP Group and EFA as a political party (Kernalegenn, 
2013: 4-5).  
The European Free Alliance MEPs, too small to create their own autonomous 
EP Group, have joined other groups. Table 3.2, updated from Lynch and 
DeWinter (2008: 587), shows the progression of EFA’s EP Group membership. 
EFA has been allied with the Green Group since 1999.  
Table 3.2 The European Free Alliance and EP Groups Over Time 
European Parliament 
Session 
EP Group EFA MEPs (Overall 
Group MEPs)  
1979-1984 Technical co-ordination 
group 
2 (12) 
1984-1989 Rainbow Group 1 3 (20) 
1989-1994 Rainbow Group 2 8 (15) 
1994-1999 European Radical 
Alliance 
4 (19) 
1999-2004 Greens/EFA 10 (45)  
2004-2009 Greens/EFA 5 (42) 
2009-2014 Greens/EFA 7 (50) 
2014-2019 Greens/EFA 7 (52) 
Source: European Parliament website; Lynch and DeWinter (2008: 587) 
Currently, only five of EFA’s member parties are represented in the EFA EP 
group. Most EFA member parties do not have an MEP, while the SNP and ERC 
each have two. Member party the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) has MEPs 
which sit in a different EP group, the European Conservatives and Reformists 
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(ECR).6 Many EFA members do not run in European Parliamentary elections; 
others struggle to gain votes due to their marginal and regional nature.  
European Parliament elections are particularly challenging for regional parties. 
Twenty two EU states are comprised of only one European Parliament 
constituency (including the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany). For regional 
parties, gaining enough votes across the whole country to be elected to the 
European Parliament is more difficult as their support is concentrated into the 
regional subset of the population. Furthermore, there are proposals to 
implement a 5% minimum vote threshold for EP elections. EFA has opposed 
the implementation of such thresholds and urged member N-VA to block any 
such initiative in the European Council. Given existing difficulties and the threat 
of minimum vote thresholds, for regional parties, election to the European 
Parliament on a regional platform requires either very significant regional 
support or access to regionalist coalition partners within one state. When 
parties run on a coalition platform, they may share an MEP seat, as is visible 
in Table 3.3. 
The limited number of parties in the EP group causes a two-level EFA. Parties 
who have or could have elected Members of the European Parliament tend to 
discuss the EP manifesto together at General Assemblies. Those that don’t run 





                                                          
6 The N-VA is a party which follows on from the Volksunie (VU), one of EFA’s founding parties. In 
2014, the N-VA Group in the European Parliament became a member of the ECR in order to better 
reflect their political priorities in that electoral manifesto. As a result, the EFA Presidency moved from 
the N-VA’s Eric de Voort to Corsican President Francois Alfonsi (Gomez-Reino, 2017: 142).  
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Table 3.3 Members of the European Parliament in the EFA EP Group   





ERC EFA President 
and first Vice 




Jordi Solé* ERC  2017-2019 
Ernest Maragall* New Catalan 
Left  
 2014-2016 
Ian Hudghton  SNP Vice President 1999-2019 
Alyn Smith SNP  2004-2019 
Jill Evans Plaid Cymru Vice President 1999-2019 










Tatjana Ždanoka*** Latvijas Krievu 
savienība 
 2004-2018 
*Stepped down part way through term due to running on a shared electoral list. 
***Ždanoka stepped down to run in the Latvian Parliamentary election  
 
Nonetheless, the EP manifesto is voted on by all parties. Furthermore, once 
elected, MEPs work with all member parties. As one of the EP Group’s advisers 
explained: 
“For the first election of the European parliament there was [Flemish 
MEP] Maurits Coppieters. Coppieters went to Corsica and Bastia in ’79 
and said to the Corsicans, ‘I will be your MEP’. It was a shock. He was 
a Flemish guy saying to a Corsican audience, ‘I will be your MEP’. How 
could you be my MEP? You are not elected by me. And this was one of 
the founding moments of EFA. Yes, we have MEPs elected from the 
stateless nations but at the end, he or she should be the MEP of all 
stateless nationals in EU” (Interview 37). 
This representative function is expressed through MEPs’ work in the European 
Parliament and in visits to regions. In the European Parliament, MEPs are often 
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asked to speak for non-represented EFA parties. For example, at the 2018 EFA 
General Assembly (GA), the EP Group was asked to make representations to 
French President Emanuel Macron (who would shortly be visiting the EP) on 
behalf of EFA’s Corsican member parties. Smaller parties from the French 
state also encouraged the EP Group to include more widespread French 
minority rights.  
As one elected member of the Frisian National Party explained, “The moment 
that something happens with us that is related to European policy or the 
European Union, we contact our people in the EP and they will ask questions” 
(Interview 3). The EP Group sponsors events in Brussels to draw attention to 
regional issues, such as a conference on “The Catalan Path to Independence” 
and (post-Brexit) “Plaid Cymru: positive about the EU.” The EP Group also 
sends official delegations abroad. For example, in 2017 the EP Group sent 
official delegations to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Wales. They 
attended events such as the General Assembly of the Parti Québécois, Sinn 
Fein’s Annual Conference and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the 
Mediterranean. Through their roles as MEPs, the EP Group navigates the 
network of the regionalists/nationalists.  
However, the EFA EP Group must work primarily through the European 
Parliament. The EP Group has several limitations in their work for EFA. First, 
the Group only represents a small number of EFA parties. Second, MEPs 
predominantly do Parliamentary work: serving on committees, liaising with 
constituents, and pushing their own parties’ interests such as Brexit, the 
Catalan referendum, and fisheries. Third, MEPs must focus on their 
relationships with their voters and national party. Research has found that, in 
their voting behaviour, MEPs are much more driven by national party 
membership than their EP group (Hix, 2002). One member of EFA prominent 
in European relations in his region explained:  
96 
 
“[In the EFA EP Group] of course we try to reach common positions, we 
always try to vote in the same way, but there is always the possibility 
that one member wants to vote yes and the other one votes no, for 
legitimate reasons, and then of course what prevails is the individual 
position” (Interview 25).  
Finally, MEPs have significant freedom to develop policies without the 
constraints of other EFA parties. MEPs run on a manifesto agreed at the EFA 
General Assembly, but these manifestos are vague. Lynch explained that EFA 
initially developed, “a very broad common programme which was essentially a 
statement of principles rather than a political manifesto” (Lynch, 2003: 193). At 
the 2018 General Assembly, discussions about the lack of political positioning 
in the EP manifesto continued. Parties running for the EP develop their own 
domestic manifestos. These align with the EFA manifesto and may draw on it, 
but variance in each parties’ domestic approach encourages a vagueness at 
the transnational level. 
Given the vague EFA policy basis, the EP Group must work to find common 
positions on votes in the Parliament. They must also agree these positions and 
often take forward shared policy initiatives with European Green MEPs. As 
noted previously, EFA coalesces in the European Parliament with the 
European Green Party. This coalition is made necessary by the regulations on 
EP Party Groups which require 25 MEPs from 7 different countries. Forming 
an EP party group is beneficial because of the role of party groups in the EP 
as ‘agenda setters’ (Hix et al., 2006: 496). However, the European Greens 
have their own extra-Parliamentary party structures and act as a separate TNP. 
Every EFA MEP has a right to contribute and to develop the EFA/Greens 
position. An EFA EP Group policy adviser explained:  
“I stimulate a discussion in the group aiming at reaching a compromise 
in the group to ensure that a certain point, we have a group policy on 
something. So, if there is an issue which is coming up quite soon, my 
role is also to, to avoid a difficult situation at the end. We will vote in 
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plenary to secure a group position beforehand to be sure that the group 
is united on this” (Interview 37). 
MEPs contribute to EFA transnational networking and are leaders in the 
network. However, much of their work happens independently of EFA member 
parties. MEPs are constrained by both their national parties and voters and by 
the institutional requirements and work of the EP. 
There is some coordination between national Parliamentarians from each party 
and the EP group, but this coordination is ‘the weakest point.’ The European 
sphere and policy decisions are not of interest to all national Parliamentarians. 
For example, the EP Group must develop its policy on the Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework years before the legislation goes into effect. However, 
national Parliamentarians “have other priorities, because of course, in politics 
you want to fix the next problem first…It’s difficult to think in the long term” 
(Interview 37). The distance between national and European party can be 
partly understood by the idea that EP elections are ‘second order,’ meaning 
that, from the voters’ perspective there is ‘less at stake’ (Reif and Schmitt, 
1980).  
Existing literature on TNPs centres heavily on the EP Group but this is a limiting 
focus. The focus on EP Groups seems to stem from the lack of development 
and weakness of TNP’s extra-parliamentary bodies until very recently (Bardi, 
1996: 102). Given the changes to transnational political party regulations in the 
last 15 years, I argue that the TNP now communicates with and coordinates 
member parties primarily through EFA’s central organisational institutions: the 
secretariat and the bureau. This is particularly important in the European Free 
Alliance, because very few EFA member parties elect a MEP, and many do not 
run in EP elections.  
(2) The Secretariat  
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The secretariat in the TNP network has become more important since new TNP 
regulations. Since the changes in regulations, “all five Europarties now have a 
permanent salaried staff, although the number employed varies from two for 
the EFA to 20 for the EPP” (Lightfoot, 2006: 309). EFA has, since Lightfoot’s 
(2006) analysis, doubled its staff. It now has five permanent staff. It has a legal 
advisor, and two recently formed roles of the financial officer and 
communications and community manager. The party also has a rotating 
internship scheme open to young people from its member parties. EFA’s 
permanent staff is listed in table 3.4 below.  
Table 3.4 Members of the EFA Secretariat (January 2019) 
Name Position 
Günther Dauwen Director 
Eva Bidania Political Adviser 
Gio Paolo Baglioni Legal Adviser 
Laura Milena Rahman Communications and Community 
Manager 
Marivic Claveria Financial and Administrative Officer 
 
Unlike EP groups, there are no comparative or focused studies of Euro-party 
secretariats. However, since regulatory changes, “Europarties are becoming 
more autonomous vis-à-vis their member parties and vis-à-vis their respective 
groups in the European Parliament” (Johansson, 2009: 174). In contrast to 
MEPS who are stretched between the ‘two principals’ of the TNP and domestic 
party (Hix, 2002), members of the TNP secretariat generally tend to hold a 
more transnational identity and beliefs. This is what Day calls a “tendency to 
operate on the basis of instinctual supranationalism” (2005: 62). 
EFA’s secretariat members reflect this ambition. They eschew links to specific 
EFA member parties. One explained: “Since the beginning, I could work for all 
the parties of EFA. That was very clear for me. If there was one thing written 
on my forehead, it's that I hate conflict of interest. Working for one party, or 
favouring that one party, would go against my work or my professionalism in 
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general” (Interview 11). Another said: “We succeeded in that because more 
and more in General Assemblies people come to us and say, "You are EFA, 
you are the backbone of EFA” (Interview 10). Members of the secretariat are 
among the most recognizable figures for EFA members. They regularly travel 
to attend and help organise events in EFA’s member regions. 
EFA’s internal rules note: “The EFA Secretariat shall carry out the decisions of 
the Federation. It shall be responsible, in particular, for assisting the President, 
the Secretary-General and the Vice-Presidents, for preparing and organizing 
meetings and for relations with the member parties, the press and the public.” 
Secretariat staff are the organisational and administrative organ of EFA. Their 
tasks are myriad: “We have to do a little bit of everything. We have to do 
accounts, we have to do political speeches, we have to book flights, we have 
to help organise events...We do everything: bilateral contact with the parties, 
coordinate events, coordinate meetings” (Interview 11).  
The concentration of EFA’s organisational work into this small group of 
individuals, and predominantly into Dauwen and Bidania, has a profound effect 
on the nature of the EFA network. Given their contact with all member parties, 
the secretariat can be seen as a bridge across the EFA network. Information is 
consolidated in the EFA secretariat. One member explained, “We have the 
whole picture: finances, administration, political situation in the country of our 
member, events they want to organise, etc. Do they involve us? Do they not 
involve us?” (Interview 11). This allows for a shorter distance between member 
parties, in the sense that they are all linked through only a few individuals. 
However, as one member of the secretariat said, “The handicap is that we are 
human beings, we are not robots. We only have 24 hours per day like any other 
person. We have to be very efficient” (Interview 10).  
The secretariat is particularly important in the case of EFA, because EFA does 
not have high level elected officials in EU member states. Parties like the 
100 
 
European People’s Party and Party of European Socialists organise ministerial 
meetings before European Council meetings; this is not possible for EFA 
members (Johansson, 2009: 163). EFA secretariat staff must stimulate 
exchange outside of the EU’s institutions, promote contacts between member 
parties, and facilitate the network as a whole. The secretariat crucially provides 
spaces for information exchange within EFA.  
(3) The Bureau  
In contrast to the secretariat, whose members act at a truly transnational level, 
the EFA bureau is comprised of members from EFA member parties. Bureau 
members are nominated by EFA’s member parties and voted on at the General 
Assembly. There is no set term for bureau membership outlined in EFA’s rules 
of internal order. 
The EFA bureau is:  
 “The executive body of the EFA. We implement the program from the 
General Assembly. But we are also very easy to ask questions about 
memberships, finances, the program...especially the practice side of 
membership. The daily implementation of the work is done through the 
[secretariat] office” (Interview 9). They meet six to seven times a year. 
In these meetings, bureau members discuss issues in EFA, the party’s 
political trajectory, and their work with member parties. The main 
purpose of the bureau is to “support our member parties in their 
missions” (Interview 9).  
Members of the bureau travel extensively throughout the year to different 
events. For example, in 2017, members of the bureau attended 10 party 
congresses, met with individual parties in Brussels or their regions, attended 
national days, rallies, and organised conferences on issues such as minority 
media, state building, green nations, and more. These visits were spread 
across numerous regions from Galicia to Friesland to Transylvania. The bureau 
also participates in EP Group events, such as their 3-day joint meeting in 




Table 3.5 Members of the EFA Bureau (September 2018) 
Name Position Party 
François Alfonsi President Partitu di a Nazione 
Corsa 
Jordi Solé Secretary General Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya 





Jill Evans MEP Vice-President Plaid Cymru 
David Grosclaude Vice-President Partit Occitan 
Andrea Cocco Vice-President Partiu Sartu d’Azione 
Anke Spoorendonk Vice-President Südschleswigschen 
Wählerverbands 
Wouter Patho Vice-President Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie 
Olrik Bouma Vice-President Frisian National Party 
Anders Eriksson Vice-President Ålands Framtid 
Marta Bainka Vice-President Ruch Autonomii Slaska 
 
The bureau also helps member parties navigate the European Union. For 
example, when the FNP wanted to seek help from EFA on regional bus 
announcements in Frisian, they did so via their bureau member, who arranged 
for a question to be asked by MEPs. Through their personal networks, bureau 
members thus link EFA’s member parties to the central organisation in 
Brussels. They can also be seen as central agents of information exchange 
linking the EFA network.  Having a member of the bureau is seen as a way to 
have easier access to EFA’s central organizing institutions. For example, in the 
2017 debate about the membership of an Italy-based party of EFA, one 
delegate, exasperated with the direction of the debate, explained: “It was easier 
when there was an Italian member of the bureau.”  
When asked about the most active member parties of EFA, one of EFA’s staff 
explained: “Over a longer period of time, in the most consistent way then I 
would say that you have to mention the parties in the bureau, the parties who 
were the founders. Most are very active and important and still have a role in 
our structure and in our current bureau” (Interview 10). As the following 
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chapters will show, parties with a bureau member (including the FNP and ERC) 
see these members as having a high profile regionally. For example, ERC’s 
bureau member Jordi Solé was also the Minister of Europe and is now an MEP. 
Meanwhile the FNP’s bureau members have previously been a provincial 
council member and head of the FNP’s EFA Commission. Their current bureau 
member, Olrik Bouma, was previously an EFA intern, CMC intern, and EFAy 
Secretary General. Bouma was described by another member of his party as 
‘our man in Brussels.’ Given his presence in Brussels, one of the FNP’s staff 
members explained, “The lines [of communication] are much shorter” 
(Interview 6).  
Bureau membership entrenches certain individuals in the EFA network. This 
may give their party more access to information. However, bureau members 
also interact across the EFA network. They travel across Europe to represent 
EFA officially to the member parties. With the help of the secretariat and EP 
Group, the bureau also takes part in organizing events at both regional and 
European level to amplify the voices of EFA member parties. 
(4) EFA Youth  
EFA Youth, often shorted to EFAy, is a separate organisation from EFA with 
its own General Assembly, bureau, and coordinator. Substantively, EFAy and 
EFA differ in their programmes, leadership, and membership. EFAy has 28 
members, whereas EFA has 44 members and observer members. Members 
of EFA do not have to have youth organisations that are members of the youth 
party; the reverse may also be true. For example, one EFA staff member 
explained that the Republic Party in the Faroe Islands are considering, yet not 
actively seeking membership of EFA. However, “the youth branch of the 
Republic Party joined EFA youth a couple of years ago and they are pushing 
the party to join EFA” (Interview 11).  
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The two organisations do work closely together. EFA funds EFAy and the EFAy 
Secretary General works in the EFA office. In recent years, EFA and EFAy 
General Assemblies have been held in parallel to one another. EFAy also 
presents its year’s activities to EFA’s GA (Interview 37). EFAy bureau members 
act in a similar fashion to EFA bureau members, attending member parties’ 
national days, rallies, and conferences. They also attend meetings of other, 
more generalised youth organisations, such as the European Youth Forum, the 
International Youth for Peace meeting, and the European Youth Conference.  
EFAy has grown alongside EFA. An earlier coordinator of EFAy explained that 
in the past, “The members of EFA youth were not very responsive. Of course, 
those organisations are very often very small political parties” (Interview 11). A 
former president of EFAy explained, “When I became president (in 2011), the 
youth branch was almost inactive” (Interview 37). EFAy faces more difficulties 
than the ‘mother’ party. In EFAy, members tend not to be employed by their 
political party. As such, “usually you have one or two people involved in the 
international relationship in EFA youth…it depends a lot on the commitments 
of those people” (Interview 37).  
Table 3.6 Members of the EFA Youth Bureau (2018-2019) 
Name Position Party 
Max Zañartu President Joventuts d'Esquerra 
Republicana 




Karolina Rzepecka Treasurer/Vice President Młodzi Górnoślązacy 
Adrián Fuentes 
Arévalo 
Vice President for 
External Relations 
Gazte Abertzaleak 
Deian Timms Vice President for 
Institutional Affairs 
Plaid Cymru Ifanc 
Àngels Grimalt i Vives Vice-president for Gender 
and LGBT+ Rights 
Joves PV – 
Compromís 
Giovanni Masarà Vice-president for Policy 






Despite earlier difficulties, the youth parties are also ‘more dynamic’ and more 
likely to engage with one another, perhaps due to young people’s language 
skills and their ‘youthful political idealism’ (Interview 9). After all, “if you’re a 
young person active at a European level for a political party that means that 
you must be really interested in that party, because a normal or average young 
person isn’t” (Interview 9). The enthusiasm and organisational independence 
of EFAy may affect transnational party networking in a few ways.  
First, it may provide a more radical political and ideological space for 
discussion. Youth collaborations can be a testing or training space for policies, 
and they try to affect EFA ‘mother party’ policy making as well. For example, 
EFAy has organised a number of events on feminist issues and opposing the 
radical right. In the EFA mother party, “political parties are often very stiff, like 
an elephant. It goes very slow sometimes because they also depend on the 
domestic political situation…With the youth, it's not always like that. They have 
more freedom, they're not as exposed to be elected for example” (Interview 
11).  
Second, involvement in EFAy can build capacity and skills in member party’s 
young activists. Among young members of EFA, there are fewer elected or 
employed members of political parties. EFAy creates a (funded) opportunity to 
encourage members to be more involved in politics. One party leader 
explained, “The meetings between youth parties are important for us. It’s a role 
of formation in our party…It helps newcomers feel more strongly” (Interview 
20). This was one reason for holding the General Assemblies simultaneously. 
One EFA staff member explained: “It's good that the youngsters see the 
perspective of the adult party...seeing that there's something more…That is 
why we finance that one youngster per party comes and we pay their travel 
cost and accommodation” (Interview 10). 
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Finally, engagement with EFAy can sometimes lead to future engagement with 
the ‘mother party’ of EFA. A member of the EFA secretariat explained: 
“Sometimes a young generation takes over a party and if you are in good 
contact with your youth branch and they grow towards being the leadership of 
the new party, that helps” (Interview 10). One example of this would be EFA’s 
political adviser Eva Bidania. Bidania, “joined the [Eusko Alkartasuna] youth 
branch and I was in the board of the youth branch for many years. As member 
of the board, I had the opportunity to join EFA General Assemblies.” She then 
went on to hold the position of EFAy secretary general and eventually to be 
EFA secretariat staff. The youth party thus allows for a development of young 
regionalists and nationalists within the organisational culture of EFA and 
provides a sense of continuity within the network.   
(5) The Political Foundation: Centre Maurits Coppetiers 
The Centre Maurits Coppetiers (CMC) is both the youngest component of EFA 
and the most distant from political parties. The CMC was founded in 2007 after 
the TNP reforms encouraged the creation of political foundations. Each political 
foundation is linked with a specific TNP. The CMC is comprised of 12 full 
members and 5 associated members. Seven of these members are from Spain 
and three from France. These member organisations and the CMC form a think 
tank which centres on the key issues of EFA: cultural diversity, minority rights, 
decentralization, self-determination, and constitutional reforms (CMC website, 
ideasforeurope.eu).  
The CMC links researchers to EFA. Political foundations have had a formal, 
funded role in the EU and were envisioned by the European Commission as 
“‘catalysers of new ideas’ and a means of strengthening ‘informed debate on 
current and future European issues” (Dakowska, 2009: 202). As Dakowksa 
(2009) has shown, TNP political foundations create networks of national 
political foundations, EP groups, TNP secretariats/bureaus, Commission 
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officials, and other interested actors. To ensure coherence the CMC’s work 
with EFA, Günther Dauwen is both the Secretary General of the CMC and the 
Director of EFA. He explained: “this is to ensure that we work in a smooth way 
and that I know first-hand what is cooking in the foundation, what they aim to 
do, so that the party also knows that.”  
By creating a space for collating information, the CMC would seem to be a 
useful place to consider learning. However, the CMC is a recently founded 
component of EFA. While TNP’s political foundations have potential to be 
impactful, the “potential policy impact of these organisations is difficult to 
measure since their definitive form and role remains to be clarified” (Dakowska, 
2009: 217). CMC development is still in nascent forms and it would be early to 
draw conclusions. Furthermore, the CMC is not fully integrated into the EFA 
network. Members of the CMC represent very few member regions of EFA. It 
is dominated by those based in the French and Spanish states. The CMC’s 
members are foundations and not domestic political parties. The CMC’s 
political foundations are linked to domestic political parties, but the CMC does 
not have a direct link to all EFA member parties. 
I have chosen to focus on EFA member party-to-member party relationships, 
rather than those mediated through the CMC and political foundations. Diane 
Stone recognizes that think tanks can network internationally (2000, 55). 
However, she also concludes that they’re more likely to take a passive role in 
the process. Studying the role of political foundations in party learning would 
an interesting area for future studies of learning in TNPs.  
(6) EFA and Typologies of the TNP  
Having reviewed the different parts of EFA, to conclude this section, I return to 
existing typologies and categorizations of transnational political parties which 
were considered in Chapter One. A common categorization is Niedermeyer’s 
(1986) three stages: contact, cooperation, and integration. Lightfoot argues 
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that EFA has already reached the cooperation stage in which parties are 
“characterised by permanent transnational interaction and therefore requires a 
permanent organisation” (Lightfoot, 2006: 304). For Niedermeyer and 
Lightfoot, at integration stage you would expect “regular meetings, common 
symbols, staff and own resources” (Lightfoot, 2006: 304). For Dietz, “the 
integration stage is marked by the transmission of party sovereignty to a 
European party organization” (2000: 202).  
In EFA and other TNPs, the full transfer of sovereignty is lacking; EFA has no 
coercive power over its members. However, EFA’s central actors—the 
secretariat, bureau, and EP Group—do employ their own resources and, in 
cooperation with member parties, have regular meetings and communication. 
EFA’s development was explicitly addressed by EFA’s Director. He explained:  
“From 2004 to 2009, it was sort of each year trying to increase our 
representation to see that we don't fall short in representation, to ensure 
that we continue to be recognized and financed. By 2009, we had a sort 
of stability and we went into more ambitious ideas for enlarging our 
political respectability…It was no longer about every day survival but 
about consolidation and looking ahead to the future.”  
In this consolidation, EFA expanded its ability to communicate with other actors 
in the European and international sphere. The party received a lot of attention 
as a result of the 2014 Scottish referendum: “Those weeks in the run up to the 
18 September referendum in Scotland and the Catalan consultation, we had a 
huge exposure…Ever since that moment, our engine is turning in a higher gear 
and our visibility is higher” (Interview 10). Consolidation also comes in more 
subtle ways, such as the change in EFA’s ‘corporate image’ which “help[ed] on 
the visibility and on the perception of us as a more serious and structured 
political party” (Interview 11).  
EFA’s organisational bodies provide spaces for interaction and information 
exchange between EFA member parties. This may be through the relationship 
between individuals in the bureau, the connective work of the secretariat, or 
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events organised in the European Parliament. It is difficult to identify the precise 
role of EFA staff and leaders, because their work is both so varied and often 
informal. However, the transnational political party, through its organisational 
work and web of connections, creates the structural opportunities for parties to 
interact, and thus potentially learn. 
3.2 Member Parties in EFA  
Although EFA is the party of minorities and stateless nationalist and regionalist 
parties, not all parties in this ‘party family’ are members of EFA. The ‘party 
family’ of minority nationalist parties has long been disjointed, along ideological 
and strategic lines. As such, some prominent parties in the party family—the 
Lega in Italy, the Catalan PDeCAT, and Basque PNV—are not members of the 
European Free Alliance. Gómez-Reino argues that “minority nationalist parties 
maintained their initial fragmentation among political groups over the past three 
decades” (2017: 119).  
Despite these divisions, EFA’s approach to membership is characterized by its 
expansionist, open nature. This open nature includes incorporating and 
interacting with parties that are not in the Greens/EFA EP Group. For example, 
the N-VA remains a member of EFA while sitting in a different EP Group. EFA 
also has relationships with non-EFA parties when they are in government or 
coalitions with EFA member parties. For example, the EFA offices in Brussels 
have been used to host meetings for Catalan President Carles Puigdemont, 
whose party is not in EFA but is allied with EFA member party Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya (ERC).  
However, in this section, I explore the member parties and their role in the 
European Free Alliance. In the first section, I introduce the member parties of 
the European Free Alliance by showing their variation along some contextual 
factors: electoral strength, governing responsibility, and ideology. By reviewing 
these variations, I highlight the various sub-groupings which may form in the 
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broader EFA network and which may hinder/facilitation learning. In the second 
section, I review some possible modes of interaction between member parties 
in EFA which are facilitated by membership of the TNP.  
(1) Introducing the Member Parties in EFA 
To be a full member of EFA, a party must contribute financially. EFA must raise 
15% of its own resources in order to access the full grant of funding from the 
European Union. In EFA, the level of a party’s contribution is proportionate to 
the size and success of the party. It is based on the number of representatives 
that a party has at local, regional, state, and European level with each level of 
government requiring a higher level of contribution. If a party is in government, 
they must pay a supplementary contribution. The maximum annual 
subscription is ten thousand Euros (Articles of Association, Article 7). The need 
to commit resources to EFA means that parties must actively consider 
membership and may seek to more actively engage as a result.  
Furthermore, membership is not guaranteed for any party who seeks to join 
EFA. Rather, there is a set process of application. Before the 
professionalization of EFA, “there were no dossiers, no records, no minimum 
request of documents on what a party needed to introduce in order to evaluate 
whether they are eligible to become a member of EFA” (Interview 10). Now, 
parties must provide internal statutes, political programmes, publications, 
electoral results, and a list of elected members. This allows EFA to make a 
more informed decision on membership and is illustrative of the 
professionalization and institutionalization of the TNP.  
While parties are vetted before they become members, EFA is open to a wide 
range of members. Variation across the network may encourage learning by 
providing new ideas. Alternately, it may hinder learning by creating barriers in 
communication between member parties. The tension between consensus and 
diversity is often explored in organizational learning studies. Managers of 
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organisations “must actively encourage the development of different and 
conflicting views of what is thought to be true, while striving for a shared framing 
of the issues that is broad enough to encompass those differences” (Fiol, 1994: 
403). Diversity of experiences in an organisation like EFA provides fodder for 
information exchange. Consensus provides a foundation for shared 
interpretations.  
The following sections provides an overview of how EFA parties vary on a 
number of factors including their electoral strength and governing 
responsibility, ideologies, and culturally. This brief picture of EFA member party 
variation provides a foundation for the upcoming chapters, which focus on 
individual parties. It particularly introduces some fundamental lines of 
separation within the EFA network, which might affect the ability of parties to 
interact. 
Electoral Strength and Governing Responsibility 
As previously noted, EFA member parties tend not to have significant 
representations at the state level. Their primary arena of electoral competition 
is at the regional level. However, even at the regional level, parties’ success 
levels vary significantly. Variation of electoral success and governing 
responsibility are also indicators of many other types of difference between 
EFA member parties include variance in party membership, funding, and levels 
of regional empowerment. 
In Table 3.7, below, I list the parties that run in distinctive regional elections, 
their regional vote share in the most recent election, and their level of governing 
responsibility. Their level of electoral support ranges from just over 1% to 
almost 50% depending on the region. Furthermore, some parties have sole 
governing responsibility, some govern in coalitions, some sit in oppositions, 
and further parties do not have any seats. The table does not include all EFA 
member parties.  
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Numerous EFA parties do not have regional institutions that correspond with 
their territorial demands. For example, for Unser Land in Alsace the 
consolidation of French regions makes it significantly harder to seek 
representation as a small, regionalist party. For the Yorkshire Party, there is no 
singular ‘regional’ body to compete in, although the party does compete on 
national and local levels. Other parties do not run in elections due to a lack of 
resources or electoral rules (such as thresholds) which disadvantage 
regionalist parties. For example, Rainbow, which represents the Macedonian 
population in Northern Greece, has previously struggled to fund campaigns and 
has made allegations of media bias and electoral corruption. 
In addition to party-level differences in success and responsibility, EFA 
member parties are also divided by the level of power devolved to each of their 
regions. Even regions with devolved legislatures or councils vary in the level of 
decision making and funding endowed to those devolved bodies. Hooghe et al. 
(2010) sought to measure the authority of intermediate or regional 
governments in 42 democracies or quasi-democracies on an annual basis over 
the period 1950–2006. They showed that regional authority varies on a number 
of dimensions: first, between self and shared rule. At regional level, regional 
bodies also vary in their levels of institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal 
autonomy, and representation. Due to this variation, it is important to 
contextualize parties in their regional institutions. 
In Chapter One, I posited that a party’s electoral success affects its ability and 
willingness to engage with the EFA Network. Less successful parties may also 
struggle to maintain a presence at the European level. For example, in 2018, 
the German Frisian party, Die Friesen, left EFA. They argued that this was 
because they did not receive enough support in a European court case, but 
one EFA staff member suggested to me that Die Friesen had been struggling 
to maintain EFA connections and may have struggled to pay their contribution.  
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As a former staff member of EFA said, “Smaller parties are less active because 
they have difficulties getting traction in their own region and so also difficulties 
getting traction at the European level. Maybe they have fewer funds, fewer 
people—there can be different reasons for it” (Interview 9).  
Nonetheless, many of EFA’s smaller parties are active, for example sending 
extra members to the EFA General Assembly or hosting events in their region. 
Another member of staff for EFA explained, “You have to strike a balance 
between having strong parties able to be visible (the SNP are the biggest) and 
at the same time you should not let some small areas, parties, regions down. 
For example, Galicia is small territory, but the BNG are a really active member 
there in Galicia” (Interview 37). Small and large parties, as this respondent 
suggests, have different motives and priorities at the European level. As such, 
this may cause variation and differentiation between parties in EFA. However, 
as I will show in the following empirical chapters, differences in electoral 
success and governing responsibility also incentivize parties to seek out 












Table 3.7 Electoral Results and Governing Responsibility of EFA Member 
Parties  






Ålands Framtid 7.4% (2015) Opposition  
Autonomie, Liberté, Participation, 
Écologie* 
9% (2018)  In Coalition 
Government 
Bayernpartei 1.7% (2018) No seats 
Bloc Nacionalista Valencia 18.5% (2015)* In Coalition 
Government 
Bloque Nacionalista Gallego 8.3% (2015) Opposition  
Eusko Alkartasuna 21.1% (2016)* Opposition 
Esquerra Republicana de Cataunya 21.4% (2017)  In Coalition 
Government 
Fryske Nasjonale Partij 8.4% (2015) In Coalition 
Government 
Inseme per a Corsica 45.36% (2017)  In Government 
Mebyon Kernow 4.0% (2017) Opposition 
Moravané 1.75% (2012) Opposition 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 24.8% (2018) In Coalition 
Government 
Plaid Cymru 20.5% (2016) Opposition 
Partito Sardo d’Azione* 4.67% (2014) Opposition  
Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista 15.32% (2015)* In Coalition 
Government 
Ruch Autonomii Śląska 7.2% (2014) In Coalition 
Government 
Slovenska Skupnost 1.4% (2013) Opposition 
Scottish National Party 46.5% (2016) In Government  
Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands 4.6% (2017) Opposition 
Schleswig Partei 0.8% (2017) No seats 
Süd-Tiroler Freiheit 6.0% (2018) Opposition  
Union Démocratique Bretonne   6.7% (2015)* No seats 
*parties ran as part of a wider coalition platform 
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Ideology and Policy Preferences 
While self-determination and defence of the sub-state region is the founding 
commonality of EFA, member parties still vary in their autonomy claims. Some 
parties are seeking recognition for their language or culture while others make 
secessionist claims. On the autonomy ‘axis’ of EFA member party positioning, 
there tends to be a progression towards further autonomy. One EFA staff 
member explained, “In the self-determination pillar most of the movement goes 
towards independence. There is not a case of independence where after many 
years they go towards independence but then they put it in the past” (Interview 
10). One member of the EFA bureau explained: “For some, applying the right 
to self-determination means becoming an independent state but for others that 
might mean to have autonomy or to have cultural recognition and so on…we 
try to have a common discourse on basic European matters, but it’s not easy 
sometimes” (Interview 25).  
As this respondent suggests, while autonomy is an agreed point of view, 
discourse on ‘basic European matters’ can be more difficult. DeWinter and 
Cachafeiro argue that it is ‘ideological distance’ which is the crucial disruptor of 
cohesion in EFA (2002: 49). I use classifications from Massetti and Schakel’s 
2015 article to show the variance in left/right positioning among EFA member 
parties. Their article does not include all EFA member parties, so this selection 
of EFA member parties can only be indicative rather than comprehensive. Their 
coding classifies parties along a scale from most left (1) to most right (6). This 
can be seen as a three-class categorization (clearly left (1–2), centrist (3–4), 
clearly right (5–6)) (Massetti and Schakel, 2015: 877).  
Although EFA has members from across the political spectrum, parties tend to 
skew towards the left and centre-left. There is a perception by some members 
that there is bias towards the left. As one participant at the General Assembly 
said: “I believe EFA is blind with its left eye.” 
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Table 3.8 EFA Member Parties’ left-right ranking  




Bloc Nacionalista Galego 1.63 Left 
Chunta Aragonesista 2 Left 
Eusko Alkartasuna 2 Left 
Union Democratique Bretonne 2 Left 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 2.56 Left 
Plaid Cymru 2.67 Left 
Scottish National Party 2.67 Left 
Partito Sardo d’Azione 2.88 Left 
Frisian National Party 3.3 Centrist 
Süd-Tiroler Freiheit 4 Right 
Bayernpartei 5 Right 
Nieuwe Vlaamse Alliantie 5 Right 
 
Source: Massetti and Schakel (2015: 875-876)  
General Assemblies showed that diversity can hinder communication about 
policy and politics. The diverse priorities and policies of EFA member parties 
sometimes meant that conclusions reached at the GA were vague or 
incomplete. There were clear lines of ideological division, particularly on issues 
such as immigration. However, as each of the next chapters will show, parties 
tend to form smaller networks within which they interact mostly with 
ideologically similar parties. 
Ideologically, EFA polices two ‘red lines’, which exclude parties which are (1) 
involved in violent conflict or (2) far right and anti-immigrant. As one EFA staff 
member said, “Anything that has to do with xenophobia, populism, racism, 
Islamophobia or whatever kind of exclusion and violence, we do not tolerate 
that” (Interview 10). EFA maintains its boundaries through suspension and 
expulsion, for example the decision to suspend the Lega Nord in 1994 (which 
led to the party leaving EFA).  
Western and Eastern European Members 
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The most prominent membership change was caused by the incorporation of 
Eastern European countries into the EU. The entry of Eastern European 
countries throughout the early 2000s led to an expansion of European political 
parties. Lightfoot and Holmes’s (2011) study of the Party of European Socialists 
and the Central and Eastern European accession countries showed that the 
engagement between the TNP and enlargement parties was largely superficial. 
They argued that TNPs would need to be more “prepared to countenance 
disruption of its existing structures and it will also have to be prepared to disturb 
the interests and preferences of its existing members” (Lightfoot and Holmes, 
2011: 55).  
The European Free Alliance has nine full and observer members from the new 
EU member states. The expansion was an explicit goal of the EFA central office 
after “the period of political consolidation from 2004 to 2009” (Interview 10). 
EFA and EFAy have Eastern European members. However, the level of 
engagement between EFA and these Eastern European parties is much lower 
than with Western European members. The issue was raised at one General 
Assembly and one bureau member explained: “It’s difficult because we are 
mostly based in Western Europe. But we have to make an effort.” They urged 
parties from new member states to contact the EFA bureau, as the bureau is 
“already understaffed” and may not always be able to proactively reach out to 
member parties.  
One interview respondent explained, “Ideologically it's difficult to have the 
same ideas in the West and in the East” (Interview 21). Lynch and DeWinter 
note that the difficulties for EFA in attracting new accession country parties is 
also due to the relative centralization of these states which disempowers 
regional political actors; “this situation is very much ‘problems as usual’” (2008: 
588). The following empirical chapters will show that few parties identify new 
accession parties as their close partners. In some cases, respondents explicitly 
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explain their feeling of alienation from Eastern European parties, who are seen 
as politically and culturally different.  
The Role of Language  
While there are a number of ways for member parties to interact with one 
another there are also barriers to engaging with other parties in EFA. One 
major barrier is the issue of language. During my observations at EFA events, 
there were clear linguistic divisions in informal settings. While EFA provides 
many interpreters during formal debates, in informal gatherings, some 
members split into linguistic groupings.  
For example, there is a clear German speaking group. One respondent noted 
growing Germanophone links, “including Sud Tiroler Freiheits who are in the 
Italian state but are very much linked to Bayern Partei and other 
Germanophone parties. They feel themselves more in line with the Northern 
approach than the Southern approach” (Interview 11). A member of the UDB 
explained that links with other parties in the French state were easier because: 
“We all face the French state, so we support each other, and then we speak 
French so it's easy" (Interview 20). As these respondents show a shared 
language and culture encourages links between specific parties. On the other 
hand, lack of linguistic ability might make it difficult for individuals or parties to 
engage across the breadth of EFA.  
Language learning and multilingualism is a closely held value of many EFA 
parties, considering their political work to support minority languages. One 
multilingual respondent explained:  
“Almost all the parties speak English, so it is the language which is most 
spoken between us…I studied Welsh at university...when we go to 
Wales and I speak Welsh then everything after that is easier. It gives 
you access, then it's a pleasure to speak Welsh” (Interview 19). 
Members of EFA with fewer English skills are less likely to acquire all 
information shared at EFA events. They are particularly likely to miss out on 
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relationships built in more informal networking occasions. They are also less 
likely to speak and share their own information due to a lack of confidence in 
transnational communication. Linguistic ability may in some cases hinder 
communication, but linguistic similarities between parties can also shape which 
parties engage with one another.   
The diversity within the European Free Alliance membership ideologically, 
geographically and strategically may lead to barriers to exchange in the EFA 
network. As the party has professionalized, its membership has become more 
closely vetted and has consolidated its policy stances. Despite this 
consolidation, my observations at EFA events showed that parties are still likely 
to engage in smaller sub-networks built on a sense of ideological, linguistic, or 
geographical commonality. These commonalities allow for the exchange of 
information which is seen as comparable and which can be interpreted into 
each member parties’ domestic context. The following empirical chapters each 
include a section on the party’s transnational relationships to delineate the 
scope of interactions that party has in EFA.  
(2) Member Party Interactions  
Although the first section of this chapter focused on the supranational bodies 
of EFA, member parties’ interactions with one another are fundamental to 
creating and sustaining EFA. In a commemoration of EFA’s 30 year 
anniversary, EFA’s president at the time explained: 
 “EFA’s activity and political involvement did not start in Parliament. One 
of EFA’s driving principles is self-determination. We promote the 
emergence of truly constructive interactions between Europe’s nations, 
peoples, communities and citizens, by claiming collective rights, more 
autonomy and very often full independence.” 
These interactions between Europe’s peoples rather than states are a political 
ambition of EFA, but the nation to nation ethos of Europe is also enacted within 
EFA. Events and other types of communication often happen horizontally 
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between member parties rather than in a top-down nature within EFA. Three 
main types of interaction occur between member parties of EFA: bilateral, 
multilateral and virtual.   
Bilateral Interactions 
EFA’s Director noted: “we always try to stimulate bilateral contacts. With the 
staff that we have here, we can never manage an ever-growing number of 
member parties” (Interview 10). Bilateral links can take the form of meetings 
between elected officials, interactions between parties’ staff members, 
organisation of joint events, shared policy projects, and more.  
A typical case of a strong bilateral relationship would be the relationship 
between Plaid Cymru and the Union Démocratique Bretonne. Members of the 
UDB reported attending events and interacting with Plaid colleagues. Some of 
these events include the European Free Alliance General Assemblies, or Plaid 
annual conferences where ‘sister parties’ are invited to participate. On a trip to 
Cardiff, UDB members met with the leader of Plaid Cymru Ifanc (Youth) and 
with Plaid Cymru Assembly members. The UDB also sought to bring Plaid 
Cymru leader Leanne Wood to Brittany to give a lecture.  
The Plaid-UDB links were established within the auspices of the European Free 
Alliance. However, it is often hard to disentangle the role of the TNP in 
encouraging further bilateral relations. Sometimes, as in the case of EFA GAs, 
the TNP directly fosters links. EFA staff may also be involved in encouraging 
bilateral relationships through personal contacts, which are not easily 
traceable. In other cases, the UDB and Plaid’s joint membership of EFA simply 
provides structural encouragement for meetings. Their interactions at a 
multilateral level over a long period of time allowed the relationship to become 
regularized. The personal links that stem from this regularity then engender 
further meetings that grow party links beyond EFA’s immediate multilateral 




Multilateral interactions are much more common than bilateral relationships. 
Parties may see more value in attending a larger event as it provides more 
scope for both networking and projecting their party’s message. Furthermore, 
EFA member parties have funded access to multilateral meetings organised by 
EFA. Fewer member parties will have the strong relationships necessary to 
initiate and fund regular bilateral contact.  
The most important event for EFA collaboration is the annual General 
Assembly (GA). For each GA, EFA funds one representative from each party 
to attend. EFAy and the CMC each fund one delegate from each youth party 
and from each CMC member. These delegates have rights to vote on motions, 
the EP manifesto, party membership votes, and bureau members. Member 
parties can also fund additional delegates to participate in networking, fringe 
events, and debates (without voting). The General Assembly is one of the 
largest expenses incurred by EFA in its work, costing €94,000 in 2017 and 
€138,000 in 2016 (Ernst & Young Audit, 2018). The event is held each year in 
one of the member parties’ regions.  
The General Assembly also includes numerous spaces for informal 
relationships and conversations, such as joint lunches, dinners and visits 
around the local area. As one of EFA’s staff explained, “one of the things is to 
offer the possibility of synergy, contact, networking, everybody being there, 
talking...where sometimes the motions and declarations are just the alibi for 
some to talk in the corridors on other topics” (Interview 10). Individuals often 
return to the GA many years in a row, leading to a sense of deeper relationships 
between participants. Conversations ‘in the corridors’ often include knowledge 
sharing on the political situation in each region on shared issues as well as 
discussions about controversial GA motions or business.  
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The GA also allows for the development of cooperative projects. For example, 
the Sustainable Energy project supported by the Frisian National Party (FNP) 
was launched and regularly re-evaluated at consecutive General Assemblies. 
The party sought support, input, and funding from other EFA member parties. 
The multilateral nature of the event allows the FNP, which has relatively little 
governing power, to have a dedicated meeting with political activists and 
politicians from across Europe. For example, in 2017, the FNP’s meeting 
included a Corsican elected member with a portfolio for energy. While these 
more politicians might not travel to Friesland, the GA provides access. In this 
sense, the GA provides a level of equal opportunity access which is not 
possible in the bilateral interactions.  
Beyond the General Election, EFA sponsors many other multilateral events. 
These events might be centered on a particular policy initiative. For example, 
EFA has been involved in numerous events over the last two years including 
those focused on environmental sustainability, self-determination, refugees, 
minority media, civil rights, and more. They might also be centered on a 
particular political event, with the most prominent recent examples being the 
organised EFA delegations at the Scottish and Catalan referendums.  
In 2017, EFA spent €142,000 on conferences, and €24,000 on ‘other 
meetings.’ EFAy, equally, spends most of its budget on its one staff member (a 
full-time coordinator based in Brussels) and on organising events. Coordination 
of party interactions by Brussels-based staff is a significant part of EFA’s work. 
This funding and organisational support from EFA bodies is essential to bring 
members of EFA together. One active member of explained, “For example, it’s 
EFA that organised [the event], who financed and made possible this training 
in Glasgow. It’s thanks to them who bring together all the parties, a little bit on 
the same line…it is also thanks to EFA that we manage to meet all together 
and to have an exchange” (Interview 19). 
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Finally, within some states, EFA parties have developed multilateral institutions 
to communicate. The most notable of these is the French organisation Regions 
et Peuples Solidaires, which brings together regionalists from across France. 
There are also looser electoral coalitions (in Spain and the Netherlands), which 
include but are not exclusively comprised of EFA members. Regions et 
Peuples Solidaires “is a very well-structured one. They have statutes, it’s not 
just a gathering of friends. Every year they have a General Assembly, a 
summer university to talk about the hot topics of the year or of the months to 
come in the hexagon” (Interview 11). They come together to consider how they 
will advise their voters to vote in the French Presidential elections or how they 
can collectively pressure the French Government (Interview 10).  
While this cooperation has a significant effect in the French state, other states’ 
EFA member parties are less well organised. For example, Italy-based EFA 
parties tend to have a less harmonious relationship, because “you have both 
the left/right and independentism conflict there. In Italy you also have the Lega 
Nord and the racist issue and the xenophobic issue” (Interview 10). 
Given the heterogeneity of EFA and the complexities of diversity on autonomy 
and ideological stances, the organisational bodies of the European Free 
Alliance hold a key role in bringing together parties. Their encouragement of 
bilateral interactions and organisational support for multilateral events 
regularizes exchange between regionalists and nationalists in Europe.  
Virtual Interactions  
Finally, EFA member parties also interact virtually. This is a necessity, given 
the geographical spread of the parties and the considerable cost of interacting 
physically. The most commonly used means of virtual interactions between 
EFA members are e-mail, Facebook, and WhatsApp. These allow for 
relationships to be maintained over time. As one locally elected member and 
active participant in EFA explained, “How do we get support? That also 
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happens through social media, Facebook and Twitter. EFA sends press 
releases, organises the General Assembly, distributes newsletters. It is a 
constant information stream” (Interview 4). 
One example of this virtual information sharing could be found during the 
Catalan referendum. During EFA’s observation mission at the referendum, 
multiple WhatsApp groups were created by EFA staff and attendees. These 
message exchanges coordinated observers’ movements across Barcelona 
and spread information on the day and afterwards (where police and protests 
where, which polling places were open, etc). The groups continued to be used 
after the referendum to share information about Catalan political 
developments. Attendance at an EFA event can thus engender further 
interactions through social media. Information exchange is furthered by the 
ability to keep in contact from a distance.  
Parties may interact in less personal ways, such as by following prominent 
party members on Twitter. This would provide opportunities for information 
acquisition about EFA partners. This thesis takes an agential approach and 
focuses on prominent individuals, rather mass interactions. In the future, data 
mining using Twitter could show wider virtual linkages within the EFA network. 
Twitter network analysis allows a researcher to consider ‘who’s following who.’ 
It has been used to study the diffusion of information after specific events, the 
measurement of individuals’ influence, and political communication 
(Grandjean, 2016). As such, it would be an ideal further tool to use to consider 
the spread of information within the nationalist and regionalist network when a 
researcher is interested in a more specific time period or smaller number of 
parties and individuals. However, this is not in the scope of this thesis.  
3.3 Individual Party Members in the EFA Context 
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Up until this point, I have focused on EFA and its member political parties as 
collective entities. In this section I address the individual and their agency within 
EFA structures. In this thesis, I defined EFA’s entrepreneurs as individual 
members of EFA member parties who take an active role in the European Free 
Alliance. I introduced the concept of ‘key entrepreneurs’ as a possible 
contextual factor to affect learning and posited that the work of an active 
individual could facilitate interaction. On the other hand, concentrating 
transnational relationships in too few individuals may hinder the spread of 
information through the EFA member party collectively.  
Individual entrepreneurs in EFA may be empowered by the structures of the 
TNP through membership of the bureau or employment in one of EFA’s bodies 
(secretariat, EP Group). They may also be empowered through positions in 
their parties, for example by having a position on internal decision making 
bodies or through an international relations role in regional government. 
Individuals with a lot of experience and relationships in EFA can connect 
parties to one another and provide a ‘birds-eye’ view on policy issues, joint 
projects, and strategic plans. 
Existing literature on TNPs emphasizes the importance of individuals. Van 
Hecke argues: “Transnational party federations are much more elite-driven 
than are national political parties. It is the leadership that runs the party, and 
there is little participation from partisans” (2010: 398). Elites are so crucial, 
because there are no direct voters for European political parties. Voters select 
EFA member parties on their EP ballot rather than EFA. As such, there are no 
true ‘partisans’ of European political parties, although there is debate (within 
EFA and within the EU generally) on Europe-wide lists.  
Although the Party of European Socialists has introduced individual members 
or ‘activists,’ it is the only TNP to have a developed membership programme 
of this kind (Hertner, 2011: 339-340). EFA introduced a ‘Friends of EFA’ 
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programme in late 2018. However, precisely in reaction to concerns about 
‘diluting’ the power of the parties, the topic is contentious among members. At 
the time of this research, elite party members remained the most prominent 
actors in EFA. 
Elite entrepreneurs are particularly important for EFA. Other TNPs may have 
numerous member parties with resources to employ or specify a member of 
their party to deal with the European Union. They may have members of the 
government who already interact in Council of the European Union meetings. 
This is not the case for EFA. EFA’s activist are more likely to be internally 
motivated (not encouraged by an elected position or employed) to engage at a 
transnational level. This is why I call them entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs, 
as characterized by Kingdon (1984), are defined by: “their willingness to invest 
their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope 
of a future return” (122).  
I argue that regionalists are more likely to take on an entrepreneurial role in 
Europe due to their relationship with identity. As regionalists, they are more 
able to see the benefits of transnational networking and to engage in 
discussions about identity. This point, on identity, draws on Marks’ (1999) 
discussion of the category of ‘multiple identity,’ as opposed to exclusive 
identities or unattached identity. Marks’s work sought to unpack the concept of 
identity in Europe to consider its multi-level implications and the intersection 
with measures of identity ‘intensity.’ This is reinforced by Cram’s 2009 work 
studying the way that the European Union encourages and is embraced by 
many different nationalisms, rather than one singular nation. The EU facilitates 
“diverse understandings of collective identities” (Cram, 2009: 125).  
Active members of the European Free Alliance have also often worked or 
studied in different European countries. This may serve as both an impetus for 
their transnational regionalist activism and a skill building experience. For 
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example, one Italian EFA member party has four members of its international 
affairs team living in London. Another respondent explained that there was a 
link between his previous career and his interest in EFA, “because I also 
worked a lot in foreign countries. Then you also have an open attitude to 
Europe. I think we were also a generation of people who benefited from the 
open borders in Europe, free movement of people and services” (Interview 6).  
Other respondents noted that their time abroad brought out their political affinity 
for decentralization and Europe. For example, one UDB member explained that 
when they returned from their time in Belgium, “all these strangenesses of 
French nationalism really jumped in my face. I found it completely abnormal 
the functioning of this country” (Interview 12). Another transnationally active 
respondent explained his experiences abroad and noted: “when you get a taste 
of Europe, you want to defend it” (Interview 35).  
Conversely, party members that had not had very much experience travelling 
abroad tended to be more distant from EFA and other member parties. For 
example, one Breton respondent noted: “I haven’t travelled very much. That’s 
one of the particularities of my story… I am going to leave those people who 
have travelled more to give their thoughts” (Interview 17). Non-transnationally 
active members’ experiences are often more difficult to capture as they are not 
likely to notice or express the absence of transnational relationships in their 
activism. However, my selection of interview respondents aims precisely to get 
a good cross section of active party members: local government 
representatives, youth party members, party staff members, and state/regional 
elected members. As such, the network diagrams for each chapter will show 
that some individuals are less connected transnationally than others. This 
highlights the diversity of experiences, skills, and knowledge that party 
members have about EFA and other EFA parties.  
3.4 Conclusion  
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I have posited that interactions between member parties in EFA engender 
learning. Although events are often organised by or under the auspices of EFA 
as an organisation, member parties’ interactions may not always be organised 
by EFA centrally. Furthermore, the impact of a transnational political party on 
its members is often difficult to trace. Engagement between members of EFA 
is often informal, private, and voluntary. Some events have concluding reports, 
but outcomes of engagement are often undocumented. Respondents often 
explained that reports were made directly to the various decision making 
bodies of their party.  
As such, it is difficult to ascertain the precise effect that EFA has in creating a 
forum for interactions between its member parties. However, this chapter has 
shown that there are complex but structured networks of relationships within 
EFA. Different roles are held in this network by EFA’s transnational actors, 
regional member parties, and active entrepreneurs. Active individuals and 
EFA’s central bodies often organise formal structural opportunities for member 
party interactions. One result of these interactions may be informal, private 
relationships between Europe’s regionalist and nationalist parties. Whether 
formal or informal, I find in the following four chapters that interactions within 
the EFA structure engender policy and strategy learning in some cases; 
meanwhile other parties face barriers to interaction and learning from other 
European Free Alliance parties. EFA member parties experience EFA as an 
organisation differently, depending on their regional and internal dynamics. An 
analysis of different parties’ experiences of EFA membership and the process 



























Chapter Four: The Frisian National Party  
In 1981, the Frisian National Party (FNP) was one of the founding members of 
the European Free Alliance and it remains one of the most engaged members 
of EFA today. Although it is small in international terms, the FNP is the most 
prominent regionalist party in the Netherlands. It is a regionalist party seeking 
more autonomy for the province of Friesland, in the northeast of the 
Netherlands. The party was founded in 1962 and has since based its policies 
on seeking a ‘more Frisian Friesland.’ The party emphasizes preserving the 
Frisian landscape, language and culture. It has seven core values: democracy, 
federalism, internationalism, language and culture, entrepreneurship, solidarity 
and sustainability. However, the party is also undergoing internal debate to 
more specifically determine its policies and electoral strategy; these debates 
fuel information seeking.  
The FNP and its elite members learn from EFA partners. This learning is driven 
by the party’s drive to develop policies and achieve more electoral success. 
The party’s structures put EFA at the centre of international policy and the 
FNP’s EFA entrepreneurs have established structural roles in both the FNP 
and EFA. This chapter shows how the FNP has acquired, interpreted and 
implemented new information about sustainable policies in regions, particularly 
through their joint project and conference with the European Free Alliance. It 
also highlights the case of electoral strategy in the FNP. Although the party has 
not collectively learned on this issue, individual members have shown 
information acquisition and interpretation from more successful EFA partners 
(particularly the SNP).  Finally, two cases in which learning does not occur 
(minority language policy, refugee policy) are explored to consider the factors 
that hinder information acquisition.  
To explore the consequences of FNP interactions in EFA, I first give an 
overview of the party. In this overview, I describe the party’s position on each 
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of the contextual factors addressed in the theoretical framework. In section two, 
I unpack the FNP’s transnational interactions with a focus on with which parties 
and types of interactions it engages in. Section three explores the 
consequences (or lack thereof) of transnational interactions. It considers 
whether the FNP displays signs of the process of learning (information 
acquisition, interpretation, implementation) and behavioural learning. I also 
examine why learning does not occur. Policy and strategy areas that will be 
analysed in the case of the FNP are sustainable energy, electoral strategies, 
language protection and refugee resettlement. Finally, the conclusion of this 
chapter reflects on the proposed party learning framework in light of the 
transnational experiences of the FNP. 
4.1 Introducing the Frisian National Party  
The Frisian National Party (FNP) is based in Friesland, in the North East of the 
Netherlands. The region is dominated by rural communities, with 50% of people 
living in towns of less than 5000 people (Penrose, 1990: 430). The region also 
has a number of islands (the Waddeneilanden) which spread out in an 
archipelago to the northwest of mainland Friesland. The region’s capital is 
Leeuwarden, where the Provincial Council sits.  
Figure 4.1 Map of Friesland in the Netherlands 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
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In their 2015 categorization of regionalist parties, Massetti and Schakel ranked 
the FNP on a scale from 1 to 6 (with 1 as radical left, 6 as radical right). The 
party is coded as centrist with a position of 3.30. In the party’s 2019 provincial 
election manifesto, they called for greater Frisian control over hospitals, 
housing, schools, and broadcasting. The party called for a referendum to ask 
the people of Friesland whether the provincial government should have more 
power over care, housing, and hospitals.  
However, the FNP has only recently begun to develop a wider range of policies 
beyond autonomism. This expansion of policies (on social welfare, education, 
energy) was driven by a consideration that the FNP would benefit from 
“showing its colours” more by taking positions on controversial issues in Dutch 
state-wide politics, like the War in Afghanistan and the referendum on the EU-
Ukraine deal. The FNP has been a member of the provincial government since 
2011. In the 2011 provincial elections, the party won 9.15% of the vote and in 
2015, they won 9.8%. It has four members of the provincial council, and one 
‘deputised’ member in the provincial government who focuses particularly on 
issues of the Frisian landscape and environment. With one of five Provincial 
Executive seats, the FNP is a minority coalition partner.  
Organisationally, the party is small and grassroots, with approximately 1500 
members (as reported by party elites to the author in 2016) (Van der Zwet, 
2016: 1244). The party relies heavily on volunteers. The party has an older 
membership and its youth wing is less active than in other parties. It is 
disaggregated into different local branches and a few policy commissions. 
Beyond these organisational commissions, the FNP’s policy decision making 
is very decentralized. Each local FNP branch and city councillors may have a 
different position on an issue (as long as they fit within the parties’ general 
principles). The FNP’s Provincial Council leader is Corlienke de Jong and its 
member of the Provincial Executive is Johannes Kramer.  
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Although the party has no Members of the European Parliament, FNP 
members emphasize their role as a founding member of EFA and this central 
position continues with an FNP member holding a position on the bureau of 
EFA. This member used to be provincial council member Sybren Posthumus 
but has since transitioned to Olrik Bouma, who was described by another 
interview respondent as ‘our man in Brussels.’ Bouma is now an EFA Bureau 
member but also formerly held positions as EFA intern, Centre Maurits 
Coppetiers intern, and former EFA youth Secretary General. The FNP has a 
foundational and institutional role in the EFA network, as well as active 
individuals who are more active than other party members. This entrepreneurial 
role is supported by the party’s EFA Commission, which specifically manages 
European cooperation in the party.     
4.2 Contextual Factors and the Frisian National Party 
To describe the Frisian National Party, I consider the party’s position along the 
five contextual factors. These factors are electoral strength, governing 
responsibility, party centralization, transnational entrepreneurs, and issue 
contestation. In the Frisian case, the most important factors that affect its 
relationship with the European Free Alliance are the party’s lack of electoral 
success and its embedded transnational entrepreneurs. The party’s ability to 
learn is reduced by its internal decentralization but increased by its high level 
of issue contestation.  
(1) Electoral Strength and Governing Responsibility  
Compared to other parties in EFA, the FNP has relatively low electoral success, 
but it has recently gained more governing responsibility at the provincial level. 
Since its entry into Frisian politics, the party has consistently won at least one 
seat in Friesland’s Provincial State Council. The table below shows the party’s 
performance in Provincial State elections from 1966 until 2015. The party runs 
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only in the provincial and municipal elections in Friesland, unlike other parties 
studied in this thesis, which stand candidates in national elections as well.  
Table 4.1 FNP Electoral Results Over Time 
Year 
Vote Share (Provincial 
Elections) Governing Responsibility 
2015 9,46% Coalition Partner 
2011 9,18% Coalition Partner 
2007 10,68% In Opposition 
2003 13,22% In Opposition 
1999 8,39% In Opposition 
1995 6,37% In Opposition 
1991 6,09% In Opposition 
1987 4,49% In Opposition 
1982 5,4% In Opposition 
1978 4,76% In Opposition 
Source: Kiesraad.nl 
In the most recent provincial elections, the FNP won 9.46% of the votes and 4 
seats on the Provincial Parliament. This was a slight increase from 2011, when 
the party won 9.18% of votes. The party also improved slightly in municipal 
elections, coming in second in 4 different municipalities.  Despite a decrease 
in vote percentage, in 2011 the FNP became a member of the Provincial 
Parliament’s ruling coalition for the first time. This coalition was in partnership 
with the CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) and PvdA (Labour Party). The shift 
from opposition to coalition partner was made possible by a fracturing of the 
larger parties’ vote shares. The fracturing of larger parties’ vote shares at local 
and provincial level is a trend across the Netherlands. In 2006, independent, 
local parties still took up the largest share of seats in municipal councils 
(Boogers and Voerman, 2010: 78). In 2015, a record number of regional parties 
took part in the provincial elections (NOS, 21.3.15). The pattern was true on a 
state level as well. One author quipped: “The party landscape has thereby 
become as flat as the country itself” (Van Holsteyn, 2011: 412).  
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After the 2015 elections, the FNP again went into coalition with the CDA, the 
VVD (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), and the SP (Socialist 
Party). The FNP currently has four members of the Frisian Provincial 
Parliament, and one member of the Frisian Provincial Executive, Johannes 
Kramer. Provincial elected members are supported by two staff members. The 
party also has a member of the Dutch Senate (the Tweede Kamer) who was 
elected as representative of the Netherlands-wide Onafhankelijke 
Senaatsfractie (the Independent Senate Group, OSF). The FNP is the largest 
member of this Senate group, which brings together regional parties.  
Kramer’s portfolio centres on the Frisian landscape and environment. This 
portfolio allocation emphasizes the centrality of environmental policy to the 
FNP. In coalition negotiations, “parties prefer, and aim to gain control over, 
ministries with a policy area of competence that was stressed in their election 
manifestos” (Bäck et al., 2011: 467). Kramer confirmed in an interview with 
regional news organisation Omrop Fryslan that the party’s demands in the 
2011 coalition negotiation centred on opposing wind turbines on Frisian land.7  
The party’s elected members pointed to the 2011 and 2015 coalition roles as 
an important impetus to policy development, since the position means the party 
has both new opportunities and new responsibilities. One member of the 
executive board explained: “We used to just be an opposition party. Then you 
can shout what you like, you don’t have to make it come true.” Another member 
of the executive board echoed this: “Before you could predominantly just shout 
about how everything shouldn’t happen, now we need to say how it could be 
done better.”  
(2) Party Centralization  
                                                          




The FNP is a decentralized organisation. The party makes decisions from the 
bottom-up. The party is fairly small, with approximately 1500 members (as 
reported to the author in 2016). Its structures are grassroots and decentralized. 
The party is disaggregated into different local branches which have substantial 
autonomy, including in policy making. If local party policies fit into the FNP’s 
seven fundamental values, each branch and city councillor group may have 
their own position on an issue.  
This may sometimes hinder its collective decision-making process, as in the 
Dutch referendum on the EU-Ukraine deal. This referendum was held in 2015 
and the FNP did not take a united party stance on the issue. One FNP elected 
member explained: “You had a group of supporters and a group of detractors 
[of the EU-Ukraine deal]. An elected member wrote an article in the provincial 
newsletter that the party wouldn’t take a particular stance. It depends on your 
personal approach” (Interview 2). Nonetheless, party elites made public their 
stances on the referendum, leading to some division in the party membership 
who felt that this limited freedom of expression within the party.  
The party encourages dialogue across the province through policy-specific 
‘theme evenings’ as well as regional gatherings (for the North, Middle and 
South of Friesland). Centrally, the party has an executive board which is 
comprised of six party members from different regions of Friesland who take 
different portfolios or responsibilities. The board is supported by policy 
commissions on the European Free Alliance, finance, PR, party archives, and 
the party programme as well as the Provincial council members and the FNP’s 
Dutch Senate representative. The committee on EFA is chaired by a member 
of the executive board, reinforcing that EFA membership is integrated and 
important in the structure of the party. The committee serves as an advice 
committee to the executive board of the party. 
(3) Key Entrepreneurs  
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The FNP was one of nine founding members of the European Free Alliance. 
Since then, they have had an enduring EFA entrepreneur who sits on the board 
of EFA. This entrepreneur serves to link EFA and the FNP. FNP member 
Roelof Falkena helped found the party and joined the EFA Board in 1981. He 
served until 2004. He also held a position as a member of the Provincial 
Parliament for 11 years (1988-1999).8 The importance of the EFA bureau 
member was set out from the start of EFA. EFA’s history of Falkena notes that: 
“He knew how to use the tool of the EFA to channel Frisian interests at a 
European level.” 
After Roelof Falkena, the FNP’s board member was Douwe Bijlsma. Bijlsma 
was posthumously awarded honorary EFA membership, was a provincial 
councillor for twelve years, and chairperson of the FNP for nine years. After 
Bijlsma’s sudden death, provincial council member Sybren Posthumus became 
the EFA board member.  
Finally, the position recently transitioned to Olrik Bouma. It is notable that the 
EFA bureau member has traditionally been an individual who is central to the 
FNP, often one of the few provincial councillors the party has. The FNP’s EFA 
bureau member was described as ‘our man in Brussels’ (Interview 6). EFA 
board member Olrik Bouma formerly held positions as an EFA intern, Centre 
Maurits Coppetiers intern, and EFA Youth Secretary General. He is a member 
of the FNP’s EFA Commission. The position on EFA’s board allows the party 
to engage frequently with EFA through quarterly EFA board meetings and 
speeches/visits organised as a member of the EFA board (Interview 4). The 
FNP member of the EFA board also reports back to the FNP on EFA’s 
initiatives and work.  
                                                          
8 “European Free Alliance: Voice of the Peoples of Europe. The First 25 Years of History (1981-2006).” 




(4) Issue Contestation  
Studies of Dutch local parties have shown that “their ideological position on the 
classic left-right spectrum is vague, but they take clear and distinctive positions 
on local issues” (Booger sand Voerman, 2010: 85). The most distinctive and 
uncontested policy positions in the FNP are those on language and culture 
issues. However, the party is regularly developing further policy stances, 
particularly on their shared value of environmental protection. There are distinct 
divisions on electoral strategy, namely on whether or not the party should 
contest statewide elections.  
Early Frisian regionalism was predominantly linguistic. FNP respondents 
lamented the infrequency of Frisian use in politics and noted the draw of the 
‘randstad’ (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) for young 
Frisians. Activism around Frisian issues (initially predominantly cultural and 
linguistic) resulted in the creation of the Frisian National Party in 1961. The 
FNP’s foundational focus on the Frisian dimension of policies can be 
exemplified by a 1973 party slogan: “Not left, not right, but Frisian national” 
(quoted in van der Zwet, 2011: 99). The FNP’s defense of Frisian interests and 
language are closely mapped onto one another. A more recent survey by Arno 
van der Zwet (2011, survey conducted 2009) showed that a concern about the 
Frisian language was the most important reason for joining the party for 22.6% 
of the FNP’s members. The defense of the Frisian language, identity and 
political decentralization are relatively uncontested policy areas in the FNP.   
The development of a wider range of policies has been an explicit project in the 
FNP in the last few years. In a 2016 article in the Dutch state-wide paper de 
Volksrant, the party’s member of the provincial executive Johannes Kramer 
explained that the party felt it had the potential to appeal out to a broader 
audience: “We want to be a party for everyone. There is also a reason for this, 
because we notice that our supporters are growing. Furthermore, we do not 
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want to exclude people” (Bloemhof, 2016). One member of the FNP’s executive 
board explained that this expansion of policies (on social welfare, education, 
energy) was driven by the executive’s opinion that the FNP would benefit from 
“showing its colours” more (Interview 5).  
Although the party leans towards the centre-left, “in the FNP, everyone is 
welcome. We have a right wing, a left wing, and a centrist wing’ (Interview 2). 
These differences in the party are most obvious in the case of asylum seeker 
and immigration policies. Anti-immigrant views are neither organised nor 
accepted by the party organisationally (van der Zwet, 2016: 1249). However, 
about 18% of members agree with the statement that ‘It is better for a country 
if everyone shares the same customs and traditions’ (van der Zwet, 2016: 
1250). The underlying value of internationalism has been challenged with the 
influx of asylum seekers in recent years. When Frisian towns are asked to 
accept asylum seekers, the bottom up decision-making process of the party 
has led to different responses by the FNP across the province (Interview 2; van 
Es, 2014).  
On issues like refugee resettlement, issue contestation leads to diverse policy 
positions across the province. This reflects the FNP’s decentralized decision-
making process. One FNP staff member explained: “The most important thing 
for the FNP is that governance comes from the bottom up, from the bottom 
outward” (Interview 7). Some have questioned the party’s decision to expand 
its policy platform. A member of the FNP’s executive board explained, “if you 
let the Frisian element fall away, then you’re just gone. It’s what differentiates 
us from the other parties” (Interview 8). Local meetings about the expansion of 
the party’s programme were met with some scepticism from membership 
(Interview 8).  
The party’s provincial election manifestos expanded from 16 to 30 pages 
between 2011 and 2015. Policy development particularly occurred in 
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environmental policy. There are three drivers for the focus on the environment. 
First, as the party transitions to be a governing party, it seeks to use the levers 
available to it. Provinces in the Netherlands are largely administrative and 
where they have the most autonomous decision-making power is in the 
planning of infrastructure, housing and the environment (van der Zwet, 2011: 
95). Second, environmental policy is aligned with making Friesland more 
Frisian. Environmental policy allows the FNP to protect the Frisian landscape, 
which is seen as unique and typically Frisian (Interview 5). Third, the party 
membership overwhelmingly agrees on the environmental agenda. Van der 
Zwet’s 2011 FNP survey data shows that members see investing in 
environmentally friendly policies as a high priority (7.53 on a scale from 0 to 
10). Environmental policy thus performs many functions for the party: 
developing the party’s ideological basis, using its new powers, and satisfying 
the party membership’s interest in defending Frisian identity. 
Finally, running in state-wide elections has been a longstanding discussion 
within the party. One FNP elected member explained: “It has always been at 
play in the party. It has always split the party because a large proportion of our 
supporters actually support other parties at national level” (Interview 3). The 
care with which party elites consider the issue is revealed in the trade off made 
between the FNP and researcher Arno van der Zwet. Van der Zwet received 
funding and party support for his survey with only one condition— “that the 
survey included 3 questions that related to the FNP’s participation in the Dutch 
general elections” (2011: 63). The efforts to collect data on membership 
attitudes towards running in state-wide elections also shows the importance in 
the FNP of gaining support from members. This reflects the party’s 
decentralized decision-making process and the higher level of disagreement 
on electoral strategy. 
4.3 Transnational Interactions 
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While the FNP is decentralized in its decision-making processes, the European 
Free Alliance plays a central role for its organisational elite. The EFA 
Committee includes members of the party’s board as well as the FNP’s 
member of the EFA Board. This allows for a clear line of communication 
between the FNP and EFA executives. But what is communicated in these 
lines? And with whom does the FNP communicate most in EFA?  
FNP elites indicate that membership of the European Free Alliance “expands 
your horizons,” “provides inspiration,” and “is a piece of motivation” (Interview 
2, 4, 5, and 6). Before considering the consequences of transnational 
interactions, I consider with whom the FNP engages. Van der Zwet argues that 
the FNP is part of a ‘little EFA’ group, which brings together parties with a focus 
on language/culture and which resemble political movements rather than 
parties (van der Zwet, 2015: 69). However, the FNP’s interactions do go 
beyond this grouping, as shown in Figure 4.2. This network visualization was 
created by coding interview respondents’ positive mentions of other parties. 
Electorally successful parties like the SNP, ERC, and Plaid Cymru are central. 
Respondents also reported interactions based around cultural events, such as 
with geographically and culturally close parties like Die Friesen. Interview 
respondent 2 also reported non-party cultural relationships with other regions 
(Graubunden, Andalucia). Finally, members also reported relationships based 
in similar energy policy concerns (such as the Süd-Tiroler Freiheit). The basis 
for these relationships will be further explored in this section. 
Lack of membership in EFA does not preclude contact. For example, EFA is 
developing closer relationships with Faroese political party Republic 
(Republic’s youth branch is already a member of EFA youth) (Interviews 10 




Figure 4.2 SNA Visualization of FNP Relationships in EFA 
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(1) Key Partners 
There are core parties of interest to the FNP which are shared by most 
respondents: the SNP, Plaid Cymru, the Flemish N-VA, Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya (ERC), and Basque Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). Most regions 
mentioned (12/16) are either ‘Northern European’ or Germanophone (in the 
case of South Tyrol). This is consistent with FNP elites’ characterization of their 
relationships in EFA. Most respondents noted that the closest partners in the 
European Free Alliance were those that shared cultural and geographical 
characteristics. One respondent outlined a ‘North West’ EFA group, which 
included broadly the Welsh, Scots, Flemish, Frisians, and minorities in 
Germany. The group was differentiated by its history and its more moderate 
and non-violent approach to the central state (Interview 6). Another suggested 
the FNP’s partners all shared a ‘North Sea culture.’ 
This ‘northern’ network also includes Frisian partners, particularly Die Friesen 
(a German Frisian regionalist party). During the period of study, Die Friesen 
was a member of EFA. However, a well-connected FNP respondent explained 
that interactions with Die Friesen went beyond the EFA network and extended 
into inter-Frisian networks and a bilateral relationship (Interview 1). The FNP’s 
website also notes: “By actively engaging with the FNP, now also two Frisian 
political parties in North and East Friesland (German states) have become 
active in the EFA context. These are the SSW (Schleswig-Holstein) and Die 
Friesen (East Friesland).” The FNP have worked towards a “Cultural Treaty” 
with the SSW which focused on “the European collaboration of the regions on 
the North Sea coast, the sea dykes, the Wadden Sea Landscape, the trilateral 
Wadden Academy, the geese and the European Interreg projects.”9 Other 
Frisian partners are thus seen as close to the FNP independent of EFA.  
                                                          
9 “FNP on a working visit to the party in office SSW in Schleswig-Holstein.” Accessed on 28 February 
at http://www.fnp.frl/english/news/16/.  
143 
 
These bilateral relationships facilitate both institutional and political 
collaboration. For example, subsequent EFA membership (in 2008 by Die 
Friesen and 2009 by the SSW) is seen as a success of the FNP’s networking. 
In 2018 Die Friesen chose to leave EFA due to a perceived lack of support 
from EFA for a court case in the European Court of Human Rights (Partei Die 
Friesen v. Germany). However, one FNP member explained, that while this 
disagreement was disappointing, the FNP would continue engagement with 
Die Friesen. Thus, Frisian and EFA networks are overlapping but not 
dependent on one another; interview respondents clearly separated Frisian 
cultural networks from EFA.  
Some of the most commonly mentioned parties are outside of the ‘northern’ 
group: ERC, EA and the PNC. These parties belong to another group of interest 
to the FNP: high profile, successful movements. The chairman of the EFA 
Commission explained of the SNP and ERC: “You have the bigger players that 
are your examples” (Interview 5). Every respondent mentioned the Scottish 
National Party. Seventeen FNP members were funded by the FNP’s Senate 
group (the OSF) to travel to Edinburgh in 2014 to study the Scottish referendum 
vote. One member noted: “of course, the SNP is much further along than the 
FNP” (Interview 8).  
The relationship is not mutual, due to this power imbalance. FNP interview 
respondents expressed having difficulty contacting the SNP (Interviews 5, 8, 
9). At an FNP-led meeting at the EFA conference in 2017 one FNP member 
noted with resignation: “I would have liked to see a member of the SNP here.” 
Another respondent contrasted the FNP’s relationship with the Lusatian 
Alliance, which was described as mutual to the relationship with the SNP. He 
explained, “When the Sorbs come, they learn from us and we also learn from 
them. From the Scots, we learn” (Interview 1). Asymmetry in relationships 
affects the regularity of interactions. 
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(2) Varied Modes of Interaction  
Parties can also be separated into those the FNP would like to work with on 
specific issues (energy policy, language policies, campaigning strategies) and 
those that have a more emotive, solidarity relationship. This latter function 
could be more superficial, with less information exchanged. For example, when 
EFA provides information regarding political prisoners in the Basque country, 
“we find that interesting to hear, but we don’t have the same understanding and 
connection to it because we don’t have political prisoners in Friesland” 
(Interview 3).  
The FNP has a more project-based approach to EFA than the other parties 
studied in this thesis. The structured engagement may be facilitated by the 
small number of elites and the initiative of the FNP’s EFA Committee. Currently, 
the party is developing a project on sustainable energy in sub-state regions. 
This feeds into the party’s local activism against gas extraction and wind 
turbines. The regional sustainable energy project was launched in 2016 and 
continues to the present. It included a conference in Leeuwarden in the autumn 
of 2017 and panels at EFA General Assemblies (2016, 2017 and 2018). This 
project is progressed by the FNP’s EFA Commission and a newly created 
regional sustainable energy commission. The consequences of this 
“Sustainable Energy in a Europe of the Regions” projects will be explored 
further in the next section. 
The FNP also saw its visit to Edinburgh as a structured project and the 
delegation wrote a report based on their interviews with Scottish voters done 
in Edinburgh during the 2014 referendum vote. This was shared with the party’s 
executive and with other OSF parties across the Netherlands. The formal and 
elite led approach to EFA interaction stands in contrast to other parties’ 
approaches which are more driven by informal relationships and individual 
initiative. The formal nature of the FNP’s transnational interactions implies that 
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consulting EFA is somewhat of an organisational routine, most simply defined 
as ‘recurrent interaction patterns’ (Becker, 2005).  
Face-to-face and project-based interactions are supported by knowledge 
gained from afar through reading articles, following other parties on Twitter, 
and other social media platforms. For example, before the 2014 visit to 
Edinburgh, all FNP members on the trip were required to read ‘a number of 
articles about the political situation in Scotland, the run-up to the referendum, 
and the arguments for and against independence.’10 One active member, who 
had been an EFA bureau member, explained that the first line of follow up after 
an international visit was often to find contacts on social media and share his 
experiences from the visit (both photos and written reflection). Through these 
linkages online, the FNP also receives “support via social media, via Facebook 
and Twitter. EFA sends press releases, newsletters, and updates on events. 
It’s a constant information stream” (Interview 4). Another noted that visits from 
other EFA partners led to social media friendships, and after repeated 
interactions, “eventually people will begin to meet up with each other 
spontaneously” (Interview 1).  
Social media contacts are not seen as replacements for direct interaction. One 
respondent noted: “It often happens that when you speak to people it’s really 
positive, and they say, ‘oh yeah that’s a good idea.’ Then later it’s difficult to 
get traction and to really set something up” (Interview 9). The FNP’s high level 
of interaction in EFA through a project and research-based approach suggests 
that they will regularly receive information, although this quote suggests 
interactions may not always lead to sustained exchange.   
4.4 Learning in the Frisian National Party 
                                                          
10 “Studiereis referendum over toekomst Schotland: Rapportage voor OSF.” Party report on the 2014 
Scotland trip provided by interview respondent.  
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Transnational interactions may lead to FNP learning through information 
exchange and the process of learning which may subsequently cause 
behavioural change. This section will apply the political party learning 
framework. In the first instance, I consider the process of learning by asking 
whether FNP members (individually or collectively) acquired, interpreted and 
implemented information from EFA partners. I consider the FNP’s learning 
through nine interviews, predominantly with members of the party’s executive 
and elected members, and analysis of relevant documents. All interviews and 
documents were collected and transcribed in Dutch.  
Four policy areas emerged as central to the party: energy policy, campaign 
strategy, Frisian language protection, and refugee resettlement. The FNP 
learns on two main issues of policy development: environmental sustainability 
and campaign strategy. Interestingly, the first is not a contested issue but it is 
an area of policy development whereas the second is highly contested. This 
alters the process of learning, particularly in the stage of information 
interpretation. The FNP also provides two cases where one might expect 
learning. The first, Frisian language protection, is the topic of transnational 
relationships but outwith the European Free Alliance. The second, refugee 
resettlement, is an international and European issue but the high level of 
internal disagreement means that the FNP has not interacted with transnational 
partners on refugee policy. As such, following these four cases through the 
proposed theoretical framework of political party learning provides a useful way 
to study cases in which learning does occur and in which it does not. 
(1) Information Acquisition  
The party actively acquires information from EFA partners on two issues: 
sustainable energy policy and campaign strategies. In this section, I review how 
information was passed from EFA partners to the FNP. I also consider a case 
where information transmission is not mediated through EFA (language 
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protection) and one where there is little to no information acquired from EFA 
partners (refugee resettlement). I consider why the FNP showed little interest 
in acquiring information from EFA partners on asylum seeker resettlement, 
despite the salience of the issue in Friesland, the Netherlands and across the 
EU.   
Sustainable Energy 
The FNP’s regional sustainable energy project, entitled ‘Sustainable Energy in 
a Europe of the Regions,’ seeks to ensure that: “European regions can better 
organise their strategies and policies for Sustainable Energy, as well as co-
operate and learn from each other” (EFA Press Release, 28/7/17). The project 
is comprised of two substantive elements: research into renewable technology 
suitable for regions (especially but not only Friesland) and research into the 
political opportunities that exist for regions on sustainable energy development. 
Although organised primarily by a group within the FNP, the European Free 
Alliance helped coordinate events, funded the project, and attended events. 
Meetings to work on the project were held at the 2016, 2017, and 2018 EFA 
General Assemblies and an October 2017 conference in Leeuwarden.  
This conference provides a good case study of how the FNP acquires 
information from other EFA parties. The conference was attended by most of 
the FNP’s elected members, current and previous EFA bureau members, and 
the FNP’s EFA Committee members. International presenters included the 
Director of EFA, a Plaid Cymru economic adviser, the leader of the SSW, 
international legal expert Ana Stanic, and an energy expert from Galicia. 
Attendees also included a representative from Valencian party Compromis and 
Miguel Martinez Tomey, who is responsible for the Europeans Affairs of Chunta 
Aragonesista (CHA) and an EFA Vice President. The aims of the project and 




In presentations, international presenters imparted information about the 
specific situation in their regions—for example, the use of small scale solar 
panel developments and people-centered projects in Schleswig Holstein or the 
use of hydro-electric plants and on-shore wind projects in Galicia. In summary 
slides about the conference, the FNP noted that presentations were very 
technical and provided a large amount of data. The FNP’s ‘wrap up’ after the 
conference noted that these presentations ‘confirmed knowledge about energy 
sources, including their business impact.’11 
Formal presentations were complemented by informal ‘break out’ sessions 
which were meant to be more action oriented. Informal spaces also revealed 
some difficulties for the FNP in incorporating ideas that were imparted by 
attendees. For example, in one break out session the discussion quickly 
became very specifically Frisian and sometimes strayed away from English as 
its main language. Although translation was attempted, the disparity in Dutch 
speakers versus English speakers (only 1 or 2 in a room with 15 plus 
participants) made this difficult. While at the EFA General Assembly, this also 
sometimes caused difficulty. While the plenary GA sessions are fully translated, 
the breakout sessions were not always so. Other informal spaces, such as 
lunch times saw similar linguistic division, with people tending to communicate 
with those they already knew. Linguistic and cultural division thus hindered 
further acquisition; the predominance of Frisian attendees meant that Frisian-
specific information rather than information from other regions was more likely 
to be discussed. 
Many of the ‘Northern’ connections posited as important by the FNP 
materialized but the project also drew connections to ‘southern’ regions with 
similar energy concerns (Galicia in the October conference, and Corsica in the 
2017 EFA GA meeting). It is interesting in the follow-up slides uploaded to 
                                                          




sec2017.eu that the FNP mentions specifically that, in its relationship with EFA 
on energy they should “mind specifically the Spanish situation.” However, the 
SNP and ERC are largely absent from the sustainable energy process. This 
shows another barrier in information acquisition about environmental policy. 
Members of the FNP’s organizing team expressed a desire to have SNP 
representatives at the October 2017 conference. However, they persistently 
received no response from SNP contacts.  
Electoral Strategy 
What do FNP elites take away from their interactions with high profile EFA 
partners? The SNP was mentioned multiple times as a party that runs in state-
wide elections. One respondent noted, “The SNP was a relatively small party 
but at some point, they did go to London and to the European Parliament…they 
are now the biggest party in Scotland, the most important opposition party in 
Westminster” (Interview 4). Another noted his interest in the way that the SNP 
strategically used the bedroom tax, the way they ‘replaced the local left-wing 
party,’ and their influence in Westminster (Interview 5). A third respondent 
noted that the SNP was seen as closely related to the Scottish people and 
positioned itself in opposition to the ‘neglect’ of Scotland by Labour and the 
Conservatives (Interview 8). Another noted the organised process of the 2014 
referendum, and the way it reflected the trust of the Scottish people (Interview 
7).  
In 2014, seventeen FNP members went to Edinburgh during the Scottish 
referendum process. The FNP’s overview of their trip explained that “purpose 
of the visit was to research the referendum process, from which lessons could 
be taken for Friesland and other regions in the Netherlands and Europe.” The 
party’s members interviewed 168 voters, across 18 polling places in Edinburgh. 
The referendum visit centered on gathering information about the process of 
the referendum, rather than the policy of independence. The lack of policy-
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related exchange may be due to the way that information is acquired. Rather 
than through face to face interaction with SNP members, information acquired 
on the trip was from Scottish voters. Given the lack of response from SNP 
contacts, in the FNP information about the SNP is often sourced through 
reading the news or mediated through EFA. Although the FNP invests in 
understanding Scotland, the SNP is seen as ‘holding itself at a distance’ 
(Interview 9). 
Frisian Language Protection 
Despite the centrality of language policy to the FNP’s programme, it is rarely 
mentioned as a topic of transnational relationships. This lack of transnational 
interaction seems to stem from a lack of internal FNP disagreement on 
linguistic protection as a central value. In fact, transnational relationships with 
other parties seemed to be more about information sharing from the FNP to 
other parties than about acquisition. For example, when speaking of the Sorbs 
in Germany, one respondent involved in the EFA Commission noted: “We are 
a bit stronger than those parties. We can help them with their survival, party 
governance, and building supporters” (Interview 5).  
With parties that are more successful than the FNP, the issue of interest is not 
language. The FNP’s policy adviser explained:  
“Look, in Friesland language is a really important part of people’s 
identity. That’s why in our province it’s an important policy. But in Europe 
there are a lot of issues. It is also really varied how regional parties deal 
with identity and such issues. For example, in Catalonia, they have a 
strong identity…their identity has more to do with the economy and with 
politics, just like in Scotland” (Interview 6).  
One transnational language project emerged from outside of EFA. The FNP 
has institutional access, through the Leeuwarden City of Culture bid, to a 
delegation from the Basque Country. This visit was organised as part of San 
Sebastian’s City of Culture which has a ‘project to set up a protocol of linguistic 
rights.’ One respondent who had been involved in the cooperation explained: 
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“A delegation came to Leeuwarden and they invited several people to speak to 
them. We [the FNP] also gave our input” (Interview 8). On the language policies 
in the FNP, policies are very settled and transnational information exchange 
flows predominantly outwards. Furthermore, language policy is not wholly party 
political; it is also channelled through other organisations (such as the Bureau 
of Small Languages, the Inter-Frisian Council). 
Refugee Resettlement 
Finally, another issue of importance in recent years in Friesland is the 
resettlement of refugees. While it was referred to as a salient policy issue, no 
FNP elites mentioned drawing on EFA partners for information about this policy 
area. Given the European Union’s partial competence on refugee policy, I 
would expect this policy area to have a more transnational element. One 
hindrance to transnational information acquisition on the issue of refugees is 
the diverse range of opinions on the matter.  
Migration is a salient issue in the Netherlands. The Party for Freedom (PVV) 
fought the 2006 and 2010 parliamentary elections on an anti-immigration (anti-
Islamic) and anti-establishment ticket (Mair 2008). Their vote share increased 
considerably in 2010 so that they became the 3rd largest party with 15.5% of 
the vote. In Friesland they won only 11.4% of the vote. One FNP city councilor 
said: “It’s a European problem and one that we, in our manifesto, we take very 
seriously. We are proponents of taking in refugees. Now that they are coming 
in large numbers, we have a lot of emergency reception centres in Friesland” 
(Interview 3).    
Despite this positive party position towards refugees, concern about the issue 
of refugee integration is not alien to Friesland. For example, in one municipality 
(Rijs), residents’ protests led to the rejection of a proposed asylum seeker 
center by an FNP/CDA coalition council (Schravesande et al., 2015). The issue 
is ‘very sensitive,’ explained one elected member. They elaborated: “We have 
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a lot of unemployed people, the highest percentage in the Netherlands. Our 
unemployed residents also want a job” (Interview 3). Given the FNP’s bottom 
up approach to policy making, the party is likely to be reactive and sensitive to 
local variation on the issues. 
Since the integration of asylum seekers is a local competence, each municipal 
council group can develop their own policy on the issue. One city’s group’s 
manifesto explained: “The FNP wants to comply with the statutory task when it 
comes to making homes for status holders available (asylum seekers with a 
residence status) …However, the FNP is of the opinion that the supervision 
and integration of these new residents can be managed much better” (2018 
Manifesto, Waadhoeke FNP).  
Other municipal manifestos were more direct about their claims: “The 
integration of immigrants should gain more attention without negatively 
affecting identity...New citizens and businesses outside of Friesland should be 
informed about the bilingual situation” (2018 Manifesto, Dantumadiel and 
Heerenveen FNP). Another municipality yet noted that money spent on refugee 
integration would be better spent on helping people in their own region (i.e. on 
international aid) (2018 Manifesto, Kollumerlan FNP). More than half of 
municipalities had no mention of the refugee issue in their programmes, while 
others included an entire paragraph on integration. This shows the disparity of 
interest across Friesland.  
Most of the key actors that work regularly with EFA are based at provincial, 
rather than municipal level. Given the municipal competency and divisions on 
the issue, elites may not see it as advantageous or appropriate to use EFA to 
acquire information on refugee/asylum-seeker policy. The lack of engagement 
with EFA partners on refugee and asylum seeker policy stands in contrast to 
the FNP’s active, organised and targeted information acquisition on 
environmental policy and Scottish campaign strategies. It shows how internal 
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contestation and decentralized decision making in the FNP can hinder 
information acquisition from EFA partners. 
(2) Information Interpretation  
In the two cases where the FNP acquired information from their transnational 
interactions, the party and its elites would then interpret that information. 
Interpretation is the process through which individuals and groups make 
meaning of information and adapt it to the specific case of their party. The FNP 
displays a mostly uniform, collective interpretation of sustainable energy 
information but discordant interpretations of campaign strategies. This reflects 
its existing divisions on electoral strategy and shared interpretation of the 
importance of the Frisian landscape (sustainability is one of its seven core 
values). Agreement on the interpretation of information about environmental 
sustainability allows for the party to continue along the learning process. 
Disagreement on electoral strategy means that learning about campaign 
strategies is kept at an individual rather than collective level.  
As noted in the previous section, much of the information imparted through the 
‘Sustainable Energy in Europe’ project is technical. However, the way it is 
interpreted shows the importance of pre-existing policy on the learning process. 
This confirms existing understanding of the use of evidence in policy making 
which argued that existing attitudes shape the way that people interpret 
information. As one author wrote: “It need not be the content of the research, 
or even its truth, that counts…but the zeitgeist. If it contradicts the zeitgeist it 
will have a harder time getting through” (Kogan, 1999: 12).  
Evidence that confirms the existing perspective of the FNP is thus much more 
likely to be internalized and adapted by party members. For example, the 
Galician scientist invited suggested that on-shore wind turbines were an 
important part of the Galician energy mix. In a subsequent breakout session, 
one member of the FNP explained: “In Spain, wind turbines don’t bother me, 
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but Friesland is a very flat, old country. Wind turbines don’t have a human 
character.” Another Frisian attendee, from an anti-wind farm community action 
group, argued: “Wind mills aren’t half as efficient as people say they are.” 
Existing policies and internal pressures in Friesland thus meant that the 
Galician experience of on-shore wind was seen as irrelevant.  
While the stance on wind farms was influential in the FNP’s interpretation, so 
was the party’s focus on regional autonomy. The emphasis on regional 
environmental mobilization (as opposed to statewide action) is confirmed by 
EFA partners. One respondent explained that the parties who engage with the 
FNP on the energy policy have a reason: they have often experienced the most 
negative effects of central state energy policies, in places like South Tyrol and 
Silesia (Interview 9). Transnational interactions confirm the urgency of FNP 
action. This can be seen in their conclusion that the party must: “hurry with 
such plans and approach the government in The Hague…and do so before 
others (like ministerial staff) develop plans for Friesland.”  
The emphasis on standing up to the central state and finding alternative 
sustainable energy sources to wind turbines in the FNP is to be expected. 
Existing understandings affect interpretations, because “people are more likely 
to ‘see something when they believe it’ rather than ‘believe it when they see it’” 
(Crossan et al., 1999: 528). Thus, in its official party interpretation, the FNP 
relied on shared understandings of environmentalism and regionalism. This 
was particularly possible because the project was underpinned by the party’s 
core values, very technical, and led by a small group of elites.  
On the other hand, the interpretations of the SNP’s campaign strategy were 
much less united.  This acquired information led to varied individual 
interpretations in the FNP. A few elites advocate running in statewide elections 
and interpret the SNP’s success as support for this argument. One elected 
member with strong links in EFA explained: “Will we take part in Dutch 
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elections, alongside other regional parties? Well, the SNP sits in Westminster, 
Plaid Cymru too. The Catalan and Basque parties sit in Madrid and they all sit 
in the European Parliament. These are steps the FNP still has to make” 
(Interview 4). Another respondent said: “you see that the SNP also sits directly 
in the UK Parliament. If you look at strategy, it does give us the idea that we 
should take that challenge to join the Tweede Kamer, maybe within the OSF” 
(Interview 5). These elites have used EFA partners to justify the feasibility of 
their position on campaign strategy.  
However, others interpret the SNP’s success as a function of how much they 
understand their local constituents rather than related to their campaign 
strategy at statewide level. For example, one member of the EFA Commission 
explained: “The other parties, like Labour and the Conservatives, neglected 
Scotland. They did little for Scotland and Scots felt excluded from those parties. 
The SNP orients itself to Scotland and that determines the attractiveness of the 
party” (Interview 8). An FNP elected member cautioned that Friesland could 
not be directly compared to Scotland due to divergent histories: “Friesland has 
never been an independent political unit, like in Scotland, Wales or Flanders” 
(Interview 3). Pre-existing contestation within the party is reflected in 
interpretations of the SNP’s success.  
Finally, there was some discussion of the example of the Scottish referendum 
in 2014. Respondents who mentioned the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum interpreted it as a mechanism that would be useful in a Frisian 
context, within the FNP’s more moderate autonomy claims. One respondent 
who attended the referendum observation explained: “It is naturally an example 
of, were we to ever do something like that here, how it should be done and 
what shouldn’t be done” (Interview 4). An FNP elected member said to a local 
radio station: “Friesland isn’t the same as Scotland, so they aren’t completely 
comparable, but a referendum would be possible here” (2014 Omrop Fryslan 
interview). The post Scottish referendum report, written by a member of the 
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FNP’s executive board, concluded: “For Friesland/the Netherlands, a 
referendum can be an excellent democratic means to involve the population 
and make a statement about the future of an area.”  
(3) Information Implementation  
In this final part of the learning process, information which has been 
internalized and adapted would then be applied within the party. In some cases, 
this implementation will be more internal (i.e. changing the arguments used, 
reinforcing existing positions) but in other cases information implementation 
might be reflected in changed behaviour (such as manifesto commitments, 
strategic choices). In the case of the FNP, the sustainable energy project 
confirmed existing policies and provided evidence for the FNP’s rejection of 
wind energy and promotion of alternative energy sources (geothermal and 
solar). On the other hand, the campaign strategy information, drawn 
predominantly from the SNP, did not lead to a collective change in the FNP 
because of the lack of a collective interpretation. However, it did strengthen 
some individual elite members beliefs in the appropriate way forward. Finally, 
although the causality is not fully attributable, it is likely that the Scottish 
referendum encouraged FNP members to propose the mechanism in their 
2015 manifesto.  
On sustainable energy, there is not a change in the party’s policy from 2016 
onwards, as sustainability is a long-standing value. However, the project has 
been used to develop further evidence and conviction for existing stances. For 
example, in the press release after the energy conference, the party noted that: 
“The presentations showed that Friesland had a large potential for sustainable 
energy. Therefore, we are looking particularly at geothermal energy, solar 
energy and wind turbines at sea” (FNP press release, October 2017). The FNP 
has suggested that the next steps in the project include seminars on specific 
issues (like energy storage), workshops at the EFA conference, providing 
157 
 
advice based on existing evidence, further studies (drawing on technical 
universities), and developing a sustainable energy development team (within 
EFA).  
Members expressed their willingness to learn in an iterative manner, 
particularly focused on the development of a more cooperative approach. For 
example, between the 2016 EFA GA and the 2017 EFA GA in Katowice the 
party was unable to activate some of the contacts it had made. However, one 
FNP respondent involved in the Sustainable Energy Commission explained: 
“Now we have re-initiated those contacts in Katowice and the question is what 
kind of result comes from this. It’s kind of like a repeat of the same situation, 
but maybe it will go better now” (Interview 9).  
The repetitiveness of learning processes, and the way in which they feed into 
further learning, touches on a key feature of learning implementation. Learning 
and the problems it is used to solve “evolve through a multistage, iterative 
process. Every implementation action simultaneously changes policy 
problems, policy resources, and policy objectives. New issues, new 
requirements, new considerations emerge as the process unfolds” 
(McLaughlin, 1987: 174). It would be interesting, in further research, to follow 
a learning process over a wider span of time to explore this dynamic. 
A further, likely unintended, behavioural outcome of the project is a higher 
amount of engagement from FNP members with EFA. Since the project was 
launched, there have been more FNP members attending EFA events “to build 
up contacts, to interact with others. So now there are also more people in the 
FNP who have direct contact with other EFA parties” (Interview 9). 
On electoral strategy, individuals’ beliefs have been affected by the examples 
of more successful parties, especially the SNP. One Provincial Council 
member, who was also highly active in EFA, expressed that the Scottish 
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example encouraged him to push for more action and ambition in the party. He 
explained:  
“The FNP already has a vision for the future of Friesland and it means 
that we want more powers, more autonomy, more powers, but now the 
implementation. That is taking a long time. The party really has to step 
up…It will be important in the coming years: are we constantly in a 
comfort zone or are we moving forward? You may lose members, but it 
offers chances. The SNP was a pretty small party, but at a certain 
moment they went to London…Well, we still have that way to go” 
(Interview 4).  
Political party elite recognize the need to get party buy in, to disperse 
information they have acquired, and the risks that are posed by attempting 
party change. As noted previously in the chapter, these risks center around 
moving beyond the parties’ core belief of language and Frisian cultural defense 
and beginning to take stronger positions on state wide issues. This is 
particularly complicated by the FNP’s decentralized decision making structure. 
Multiple elites emphasized the need to follow party procedures (decision 
making ‘from the bottom up’) and that the general party would need to be 
convinced before the choice to run in statewide elections (Interviews 3, 4, 8).  
The SNP example is implemented in FNP elites’ beliefs, but it is yet to translate 
to collective learning. One member of the FNP’s executive bureau noted that 
at a recent FNP members’ gathering: “There was conflict over the role of 
language policy. There were groups within the party that felt we should let the 
Frisian element sail. We need to expand the party through a more 
generalizable programme…we had elaborate conversations about [expanding 
the party programme] but this was turned down so it will stay as it is” (Interview 
8).  
It is possible to consider a third point of party learning around the FNP’s 
interpretation of the SNP. That is, respondents suggested that the 2014 
Scottish referendum showed that a referendum was a feasible democratic 
mechanism in Friesland. This was a view presented in both interviews and the 
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party’s report of its trip (which was also shared with the party). In the party’s 
2011 referendum, the party suggested that administrative “reclassifications 
must be demonstrably supported by a substantial majority of the residents 
concerned. That is possible, if at least it was the subject of the council elections 
or else with a referendum” (p. 5).  
However, in 2015 the party promoted a much more proactive policy that called 
for a referendum on autonomy. The 2015 manifesto noted that: “the FNP wants 
the province to start a broad discussion among the residents of Friesland...This 
should culminate in a referendum at the same time as the municipal elections 
in 2017 about whether and how Friesland and the Frisians get more say in 
hospitals, housing corporations and healthcare institutions” (p. 6). The 2019 
manifesto confirmed this policy. It is difficult to attribute direct causality from the 
2014 referendum to this stronger policy on holding a referendum, it is possible 
that the experience of the Scottish referendum emboldened the FNP’s policy 
in this area. The party also proposes a specific question and date for the 
referendum, two points they noted as commendable in the Scottish process.  
4.5 Conclusion  
The European Free Alliance has been central to the way that the FNP 
expresses its core value of internationalism. The FNP has both a structural role 
in EFA (a bureau membership) and a structural role for EFA in the FNP (the 
EFA Commission). The FNP uses the European Free Alliance to build up 
relationships with regionalists across Europe, although they are not solely 
transnationally active through EFA. Inter-Frisian connections and minority 
language protection organisations offer alternative routes of cross-border 
cooperation. The FNP used EFA connections to develop a sustainable energy 
project, which brought numerous EFA parties as well as EFA central staff to 
Friesland. They also built up more distant connections to the SNP, often using 
virtual means and travelling to Scotland to understand the independence 
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process. Both of these information acquisition processes engendered learning 
in different ways. 
The FNP primarily learned on uncontested area of policy, environmental 
sustainability. Although the general ideological stance on sustainability was 
agreed, the FNP’s small size and limited policy platform led them to expand 
and detail their policy on environmental sustainability. Learning thus occurred 
as part of a process of policy development. The joint EFA-FNP “Sustainable 
Energy in a Europe of the Regions” project and October 2017 conference thus 
provided a space for adopting new evidence and arguments to support their 
Frisian environmentalism. It is notable that where the party had strong policies 
(i.e. anti-onshore wind), new information was not incorporated.  
On electoral strategy there was no such pre-existing agreement on policy. 
While the status quo and members tended towards protecting the Frisian 
specificity of the party, numerous elites sought to alter the party’s strategy. 
They encouraged the party to enter statewide elections, drawing on examples 
from other EFA member parties. Different stances between elites and members 
of the FNP on this strategic choice, contestation and the need for negotiation, 
meant that the process of learning was halted at the level of individual 
interpretation of information. Individuals interpreted and internalized 
information about other regionalist parties, but they were unable to disseminate 
this information and engender collective party learning. 
The FNP also provides two examples of policy areas that were salient to the 
party but did not display learning, despite some indications that they would. 
The first is the central policy of minority language protection, which the FNP 
shares with many of its EFA partners. However, given their developed policy 
on language protection, the FNP saw itself more as a transmitter of information 
on this issue. Furthermore, Friesland had also developed administrative and 
third sector organisations which mediate transnational relationships on 
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language protection. As such, just as issue contestation leads FNP elites to 
seek information, a strongly agreed and developed policy area may discourage 
learning. The second case of non-learning is on refugee resettlement policy. 
Although this is a European issue, the municipal level of decision making on 
the implementation of resettlement and the decentralized nature of FNP 
decision making mean that the party does not acquire information from EFA 
partners on refugee and asylum seeker policy.  
The FNP’s transnational interactions, guided by the European Free Alliance, 
allowed them to acquire information on partners (particularly those with more 
electoral success) such as the SNP and policy areas such as environmental 
sustainability. This information acquisition led to some further learning, both at 
a collective level (in the case of the environmental project) and individually (in 
the case of electoral strategy). Learning was particularly useful to support 
elites’ arguments. It allowed them to support calls for alternative types of 
renewable energy with technical information and cases from abroad (for 
example, Galicia). Some elites also called on the Scottish example to support 
their preferences on electoral strategy and the choice of a referendum 
mechanism for autonomism.  
The FNP case does provide some useful caveats to the proposed party-political 
learning framework. First, the contextual factor of governing responsibility was 
complicated in the FNP case. In Chapter One, I proposed that governing 
responsibility will reduce learning due to the increased responsibility in 
government. As a minority coalition partner, the FNP does not fully fit the role 
of a governing party. However, the FNP’s role in provincial government 
incentivizes the party to develop its policy on its key coalition demand of 
sustainable energy. Sustainable energy is subsequently a key area of 
transnational learning for the party, indicating that there may be a further 
contextual factor of the effect of coalition positions on party learning.  
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It would also be useful to consider how the contextual factors affect parties in 
a more complex configuration, how contextual factors interact with one another. 
For example, the FNP’s mixture of decentralized decision making and its 
internal contestation on the issue of refugees and asylum seekers meant that 
the party did not acquire European level information on that policy area. The 
grounded approach taken in this thesis allows me to unpack the way that 
ideological and institutional factors shape the movement of information 


















Chapter Five: l’Union Démocratique Bretonne  
The Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB) is a small regionalist party that 
defends Breton regional culture and promotes autonomy from a foundation of 
left wing politics. The UDB is based in Brittany, which can be understood as a 
‘region of very strong contrasts’ (Pasquier, 2014: 29). The region is 
characterized by two regional languages (Gallo and Breton), dual capitals 
(Rennes and Nantes), and political tension between Gaullist centralization and 
Celtic regionalism. Brittany also contrasts with the rest of France; the region 
consistently has a higher Socialist and lower Front National vote (Pasquier, 
2014: 28). Within this context, the UDB was founded in 1964. In its early days, 
the party particularly employed the concept of internal colonialism and 
combatted what it saw as colonialist politics both at home and abroad (Rogers, 
1996: 551).  
The UDB remains a small party with around 500 members12 and little governing 
power. Having distanced itself from its more communist roots, the UDB is now 
a left wing, environmentalist and autonomist party. Left-wing regionalism has 
been entrenched by the presence of radical right-wing Breton regionalist 
parties (previously POBL and currently Adsav). The party’s strong ideological 
stance, Celtic cultural connections, and small size affect their role in the EFA 
network and the way they move through the learning process.  
This chapter finds that the UDB displays learning, to varying degrees, in four 
different cases. The party’s elites display learning in their promotion of a more 
autonomous electoral strategy (a contentious issue). Meanwhile, learning on 
campaign strategies are more technocratic and ‘scientific.’ Finally, information 
is acquired on areas of importance to members of the UDB: regional autonomy 
and minority language protection. Interestingly, on both these policy areas, 
information from other EFA regionalist parties is interpreted as a way to support 
                                                          
12 As reported by interview respondents.  
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the ‘feasibility’ of Breton autonomy. This unified interpretation reflects the 
ideological unity in the UDB. However, it also reflects a factor that hinders the 
UDB’s learning: the feeling of falling behind. I find that this feeling hinders 
progress along the process of learning.  
Findings in this chapter stem from ten interviews with members of the UDB. 
Eight of these interview respondents are members of the party’s executive 
board, nine have been UDB candidates, and one is an elected member. The 
chapter also draws on the book S’emanciper, articles from the UDB’s magazine 
Le Peuple Breton, and press releases from the UDB. Interviews and 
documents were conducted/collected and analyzed in French.  
This chapter begins with an introduction to the Union Démocratique Bretonne 
and then a review of how the UDB performs on the five contextual factors of 
my theoretical framework. In section three, I unpack the UDB’s transnational 
interactions by mapping the UDB’s relationships in EFA. Section four explores 
whether the UDB displays learning by following the three stages of information 
acquisition, interpretation, and implementation. I also consider barriers to 
learning such as their lack of regional success and activist approach to 
transnational networking. I thus explore the tension that the UDB is both deeply 
committed to transnational regionalism and persistently unsuccessful in Breton 
regional politics. Finally, I conclude by reflecting on the role of contextual 
factors in learning, the transnational party-political learning framework 
proposed in this thesis and to what extent the UDB’s experience is consistent 
with this theoretical proposal.  
5.1 Introducing the Union Démocratique Bretonne 
The Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB) is a left-wing autonomist party based 
in the regions of Brittany and Loire-Atlantique in France. The party’s three main 
aims are left wing (‘gauche’) economic policies, autonomism, and 
environmentalism. The UDB is not independentist but it promotes federalism, 
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in France and in the EU. The party’s goals are influenced by what they see as 
the hyper-centralization of France. French centralization means that Breton 
regional institutions are still heavily controlled by the French state, which has a 
‘tentacular’ nature (Cole and Laughlin, 2003: 267). This sense of regional 
disempowerment becomes important when the UDB tries to adapt policies from 
other parties.  
 
Source: French Ministry of the Interior  
Figure 5.1 Map of French administrative regions 
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Furthermore, the UDB is affected by the separation of Brittany into two 
administrative regions: Bretagne and the Pays de la Loire, which the UDB 
seeks to unify. Reunification was the second point of its founding charter in 
1964 and remains a priority for UDB politicians (Miodownik and Cartrite, 2006: 
62). The map below delineates the administrative division of the region. The 
second map highlights another division in the region: linguistic differences in 
Brittany. Alongside Breton, Brittany is also home to Gallo. These institutional 
and cultural factors shape the UDB.  
 
Source: Bretagne Culture Diversite 
Figure 5.2 Map of Regional Languages in Brittany 
Recently, the UDB decided to no longer form coalitions with the French 
Socialist party. This decision reflected party members’ disappointment with the 
Socialist Government and regional Socialist leaders (particularly regional 
President and then Minister for Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian). Several older 
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UDB members left in disagreement with this electorally autonomous approach 
to elections, highlighting the divisive power of Le Drian for autonomists 
(Pasquier, 2016: 157-159). After separating from Socialist and Green partners, 
in the 2015 regional elections, the UDB ran on a regionalist platform (Oui la 
Bretagne). The regionalist coalition won 6.7% of the vote and the UDB was 
unable to re-elect any members to the regional government. This recent 
strategic shift and the organisational rejuvenation (particularly in age) of the 
party provide the foundation for my discussion of party learning.  
5.2 Contextual Factors and the UDB 
To compare the UDB’s experience of transnational political party networking 
and learning, I first consider how the party performs on a number of contextual 
factors: electoral success, governing responsibility, party centralization, key 
transnational entrepreneurs, and issue contention. For the UDB, the most 
important contextual factors are lack of electoral success, presence of 
numerous transnational entrepreneurs, and issue contention. The party’s low 
levels of electoral support and strong ideological stance hinder its ability to 
learn. Nonetheless, the party’s communicative executive, including numerous 
entrepreneurs, and intra-party strategic contestation mean that members of the 
UDB attempt and occasionally succeed at learning from EFA partners.  
(1) Electoral Strength and Governing Responsibility 
The UDB has low, although steady, levels of electoral strength and few 
positions of governing responsibility. This lack of electoral strength and 
governing responsibility encourages them to look for positive, more successful 
examples elsewhere, but it also engenders a feeling of being left behind. The 
UDB’s support base has traditionally been very small and it has often run on 
varied coalition platforms. As such, it is difficult to follow the party’s electoral 
evolution through vote shares. At the much broader level of French legislative 
elections (which also add on the complication of two rounds of election). 
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However, there has been some increase in UDB vote share over time. More 
importantly, the party has consistently contested elections since its foundation, 
although in some cases at national legislative elections they presented 
candidates in only some constituencies. This consistency sets them apart from 
other Breton regionalist parties, which have mostly been short-lived.  
Table 5.1 UDB regional electoral results (1986-2015) (Pasquier, 2015) 
Year  
UDB Percent of 
Vote Seats Governing Responsibility 
2015 6.71%* 0 - 
2010 12.7%** 3 In Opposition  
     2004 9.70%** 4 In Opposition 
1998 3.6% 0 - 
1992 2.4%*** 0 - 
1986 1.6%**** 0 - 
*on regionalist ‘Oui La Bretagne’ list 
**on Green/UDB list 
***on joint Breton regionalist platform 
****on list with PSU 
In Breton regional elections, the UDB has consistently contested elections and 
received a steady, if low, vote share. Their separation from more mainstream 
parties’ coalitions led to the loss of all three regional elected members in 2015. 
However, the UDB has elected two Nantes city councillors. These councillors 
sit in the governing coalition on the Nantes City Council, with the Socialist 
Party.  
At the statewide level, the picture is more complicated as the UDB does not 
always run in each constituency and has varied agreements to support or 
coalesce around other parties’ candidates. As such, it is difficult to show 
precise vote share figures for UDB performance in statewide legislative 
elections. However, in 2012, the first Breton autonomist, Paul Molac, was 
elected to the Assemblée Nationale. Molac was supported by the Parti 
Socialiste, Europe Écologie-Les Verts, and the UDB. Although Molac distances 
himself from party membership, he is closely linked to the UDB; some of his 
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staff are active members of the party. Molac was re-elected in 2017 on 
Emmanuel Macron’s ‘La Republique en Marche’ list, although “he nevertheless 
maintains links with Regions et Peuples Solidaires” (Peuple Breton, 25 August 
2017). 
Despite this breakthrough for the UDB, the party remains small. A member of 
the party’s executive explained that recruitment was a priority and that, “it is 
difficult to convince people to join parties and participate.” The UDB 
nonetheless maintains a consistent presence in elections and a stable core 
membership. 
As previously noted, in 2015, the UDB formed the ‘Oui la Bretagne’ electoral 
coalition with Christian Troadec. Troadec became well known in Brittany as 
mayor of Carhaix and a leader of the bonnet rouges movement.13 This coalition 
was seen as a way to consolidate the Breton autonomist movement and a 
strategic choice to build the UDB’s support base. The party’s spokesperson 
explained that under Oui la Bretagne: “There are many people today who do 
not want to join a political party, but still want to take part in politics. With the 
platform ‘Oui la Bretagne,' we give them the opportunity to do so.” The platform 
is envisioned by party leadership to be in place for ‘many years’ beyond the 
2015 regional election.  
(2) Party Centralization  
The UDB as an organisation displays characteristics of structured 
decentralization. The UDB has a consistent base of 500 members, ‘can 
campaign, can present candidates all over’ and ‘has a form of continuity with 
consistent membership and a regular presence’ in Brittany (Interview 14). The 
party eschews formal, centralized leadership. Rather than adopting a top-down 
approach, the UDB’s organizational structure stems from its Marxist and anti-
                                                          
13 The bonnet rouges were a protest movement against a proposed new tax on trucks, which was 
seen as detrimental to the Breton agricultural industry.  
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colonialist roots. One staff member explained: “the specialty of the UDB I think 
is a party that leaves a lot of room for individual energy but in a very structured 
framework—very leftist” (Interview 12).  
The decentralized components of the party are typified by the fact that the UDB 
does not have a formal role for a leader. From the early years of the party, 
members “sought to avoid the monopolization of power by a leader by favoring 
a collegiate operation” (Pasquier, 2004: 113). However, the party has a small 
group of elites which make it possible to identify a de facto leader and leading 
role. The de facto leading role in the party is its spokesperson; the position is 
currently held by Nil Caouissin. Caouissin explained this role:  
“Normally we decide everything communally and there is a responsible 
member for each internal issue. In these cases, I am just a member of 
the party. But, as I must speak for the party, often in front of the 
media…it's me who will finally report the decisions. It’s me who signs 
accords with our partners. And when someone wants to speak with the 
UDB, it’s me they call. So—I have more information than others, but I 
try to share it as much as possible.”  
Party policy, on day to day matters, is decided by the bureau politique which is 
comprised of 28 members: 14 from each regional branch and 14 members 
elected at the National Congress. This includes members such as the 
spokesperson and members responsible for communication, training, and 
international affairs. The bureau meets every 6 weeks. However, on bigger 
issues, the party consults its members. This can occur through a vote in each 
territorial federation or through a convention, where each member has a vote 
(Interview 19). Information transmission across these structures is aided by the 
party’s communication wing which is underpinned by the monthly magazine Le 
Peuple Breton. This magazine disseminates information between members 
(about half of Peuple Breton subscribers are UDB members). Notably, the 
magazine has a permanent international section.  
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Organisationally, the party’s strategic shift catalysed a renewal in the party 
which has led to a younger membership and executive. One member of the 
executive bureau explained: “We have a direction which is completely 
rejuvenated. And consequently, we leave room for new initiatives” (Interview 
14). Another executive member explained that a new young cohort, “brought 
new life into the UDB with the support and help of older members” (Interview 
19). The level of centralization within a party affects the extent to which 
information acquired from other parties can be shifted from individual to 
collective understanding. Although the UDB has a decentralized Marxist ethos, 
the small size of the party, close relationships within the elite cohort, and the 
younger core of the party contribute to clear communication across the party. 
Decentralization does thus not lead to significant divergent views across the 
party.  
(3) Key Entrepreneurs  
Entrepreneurs maintain connections and bridge the gap between the regional 
party and EFA. In a small party with few resources, active entrepreneurs are 
particularly important. One long time UDB member and active member of EFA 
explained that it is often difficult to talk about official ‘relationships’ between 
parties, “because we are small and so we have contacts that are like 
friendships” (Interview 21). The UDB has several very invested entrepreneurs 
who play a central role in both the UDB and EFA. 
Earlier in his career, Le Peuple Breton’s editor and the UDB’s head of 
communications, Gael Briand, served as a European Free Alliance intern. The 
magazine is now affiliated with EFA’s political foundation, the Centre Maurits 
Coppetiers (CMC). This relationship with the CMC encourages more points of 
contact between the UDB and EFA. For example, membership of the CMC 
means that the UDB can send not only a UDB delegate to the EFA General 
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Assembly but a delegate to the CMC General Assembly (held parallel to the 
EFA GA).  
The UDB also has a dedicated international officer (Victor Gallou) and the UDB 
Jeunes, the party’s youth branch, has its own international officer (Jean-
Christophe Cordaillat). Both regularly attend EFA events. Gallou explained that 
the role entails “managing relations with EFA parties and the promotion or 
political development of the UDB in Europe and internationally.” 
Earlier on in EFA’s history, Corsican MEP Max Siemoni strengthened the 
relationship between EFA and French EFA member parties. Simeoni was the 
first French regionalist MEP, elected in 1989. During his tenure in the European 
Parliament, his staff included UDB spokesperson Christian Guyonvarc’h. One 
UDB member explained: “Christian Guyonvarc’h, who is a UDB official, was a 
parliamentary assistant in Europe for years. So, there is a UDB official in the 
European parliamentary system. We actively participate in the system” 
(Interview 16).  
(4) Issue Contestation 
Issue contestation can lead to a greater effort to develop policies within a party 
and to strengthen the arguments by different factions within a party. Alternately, 
policy agreement might lead parties to emphasize certain policy areas in their 
communications transnationally. Learning is commenced by a transfer of 
information, often initiated by a policy seeking. Issue contestation might affect 
how likely a party is to seek new information on specific policy areas and which 
policy or strategy issues it is likely to learn on. 
The core values of the UDB are autonomism (both a defense of Breton culture 
and a call for greater regional autonomy) and left-wing social and economic 
stances. The UDB’s position has shifted over time towards a more moderate 
left-wing position. One long-standing member of the party explained that 
previously the party had “a rigidity, based in the Marxist-Leninist culture. And 
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it’s true that the line of the party was a bit rigid. The left-wing values are still 
there…you can’t forget that the UDB supports the liberation fights of all 
peoples. So, that has stayed the same in the UDB. These are stable and 
reassuring values” (Interview 16).  
Left-wing economic and social positions also underpin the party’s position on 
Europe. A common refrain from interview respondents on the European Union 
was to call for a ‘social Europe’ and a ‘political Europe’ and to argue against 
the ‘hyper-liberal’ nature of the EU. Although the party’s members avow pro-
European stances and identities, there is a tension at the heart of this stance. 
One young, more Eurosceptic member explained: “So we have to choose: to 
support liberal politics or to push for change in Europe—but at the risk of 
destroying Europe?” (Interview 18). 
The party’s other area of focus is language. The UDB emphasizes the 
importance of minority languages (Breton and Gallo) and Breton culture. While 
“the defense of the language remains essential and dominant,” I would argue 
that it was less salient than in the FNP (Interview 16). The first reason for this 
is that Brittany has two main languages. One youth member noted that: “we 
always talk about Breton, but we forget about Gallo, which is also a language 
of Brittany” (Interview 15). Second, the Breton cultural movement does not 
have explicit political links (Interview 16). Finally, language policy is not 
perceived to lead to success. A member of the UDB executive explained: “[The 
Breton language] is important for many people in the UDB but in the political 
discourse we don’t put it first. Because we are caricatured” (Interview 19).  
There is a strong sense of ideological agreement within the UDB. One interview 
respondent explained: “For me ideology is hyper-important. After, however, we 
must also know that there is ideology on one side and after arriving in power 
on the other…we’re on the fence: between the political system which obliges 
us to make alliances to be elected and our ideology which encourages us to 
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work autonomously” (Interview 21). This juggling of autonomist values and 
strategy has also led to a recent, contested change in the party’s electoral 
behaviour.  
In 2014, the UDB chose to contest elections autonomously, separating 
themselves from shared lists with the Socialist Party and the Green Party. The 
link between the UDB and Socialists was well established, but controversial. 
One party member explained, “Those who hate us said we are the dogs of the 
Socialist Party.” After the election of Socialist President Francois Hollande, 
UDB members were disappointed with the Socialist French Government and 
regional Socialist leaders (particularly President of the Breton region and 
Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian). They also felt that 
the regionalist agenda was being co-opted by mainstream parties who adopt a 
regionalist rhetoric in Brittany (Cole and Laughlin, 2010: 268).  
In 2014, Caouissin unseated incumbent leader Mona Bras and was elected at 
the age of 23 to the spokesperson role. Some members were upset with the 
change; a staff member explained that, after the change, “a lot of our members, 
often the older ones, quit the party” (Interview 12). In section four of this 
chapter, I will further elaborate on how elites learned in order to support their 
positions in this strategic debate.  
5.3 Transnational Interactions 
The root of my proposed party learning framework is the sustained interactions 
between EFA’s member parties. This section allows me to map the UDB’s 
relationships within the European Free Alliance. These are developed through 
interactions at EFA events, bilateral personal contacts, and information-
seeking outreach by the UDB’s transnationally active elite members. The UDB 
joined EFA in 1986 and eight years later co-founded what was described as 
the ‘EFA in France’ Regions et Peuples Solidaires, which links French 
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regionalist parties to one another. The UDB’s history of international relations 
predates their membership of EFA: 
“Even in a way in the 70s, we had relations with the Irish, the Kanaks, 
the Martinicans ... International affairs, for us in Brittany, has always 
enormously counted. Because as a peripheral nation we have also 
needed relationships and support from elsewhere…This has always 
been a very important aspect: solidarity internationally, between 
peoples” (Interview 14). 
International solidarity reflects both the anti-colonialism of the UDB and the 
party’s peripheral nature in France. The party’s policy book explained: 
“International solidarity has nothing to do with charity, but first requires a review 
of the rules of the global economy” (S’emanciper, 2018: 163). In Europe, the 
UDB particularly aligns itself with parties it sees as having a Celtic tradition. 
One respondent explained: “there is an open-mindedness and a desire for 
mutual aid between Brittany and Cornwall, Wales, Scotland and on the Atlantic 
Arc…There is a willingness to share” (Interview 18).  
The network visualization of the UDB’s connections provides an overview of 
UDB elites’ relationships in the EFA network. There are a high number of 
connected interview respondents in the UDB. Six of the ten respondents name 
more than seven parties. The graph notably shows one respondent with no 
connections. That respondent believed that international connections were 
better discussed by those in ‘international affairs’ roles. This shows the power 
of the ‘entrepreneur’ in the EFA network. They are the conduit to connections 
for less internationally active party members. The graph also shows which EFA 
parties were named by most respondents: Plaid Cymru, the SNP, ERC, Eusko 
Alkartasuna (from the Basque Country) and the PNC from Corsica. These 
connections will be discussed in the rest of this section. 
(1) Key Partners 
Most UDB members interviewed named the Welsh nationalist party, Plaid 
Cymru, as its closest ally. Plaid’s ideologies and culture are seen to align with 
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Breton culture and UDB ideologies. One elected member explained: “For us, 
starting from history and culture, we end up with natural allies such as Wales 
or other Celtic countries…The Corsicans, they have more relations with 
Sardinia or with Catalonia because they are natural allies in terms of culture 
and language” (Interview 13).  
UDB members consider Plaid’s autonomist, but not fully independentist, stance 
as more relatable to Brittany. Furthermore, “what is interesting with Wales is 
that there have always been strong historical links between Brittany and Wales, 
because the languages are really similar…Wales and Brittany are kind of the 
same size, the same population, thus we can concretely compare ourselves to 
them” (Interview 12). This sense of comparability becomes important when 
exchanging information and going through the learning process because it 
eases the burden on UDB members to adapt information to the Breton context.  
The relationship to Plaid is seen as much stronger than the relationship to other 
EFA parties. One member explained, “Even if we have amicable, respectful 
relations with the SNP, there aren’t the same intensive ties that we have with 
Plaid” (Interview 18). Before membership of EFA, in 1974 the UDB signed the 
Chartre de Brest with ‘likeminded’ movements across Europe including: Welsh, 
Galician, Irish, Catalan, Sardinian, and Basque movements (Schrijver, 2006: 
212). The uniting factor for these parties was the dual goals of autonomism and 
socialism.  
A member of the party’s executive explained that the UDB “also have fairly 
close relations with the BNG of Galicia, and with ERC de Catalonia because 
they are two leftist parties. We have historical relations with them” (Interview 
20). Further, the UDB saw its network as stretching between parties on the 
Iberic Peninsula and the British Isles. With the former, ideological congruence 
drove relationships. With the latter both ideology and a Celtic culture were seen 
to be aligned.  
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A key figure in the UDB’s transnational relationships explained that Mebyn 
Kernow, the Cornish nationalist party, is a party with which the UDB is ‘very, 
very close’ (Interview 14). The relationship is enhanced by a power differential. 
The respondent explained: “it’s easier to work with the Cornish because they 
respond to us when we communicate with them immediately. The issue is that 
as we are weaker than the Welsh and Scots. So, the Welsh and Scots come 
because of kindness but they are not necessarily demanding to come to 
Brittany” (Interview 14). However, the small size also has a disadvantage. One 
internationally active member explained that “with Mebyn Kernow, there’s not 
enough exchange because they are so small that there is no time for them to 
organise things” (Interview 21).  
On the contrary, while relationships with MK are encouraged through a power 
differential, they are hindered with the SNP. The UDB relates to the SNP, both 
as one of its Celtic cultural sister parties, and ideologically. However, there are 
“very few relations with Scotland, even if we would like that there were more” 
(Interview 12). One respondent explained, that with Brexit: “The SNP is 
especially focused on itself right now. It's an internal fight this moment…For 
our general meeting in March, we sent invitations to the SNP and Plaid. For the 
moment only have the Plaid answered. The SNP is currently occupied” 
(Interview 18). One internationally active member noted that “with the Scots, 
the issue is that we have trouble contacting them because, well of course, the 
Scots can talk to states” (Interview 14) 
The UDB’s sub-network is shaped by its leftist ideological and Celtic cultural 
positionality. However, power also shapes the level of interactions within the 
European Free Alliance. Within the UDB’s sub-network, the party finds itself in 
the middle: “That's really the thing: the Cornish want to be like the Bretons, the 
Bretons want to be like the Welsh, and the Welsh want to be like the Scots” 
(Interview 14).  
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(2) Regions et Peuples Solidaires  
In addition to looking at the UDB’s network in the European Free Alliance, it is 
important to mention its network within the French state. The UDB cofounded 
Regions et Peuples Solidaires (RPS), a network bringing together French 
nationalist and regionalist parties. RPS is not an electoral or legislative 
coalition. Rather, it is a broader collaborative institution, like the European Free 
Alliance.  
RPS members meet every year in a ‘summer school’ which rotates across the 
French regionalists’ territories. At this summer school, the RPS parties come 
together “to create a network of knowledge, to see how the other parties 
campaign, how active they are.” EFA partners and staff are also often in 
attendance. One of the party’s executive members explained: “in general, 
[RPS] has served me in an indirect way. That is, it's not an argument that is 
very effective in convincing Breton people. But on the other hand, to see how 
the other parties organise themselves and campaign effectively has often 
helped me” (Interview 20). Within RPS, relationships that were emphasized 
were those with the Occitan Party, the Alsacian Unser Land party, and the 
Corsican U Partitu di a Nazione Corsa (PNC). 
The UDB sees itself as a leader in the RPS network. Members of the UDB 
explained, that while Corsica has regional power currently, the UDB represents 
a much larger population and is more transnationally active than the Corsican 
parties. Corsica is considered slightly ‘insular’ and, due to its island nature, 
‘particular.’ One UDB staff member explained:  
“By our partners in France, we are regarded as the big party. On the 
other hand, at the European level, it's the opposite. We are one of the 
smallest regionalist parties at European level. We are a little in the 
middle. That is to say, at the French level, other partners are expecting 
a lot from us. While at the European level, nobody is expecting anything 
from us” (Interview 12).  
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The UDB straddles the line between acting as a powerful actor in its French 
network, and being at a European level, seen as electorally weak. Intra-state 
relationships between nationalist and regionalist parties are not the focus of 
this thesis, but networks such as RPS relationships between nationalist and 
regionalist parties. These provide useful case studies for further applications of 
the party learning framework.  
(3) Boundaries  
Just as ideology brings the UDB closer to some parties, it also distances them 
from other partners. This includes particularly right wing parties, particularly in 
Italy (Interview 14). There is also a boundary also between Western and 
Eastern Europe. The lack of relationships with Eastern European countries is 
because, “they are more conservative parties—not always, but often. And then, 
they are further away. So, we are in solidarity, but we communicate less often” 
(Interview 20). 
A more complex case is Sinn Fein. One UDB executive member active in EFA 
explained: “I do not have a relationship with them today because I have almost 
never seen them. Because they are not in EFA” (Interview 14). Given the 
UDB’s limited resources, the European Free Alliance events thus offer a main 
and dominant space for interactions. Despite willingness to speak to Sinn Fein, 
Sinn Fein’s absence from these events reduces the likelihood of UDB 
engagement. Furthermore, another executive member suggested: “the SNP 
don't want EFA to have relationships with the Irish party because of the history” 
(Interview 21). The SNP’s power and the UDB’s desire to relate to them thus 
also play a factor in their distance from this specific Celtic, left-wing party.  
Beyond the patterns of relationships between parties, this thesis seeks to 
understand the content, the substance, of transnational party networking. What 
information passes between parties in the EFA network? Do parties learn from 
one another? When members travel between regions, they travel “to see how 
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it goes elsewhere, to meet the parties, how do the other parties to implement 
their policies and even how they gather the people, how they manage to gather 
members” (Interview 19). The next section seeks more detail on how this 
process of interaction and information seeking progresses.  
5.4 Learning in the Union Démocratique Bretonne 
This thesis is built on the idea that regular transnational interaction has been 
facilitated by the European Free Alliance. These interactions, I argue, are likely 
to have some consequential exchange of information. This can thus trigger a 
process of learning. I theorized that the process would then proceed in three 
stages: information acquisition, interpretation, and implementation. One UDB 
member explained that their transnational interactions were a way of gathering 
information: “In the UDB I think we all have an interest in looking at what is 
happening in the other regionalist and nationalist parties in Europe to see - how 
are they succeeding? How are they advancing? How can we make our 
movement progress?” (Interview 13).  
I follow the three stages of learning to consider whether the UDB has learned 
from their transnational inquiries. In the case of the UDB, I find four cases of 
information processing and learning on: campaign techniques, electoral 
strategy, minority language protection, and autonomism. The latter two policy 
areas are interpreted using a similar ‘feasibility’ frame, using EFA partners’ 
information to normalize autonomism. As such, these four policy areas 
engender three cases of learning which vary in their level of depth and 
complexity.  
(1) Information Acquisition 
Information acquisition is crucial to the learning process, because learning 
requires change in belief or behaviour based on some new experience or 
information. This stage has also been called ‘scanning’ in which individuals 
monitor their environment and collect data (Daft and Weick, 1984: 286). 
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Although not as mechanical as this description suggests, UDB elites do collect 
new information from EFA partners. This has particularly occurred on four 
policy areas: campaigning, electoral strategy, regional autonomy and language 
policy. Most of these experiences include some ‘in person’ contact. This 
suggests that travel particularly contributes to cross-party information 
exchange. There are also instances in which the UDB fails to acquire 
information from EFA partners. A main barrier to information acquisition, I 
argue, is the party’s strict ideological limits. 
Campaigning and Electoral Strategy 
One notable instance of UDB members travelling was when, through funding 
from EFA, five UDB members travelled to Scotland for a workshop run by SNP 
Youth on campaigning. Another UDB Jeunes member also travelled to Wales 
for the Brexit vote. Both weekends were oriented towards learning to campaign. 
One attendee of the Glasgow event explained: “Why were we in Glasgow? To 
learn the techniques of activism. How could the SNP evolve and ultimately gain 
power? They taught us the basis of the technique…it's more than just political 
or symbolic. It's really about helping each other in a concrete way” (Interview 
15). 
Another attendee and member of the executive bureau explained that 
participants learned ‘how to impart a positive political message and interest 
people,’ a ‘scientific manner’ of campaigning, and ‘methods of organisation.’ 
They emphasized: “we were not there just to listen but also to get a feel for how 
to campaign” (Interview 19). In this case, the information acquired was very 
specific and practical. One member of the UDB, for example, noted their 
interest in how the SNP activists took selfies in the street while campaigning 
(Interview 14). 
At a more strategic level, the UDB decided, after much debate, to run more 
autonomously in elections. Elite party members noted a lot of evidence of other 
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EFA member parties who campaigned more autonomously. One referred to 
the ‘wonderful’ way the SNP broke their link with London, developing their own 
project in a Scottish rather than British context (Interview 21). Recalling 
conversations with Basque and Galician partners, a prominent UDB member 
explained:  
“I saw places that had been successful, they presented themselves 
whether alone or in coalition, but in any case, in their own right. And it 
was important for me to realize that we were indeed ... maybe it's not 
true but I had the impression that we are kind of the only ones in Europe 
to try to have autonomy thanks to a French party. And it did not work.” 
(Interview 20). 
Involvement in the EFA network allowed UDB elites to acquire relevant 
information. Other parties’ success drove information acquisition, reinforcing 
the role of differential electoral success in the learning process. The member 
reinforces this dynamic, explaining:  
 “Another thing I have seen in international contacts is the importance of 
coalitions. For example, in the North Basque Country, the party in the 
French state, they began to really progress with the electorate when 
they managed to reunite their different politicians who were very 
opposed to one another. When they managed to meet and progress in 
Corsica for example, they won the elections” (Interview 20).  
The same narrative of seeking information about more successful parties can 
be seen in the UDB’s youth wing. The UDB Jeunes spokesperson explained 
that the youth party was entering a debate: “We are going to decide there how 
we will evolve the UDB Jeunes. Should we autonomise more? To attract more 
young people? A little bit like in Galicia, where there is Galicia Nova.” Strategic 
debates are spurred on by elite observations of different strategic and 
organisational choices elsewhere. 
Language policy  
Information gathering from EFA partners on language policy is much more 
technocratic than that on campaigning. This is driven specifically through 
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institutional access. Pierre-Emmanuel Marais, a councillor at the Nantes City 
Council, holds “the function of delegate for linguistic, educational and cultural 
diversity and actions around schools.” Through this position, Marais and his 
staff member were able to visit Cardiff as part of the Nantes/Cardiff ‘town 
twinning’ project. The visit “was part of a municipal objective, but we were, at 
the same time able to meet Plaid Cymru activists and the President of Plaid 
Cymru Ifanc (Youth).” Through these links, the party seeks further information 
about Plaid success. Marais explained:  
“We work within the framework of my delegation: linguistic diversity. It 
interests me what happened in Wales in terms of Welsh language 
development. After, of course, it’s strategic. We met the youth president 
of Plaid Cymru, and they have 700 members in Plaid Cymru. That’s the 
equivalent of our forces in Brittany. We were surprised, and we 
considered it with interest—how did they do it? The question of the 
existence of the Welsh nation, Welsh culture, Welsh language: all these 
can be transposed in Brittany.” 
Marais also used his position in the city council to study other examples of 
language policy through a visit to Brussels and a visit to Ireland. The Peuple 
Breton reported on his trip: “At the crossroads of social and economic fields, 
the inhabitants of Brussels have invented modern linguistic tools. This is an 
example that Pierre-Emmanuel Marais hopes to highlight as part of his 
delegation on linguistic diversity in Nantes, particularly concerning the 
development of Breton” (Le Peuple Breton, 16 June 2017). Another UDB 
member noted that he had visited Friesland, “but it was not for EFA. It was for 
Network to Promote Linguistic Diversity (NPLD), an association that speaks 
about languages” (Interview 21). Breton exchange on language is facilitated 
through non-party institutional links.  
The use of technocratic routes to seek policy solutions on minority language 
policy reflects the institutionalization of this policy area at an EU level. 
“Supranational organizations have been central to developments in 
international law facilitating the greater recognition of promotion-oriented 
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language rights for minorities” (May, 2013: 246). Minority language protection 
has become framed in terms of legal ‘rights.’ As such, the UDB is able to use 
non-political party routes to learn about language policy. However, while the 
method of information acquisition is more technocratic, the interpretation of 
information from these trips seems political. Marais explained: “We have some 
perspective on questions of language, with Breton language schools, but as far 
as the political point of view, we have a lot to learn.”  
Regional autonomy policy   
The party has sought information about the autonomous legislatures, of the UK 
and Germany particularly. In the late 1990s, the UDB was inspired by the 
devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales. The party began to write a 
document calling for a special statute of autonomy for Brittany in 1998 and 
finally adopted it in May 1999 (contemporaneously to the first elections for the 
Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly).  
In 2018, one member of the executive board explained that the UDB still 
“demand a statute of autonomy like the one that exists already in Scotland or 
Wales. We also take the example of the German Lander” (Interview 20). In the 
2018 restatement of the UDB’s policy (S’emanciper), the party cites the 1999 
brochure. For the last 20 years, information about autonomist settlements in 
the UK and Germany have been used as a reference point to explain the 
autonomist demands.  
Barriers to acquisition 
Although there are points of information acquisition in the UDB, there are also 
barriers to UDB members receiving information from their relationships. The 
UDB view their engagement in EFA as not only about receiving information, 
but also about transmitting it. For example, the UDB limits the number of parties 
it will engage with within EFA. While, “the UDB does not demand that all are 
left parties. We will demand that the parties are progressive, that they are open 
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to others. This is our minimum requirement” (Interview 18). Members set strict 
boundaries to who they will engage with. For example, the party was one of 
three moved to suspend the Partito Sardu d’Azione (a Sardinian regionalist 
party) and Pro Lombardia Independenzia (a Lombardian regionalist party). 
Three French regionalist parties (UDB, Partitu di a Nazione Corsa, Partit 
Occitan) called on EFA at the 2018 General Assembly to suspend these parties 
for their cooperation with the far right La Lega in recent Italian elections.  
One of the proponents argued at the General Assembly: “If you hid behind 
traditions and culture, then you can excuse anything…individuality only has 
value if there are values and principles above that.” For the UDB then, 
information acquisition explicitly occurs within its existing sub-network, which 
is framed around its ideological stances.  
(2) Information Interpretation  
Information interpretation is the incorporation of new information into the 
existing context of an individual or organisation. Interpretation allows the new 
information to be adapted into existing knowledge, it is a ‘process of 
sensemaking.’ In this sensemaking, “organizational actors have first to make 
sense of what is happening in their organizational environments, in order to 
develop a shared interpretation that can serve as a context for organizational 
action” (Choo, 1996: 332). As seen in the FNP, individuals in a political party 
may not have the same interpretation of information, which can hinder 
collective learning. In the case of the UDB, ideological agreement underpins 
party elites’ agreement on interpretations of transnational information.  
There is a particularly an interesting convergence of interpretations on 
information about other regions’ language and autonomy statutes. UDB 
members use this information to underpin the feasibility of Breton autonomism. 
This interpretation further allows the UDB to justify their existing policy of 
autonomism, rather than changing the policy choice itself. I also consider a 
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barrier to further information interpretation, the organisational culture in the 
UDB of ‘feeling left behind.’ This feeling drives the need to learn but it also 
allows members to fully question whether information is applicable to the 
Breton case. 
Campaigning and Electoral Strategy 
The interpretation from those who attended the Glasgow campaigning training 
event focused on the ‘scientific’ nature of the SNP’s campaign. In canvassing 
with the SNP, one attendee explained:  
“Everything is calculated. We did not miss any door. We knew how to 
talk to people, we defined everything, and we learned a lot about how to 
talk to people, how to get the message across…there in the scientific 
aspect we really learned a lot...We really need to plead our case here in 
Brittany because we have three elections coming up: presidential, 
legislative, senatorial” (Interview 14).  
Another explained that, while Brittany was not Scotland, “on the level of 
everything that is technical and practical, you can still organise things a little bit 
like they do in Scotland” (Interview 19). This suggests that, when information is 
acquired in a technical and specific manner, information can be more easily 
interpreted. In this sense, the UDB echoes the SNP’s interpretation of itself as 
a party able to campaign in a modern way, using their Activate/NationBuilder 
database. UDB members saw the SNP’s technical choices as not regionally 
specific, but rather about party organisational skills, and thus adaptable to 
Breton campaigning. 
While the interpretation of the SNP’s campaigning lessons was eased by its 
technocratic nature, the strategic choices that faced the UDB were more 
complex. As explained previously, the faction of the party that sought to run in 
elections more autonomously ultimately won the debate. To do so, elites on 
this side of the debate drew on examples from other countries. For example, 
one noted that the electoral coalitions in Corsica and the Basque Country were:  
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“an inspiration to build ‘Oui la Bretagne. It's also an argument to 
convince others in the UDB because when I talk about Scotland, Wales, 
for example, they say: ‘But it's not it's not the French state so it's not the 
same situation, you cannot compare.’ But Corsica or the Basque 
Country, that's the French state too and yet they managed anyway. So 
that means it's possible” (Interview 20).  
This quote is revealing of the process of interpretation. While the respondent 
had a wide range of information, the interpretive process helped them find the 
information that was most adaptable.  
Furthermore, this respondent quite clearly takes part in moving their learning 
from an individual choice to a collective one. They sought ‘to convince others 
in the UDB.’ Another member of the UDB executive board remembered the 
debates around the UDB’s strategy and noted: “it took a long time, working to 
show that it is better to spend time building our strategy for ourselves” 
(Interview 19). Intra-party contestation on strategy thus led elite party members 
to seek supporting evidence from the EFA network. Interpretative processes 
also led elites to consider how to collectivize their learning and lessons from 
other EFA partners were adopted to convince party members about a strategic 
decision. 
Regional autonomy and language protection policy  
Using Scottish, Welsh and German examples of autonomy has been the 
practice in the UDB since the late 1990’s. But what is the party’s interpretation 
of these examples? The overarching interpretation within the UDB is that these 
cases give the UDB’s plans for autonomy a sense of feasibility and legitimacy. 
An exchange between two interview respondents helps to illustrate this. 
Speaking of the value of transnational relationships, one interview respondent 
explains:  
“And above all it gives us weapons to say - you say it's not possible in 
France – look: it's better than at home and you say it's not possible” 
(Interview 15). 
“That's a great argument” (Interview 16). 
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“It's a great argument, but it’s not working.” 
“Just wait, it will catch on.” 
This exchange illustrates how UDB members point at transnational examples 
of devolution processes and use these processes to demonstrate the benefits 
and feasibility of autonomy. The feasibility interpretation is longstanding in the 
UDB. For example, the 1999 Statut politique pour la Bretagne explicitly 
modelled its demands on the Welsh Assembly. In 2008 the UDB sent a 
delegate to the SNP conference and concluded: “The UDB is pleased to have 
as a partner a party like the SNP, which proves that the political autonomy of a 
people is credible and necessary at the time of Europe” (UDB press release, 
21/10/08).  
In 2014, after the Scottish independence referendum, the spokesperson/de 
facto leader of the UDB at the time Mona Bras wrote, “The Scottish example 
should lead France to question itself.” The feasibility framing is a recognized 
pattern in lesson-drawing. Richard Rose wrote: “The emphasis that 
policymakers place upon the lessons of experience reflects their concern with 
feasibility. Is a proposed course of action capable of being carried out, and if 
so, will it produce the predicted result?” (1991: 5).  
Interpretation allows individuals to adapt information to their regional situation. 
For UDB activists, a prescient issue is that “in Brittany, many people are scared 
of the idea of independence and so the example of Germany reassures them. 
There are autonomous regions that are not demanding independence. It’s an 
example that allows us to calm people generally” (Interview 20). International 
examples help to ‘normalize’ autonomist ideas and are used as supporting 
argumentation for existing UDB autonomism. In Brittany, “when we talk about 
our linguistic policies, it doesn’t really interest people. But when we say that 
there is the same thing in Wales or Catalonia, suddenly it’s wonderful. Thus, 
we try also to play on this international side of things” (Interview 13).  
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As this quote suggests, the feasibility framing extends to both autonomy and 
language policy. In Pierre-Emmanuel Marais’s report on Breton language 
street signs he argued: “The Breton language offers a chance to demarcate 
and reinforce Nantes’s attractiveness against other European metropoles, like 
Barcelona and Edinburgh have done.”14 Nantes, he argues, is also a regional 
capital. Marais argued that bilingualism should be legislated for at the Breton 
Assembly: “We can do it. Today, it’s not a question for us, but for France. And 
in Europe, there are many languages—bilingualism is the norm” (Interview 13).  
The UDB sees the SNP as “a big inspiration because for them it’s totally normal 
to go towards autonomy. In France, it’s hard. It’s a rather marginal idea” 
(Interview 18). More advanced regionalist and nationalist parties inspire the 
UDB and the UDB sees caricatures of autonomism’s peripherality as a barrier 
to its success. As such, information and arguments drawn from other EFA 
parties are mobilized to emphasize the feasibility of autonomist policies.  
Barriers to Interpretation 
Information interpretation requires the adaptation of information from 
transnational partners to the local context. Throughout the interviews, 
respondents often lamented that information from other parties did not seem to 
apply to the UDB. This common refrain was based on the feeling that the UDB 
was too ‘behind’ to fully adapt information from EFA partners. Other parties’ 
electoral success incentivizes parties to learn about them but too much of a 
difference can hinder information interpretation. This balance of perceived 
‘achievable’ success is one reason that the relationship between the UDB and 
Plaid Cymru is more valuable to UDB members than that with the SNP. 
I previously touched on the tension between the UDB’s transnational activism 
and their domestic lack of success. One elected member explained: “We are 
                                                          
14 Report shared with author by Marais.  
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part of EFA. We try of course to meet one another regularly and to change 
after. But the difficulty is that we are not at the level of Welsh or Scots for 
example, or even the Catalans” (Interview 13). There was not only a sense that 
the UDB was behind, but also an understanding that it had been for a while.  
When asked whether the party had changed, one staff member explained: “We 
have obtained very few things…The base demands are still there, since we 
haven’t advanced a lot” (Interview 12). Members were prepared for a long 
journey ahead. While “self-determination is more or less pushed by many 
European peoples - Catalans, Basques, the Scots who today have their 
parliament. We are still years away, we are still far from all that” (Interview 16). 
This difference in power made the UDB more reluctant to believe they were 
able to adapt policies from more powerful parties. One member of the executive 
board explained: 
 “I went to Scotland a few weeks ago and they have a lot of elected 
people, ministers and deputies. And they have power, so they can make 
it happen. Here we don't have this. It's very difficult to make things work 
as we want because we don't have many elected people, we don't have 
a good place in the media” (Interview 19).  
The SNP is regularly seen as too advanced for the UDB to learn from. For 
example, one UDB member admired the SNP’s positive campaigning and 
argued that the UDB should adopt this strategy. However, he added: “Well I 
don't really know if we will succeed, because we are really little, and the 
elections are not for us” (Interview 21). Another member, who noted that his 
main goal was to increase the UDB’s membership, noted: “In France, in general 
there are few people in political parties. I learned that it’s a real difference with 
what you can find in Wales, Scotland, or England where I have the impression 
that people engage more easily. Here it’s difficult to get people to join parties” 
(Interview 20). In each of these cases, members were seeking to engage with 
their understanding of the SNP’s policies and success and to adapt it to the 
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UDB—to interpret it to their context. However, in each case, interpretation was 
hindered by a feeling of inadequacy, of being ‘behind’ in the EFA network. 
The differences in electoral success also hinder communication from the UDB 
to other parties. For example, when speaking to the SNP and Plaid Cymru:  
“For them it’s evident to demand independence. I noticed that 
sometimes it is difficult to make them understand that we are not there. 
We ask for autonomy to have some means to make decisions, to put in 
place a good policy in Brittany. It is a difference that is quite notable” 
(Interview 19).  
Brittany, another respondent explained, does not even have the national 
recognition of Catalonia or Scotland. In France, “we do not have the Breton 
language and Gallo language as a public language nor the existence of Breton 
identity. That's what really sets us apart from other brothers-in-arms, brother-
nations...because here we are really, we are behind” (Interview 18). The feeling 
of falling behind hinders communication with more successful parties and 
reduces the adaptability of information received.  
However, the feeling of falling behind also helps drive the UDB’s efforts to be 
close to Plaid Cymru, which is seen as an ‘inspiration’ but one which is not too 
powerful. Plaid is seen as a “truly a brother party that began very low like the 
UDB. Today they have improved a lot…We are close in our efforts” (Interview 
18). Another echoed this: “We look a lot at the Welsh, Plaid Cymru. They were 
in the same situation as us at one moment” (Interview 13). As such, in the UDB, 
“our model, that we follow a little, is the example of Wales. Because Scotland—
we are not there yet. We don’t have sufficient identity in Brittany for people to 
confront the French state” (Interview 14).  
For the UDB, Plaid Cymru is a useful partner because the information received 
has a relatable quality. For example, one youth member explained: “Plaid Ifanc 
(Youth) also started two three people who arrived and are now having about 
fifty activists. We can do the same thing” (Interview 18). For information 
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acquisition to progress to a party-wide interpretation it must not only be seen 
as useful or indicative of success, but also considered comparable. This 
comparability, whether it be within the French state or at a similar level of 
success, allows the UDB to mobilize transnational narratives within Breton 
policy/political narratives.  
(3) Information Implementation  
Information implementation in this thesis was defined as a change, either in 
belief or behaviour, stemming from the acquired information. The UDB has 
implemented three lessons: campaigning techniques from the SNP, a 
feasibility framing to its autonomist policies, and other regions’ examples of 
electorally autonomous behaviour. These three cases show three different 
types of implementation. In the first case, individuals who learned directly from 
the SNP implement their lessons by sharing information across the party, 
shifting individual to more collective behavioural change. In the second case, 
information from EFA partners’ affects policy arguments rather than choices. 
Finally, in the case of strategy, I will discuss how learning from EFA partners 
was one of multiple causes that contributed to elite commitment to an 
autonomous electoral strategy. 
Campaigning  
The Glasgow event, although a small case of EFA interactions and subsequent 
learning, is a useful case. It highlights how EFA can facilitate specific meetings 
between political parties and activists and the work that is done between parties 
to teach and learn skills. In this case, SNP Youth led the event and training. As 
noted, UDB participants noted the ‘scientific’ nature of the campaigning 
techniques learned. One respondent noted that they planned to “do trainings 
for UDB members on what we learned. For example, on how to organise a 
campaign, to function as a party, on how to plan with quite rigorous methods” 
(Interview 19). One of the attendees was Trefina Kerrain, who is in charge of 
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education and training in the UDB. The direct correlation between what was 
learned in the EFA network and Kerrain’s role in the UDB shows how having 
EFA entrepreneurs that are also central to the political party facilitates learning. 
Electoral strategy  
On electoral strategy, the UDB’s spokesperson explained how EFA partners 
directly influenced his decision. He explained:  
“On the strategy for example, at one time I was very hesitant. Is it 
necessary to change the strategy? It was hard to make the choice. And 
many members of the other parties—either in Regions and Peoples 
Solidarity, or EFA—for example Basque or Galicians told me: “but you 
must do that, you must present yourself. Otherwise you will disappear.” 
In this case, the respondent provides an account of the way that EFA partners 
influenced him as an individual. However, the individual change in beliefs of 
multiple UDB elites led to a change in the party collectively. Caouissin was a 
prominent proponent of the change to a more autonomous electoral strategy. 
His election to spokesperson signified wider membership support for changing 
the UDB’s electoral strategy.  
The relationship to other parties in the European Free Alliance encouraged the 
UDB to move towards autonomous electoral strategies. I return to a quote used 
before, from a member of the UDB executive board: “I saw places that had 
been successful, they presented themselves whether alone or in coalition, but 
in any case, in their own right…seeing others elsewhere makes me think about 
another way to campaign” (Interview 20). When we consider this final phrase, 
it closely fits our original definition of learning. Organisational learning was 
previously defined as “if, through its processing of information, the range of [an 
organisation’s] potential behaviours is changed” (Huber, 1991: 89). By 
observing EFA partners strategic choices and discussing these strategies 
directly with partners, UDB elites observed and found support for a new 
potential behaviour: a more autonomous electoral strategy. This learning had 
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behavioural outcomes, with the ‘Oui la Bretagne’ alliance replacing the UDB’s 
links with the Socialist Party.  
It is important to note that transnational party learning was just one of multiple 
causes of this change. The choice to move away from the PS was instigated 
by disappointment in Francois Hollande and his territorial reform. It also reflects 
a ‘renewal’ of the UDB, with a younger membership and the need to recruit 
more members. This case highlights that party learning in the TNP network is 
also part of a pattern of multiple causation. While learning explains some part 
of policy or strategy decisions made by party elites and adopted collectively by 
parties, every party policy decision has numerous determinants. 
Regional autonomy and language policy 
The feasibility framing of autonomy policies (supporting more devolution and 
language protection) has developed over time using transnational examples as 
support. This framing focuses on autonomy being ‘the norm,’ it provides a 
narrative around an agreed goal of the UDB. This is implemented in the UDB’s 
most recent policy document, S’émanciper. For example:  
“In relation to all of Europe, numerous examples prove that autonomy is 
positive. It permitted the southern Basque Country to assure its 
economic development; it participates in the democratic and territorial 
equilibrium in Germany; it allows Scotland to promote its public services, 
social justice and renewable energy policies despite an unfavorable 
context of British austerity politics” (2018, 171). 
The same section reinforces the 1999 UDB statute which demands a Breton 
model follow the example of Wales and Scotland. The section, which proposes 
in more detail the Breton Assembly, notes that the Assembly will have both 
regional and constituency representatives, “as has been the case for twenty 
years in Scotland and Wales” (S’emanciper, 2018: 140).  
In a recent speech about the book, Gael Briand noted that “the UDB has always 
had a civic vision. It is this civic vision that allowed the Scots to broaden their 
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electoral base, it is this civic vision that allowed Gilles Simeoni, in Corsica, to 
win the last elections.” Examples of other nationalist and regionalist parties 
draws on the framing of feasibility and normality. This, and other uses of the 
Scottish example, show that the UDB is a normal political party and that 
autonomy is part of an internationally accepted and broader movement 
(internationally and ideologically).  
Like in the FNP, policy areas of learning for the UDB span both core and 
contested values. Two key patterns of learning have emerged both in this 
chapter and the last which center on the contextual factor of issue contestation. 
The first pattern of learning, on agreed policies, uses EFA partners to provide 
arguments and evidence to support an existing policy. The second, learning 
about contested policies, is driven by individuals seeking evidence and support 
for their point of view. These are then mobilized within the party’s decision 
making processes and used to negotiate interests within the party collectively. 
While in the FNP this strategic negotiation is ongoing, in the UDB, the choice 
for electoral autonomy won the strategic argument. Proponents of strategic 
change drew explicitly on support and examples from EFA partners. Given its 
very small core set of elites, the UDB’s organisational structure also allows for 
a useful examination of the way that elite entrepreneurs bridge the 
EFA/member party divide and mobilize information to lead to collective 
learning.  
5.5 Conclusion  
The Union Démocratique Bretonne does not have a central institutional role in 
the European Free Alliance. It has neither an EFA MEP nor an EFA board 
member. However, this chapter has shown the active engagement that UDB 
members have with EFA. Active EFA membership thus also has a component 
of choice and agency from the member party. UDB elites travel to EFA events 
and show a willingness to engage with both technical and ideological 
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information transmitted by EFA partners. Prominent entrepreneurs in the UDB, 
such as communications head Gael Briand and international affairs head Victor 
Gallou, have strong profiles in the EFA network.  
Through their active investment, the UDB maintains a recognized presence in 
the EFA network. There is a strong contrast between the UDB’s lack of power 
regionally and its connectedness within the EFA network. The UDB’s 
commitment to internationalism and entrepreneurs’ pro-active information-
seeking behaviour engenders learning. Learning spans from the technocratic 
(campaign strategies) to the argumentative (on the feasibility of autonomism) 
to more macro-level strategic choices.  
The latter is encouraged by issue contestation within the UDB on strategy, 
which saw the party distance itself from a former spokesperson who continued 
to work with the Socialist Party (UDB PR, 23/10/15). This debate incentivizes 
party elites to seek positive examples to support their argument. Interestingly, 
the UDB’s discussion around having more ambitious electoral strategy and the 
use of transnational examples echoes discussions in the FNP about running in 
state-wide elections. Information about party strategy and a desire to improve 
electoral results is something that most small political parties share. The 
process of gaining electoral support is thus a key piece of information that both 
small party cases in this thesis sought from more successful EFA partners. 
Learning in the case of autonomy policy is not a change in belief or behaviour, 
but rather a change in the underpinning arguments which support the UDB’s 
autonomism. Drawing on information about the UDB’s partners in Wales and 
Scotland, the party argues that autonomism is feasible and normal. They 
propose to copy certain institutional arrangements to emphasize the normality 
of autonomism. This adoption of new patterns of thinking shows a change in 
evidence and approach to autonomy policy that emerges from EFA partners. 
Contrasting the UDB’s learning on autonomy policy and electoral autonomy 
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shows the importance of issue contestation; the lack of contestation in the 
former led to no discernable policy/strategy change but rather a change in 
argumentation.  
Finally, the UDB also has a limited case of technocratic change on 
campaigning, with UDB members drawing on lessons learned in Glasgow at 
an SNP Youth training. Tracing the members’ experiences of this training 
weekend is useful because it highlights a number of phenomena. First, the 
UDB members’ widespread interest (five members attended) show the power 
of electoral success in the EFA network. As one member said, there are “very 
few relations with Scotland, even if we would like that there were more” 
(Interview 12). When given the chance to interact with the SNP, the UDB 
sought to send as many members as possible. Second, the discussions by 
members who attended emphasized the needs to transfer this knowledge to 
other UDB members. This shows how transnational interaction, undertaken by 
relatively few party members, must be extended to engender collective party 
learning.  
This chapter has also touched on the difficulties the UDB faces in learning from 
EFA partners: its ideological activism leads to boundary-setting within EFA and 
its feeling of being too far ‘behind’ to adapt information from more powerful 
parties (especially the SNP). Activism in EFA also leads the UDB to a more 
collaborative approach to learning. The process of collaboration may engender 
learning, but it is not synonymous with party political learning. Collaboration 
requires working together towards a shared goal, which differs from the ‘give 
and take’ dynamic of learning. The UDB emphasizes its collegiality with EFA 
partners and shows signs of trying to develop collaboration. One member 
explained:  
“I tried to convince for example the Kurdish party (the HDP) to make 
some press releases but it's really difficult, because they have lots of 
problems. Here there is only a small membership and not the big one, 
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so I can't reach the big parties...My objective is to do that, to make 
European movements a real European movement--not only two parties 
who speak to each other but two parties who speak together. It’s not the 
same thing. I think it would be a really important European way to think” 
(Interview 21). 
Such collaborative communication does very occasionally occur, sometimes 
facilitated through EFA. However, it is not yet widespread in EFA. In Chapter 
Eight, I will return to this concept and propose further boundaries and 






































Chapter Six : Esquerra Republicana de Catalunaya 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunaya (ERC) has long promoted both 
independence and the European Union. For many years, their vision of 
Catalonia in a ‘Europe of the Peoples’ was more radical than mainstream 
Catalan politics (Keating, 2000: 34). However, the party entered the Catalan 
Government for the first time in 2003. Since this time, ERC and the wider 
Catalan independentist movement has gained support. This culminated in a 
2017 independence referendum, which was ruled illegal by the Spanish 
Government. The vote was held, but Spanish police were sent to intervene and 
claims of corruption and violence marred the result. 
Throughout the process of organizing and conducting this referendum, both 
ERC and the wider Catalan independence movement were increasingly 
internationalized, by design of Catalan autonomists. After the 2017 
independence referendum, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont moved to 
Belgium to avoid imprisonment in Spain. He noted at a 31st of October 2017 
press conference: “I decided to come to Belgium—not Belgium, but Brussels. 
It’s important to remark that, because I think this is the capital of Europe. I insist 
that this is a European subject.”  
Catalan autonomists have long been active in transnational politics and 
particularly in European networks. This chapter focuses on the transnational 
relationships Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Catalan Republican Left, 
ERC), which is a longtime member party and the only Catalan member party 
of the European Free Alliance. In section V, I briefly study the transnational 
relationships of another Catalan independentist party, Partit Demòcrata 
Europeu Català (Catalan European Democratic Party, PDeCAT). PDeCAT is a 
member of another transnational political party. Through a comparison of 
PDeCAT and ERC’s transnational networks, I consider whether TNP 
membership affects transnational interactions. 
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I do not find significant cases of learning in ERC. However, the party does see 
itself as a ‘teacher’ in the EFA network, particularly on the issue of mass 
mobilization. ERC also emulates the rhetoric of ‘Scandinavian-style’ welfare 
policy. I then explore why ERC does not learn. Lack of learning by Catalan 
autonomists is related to two phenomena: (1) their feeling that the Catalan 
situation is substantially different from their closest partner (Scotland); and (2) 
autonomists’ focus on gaining international recognition before, during and after 
their independence referendum on the 1st of October 2017. In their international 
interactions, both main Catalan autonomist parties emphasize gaining 
international recognition for the right to self-determination.  
The Catalan Government’s para-diplomatic institutions also provide an outlet 
for politicians’ international outreach. These are mobilized before political 
parties’ relationships in their TNPs. I find no clear relationship between party 
learning and Government diplomacy. Section six will discuss the distinction and 
relationship between party and government transnational relationships.  
Findings in this chapter are based on 14 interviews with members of ERC and 
PDeCAT and one interview with a founder of the ANC in July 2016 and May 
2017. I also conducted a 2-day participant observation of the EFA observation 
to the 1 October 2017 referendum. It included a seminar at CIEMEN (a pro-
Catalan independence think tank), attendance with ERC and PDeCAT 
politicians at the final campaign rally, and shadowing members of EFA in their 
observations at polling places on the day of the referendum. Interviews were 
conducted in English and French. 
6.1 Introducing Catalan Autonomist Parties  
Since regaining its Parliament in 1980, Catalonia has had a competitive political 
field with multiple autonomist and unionist parties. Autonomist parties in 
Catalonia include ERC, PDeCAT (previously the Democratic Convergence of 
Catalonia), and Popular Unity Candidacy (in Catalan, CUP). This thesis takes 
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the first two of these parties, which are the most prominent. ERC is the main 
case study, because it suits the criteria set out in the research design, which 
emphasizes parties in the European Free Alliance. Furthermore, ERC has 
been independentist for a longer period of time than PDeCAT. In this section, I 
briefly introduce each party. 
(1) Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya  
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, shortened to ERC and often referred to 
as Esquerra, was founded in 1931. In 1934, ERC’s President declared a 
Catalan state. In 1940, he was executed. Many other ERC elites were forced 
into exile during the Franco regime, resulting in organizational weakness (Elias, 
2015: 86). The party was illegal until 1978 and remained marginal until the late 
1990s. Experiences of the Franco regime still color the party’s view on Spain. 
As one ERC MP explained, “But Spain, that’s a democracy? A son of Franco’s 
dictatorship. That explains a lot of situations that you can see in Spain” 
(Interview 22). ERC has been independentist since its founding, which sets it 
apart from PDeCAT.  
It has a firm ideological position on the left. Elected members of Esquerra 
describe it as a social democratic party with a commitment to independence, 
social justice, equality and republicanism (Interview 26, Interview 22). Anwen 
Elias provides a good overview of the party’s development in which she notes 
the renewal of ERC’s left-wing credentials in the mid-1990s (2015: 86-91). A 
survey of ERC members shows that most members locate themselves on the 
left. However, between 1993 and 2004, its membership shifted away from 
extreme left positions towards more left/centre-left positions (Argelaguet, 2009: 
90-92). This moderation may reflect the entrance of ERC into Catalan 
Government politics and its increasing electoral popularity as the Catalan 
nationalist field became more plural (Argelaguet et al., 2004).  
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The party’s current president is Oriol Junqueras; Junqueras has been in jail 
since November 2017. In 2017, ERC were the third largest party with 21.4% of 
the vote. These latest elections highlighted the division between PDeCAT and 
ERC. Although they had been in a Parliamentary coalition since 2015, Junts 
pel Si (Together for Yes), the parties did not run on a united ticket in 2017. This 
decision was underpinned by disagreement and tension between the parties. 
This has continued into their relationship in the current session of the Catalan 
Parliament; conflicts have specifically occurred over the role of exiled President 
Carles Puigdemont (Jordan, 2018).  
(2) Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català  
The Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (Catalan European Democratic Party, 
PDeCAT) was previously known as Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya 
(CDC). As the CDC, the party formed an alliance with a smaller partner, the 
Democratic Union of Catalonia (Unió). This alliance, called Convergència i Unió 
(CiU, Convergence and Union), was maintained from 1978 to 2015. The CiU 
led the Catalan Government for 23 years, from 1980 to 2003. From 2010 to 
2018, the CDC (and subsequently PDeCAT) were part of ruling the Catalan 
Government, with their leader Artur Mas acting as Catalan President from 2010 
to early 2016. Under Mas, the coalition with Unió dissolved when party leaders 
opposed Mas’s plans to call an early election and to seek a mandate for 
secession (Gillespie, 2017: 409).  
In 2015, the CDC ran in the Catalan Parliament elections on a Junts pel Si 
(Together for Yes) ticket with ERC and independents. In July 2016, the CDC 
changed its name to PDeCAT. This change was linked to two issues within the 
party: their move to support independence and the allegations of corruption 
against the CDC and its leaders. In the December 2017 elections, they ran on 
a ticket called Junts pel Catalunya (Together for Catalunya) alongside 
independent candidates.  
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PDeCAT is a liberal party that promotes pluralism, a federal Europe, an open 
and competitive economy, and Catalan independence. The party has long held 
a ‘catch-all’ position in the Catalan nationalist political discourse and takes a 
less defined ideological stance than ERC. Despite the often 
‘accommodationist’ approach to Catalan autonomy, territorial strategy has 
always been an ‘all-encompassing’ policy area for the CDC (Elias, 2015: 85). 
Under Pujol, the party focused on promoting Catalan self-government within 
the Spanish state.  
However, until recently, “in ideological terms, the CDC was very vague as to 
what the future holds, with long time president and leader Jordi Pujol promising 
'assuring the survival of Catalonia and its strengthening'” (Walker, 1991: 299). 
Since 2012, the party has been ‘unashamedly in favour of independence’ 
(Interview 35). This change is perceived as a ‘radicalization’ in policy pushed 
by changing attitudes in the Catalan public since the debate over the Statute 
of Autonomy in 2006 (Crameri, 2015: 105). The change also reflects the party’s 
experience in opposition and pressure from sovereigntist internal factions such 
as the Nationalist Youth of Catalonia (JNC, Joventut Nacionalista de 
Catalunya). The party’s 2017 electoral manifesto (under Junts pel Catalunya) 
fore fronted the Catalan independence process and denounced the forced exile 
of PDeCAT leader Carles Puigdemont.  
6.2 Contextual Factors and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya  
Earlier in this thesis, I identified five factors about political parties that might 
affect the way a party exchanges information and thus learns. These factors 
are: electoral strength, governing responsibility, party centralization, key 
transnational entrepreneurs, and issue contestation. In ERC’s case, the most 
important factor is their rise in electoral strength and governing responsibility 
which give the party prominence in the EFA network and led to the 2017 
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Catalan referendum. Both ERC’s prominence in EFA and the referendum 
hindered learning, as I will further explain in the next section. 
Table 6.1: ERC Electoral Results Over Time  




2017 Regional 21.4% In Coalition 
2016 National 18.18% Opposition 
2015 Regional 44.4%* In Government 
2015 National  15.99% Opposition 
2012 Regional 13.7% Supply and 
Confidence  
2011 National 7.07% Opposition 
2010 Regional 7.0% Opposition 
2008 National 7.83% Opposition 
2006 Regional 14.0% In Coalition 
2004 National 15.89% Opposition 
2003 Regional 16.4% In Coalition 
2000 National 5.64% Opposition 
1999 Regional 8.7% Opposition 
1996 National 4.18% Opposition 
1995 Regional 9.5% Opposition 
1993 National 5.10% Opposition 
1992 Regional 8.0% Opposition  
1989 National 2.68% - 
*Ran as part of the shared Junts pel Si electoral list with the CDC 
(1) Electoral Strength  
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Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is now one of the most successful parties 
in EFA, but it only saw a rise in popularity in the late 1990s. This is evident in 
Table 6.1 which shows the increase in ERC electoral strength over time.  
The increase in electoral support has made ERC a frontrunner in elections 
alongside PDeCAT and statewide Spanish parties. Throughout the period of 
study, there was a presiding feeling in ERC that the party was now electorally 
on parity, if not more successful than PDeCAT. One respondent explained: 
“We’ve taken a lot of votes away from PDeCAT, from the old Convergència. 
We’ve gained a lot of voters from the socialists, we’ve grown considerably 
where they have been losing voters wholesale.” During its rise in 2003, ERC 
benefitted from its left-wing ideology, given the public distaste for the ruling 
Partido Popular administration’s territorial policies. Increased electoral strength 
provided ERC with an elevated position in the EFA network which ultimately 
EFA hinders ERC’s party learning.  
Growth in vote share also changed ERC’s transnational relationships. The 
party elected its first MEPs in 2004 and has consistently had MEPs since. They 
contest European Parliament elections as part of electoral coalitions. In 2004 
and 2009, this coalition was the ‘Europe of the Peoples’ platform with other left-
wing regionalist parties in Spain. In 2014, ERC ran with other left wing 
independentist parties in Catalonia on the ‘Left for the Right to Decide’ platform.  
For ERC, transnational relationships have been linked to increased success. 
One member of the ERC European relations team explained that, at first, 
transnational relationships were “not that easy, from the perspective that we 
are a small party…We didn’t have any European MPs until very recently, so 
we are starting with this facility to be more able to interact with other actors” 
(Interview 30). The party’s increase in electoral strength leads to more 
resources to communicate (domestically and abroad) because “the more 
Members of Parliament here, both here and in Madrid, the more money you 
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have. Not only money, the more resources you have in general. You have more 
personnel, more assistance, more of everything” (Interview 31). 
(2) Governing Responsibility  
Esquerra has governing responsibility, but this responsibility has always been 
as part of coalitions (either with PDeCAT/CDC or in the tripartit governments15). 
Table 6.1 shows that ERC first became a party of government from 2003-2010, 
during the two tripartite governments with the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) 
and the Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV). However, the government ran into 
difficulties during the drafting of the Statute of Autonomy. The Statute was ‘less 
ambitious than ERC had intended’ (Elias, 2015: 96). This was perceived by 
voters as a compromise to ERC’s independentism and led to the drop of 
support in 2010 which saw ERC leaving government.  
By 2012, ERC regained credibility on independence through a change in party 
leadership to “new faces untainted by the experience of coalition government” 
(Elias, 2015: 90). New leadership went alongside a moderation of their 
ideological position. The party began to prioritize independence as its goal and 
decoupled ‘the independence brand’s strong association with the revolutionary 
left’ (Dowling, 2014: 225). Their previous experience in government altered 
ERC and may affect how they practice their responsibility currently. As a 
governing party, ERC now emphasizes achieving independence and achieving 
Catalans’ right to vote on independence.  
ERC eventually rejoined government: first with a confidence and supply deal 
with the CiU in 2012 and then in the Junts pel Si coalition in 2015. After joining 
the Government with Junts pel Si, ERC members played more of a role in the 
diplomatic institutions set up by the Catalan Government. The party has 
numerous members in the Catalan Government’s External Action Ministry, 
                                                          
15 The tripartit governments in Catalonia ran from 2003-2010 and were composed of a coalition of 
three parties: ERC, the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), and the Catalan Initiative-Greens (ICV).  
209 
 
both in ministerial and advisory roles. ERC’s active transnational members are 
thus well integrated into Catalan governing institutions. In section VI of this 
chapter, I consider how the incorporation of ERC elites into the institutions of 
government diplomacy affects party transnational networking.  
(3) Party Centralization  
ERC decision making occurs through a process of structured decentralization. 
Ultimately, policy choices are made at party congresses (every four years) and 
conferences (every year). In between conferences, the national council meets 
and makes policy adjustments every three months. The party’s national 
executive meets fortnightly and is responsible for ‘day to day’ decision making. 
However, the party decentralizes some responsibilities, particularly for policy 
exploration and communications, to sectorial commissions. 
One commission focuses on ‘Europe and the World.’ Members of the 
international commission (or sectorial, as ERC members call it) organise 
events, attend events on international issues in Catalonia or abroad, write a 
newsletter, and contribute to the party’s policy position on international issues. 
The sectorial chair and secretary seek to stay connected to ERC’s MEPs. The 
head of the Europe sectorial is also a member of the national council; he works 
closely with the Minister for Europe and with ERC’s MEPs. These MEPs are 
also on the national council. As such, those most active in European relations 
sit on ERC’s central decision-making bodies.  
ERC’s youth wing, Joventuts d'Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (JERC) 
has a separate membership and significant independence from its ‘mother 
party.’ JERC has its own offices and takes forward its own policy positions. 
Unlike ERC, JERC takes more radically left positions (Interview 28). Given their 
more radical ideological points of view, the patterns of transnational 
relationships and learning for JERC may differ significantly from those of ERC 
given their more left-leaning ideological platform. 
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(4) Key Entrepreneurs  
ERC joined EFA as soon as Spain joined the EU and has been a member for 
over 30 years. ERC is deeply embedded in the EFA network. ERC has two 
MEPs in the European Free Alliance, Jordi Solé and Josep-Maria Terricabras. 
Solé is currently Secretary General of EFA, while Terricabras is EFA EP Group 
President. The current Catalan Minister for External Action was also an EFA 
MEP from 2014 to 2016. ERC’s current secretary general was Secretary 
General of EFA between 2008 and 2012.  
Catalan politicians are thus integral to the EFA network and widely known by 
other EFA members. Like its mother party, JERC also has extensive 
international contacts in EFA. The President of EFA Youth (Max Zañartu) and 
EFAy’s Secretary General (Gerard Bona) are JERC members. Given the level 
of integration into EFA leadership structures, ERC members are likely to have 
regular interaction with other EFA partners.  
(5) Issue Contestation 
There was very little issue contestation in Esquerra during the time of study. 
The party was united in its left-wing positions. However, as noted before, the 
goal of a social democratic future for Catalonia was second priority to the 
primary goal of independence. One ERC MP explained:  
“Well, first, our principal priorities are the building of an independent 
state for the Catalan nation. We are working to organise a referendum 
and this is the first priority, here in the Parliament as members of Junts 
pel Sí in the coalition, because the coalition was organised for this 
objective. Then, we are a left-wing party, so we defend pluralism, human 
rights, the rights of people and environment” (Interview 27).  
During much of the period of study of this thesis, ERC was focused on seeking 
independence and organising the independence referendum. In addition to 
maintaining unity in the Junts pel Si group, these external concerns subsumed 
conflict within ERC.   
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6.3 Transnational Interactions 
In this section, I explore the relationships that ERC has with parties across 
Europe. I identify different sub-groups of EFA that are important to ERC: parties 
in the Spanish state, higher performing parties, and left-wing parties. This 
section seeks to outline the shape of the ERC network in EFA and beyond. 
First, ERC engages with other parties through the European Free Alliance. The 
party has been involved in EFA since 1986.  
As noted in the previous section, ERC members are well integrated in EFA and 
have often taken up prominent roles in the EFA structures. Second, ERC 
engages with European partners through connections in the Catalan 
Government. This leads them to develop and seek relationships with other 
regional governments and governing parties, as well as statewide parties. 
Governing responsibility provides more resources for ERC to have a 
transnational network beyond EFA.  
(1) Network Diagram  
Figure 6.1 shows ERC interview respondents’ relationships in Europe. The 
most mentioned respondents were Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque), the SNP and 
the BNG (Galicia) which were mentioned by 5 out of 9 respondents. The next 
most mentioned respondent was Plaid Cymru. In the diagram below, member 
or affiliate parties of EFA have been coloured in red, whereas non-EFA parties 
are noted by green coloured nodes. There are multiple highly connected 
individuals (transnational entrepreneurs) within the ERC network, including 







Figure 6.1: ERC Transnational Relationships SNA Visualization  
In Figure 6.2, I colored the two interview respondents that are members of 
JERC to show the variance between these links and ERC connections. JERC’s 
connections tend to the left wing and include connections made through ‘youth’ 
networks outside of the regionalist/nationalist family. One JERC respondent 
explained that their ambitions went beyond Catalan or regionalist politics. 
Rather, “our aim is to create an international youth movement…a global 
movement to fight neo-liberalism from its roots” (Interview 29).  
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These visualizations help to highlight the commonalities between many 
interview respondents, which I see as the party’s key partners, and those 
parties which are more peripheral to ERC’s network in EFA. The following 
section will provide a more elaborate explanation of ERC’s close relationships.  
Figure 6.2: ERC/JERC (green) Transnational Relationships SNA Visualization 
3.2 Key Partners  
An ERC MP and member of the Committee on External Relations and 
Cooperation described the regionalist and nationalist family as: “this network 
of parties, of stylized nations, so you can find people from Corsica, Sardinia, 
Occitania, Galicia, Euskadi, Basque Country, Silesia in Poland, Friesland in 
Netherlands, Sami in Norway, Sweden and Finland” (Interview 22). Within this 
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broader network, several relevant sub-groups in EFA are important to ERC: 
powerful parties, parties in the Spanish state, and left-leaning parties. Outside 
of EFA, ERC has begun to seek relationships with social democratic statewide 
parties across Europe.  
Powerful EFA Members 
One ERC elected member explained that the strongest links for ERC are “with 
the parties that are very strong also in EFA. For example, we have good links 
with SNP, also with N-VA” (Interview 25). ERC’s international affairs 
spokesperson explained that, although their ideology did not match up with the 
N-VA:  
“The relationship with [the N-VA] is very good because they have 
nothing to fear from anyone…we’re fine with them. We’re not 
comfortable with their socio-economic policies, but from an international 
point of view, there’s a good relationship” (Interview 31).  
While the relationship to the N-VA is strained slightly by ideological differences, 
the party which was most mentioned was the Scottish National Party. One ERC 
MP explained: “the path followed by the SNP, we can follow this. We hope we 
can follow this” (Interview 22). A former SNP adviser who has worked regularly 
with Catalan partners noted that the relationship between the two improved 
significantly since ERC joined the Catalan Government in 2003. With ERC in 
government, the parties could speak diplomatically through the Catalan and 
Scottish Governments.  
Furthermore, an active Breton member of EFA remarked on the rapprochement 
between the Catalan and Scottish movements: “Since the recent emergence 
of Catalonia, for EFA, it’s interesting because suddenly the SNP are getting 
closer to EFA…Suddenly they found an alter-ego. And it’s the discussions 
between the SNP and ERC that made EFA really come into its own again” 
(Interview 14).  
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In 2008, First Minister Alex Salmond met with then-ERC leader and Catalan 
Parliament Vice President Josep-Lluís Carod-Rovira to discuss the regions’ 
economies, internet domains, cultural enhancement and more (Kelbie, 2008). 
Catalan Vice President Pere Aragonès attended the SNP’s 2018 conference 
where he met First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, Cabinet Secretary for External 
Affairs Fiona Hyslop, and the leader of Glasgow City Council. Aragonès’s visit 
also included a fringe event at the conference, chaired by SNP MEP Ian 
Hudghton. It is notable that, while head of JERC, Aragonès visited Edinburgh 
and met with numerous MSPs (JERC blog post, 2007). Relationships within 
EFA develop over long periods of time, encouraged by active individuals.   
There is also a grassroots relationship between the two parties. Friends of 
Catalonia was set up by Glasgow City Councillor David McDonald. McDonald 
noted that Friends of Catalonia is “a place for SNP members to show their 
support for Catalonia, to learn more about the country and its journey towards 
independence.” During the Catalan referendum, this bottom-up exchange 
between Scotland and Catalonia was also evident. For example, facilitated by 
JERC, SNP Youth sent 20 members to observe the referendum. Although the 
Scottish Government did not send an official attendee to the referendum, 
numerous SNP MPs and MSPs attended both the 1 October referendum and 
other important events, like the Catalan national day (the Diada) and elections.  
Despite these efforts, ERC members report tension between the two parties. 
One respondent argued that there is an ‘arrogance problem’ between the two 
parties. ERC members noted that the Scottish Government did not send a 
minister to the referendum and lamented that the Scottish Government did not 
recognize the declared Catalan state after the 2017 independence referendum. 
They also noted the lack of official meetings between the two governments for 




 “They have seen themselves for many, many years as the big brother 
of stateless nations, so have not wanted to become involved in regional 
parties, not even with the Catalans…After the Scottish referendum, 
which they lost, suddenly, we were the big brother, or at least we were 
sort of, you know, on a level. And they had nothing to lose” (Interview 
31).  
The relationship between SNP Youth and Esquerra’s youth branch, Joventuts 
d'Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (JERC), is seen as being better than 
that of their ‘mother’ parties. JERC’s head of international affairs explained: 
“the SNP doesn’t want to have more contact with Esquerra, but SNP youth 
does want to have contact with JERC, so that’s something that shows how 
good our relationship is” (Interview 29). While there are tensions, the SNP 
serves as an important reference point for ERC and members express their 
commitment to the relationship.  
Members of ERC also distance themselves from more peripheral and smaller 
EFA parties. A prominent member of ERC noted that “some of these parties 
even have a different ideology. But the truth is that we are in this group because 
also we don’t have many other possibilities. We believe that our natural space 
one day when we will have our own state will be to be among the parties that 
we share ideology, and this is more like the social democrat, socialist parties 
which are around Europe” (Interview 30). Another noted that ERC would 
provide guidance for smaller parties. The respondent, a member of ERC’s 
international sectorial, explained: “all those European regional parties look up 
to us. I’m very sorry for them …but we don’t shun them in any way. We don’t 
do what the SNP did. We’re involved with EFA…We meet with them regularly 
and we’re involved with them” (Interview 31). 
Parties on the Iberian Peninsula and Mediterranean  
Relationships between regionalist political parties in Spain are facilitated by 
institutional opportunity and necessity. For example, to win a seat in EP 
elections, regionalist parties across Spain have cooperated in electoral 
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coalitions. From 1987 to 2009, these coalitions were named some version of 
‘Europe of the Peoples’ (i.e. ‘For the Europe of the Peoples’ in 1989 and 1994; 
‘Coalition for the Europe of the Peoples’ in 1987). These coalitions always 
included EFA member party Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) from the Basque Country. 
In 2014, ERC left these coalitions to stand on a purely Catalan platform: 
L'Esquerra pel Dret a Decidir (EPDD; Left for the Right to Decide). The EPDD 
won two MEPs in the 2014 Parliamentary elections; these MEPs sit in the EFA 
EP Group. ERC is likely to run on a Catalan platform in the 2019 EP elections. 
The change in European Parliamentary coalition suggests a move away from 
relationships with Spanish regions. However, relationships predate and extend 
beyond electoral coalitions. One EFA staff member explained, “the Basques 
and Catalans have always had direct contact which has been very continuous 
over the years, regardless of the political situation. Regardless of whether 
parties were or were not in government...there has always been this kind of 
loyalty and will of cooperation” (Interview 11). EA and BNG were seen by ERC 
respondents as ‘brother parties.’ For JERC, important youth partners included 
Gazte Abertzaleak from the Basque Country, Galiza Nova from Galicia16, and 
Juventudes Andalucistas from Andalusia (Interview 29). The relationships were 
both historical and personal.  
In its policy proposals, ERC explains: “we are, also, substantially and materially 
Mediterranean. Of origin and tradition. By necessity and by vocation” (Esquerra 
website, ‘Proposals’). While other Spanish regionalist parties do not always fit 
into the ‘powerful’ grouping which is valued by ERC elites, there is a more 
cultural link. The international affairs spokesperson for JERC explained, “if you 
look at the way we interact and also, at our inequalities, compared to the north 
of Europe, for example, it’s completely different and there is something within 
the Mediterranean countries that we share” (Interview 29). This shared culture 
                                                          
16 Gazte is the youth wing of EA and Galiza Nova is the youth wing of the BNG. 
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was also linked to JERC’s relationships with Kurds in Turkey, activists in 
Western Sahara, and Greek minority parties.  
Social Democratic Parties  
ERC has long held a social democratic ideology and the party emphasizes 
relationships with political parties that align with this stance. An ERC MP noted 
that an emphasis on social democratic policies “is common in Catalonia and in 
Scotland. It’s not a discussion about the flag or identity or nation or roots. No, 
it’s only about welfare, the civil rights movement” (Interview 22). In Germany, 
ERC “[has] been speaking to Die Linke…and we would very much like to 
discuss things with the German Socialist Party” (Interview 31). As the quote 
suggests, given the lack of institutional links and its independentist goals, the 
party finds it more difficult to access these statewide parties.  
Nonetheless, the move towards seeking contact with statewide social 
democratic parties is not exclusive to relationships with Germany. In fact, this 
is a more recent trend in ERC. The leader of JERC explained: “We used to get 
in touch with nationalist parties and now, we are trying to make more relations 
with the left parties of the states” (Interview 28).  
Through its social policies, ERC also has contacts outside of Europe. This is 
aided by their position in the Catalan Government and Parliament. One 
member of the Committee on External Relations and Cooperation explained, 
“We want to explain to other countries, to be a model with a social movement. 
For example, we are working on another side in South America with the peace 
process in Columbia. We have a lot of associations working there, as the 
Catalan Government” (Interview 27). Another respondent noted that JERC also 
reached out to parties in Latin America, on democratic participation and 
gender. This engagement was harder due to the distance, but “for us, what’s 
very important is Latin America, in the sense that for us, it’s an example of 
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socialism and that’s something that gets us very interested in this” (Interview 
29).  
Just as ERC seeks relationships with social democratic parties, an active ERC 
transnational actor explained that they reject those with far right parties such 
as “Front National of France and Alternative for Deutschland, these kind of far 
right, anti-European and populist parties” (Interview 30). There are also red 
lines to the extreme left. In Catalonia, the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular 
(Popular Unity Candidacy, CUP) is further to the left than ERC. This means 
that further left regionalist parties sometimes prefer to work with CUP rather 
than ERC (Interview 29). 
With Governments 
Through the Catalan Government, ERC leaders also seek diplomatic 
relationships with governments. The former Catalan Minister for Europe Jordi 
Sole noted, “We have very good connections and relations with Flanders and 
Bavaria, the German Lander, Scotland as well. And this is also a way to try to 
build these connections with other regional governments, especially let’s say 
the most powerful ones.” These links are encouraged through the Catalan 
Government’s delegation in Brussels, which liaises with other sub-state and 
national governments which have representations in Brussels.  
Other reported modes of interacting with governments include Parliamentary 
groups (such as the All-Party Group on Catalonia and similar bodies in the Irish, 
Danish and Swiss Parliaments), visiting delegations (from Germany, 
Switzerland), and meetings with ambassadors (particularly from Scandinavian 
countries) (Interview 33, Interview 22). These relationships are “more formal, 
Parliament to Government, rather than inter-party cooperation” (Interview 31). 
Governmental networking is a separate strand to relationships with other 
independentists. One ERC MP and member of the Committee on External 
Relations explained:  
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“Ten years ago, we were talking about nations in Europe and now, we’re 
trying to talk with ministers, with other diplomats. So, this is a useful 
process. So, we’re friends of Kabylie, we’re friends of Tibet, we’re 
friends of all the freedom fights, but we need freedom first…So, 
yesterday, I was in Galicia, next week I’m going to Corsica, because 
these are nations. But next week, I’m going to Baltic republics. So, as 
you can see, first there are nations but on the other hand, there are 
states” (Interview 22). 
ERC elites are highly engaged in transnational relations, with many key 
entrepreneurs traveling and meeting with other parties regularly. Rather than 
focusing only on EFA, ERC has used its resources through the Catalan 
Parliament and Government to begin reaching out to states. This has created 
two pathways for reaching out to European partners: the political party route 
and the institutional route.  
6.4 Learning in Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya  
Transnational relationships have several different consequences. As noted in 
previous cases, one predominant benefit is that they allow parties to reject 
stereotypes of being insular or exclusive. As one prominent ERC member 
explained, “We want to have a much higher perspective, because sometimes 
people say, which is not true, that people who are from the Iberic Peninsula, 
from Catalonia, that we are only looking around limited piece of land in this 
world which is called Catalonia and we don’t care about the rest of issues, 
which is absolutely not true” (Interview 30). ERC members see relationships 
with regional governing parties (like the SNP and N-VA) and with statewide 
non-EFA parties as a priority. These relationships allow elites to project the 
view of ERC as both legitimate and internationalist.  
While ERC elites have extensive transnational relationships, the party does not 
display significant party learning through EFA. Party members do not articulate 
specific information acquired from EFA partners nor do they explicitly adopt or 
refer to specific policies drawn from EFA partners. ERC displays a case of 
emulation, but this is not party political learning. Rather, ERC emulates a 
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‘Nordic’ model of socio-economic policy from state governments. The party 
also sees itself as a ‘teacher’ in EFA, particularly on mass mobilization 
techniques.  
I argue that ERC does not learn because of its elevated status in EFA. Their 
regional success and the proximity of the independence referendum means 
that transnational relationships for ERC was focused on the issue of 
international recognition and explaining the Catalan process rather than 
acquiring information. Furthermore, the relationship with the SNP does not 
engender learning due to the feeling that the UK’s response to the SNP is 
significantly different and not comparable ERC’s fight against the Spanish 
state.  
(1) Emulation: the Nordic Model  
As previously discussed, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya is a ‘mainstream 
left’ sub-state nationalist and regionalist party. Their programme balances 
commitments to social welfare and equality with commitments to promoting 
independence. Transnationally, ERC seeks out social democratic parties. 
Regionally, social welfare policies were linked to the independence issue 
through a critique of central government welfare and budget cuts. This 
economic argument has weight with voters and extends beyond Catalonia, 
having also been identified in Scotland (Serrano, 2013). Through my research, 
I found that ERC elites emulate a ‘Scandinavian’ approach to social welfare 
policies. This emulation is not surprising given the link between independence 
and social welfare and their increasing outreach to social democratic parties in 
Europe.  
Interviews showed that social democratic countries are often referred to as a 
model for a future independent Catalonia. For example, one of ERC’s MPs 
detailed a long list of commonalities between the party’s goals and 
Scandinavian countries:  
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“Our model, like in health and education, is similar to the welfare state 
of Scandinavian countries. Our model is this one. The social democracy 
from Sweden, Denmark, Finland. The education frame in Finland, that’s 
our goal. The welfare state in Sweden, that’s our goal. The energy model 
in Denmark, with renewable energies, that’s our model. The model of 
mobility in Norway, with electric vehicles, that’s our model. It’s these 
things that we’re trying to do” (Interview 22). 
The head of ERC’s International Sectorial echoed these thoughts, noting that: 
 “The patterns we want to follow are closer to the Nordic countries and 
countries which have got a dimension similar in size. Regionally, we 
know that we will never be able to compete with France, Spain, UK or 
Italy or Germany because in terms of size, population, GDP and 
everything, they will be always much bigger…we see ourselves more 
similar than models like Denmark, like Sweden, like the Baltic countries, 
like Austria, which are countries that in some sense have also, 
especially the Scandinavian ones, a more social democratic approach” 
(Interview 30).  
“The model which we believe we could be more comfortable is, for 
example, Denmark …they don’t have the sources of income or the 
capacities of the big countries or the huge powers, but they have the 
possibility to be known by positive contributions towards humanity in 
terms of sustainability, in terms of being peace promoters” (Interview 
30). 
Another ERC MP and former Minister of Social Welfare explained that in 
developing welfare policies: “Nordic countries are for us very important to see, 
but we know that the context is different. Socially, strategically it’s different. But 
for example, little countries: Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, are also important” 
(Interview 26).  
These quotes show an interpretation and some adaptation of information about 
other states’ models to suit Catalonia and ERC’s social democratic ideology. 
However, this adoption of social democratic models from other states is not 
transnational party-to-party learning, as it has been set out in the early chapters 
of this thesis. Information is acquired from other states, not other political 
parties as I initially proposed. In other words, the ‘teacher’ in this case is not 
another political party but a government.  
223 
 
Furthermore, I would argue that the process of adopting a Nordic welfare model 
more closely resembles emulation than learning. Learning refers to a process 
that is more agential. In learning, there is a more specific and often direct 
interaction with partners which engenders information acquisition. In this case 
of the ‘Nordic model,’ respondents’ knowledge and information is acquired from 
a distance. The policy models were not said to stem from any direct interaction 
with Scandinavian counterparts. One MP explained: “It’s very easy with the 
internet to find a lot of information, but we can also speak with our MEPs about 
the kind of politics happening in other European Parliaments” (Interview 32). 
As such, this use of Scandinavian policy models on social democracy more 
closely resembles the process of emulation (also known as imitation or 
copying), rather than learning. Emulation differs from learning, because its 
purpose is less about problem solving and more the about “a search for 
credibility, status or simple conformity with international trends” (Meseguer, 
2005: 73).  
The search for status through the Nordic Model is clear in ERC politicians. They 
seek to internationalize their own ideology and elevate its credibility. As one 
ERC MP argued: “these countries of the North, they are our mirrors: Sweden, 
Norway. These are countries that have developed important social systems 
and we feel that we should copy certain of these policies” (Interview 32). They 
continued, “This is why we think we have something to bring to Europe…it is 
small countries who can guarantee a higher quality of life.”  
Emulation may also have a social element. Social emulation is particularly 
linked to the social construction of a certain policy solution as appropriate 
(Gilardi, 2010: 661). The quotes above indicate that Scandinavian countries 
are, in Catalan social democratic circles, understood to have the most 
appropriate policy solution. For example, despite a smaller size, Denmark 
“have the possibility to be known by positive contributions towards humanity” 
(emphasis added). Respondents suggest that Catalonia is the ‘Holland of the 
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South’ or a ‘Northern’ country in the South (Interview 30, Interview 35). The 
Nordic Model has often been imagined as a symbol of a ‘Golden Age’ of the 
welfare state and state institutions (Mjøset, 1992). Given the wider diffusion of 
the model and its alignment with images of Catalonia and ERC, it is a 
symbolically useful reference for ERC elites.  
The use of Scandinavian models by these interview respondents does show 
some signs of deeper learning. Respondents engage in information 
interpretation. For example, the first respondent considers how the models are 
solutions to policy problems (education, climate change, mobility). They also 
align the ideologies of the Scandinavian models with that of ERC (social 
democracy). Meanwhile, the second respondent considers in some detail the 
size and shape of Catalonia and seeks to find models which suit the domestic 
context. MPs do recognize the similarities and differences between 
Scandinavian countries and Catalonia. One said: “Of course each country has 
their own way of doing things. We cannot copy it exactly” (Interview 32).  
Notably, this is not a case of party-to-party learning. Rather, ERC elites seek 
information from other European states and adapt this information to their 
existing ideologies. The use of information about other governments fits with 
the trend of their transnational networking, which has been recently shifting 
towards relationships with statewide parties. ERC politicians, in this case, use 
their Government and Parliamentary roles as spaces for information acquisition 
and adoption. The use of government and legislative institutions for 
transnational relationships will be discussed further in section VII of this 
chapter.  
(2) Teaching: Mass Mobilization  
Studies of learning often focus on the ‘importers’ of ideas. Catalans also serve 
as a teacher in the learning process, defined by Bomberg (2007: 256) as “the 
carriers of ideas, the exporters or ‘teachers’ seeking to offer ‘new information 
225 
 
and experience.’” The previous section showed that ERC is highly involved in 
EFA. Through these connections, ERC and Catalan civil society share their 
experiences in mass mobilization. Mass mobilization has been an important 
tool for Catalan nationalists since the protests held on the Catalan national day 
(called the Diada) in 2012. On the Diada in 2012, the ANC organised a protest 
which brought together 1.5-2 million people. This is seen as a seminal turning 
point in the Catalan independence movement. The march received significant 
attention from Madrid-based press and international press like the New York 
Times.  
In Catalonia, “the capacity for mobilisation has always been a huge 
achievement of Catalan nationalism” (García, 2016: 230). In 2013, 1.6 million 
Catalans took part in building a human chain (the Via Catalana or Catalan Way) 
across Catalonia. This action was inspired by the 1989 Baltic Way, which 
reflects the emphasis put by Catalans on the Baltic countries as a space for 
inspiration in the fight for recognition. The Catalan “tradition of taking to the 
streets” also stems from the oppression of political organizing during the years 
of Franco’s dictatorship (Interview 34). ERC’s skill at mass mobilization is 
sought-after knowledge in EFA. For example, one Frisian politician attended 
the Catalan Way. That politician explained:  
“In Catalonia, you had a chain for independence from the Pyrenees to 
Tarragona. I also participated. Then you have a huge amount of 
solidarity because you’re standing shoulder to shoulder and you’re 
connected to hundreds of thousands of people across hundreds of 
kilometers. These types of examples, coming together on the street in 
demonstration, might also be possible in Friesland” (Interview 4).  
In Scotland, Catalan National Assembly (ANC) members presented to Yes 
groups about the Catalan process. They focused particularly on “providing first-
hand information on how their impressive campaign was organised from the 
streets upwards” (Hannan, 26 February 2018). Another observer from 
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Lombardy explained that he had attended multiple Diada protests and noted 
with envy the “spontaneity” of the Catalan mobilization. 
One of the ANC’s founders reported that Basque political organisations and 
NGOs:  
“…have been coming [to Catalonia] to say, ‘How do you organise local 
referenda? How do you organise the Catalan human chains?’ And, so 
let’s say, we’ve been helping them, inspiring them and then even giving 
them advice at the technical level…there are things moving at the grass 
roots level in the Basque country which are fairly close to what we went 
through seven or eight years ago” (Interview 34).  
One of the founders of the Friends of Catalonia explained that the group was 
considering how the ANC could help pro-independence organisations in 
Scotland (Interview 39). A representative from the Galician youth party, Galiza 
Nova, noted at an event during the Catalan referendum: “We see how 
Catalunya has mobilized. These social mobilizations are a big thing for us.” 
ERC politicians see their process as an exemplar for partners. One noted, 
“Well, there are a lot of countries with a violent, warring history. Columbia, with 
its terrorist groups, for example. Not here in Catalonia, luckily. So, I think this 
is the thing: How can we do this independentist process in a peaceful way?” 
(Interview 27). The Catalan Government’s Foreign Action Plan (2010-2015) 
explicitly put forth “positioning Catalonia as a reference actor for other 
governments” as one of its goals (Vela and Xifra, 2015: 87). These cases of 
information seeking from Catalonia and politicians’ ambition to project 
Catalonia as a peaceful process show that ERC and Catalan partners actively 
teach the nationalist and regionalist network.  
(3) Barriers to Learning: ‘The UK is not Spain’   
Despite the SNP’s prominence in ERC transnational networking, there is a 
significant barrier to learning between the two parties. ERC members feel that 
the difference between the UK and Spanish Governments’ responses to 
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independence referendums significantly affects their ability to adopt Scottish 
strategies. As Catalan President Carles Puigdemont said to Alex Salmond: 
“Rajoy is not David Cameron, and the UK is not Spain” (RT, 16 November 
2017). In the previous two chapters, electoral strategy and constitutional goals 
were important objects of learning. The feeling that the UK approach to 
referendums and independence is significantly different to Spain means that 
ERC politicians cannot easily interpret/adapt information on these key areas of 
exchange.  
One ERC MP said: “The UK is more democratic than the Spanish state. So, 
we want this scenario but it’s impossible because Spain is impossible” 
(Interview 22). One ERC member of the international sectorial explained, 
“Scotland’s different because within the United Kingdom, it’s always been 
recognised as a nation. It’s taken a huge leap for Pedro Sánchez, very recently 
in the primaries for the PSOE, to say that Catalonia is a nation within a multi-
nation Spain” (Interview 31).  
SNP members also noted that there was a difference. One SNP politician who 
was involved with ERC noted his frustration at the implied reification of the UK 
Government (Interview 39). While Scotland is seen as a close partner, on the 
most comparable of their strategies—independence referendums—there is a 
block for ERC elites in adapting Scottish information to Catalonia. This hinders 
information exchange and interpretation to adapt the Scottish case to the 
Catalan context.  
(4) Barriers: Seeking International Recognition  
Spain’s denial of the right to self-determination referendums has been a serious 
hindrance to Catalan independentists. To overcome this, ERC politicians have 
sought international recognition and support. On both a domestic and 
international stage, ERC is focused on gaining the right to decide. This 
emphasis has hindered learning by dominating international relations and 
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engendering an ‘explaining’ approach by ERC politicians abroad. A member of 
JERC noted this preoccupation: “Esquerra is focused on getting the recognition 
once we’re an independent state. It’s their only priority” (Interview 28).  
During the 2017 Catalan referendum, the search for international recognition 
became more prominent. ERC politicians sought to gain as many international 
observers to the referendum as possible. EFA delivered on this demand. There 
were 62 official EFA member observers and 52 EFAy observers, as well as 30 
Quebecois observing the referendum. The presence of these international 
observers led to the dissemination of information about Catalonia, but given 
the heightened pressure of the event, the information mostly went from 
Catalonia abroad rather than into Catalonia. One of these observers explained, 
“They [Catalans] are the protagonists. We are only here to listen and to write 
down what we see.”  
An ERC MP explained that: “in the Committee for External Relations, first of 
all, more or less, in the European area, we try to explain our desire of being an 
independent country. So, we explain the situation in other European countries, 
and we try to be a model” (Interview 27). ERC’s head of international affairs 
said: “We try to explain what’s happening in Catalonia, what is the roadmap 
towards independence, why do we want to become independent, how and 
when are we going to be an independent country, and we need to explain to 
everyone that will listen to us. And that’s what we try to do as a party.” The 
promotion of the Catalan cause disrupts the information acquisition process. 
First, learning is hindered because ERC focused on transmitting information 
outwards due to the referendum process.  
Second, learning is hindered by a lack of resources which limit the ability to 
both project information and acquire it. Catalonia’s search for international 
recognition has spurred counter-diplomacy by Spain (Bourne, 2014). This 
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counter-diplomacy by Spain has drained Catalan resources to interact abroad. 
For example, one ERC MP said:  
“the Foreign Affairs, it’s the property only of the Spanish state and they 
want to forbid us to do things. [They say]: ‘Oh, you can’t do this. You 
can’t travel, you can’t visit other parliaments, no.’ But we’re doing an 
agenda with other parliaments, other parties, other governments…We 
are talking with Scotland, of course, we’re talking with the Flemish 
people, we’re talking with the Welsh people. Also, we’re talking with 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and, of course, the Baltic republics 
– Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania” (Interview 22).  
Many of the larger countries in the EU are not on this list (France, Germany, 
Italy, and Portugal, for example). They are notably missing from Catalonia’s 
international outreach, most likely due to lack of access to state governments. 
Nonetheless, ERC politicians continue a programme of explanation and do so 
not only in EFA, but with many state governments. 
When seeking to achieve the goal of international recognition, the EFA 
transregional network becomes a less valuable resource. That is, as one ERC 
MP explained:  
“You can be a friend of other countries, other political parties, but there’s 
always only your own way because when you obtain independence, you 
need the recognition of other states…So we shut up about Catalan 
people, Basque people, Flemish people, about Occitan people, about 
Breton people, about Corsican people because at D-day, you need the 
diplomatic recognition of all the countries in the world” (Interview 22).  
The party’s distancing from other, smaller, regions includes the Catalan 
speaking regions in France and Italy. As a member of ERC’s international 
relations team explained: “We’re very serious about this independence thing, 
right? So, we don’t want to make enemies and it’s not going to be easy, 
convincing the French” (Interview 31). In a search for recognition, EFA parties 




JERC’s international affairs spokesperson explained: “Esquerra is a part of 
EFA. Esquerra likes to be in contact with other small nations, but now, as we’re 
getting closer, all this is not relevant any longer” (Interview 29). The growth of 
ERC and its success leaves ERC with fewer parties to see as equals in EFA. 
Smaller parties regularly reach out to ERC and while the party ‘tries to meet all 
these commitments,’ they are more oriented towards contact with socialist 
parties across Europe (Interview 30).  
ERC members see the need to distance themselves from other regions in order 
to gain support from states. One MP explained, “States form the EU. And in the 
EU, what counts are states” (Interview 27). Diplomatic blockage from the 
Spanish state means that, despite their efforts, ERC has little access to the 
statewide parties. Yet, to further legitimate themselves, the party distances 
itself from smaller EFA members.  
ERC is less likely to learn from their EFA partners and more likely to focus their 
limited transnational resources on explaining the Catalan cause to states. This 
work is also channeled through Government and Parliamentary resources. As 
such, the goal of international recognition is shared with governmental actors 
and their coalition partner, liberal autonomist party PDeCAT. The next section 
will consider PDeCAT’s relationships in Europe and compare PDeCAT with 
ERC.  
6.5 The Role of TNP Membership in Transnational Relationships 
In the research design of this thesis, an assumption was made that 
membership of a specific TNP (in this case, EFA) affects the interactions that 
political parties have in Europe. This assumption is built on the idea that the 
TNP provides numerous and regular institutional spaces for interaction. I 
reviewed and substantiated the ways that TNP’s provide spaces for interaction 
in Chapter Three. The Catalan case allows me to further test this assumption. 
Catalonia’s two prominent nationalist parties, PDeCAT and ERC, are members 
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of two different transnational political parties. PDeCAT is a member of the 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe (ALDE), which promotes a liberal 
platform at the European level. Meanwhile, ERC is a member of the European 
Free Alliance. My assumption that the TNP shapes transnational relationships 
is upheld. PDeCAT’s network does go beyond the liberal network, but their 
relationships are with powerful nationalist/regionalist parties and they are 
limited and much less regularized than ERC’s.  
(1) PDeCAT and ALDE  
Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català was a member of ALDE since Spain’s entry 
into the EU. The choice to join a mainstream European political party rather 
than the more marginal EFA group stemmed from the CDC’s long term 
governing power in Catalonia and its ‘ruling party’ mentality (Hanley, 2008: 
166). The choice of ALDE may also be attributed to the relatively recent change 
to independentism in PDeCAT. The CDC’s ideological leanings were 
previously more accommodationist and less aligned with EFA. One PDeCAT 
MP noted that the change in ideology towards independentism has sparked “a 
debate inside our new party to decide if this European parliamentary group is 
the best group for us or not” (Interview 24).  
The political cost of ALDE membership has increased for PDeCAT since the 
entry of Ciudadanos into ALDE in June 2016. Ciudadanos is a right wing and 
unionist competitor to PDeCAT. One PDeCAT MP noted that Ciudadanos has 
as “one of their principal missions to abort our membership inside ALDE. So, 
we have to decide if their position in this group is the best position for us, or we 
have to go to another group” (Interview 24). These difficulties increased after 
the Catalan independence referendum. PDeCAT MEP Ramon Tremosa sat 
with Flemish MEPs rather than his ALDE group during an EP discussion on 
Catalonia. ALDE leader Guy Verhofstadt was seen to be vocally in support of 
the Spanish state (Cooper, 2017). In October 2018, after fieldwork was 
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completed, PDeCAT was expelled from ALDE. This was ostensibly as a result 
of corruption allegations against the party, although many PDeCAT members 
suggest that ALDE was encouraged to expel them by Ciudadanos. 
Nonetheless, PDeCAT’s ideological positioning places it more clearly in the 
ALDE group than any other. One PDeCAT MP explained, “the Euro-deputies 
in the European Parliament from Esquerra Republicana, they are in the Green 
group. We are in the liberal group because we feel we are a liberal party with 
a very huge social feeling” (Interview 36). Further, some PDeCAT 
entrepreneurs deeply engaged in ALDE. Former leader and spokesperson 
Marta Pascal was vice president of ALDE between 2015 and 2017 and a 
member of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of 
Europe (CPLRE). PDeCAT respondents often mentioned then-party leader 
Pascal as a key interlocutor with other liberal parties. For other PDeCAT 
politicians, the relationship with other liberals was more ‘virtual than physical’ 
(Interview 24). 
PDeCAT MEP Ramon Tremosa is also a key figure. Tremosa’s engagements 
in ALDE are instructive to PDeCAT’s stances in the Europe Union. The leader 
of PDeCAT’s youth wing explained: “The party tends to orientate its policy 
according to what suits the MEP best at that time. I think the MEP is doing a 
very good job, so it makes sense for the party to do that” (Interview 35). 
PDeCAT’s youth wing, the JNC, is also involved in the European liberal sphere. 
The JNC is a member of the International Federation of Liberal Youth (IFLRY) 
and a member of LYMEC (the European Liberal Youth), as well as having a 
LYMEC board member. LYMEC is an organisation that brings together 
European Liberal Youth; it cooperates with ALDE. This relationship is 
recognized by PDeCAT MPs as relevant. One explained: “We have some 
people from the youth party that have been very involved in these European or 
international structures. We have Secretary Generals of LYMEC, we have 
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members of the IFILRY. So, I guess our youth party is one of the best-
connected parts of our party with European and international groups” (Interview 
24). Within these groups, the head of international affairs for the JNC explained 
that the party’s closest allies “would be liberal parties from small countries, like 
Belgium, like the Netherlands, Estonia. Probably because small countries tend 
to share the same outlook on life and international politics, so our views tend 
to converge” (Interview 35).  
Relationships with other liberal parties are centered on ALDE and the Brussels 
institutions, explained one MP:  
“From our party, our interlocution in these items is with the parties inside 
the Liberal and Democrat family, but we are now in the institutions, in 
the European institutions. So, in those institutions, we talk with a lot of 
persons or a lot of political members, not only from these parties but also 
from other parties that have responsibilities in the European institutions 
or in the European countries” (Interview 24). 
This confirms the Brussels-centric relationship that PDeCAT holds to liberal 
parties. It also indicates the emphasis placed by elite members on both a liberal 
network and a powerful network in Europe. This latter interest and their 
increasingly independentist focus also led PDeCAT to develop a limited 
network of regionalists and nationalists, outside of EFA.   
(2) PDeCAT and European Nationalist/Regionalist Parties 
In Figure 6.3, PDeCAT interview respondents17 are coloured blue to compare 
them with transnational relationships held by ERC respondents. ERC 
respondents reported a much wider range of transnational relationships across 
the nationalist and regionalist party family. It is also interesting to note that 
PDeCAT and ERC’s regionalist relationships within the Spanish state differ 
based on ideology. I review PDeCAT’s relationships with nationalist and 
                                                          




regionalist parties in this section and argue that they are less extensive due to 
the lack of institutional link through EFA. 
One PDeCAT MP explained:  
“We have contacts with the liberal parties; we have contacts with 
nationalist parties. We have had friendship with Belgium’s Flemish or 
the Scottish because it’s very clear that we have a shared ideology. We 
will defend a view for our country, so we have to apply it in our 
relationships abroad. But we also believe that we have to have 
relationships with nationalist parties…So on one side we relate with 
liberals but on the other side we also relate with nationalist parties” 
(Interview 36). 
However, PDeCAT MPs and elites only reported relationships with sub-state 
nationalist parties in the Spanish state and the most powerful nationalist 
parties. Of the latter category, the most prominent is the SNP. This has 
strengthened since PDeCAT’s choice of a pro-independence stance (Interview 
24).  
In July 2018, former Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond made a speech to the 
PDeCAT annual assembly and PDeCAT Catalan President Quim Torra met 
with current First Minster Nicola Sturgeon. The meeting was requested by the 
Catalan Government to speak about the situation of Catalan political prisoners, 
but it addressed far reaching topics of discussion such as the economy and the 
shared interest in national investment banks (Interview 49). PDeCAT MPs also 
traveled to Scotland for the 2014 independence referendum. 
Beyond the Scots and the Flemish, PDeCAT respondents did not report a wider 
network of relationships with nationalist and regionalist parties across Europe. 
The head of international affairs for the PDeCAT’s youth wing explained, “We 
are quite cautious with speaking to other separatist parties because 
unfortunately, in many cases, racism and separatism tend to go together… we 
try to have good relations with the SNP because they share our vision of civic 
nationalism” (Interview 35). 
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Figure 6.3: Catalan Transnational Partners (PDeCAT in blue) 
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PDeCAT interview respondents did report more intensive relationships with 
other Spanish regionalist parties, particularly the Basques and, to a lesser 
extent, the Galicians (Interview 23). This was built on common ideologies, a 
common opponent (the Spanish state), and personal friendship. For example, 
one of the Catalan Parliament’s Vice Presidents explained, “We know the 
Basques. In reality, they are very good friends of ours” (Interview 33). The 
Spanish state provides institutional opportunities for PDeCAT to meet other 
Spanish regionalist parties. One PDeCAT MP explained:  
“Historically, we have good relations, especially with Basque 
nationalists. Our brother party, to say this way, is Partido Nacionalista 
Vasco, PNV, who is in the Government now. Their strategy and our 
strategy are a little bit different, but we have common problems because 
our state is the same state…. We meet them, especially in Congreso de 
los Diputados and Senador, Spanish courts, and several times, we help 
each other to achieve solutions for the common problems” (Interview 
24). 
PDeCAT respondents’ relationships are with non-EFA Basque nationalists, as 
compared to ERC’s relationships in the Basque Country. The Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) is a member of the European Democratic Party, 
which sits in the European Parliament with ALDE. As such, PDeCAT is neither 
active in ALDE, nor in the nationalist and regionalist network. With nationalists 
and regionalists, their relationships are conditioned by access either through 
diplomatic relationships (as with the N-VA and SNP) or the Spanish state. 
Without the linkage of EFA and due to tensions with ALDE during fieldwork, 
PDeCAT respondents report very limited transnational relationships.  
(3) Converging Catalan Transnational Relations  
Despite having significantly different transnational networks, ERC and 
PDeCAT have begun to take a more united approach to transnational 
networking. This is in spite of their different transnational networks and 
centered around their shared role in the Catalan Government. One ERC MEP 
explained, “[PDeCAT] are with the liberals, but as a government, as a group, it 
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makes no difference” (Interview 25). Another ERC MP said: “I think there are 
no longer too many differences…In the moment of truth, PDeCAT has evolved 
and Esquerra has too. PDeCAT and ERC MEPs have done a huge amount of 
work together” (Interview 26). This latter point, about the collaboration between 
MEPs also highlights the conflict between ALDE and PDeCAT. In some 
conversations with EFA members, it was suggested that PDeCAT might join 
EFA. If this were the case, and in the lead up to such a move, I would expect 
the parties’ transnational relationships would begin to converge.  
PDeCAT and ERC’s approaches and transnational relationships clearly differ. 
However, politicians use their legislative and governmental roles (and 
resources) to enact a shared approach to European relations. In particular, 
PDeCAT politicians share ERC’s preoccupation with gaining international 
recognition which I touched on in the previous section. One PDeCAT MP 
explained: “It’s very curious because five or six or seven years ago probably 
nobody in the world knew anything about what’s going on, what was going on 
in Catalonia. Right now, a lot of people all around the world, several different 
countries, want to come here and want to know in first person what’s going on” 
(Interview 36). PDeCAT President Puigdemont was one of the key proponents 
of internationalizing the Catalan process, not least through his physical exile to 
Brussels. Puigdemont’s discourse shortly after the referendum, “was mostly 
addressed to the international community, seeking to show responsibility and 
emphasizing the need for dialogue and calls for mediation” (Cetrà et al., 2018: 
130).  
One MP from PDeCAT noted: “It’s very important for us right now to explain 
abroad what is going on – what is going on with this process, why we want to 
leave, why we want to be a state” (Interview 36). Another PDeCAT MP 
explained: “For our political project, it’s very important that the independence 
process in Catalonia has the recognition of the world and, first of all, of the 
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European institutions. So, one of our missions, now from the Parliament but 
also from the Government, is to explain our strategy” (Interview 24).  
The explanatory approach to the international community is driven by ERC and 
PDeCAT politicians, using the Catalan Parliament and Government. The 
parties have, over a longer period of time, built up different European networks. 
Due to its relationship with EFA, ERC is more embedded in the nationalist and 
regionalist party network. PDeCAT has previously aligned itself with liberal 
parties. However, cooperation in the Catalan Government and surrounding the 
recognition of Catalan independence has brought the parties’ transnational 
approaches closer together. The following section explores how ERC party 
transnational networking interacts with Government diplomatic resources and 
the extent to which this relates to party learning. 
6.6 Catalan Institutional Diplomacy and Learning 
Both ERC and PDeCAT party elites interact with politicians across Europe 
through their party networks (EFA and ALDE respectively) and bilateral 
connections. However, since gaining control of the Catalan Government, they 
also use Government and Parliament access to establish connections. Catalan 
para-diplomacy has a long history. This section first reviews Catalan diplomatic 
efforts, before considering the case of politicians’ relationships across the 
Mediterranean. This case is used to consider how party and government 
international relations interact.  
Catalan diplomacy has been entrenched in civil service-driven institutions. This 
creates a disconnect between transnational party networking and Catalan 
diplomacy. Furthermore, Catalan diplomacy focuses on policy-oriented 
interregional networks rather than ideological goals. The plethora of Catalan 
interregional networks and para-diplomacy provides an area of further research 
into different sources of learning in regions beyond the EFA party network. 
(1) Development of Catalan Diplomacy 
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Catalonia was one of the first regions to engage in regional representations in 
Brussels. In 1982, they established an office in Brussels. This was developed 
through ‘a public-private formula’ first called the Patronat Català Pro-Europa, 
then Patronat Catalunya Món and now the Catalan diplomacy organisation 
Diplocat (Cetrà and Liñeira, 2018: 723). This Catalan representation in 
Brussels was established before Spain became a member of the European 
Community (Nagel, 2004: 63). It was seen as a personal project of longtime 
President of Catalonia Jordi Pujol. However, while Pujol was personally 
instrumental, the internationalization approach of the Catalan Government did 
not end with his presidency.  
Through changes in political leadership, Catalan diplomacy has become more 
and more institutionalized. Institutionalization can be seen in the Catalan casals 
(Catalan Communities Abroad) and proliferation of para-embassies (Xifra, 
2012:  71). The creation of a Catalan foreign ministry and minister strengthens 
the base for this behaviour. Furthermore, Catalan international relations and 
diplomacy draws on civil society and culture (Vela and Xifra, 2015). The ANC’s 
creation of international branches since 2011 further added to this institutional 
density.  
The Catalan Government has set up many institutions including the Catalan 
Agency for Cooperation for Development, the Agency for Innovation and 
Internationalization in Catalan Business, the Institut Ramon Llull, the Council 
for Catalan Communities Abroad, and Diplocat. It is well known that, “Catalonia 
is one of the most active European regions in [interregional networking]. It 
participates, for example, in the Working Community of Regions with Industrial 
Tradition (RETI, 1984), in the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions 
(CPMR, 1986), in the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR, 1987), 
not to forget the Assembly of European Wine Growing Regions (AREV)” 
(Nagel, 2004: 63).  
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Para-diplomacy has continued through numerous changes in party power in 
Catalonia. It began under Pujol but continued through the Socialist-led tripartit 
Government and the PDeCAT/ERC coalition. The Catalan Government joined 
and developed a wide network of para-diplomatic organisations. This 
bureaucratic web ensures that Catalan Government diplomacy remains 
differentiated from party politics.  
In fact, given its resources, the Catalan Government’s para-diplomatic network 
guides politicians’ international relations. As one ERC member of the Catalan 
Parliament’s External Relations Committee noted: “I am working in the 
Committee here in Parliament, not in the Government…I follow in their line” 
(Interview 27). One example, they explained, is that Diplocat will invite MPs to 
dinners or meetings, which are arranged by the Government. The European 
Free Alliance can thus shape the partners that parties have but the Catalan 
Government and governmental agencies also have influence on how 
politicians relate across borders. As such, in cases such as this, where a party 
has access to significant para-diplomatic resources, I expect that the effect of 
the transnational political party is reduced.  
(2) The Case of Mediterranean Cooperation 
In interviews, the case of Mediterranean cooperation emerged as a goal for 
ERC elites and the Catalan Government. Catalonia serves as the base for the 
EU/Mediterranean partnership, the Union of the Mediterranean. As a party, 
ERC sees itself as having an affinity with the Mediterranean. ERC envisions 
the new Catalan state as a leader in the Mediterranean, working to address 
shared issues such as immigration and climate change. One ERC member of 
the Catalan foreign affairs ministry explained:  
“We want to be one of the hearts of this Mediterranean and to be an 
area which is the countries come, different countries, especially from the 
south, and they can learn and share the practices with us, and we can 
241 
 
develop models…We have a lot to share with Mediterranean countries 
and we believe we have something to contribute” (Interview 30).  
The Mediterranean is envisioned as a space for Catalan policy projection and 
cooperation, through the sharing of ‘models’ or best practice. This behaviour is 
linked to ERC’s work on international recognition. For example, in the quote 
above, the assertion that ‘we have something to contribute.’ Another ERC MP 
explained, “We have inputs about sympathy in other countries that it’s better 
not to say, but we think that if Catalonia becomes a republic, our situation in 
the Mediterranean Sea will be eased and important” (Interview 26). Catalan 
Government outreach in the Mediterranean is thus complemented by ERC’s 
ideological assertions of Catalonia’s ability to be independent. 
However, in its day to day implementation, Catalan diplomacy in the 
Mediterranean is much more oriented towards seeking policy solutions, 
regardless of the politics of partners. Groups like the Union of the 
Mediterranean include participants that are not sub-state nationalists and do 
not support sub-state nationalism. Historically, interregional networks have 
never been exclusively the realm of regionalists; regionalization has been a 
project separate from autonomism (Loughlin, 1996). Among political elected 
elites, the Mediterranean is seen as a place for developing policy networks. 
There was no widespread mention of achieving regional political goals or ideals 
through this network; only leaders of the more radical youth wing JERC noted 
the political issues of networking in the Mediterranean (i.e. colonialist attitudes 
and the Arab Spring) (Interview 28, Interview 29).  
The spokesperson for ERC’s international sectorial explained: “We try to keep 
the two things apart. In other words, when we decide on international relations 
policy, from the point of view of the party, it has to be one thing. And as a 
government party, when we discuss international relations as a government 
party, for the Government, it’s another thing” (Interview 31). Governing 
responsibility and access to the para-diplomatic network of the Catalan 
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Government has given ERC politicians another pathway through which to 
engage in international relations. However, this is kept separate from 
transnational party networking. This differentiation means that Catalan para-
diplomacy does not directly relate to or engender political party learning. 
6.7 Conclusion  
The case of Catalan independentist parties has provided a useful contrast to 
smaller, non-governing parties. Both Catalan parties’ governing responsibility 
affects their approach towards transnational partners. Using government 
resources, ERC seeks out statewide parties. They also work together in 
Government with PDeCAT to provide an image of unity and to seek 
international recognition. However, ERC and its most transnationally active 
elites have a wider network of contacts across the regions of Europe, which is 
facilitated by their membership of EFA since 1986. ERC members thus engage 
and seek out with two transnational networks: (1) EFA regionalist and 
nationalist ‘sister’ parties and (2) ideologically similar, social democratic 
statewide parties.  
Within the EFA network, ERC finds “a platform where you can get to know 
people, get to know other parties, establish regular relations with other parties” 
(Interview 25). Access to these regular transnational/transregional 
relationships is facilitated specifically by membership of EFA. The Catalan case 
has allowed me to substantiate a basic assumption of this thesis: that 
membership of a specific TNP affects transnational relationships. Furthermore, 
as suggested in the UDB chapter, active individuals can make membership of 
a TNP more active and useful for a party. While PDeCAT has some 
relationships with governing regionalist and nationalist parties, they do not 
report regular or extensive interactions with EFA members. Even in Spain, 
PDeCAT engages with non-EFA sub-state nationalist parties.  
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On the other hand, ERC is highly engaged in EFA networking and has many 
key entrepreneurs such as the head of the EFA EP group, EFA President, 
President of EFA Youth, and Secretary General of EFA Youth. Despite this 
highly active membership of EFA, ERC does not display significant cases of 
learning from EFA partners. However, as a consequence of its electoral 
strength, ERC does see itself as a ‘teacher’ in the EFA network, using their 
skills in mass mobilization. Their governing responsibility and attempts to work 
with states also lead to a case of emulation/copying in the adoption of the 
‘Nordic’ or ‘Scandinavian’ welfare model.  
I identified two reasons for the lack of further learning: (1) the perceived 
difference between the UK and Spanish governments responses to 
independence referendums; and (2) the emphasis on seeking international 
recognition. The former of these makes it difficult for ERC to interpret 
information from their closest partner, the SNP, as relevant or adaptable to the 
Catalan context. The latter is a consequence of ERC’s electoral success and 
governing responsibility, because of its focus on promoting and seeking to ‘win’ 
the independence referendum in October 2017.  
The 1 October referendum posed significant methodological difficulties for my 
research. Interviews for this chapter were conducted in July 2016 and May 
2017. Both interview periods were before the official referendum date was 
announced, but the latter period of interviewing was particularly close to the 
announcement of the referendum (9 June 2017). Even in 2016, discussion of 
the referendum dominated interview responses because the government had 
made it clear that a vote was imminent. As one interview respondent explained, 
“Catalan politics in general, not just in my party, has kind of gravitated around 
this over the last few years. As you may already know, in September or 
October, we’ll be having a referendum and from here until then, basically, 
almost everything’s focused on that referendum” (Interview 35).  
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It may be useful to consider the role of such important domestic events to 
parties’ transnational networking. The case of Catalonia suggested that the 
referendum was a significant intervening variable in their process of 
transnational engagement. Future research could be done to compare this 
period of the referendum to Catalan transnational networking at other times, or 
to explore how other parties’ transnational networking has been affected by 
referendums (for example, comparing SNP and ERC behaviour during their 
referendum processes). 
It would also be useful to consider further cases of how para-diplomacy and 
interregional networks affect learning. The bureaucratic web of Catalan para-
diplomacy drives a policy-oriented interregional networking, as I have used the 
case of Mediterranean cooperation to illustrate. ERC politicians use the 
Catalan Government for information seeking, which provides an alternate route 
and sets them apart from their more politically and ideologically driven EFA 
party network.  However, this requires significantly more investigation to 
become more generalizable. Research on interregional networks through a 
lens of learning would be a useful complement to my research on EFA’s 











Chapter Seven: The Scottish National Party  
The Scottish National Party (SNP) has been held up as an exemplar by many 
other parties in the European Free Alliance. This status stems mostly from its 
rise in power, from a longtime fringe and opposition party, to one of the most 
successful regionalist and nationalist parties in Europe. Many in the SNP 
attribute their sustained success to their competence in government. Studies 
of the 2007 and 2011 Scottish Parliament elections suggested that 
“performance politics was the key factor in those results” (Johns et al., 2013; 
Johns et al., 2009). This politics of competence, authors argue, is “that most 
mundane of electoral reasons” (Johns et al., 2013: 158). The SNP has long 
aspired towards this mundane ideal, working towards ‘mainstreaming’ or 
‘normalizing’ itself.  
Hepburn (2009) asserted that many nationalist and regionalist parties have 
made the move from ‘niche to normal.’ To do so, they carefully balance a 
‘competence’ approach with their political goal of radically altering the state. As 
earlier chapters have shown, EFA’s smaller member parties see the SNP as 
the model example of this balancing act. As Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans said 
at EFA’s fringe event at the SNP’s 2012 conference, “This is not a race and it's 
not a competition; we're all working together in solidarity with one another. It is 
a process of normalisation: each of our nations, in its own distinctive way, 
seeking normality in the wider European family of nations.”  
The SNP’s success and ambition at mainstreaming is also pervasive in their 
approach to international relations. In many ways, normalizing the SNP hinders 
EFA’s goal of encouraging relationships between parties. The SNP’s headline 
European integration policy of ‘Independence in Europe,’ first adopted in 1988, 
was not about radical change or a ‘Europe of the Regions’ as envisioned by 
other regionalists. In fact, the party’s ambition was and is to achieve statehood 
in Europe, to be a ‘normal country’ (Interview 49). The first two sections of this 
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chapter will further introduce the SNP and the proposed contextual factors that 
may affect party learning. I argue that the SNP’s sustained success and 
mainstreaming approach to the EU have affected their relationship with the 
European Free Alliance. The third section will show that, unlike other parties in 
this thesis, the SNP’s knowledge and interest in EFA partners is low. 
Conversely, its interest in engaging with powerful regional parties and 
statewide social democrats is high.   
In the fourth section of this chapter, I find that the SNP does not display learning 
from their relationships in the European Free Alliance. I argue that the SNP’s 
success, governing power, and centralized internal structure hinder learning. 
However, given their elevated position in the EFA network, the SNP has 
sometimes taken on a teaching role in the nationalist and regionalist network. 
The party does display learning from non-EFA partners such as Nordic 
countries and the Parti Québécois.  
The SNP mobilizes the Scottish Government’s para-diplomatic strength to seek 
international inspiration from other states, rather than political parties. As such, 
I conclude this chapter by considering the role of institutional diplomacy. The 
SNP’s governing resources and elected members’ personal initiative has 
expanded their transnational network significantly beyond EFA. The cases of 
the Nordic Model and Brexit reveal the way that the SNP uses governing 
resources, rather than transnational party networking, to learn.  
7.1 Introducing the Scottish National Party 
The party defines itself pithily as: “Scotland's largest political party and party of 
government. Centre left and social democratic.” (SNP website, “About,” 
16/10/18). This self-definition provides a useful basis upon which to briefly 
introduce two important threads in the SNP’s history. The first aspect of the 
SNP’s development is ideological movement on two scales: the centre-
periphery and the left-right. The second strand, as I have touched on, is its 
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move from the fringes of British politics to be leaders in Scottish politics. These 
two components of the SNP considerably affect their relationship to other 
European political actors and their capacity for learning.  
The Scottish National Party was founded in 1934 and it did not have a 
particularly fortuitous electoral start. The party underwent numerous internal 
schisms; a brief spike of success in the 1960s led to a 1970 article 
apocalyptically named “The Rise and Fall of the Scottish National Party” 
(McLean, 1970). This prediction did not prove true; the SNP performed well in 
the two general elections of 1974 and local elections in 1977 and 1978 (Lynch, 
2009: 622). Winnie Ewing was also elected as the SNP’s first MEP in the first 
European Parliament elections in 1979.  
Significant scholarly work has traced the history and growth of the SNP over 
the last forty years (Farbey et al., 1980; Lynch, 1996; Lynch, 2009; Mitchell et 
al., 2011). This thesis will not replicate this work. However, understanding the 
SNP’s position in the EFA network must begin from an understanding of the 
party’s evolution in Scotland. The party’s shift towards becoming an ‘electoral-
professional’ party was underpinned by the changing opportunity structure of 
devolution as well as elite driven changes to the party’s constitution and 
organisational structure (Mitchell et al., 2011: 34-53).  
Ideologically, autonomism has always been a foundational proposition of the 
SNP, although the party undertook a debate between more ‘home rule’ and 
independence played out, in the 1970s and 1980s. The debate split the party 
significantly, but a version of gradualism ultimately prevailed (Mitchell, 1988: 
475-476). This gradualism allowed the SNP to take part in and benefit from the 
1997 devolution referendum. From 1997-2009, SNP manifestos have shown it 
to be a social-democratic party, slightly to the left of the ‘broad church’ center 
(Massetti and Schakel, 2015: 869, 876). Their centre-left positioning is linked 
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to autonomy goals, with independence being framed ‘in terms of the economic 
dividends that it would bring to Scotland’ (Elias, 2018: 8).  
Since the adoption of the ‘Independence in Europe’ policy, the SNP has 
continued to be a broadly pro-European party. One MSP noted: “Scotland had 
always had that interest in Europe in the wider sense as a trading partner and 
as a cultural partner…There has always been a much more Europhile attitude 
in Scotland to the rest of Europe” (Interview 44). This pro-Europeanism and the 
SNP’s sustained power in Scotland in the last 20 years has made the party a 
sought-after actor in the EFA network. 
7.2 Contextual Factors and the Scottish National Party  
In the theoretical framework of this thesis, I identified the process of learning 
and five contextual factors which would affect it, including: electoral strength, 
governing responsibility, party centralization, presence of key transnational 
entrepreneurs, and issue contestation. In the Scottish National Party, each of 
these factors plays a role in (predominantly) hindering learning from the EFA 
network, but its electoral strength, centralization, and lack of entrepreneurs in 
EFA are particularly relevant. Its governing responsibility, as I will show in 
section V of this chapter, allows the SNP to learn from non-EFA partners, both 
state-wide parties and other governments.  
(1) Electoral Strength and Governing Responsibility  
With the creation of the devolved Scottish Parliament and Executive, the SNP’s 
electoral fortunes improved. Devolution included the Additional Member 
System (AMS) and a distinctly Scottish political sphere which were more 
favorable to the SNP (Mitchell et al., 2011: 11). In 1999 Scottish Parliament, 
the SNP sat in opposition to a Labour Government. The 1999 election proved 
difficult in part because the party had to contend with moving from the ‘margins’ 
of politics to being ‘close to power’ (Jones, 1999: 9). The 2003 Scottish 
Parliament election saw another ‘disappointing’ performance for the SNP, 
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which was seen to have suffered from the rise of smaller, anti-establishment 
parties (Denver, 2003: 51). However, in 2007, the SNP won 32.9% of the 
constituency vote, an increase of 9%. Since then, the SNP has been the ruling 
party in the Scottish Government. 
Table 7.1 Scottish National Party Electoral Results (1997-2018) 




2017  Statewide  36.9% Opposition  
2016 Devolved  46.5%* In Government 
(minority) 
2015 Statewide 50.0% Opposition 
2011  Devolved 45.4%* In Government  
2010 Statewide 19.9% Opposition 
2007 Devolved 32.9%* In Government 
(minority) 
2005 Statewide 17.7% Opposition 
2003  Devolved 23.8%* Opposition 
2001  Statewide 20.1% Opposition 
1999 Devolved 27.3%* Opposition 
1997 Statewide 22.1% Opposition 
*constituency vote share  
However, this success was preceded by many years of low voter shares before 
devolution. Given its relatively recent rise, the SNP is still focused on proving 
its ability to be a ‘party of government.’ To cultivate that image, the SNP has 
balanced its independentist goals with the promotion of ‘Scottish interests’ and 
what is ‘good for Scotland’ (Mitchell et al., 2011: 142). The focus on maintaining 
and achieving higher electoral success isolates it from some European Free 
Alliance members. One senior party and government adviser explained: “We 
250 
 
became a government up here and with Westminster group expanding…we try 
to be a proper country, working within the confines of what the UK Government 
will allow us to do” (Interview 49). 
After the 2016 Scottish Parliament elections, the SNP now forms a minority 
government in Scotland. This may hinder the ability of the government to build 
relationships internationally as frequently. As one senior staff member 
explained, “I would like to send ministers to more countries more of the time, 
but they have to turn up and vote because we’re a minority government” 
(Interview 49). Nonetheless, the SNP has used its control of the Scottish 
Government for the last 12 years to develop Scotland’s international network. 
In the last section of this chapter, I will delve into the way that the SNP links 
these diplomatic partnerships and its party-based transnational relationships. 
(2) Party Centralization  
Like most nationalist and regionalist parties, the SNP was founded with a more 
grassroots, ‘movement’ style organisational structure. The party’s original 
openness and ‘participative bias’ allowed for internal factionalism and conflict 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Newell, 2003). However, as the party 
developed, stronger leaders emerged. Higher numbers of elected members in 
the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood meant that senior party staff and members 
had “a desire for greater professionalism and administrative efficacy” and that 
the party had a need for cohesion (Mitchell et al., 2011: 36). This was also 
driven by the understanding that, as one central staff member said: “divided 
parties don’t win elections” (Interview 52). The party now has what I would call 
a centralized organisational structure.  
The SNP’s membership expanded rapidly after the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum, from 25,000 at the end of 2013 to 125,000 
members following another spike in mid-2018 (Lee, 15 June 2018). Survey 
data from Mitchell, Bennie and Johns (2017) showed that new members have 
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not changed the social or ideological profile of the SNP, as one might expect, 
because of the strong link made between left/right positioning and support for 
independence. membership growth has meant that the SNP has had to 
incorporate many new members, but in fact most of its core activists and 
policies remain the same. As one long time party staff member explained, 
“People joined us because they liked who we are” (Interview 52). 
Mitchell et al. (2011) noted that elite SNP members argue that the party is 
participative, due to its status as a ‘national movement’ and a ‘broad church.’ 
However, the SNP “is much more coherent ideologically than might have been 
expected but, on the other, less participative and decentralized than this 
internal myth would suggest” (Mitchell et al., 2011: 140).  
My interviews confirm this finding. There was a narrative among senior SNP 
members that the party is highly participative which is based in procedural 
claims about the process of decision making.  Procedurally, the party’s 
conferences are the ‘supreme ruling body of the SNP’ (SNP Constitution, 
2012). National Council is held at least twice a year between conferences. It is 
comprised of two delegates from each branch, members of the National 
Executive Committee, six delegates from affiliated organisations (such as 
Young Scots for Independence), five MSPs, two MPs, one MEP, six 
councillors, and 15 members elected at conference. Finally, the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) is responsible for the “the strategic management 
and political direction of the Party” and the implementation of Conference and 
Council decisions.  
However, two developments complicate this formally open decision-making 
procedure: the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the SNP’s move into 
government. The Scottish Government Cabinet and the Scottish Parliament 
group became new, influential centres of power in the party which disrupt the 
procedural democracy of the party. One long time SNP adviser explained: 
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 “You would’ve found that the political direction of the party would’ve 
been more based at the Scottish Parliament as of 1999. If you track 
forward more or less a decade after that to 2007, then the political 
direction of the SNP would have been to a significant extent been 
decided by the actual cabinet, not a shadow but a real administration” 
(Interview 53). 
The strong leadership of senior SNP figures counterbalances official party 
democracy. Senior figures hold an informal persuasive role in the party. One 
example of the contradiction between procedural democracy and elite 
influence is the SNP’s stance on NATO. The party’s members hold this up as 
a case of ultimate democracy, since it engendered a lively conference debate. 
However, the debate was heavily influenced by the role of prominent party 
members, notably then-Westminster leader Angus Robertson. Robertson “is a 
spokesperson on both of those issues so clearly his opinion comes with that 
weight. But it was very much a case of having to convince the membership of 
the virtue of doing that” (Interview 38). 
Ideas pushed by the SNP membership do get traction in SNP policy choices. 
One such policy is the trial of universal basic income. The SNP’s conference 
passed a resolution supporting citizen’s income in 2016 (Gollan, 2018). The 
Scottish Government committed to researching the policy in its 2017/18 
Programme for Government and funded limited trials of the policy in December 
2017 (Denholm, 2017; Brooks, 2017). However, these policies already fit with 
the social democratic stances of party leadership. Furthermore, 
implementation has been cautious.  
Participative politics in the SNP is thus constrained by centralized leadership. 
The transition to government made leadership coordination and centralization 
more necessary. One former SNP senior adviser explained this transition:  
“Whereas before there didn’t have to be nearly as much consideration 
around alignment of activities between Westminster and the SG, there 
now had to be…That was part and parcel of what I would describe as 
the professionalization of the SNP over the last decade. There was an 
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incredible amount of coordination, cooperation, and occasionally heated 
discussion between different groups” (Interview 38).  
The concentration and coordination of information between the Scottish 
Government, Westminster and Holyrood means that elected members have an 
advantage in intra-party debates and can guide members’ opinions. 
The coordination of information and power in the SNP resides in three main 
venues: the Scottish Government and its special advisers, Scottish Parliament 
whips and senior staff, and Westminster leadership team and senior staff. 
Senior staff in these venues and the European Parliament join a weekly call on 
Mondays, which sets out the priorities and issues for the week ahead. This 
‘coordination call’ highlights how governing responsibility has empowered more 
elite actors in the SNP. Party growth and governing power necessitates a new, 
unwritten process of decision making. This process “isn’t written anywhere and 
tends to be concentrated between the people who are in leadership positions” 
(Interview 41).  
The call is seen as a major moment to set the tone of SNP behaviour in elected 
and public office: 
“That just sets the tone and the working pace for the week ahead. It’s a 
real moment in the week because you know if you miss that call, you’ve 
got a lot of catch up to do because there’s a lot of stuff discussed and 
agreed on it” (Interview 46).  
Notably and importantly for this research, the European Parliament team is also 
included in this coordination call. However, respondents did not note that the 
EP group was central to the coordination of decision making. Rather, the 
Scottish Government is the hub for decisions. The Government have taken on 
a leading role in Brexit negotiations, with Cabinet Secretary for Government 
Business and Constitutional Relations Michael Russell being seen as the 
‘Brexit Minister.’  
254 
 
While SNP elites profess a democratic decision-making process, the parties’ 
agenda and strategic decisions are often taken at a much higher level. This 
level is populated with the SNP’s elected members and long-time staff, who 
influence party decision making through the coordination and concentration of 
information. A lack of open-ness to new information or information from the 
SNP’s periphery means that transnational information may not be considered 
in decision making processes. 
For example, when SNP members go abroad, the follow-up communication of 
their experiences to the SNP’s central decision makers is not always direct. As 
one respondent explained:  
“There’s no process for it. It’s up to you as an individual to think how you 
would get that out there. I’m trying to do that better with Mike…Just 
trying to build that stronger relationship there so that everybody is aware 
of what’s going on” (Interview 43). 
Respondents also noted the distance between Brussels-based SNP actors and 
the SNP’s decision making. One senior staffer explained: “From a very narrow 
legislative sense it doesn’t have much of a day to day bearing. Not much is 
considered there which is going have an instant political effect here” (Interview 
41). SNP members of the European Parliament have “quite a free reign” to act 
at the European Parliament (Interview 46). MEP’s are trusted to know SNP 
policy, because “they know what the link back home is or what the link to 
Westminster is” (Interview 46). There are very few times when MEPs voted 
against the advice of the central party. However, on the Canadian Free Trade 
deal (CETA), MEPs defied advice from Holyrood colleagues, showing their 
ability to act independently in the EP (Interview 40).  
The SNP’s centralized nature makes it less likely to develop learning as a 
collective party. Individual actors and members who have links to transnational 
partners may not be in the central decision making structures. Furthermore, the 
informal and opaque nature of those centralized decision making processes 
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means that there is no clear process for reporting back transnational 
experiences to those who make key policy making decisions. Information is 
thus likely to be acquired by individuals, but not transferred to the party 
collectively. 
(3) Key Entrepreneurs  
MEPs are the individuals in the SNP who are most involved in EFA business, 
but the SNP has many individuals with interests across Europe. While the party 
is centralized in its decision making in Scotland, its European relationships are 
diffuse. Respondents repeatedly noted that the SNP’s MEPs were the most 
active people in the European Free Alliance relationship. MEPs were also seen 
as having a lot of individual initiative and free reign, not only from their SNP 
colleagues but from EFA and Green colleagues. One senior staffer who had 
worked in Brussels noted that the proximity of the MEPs meant that “[The EFA-
Green group] functions like one team. When it comes down to the detail of 
policy, it does tend to become each member for their own portfolio” (Interview 
46). This independence from both the home party and the EFA group means 
that information is unlikely to flow from the SNP’s two MEPs to the party’s 
central decision making in Edinburgh. 
MEPs’ independent role in guiding policy and networking at the EU dates back 
to Winnie Ewing, MEP from 1975 to 1999. Ewing was President of the SNP 
from 1987 to 2004; notably she was succeeded in this role by current MEP Ian 
Hudghton. Before the creation of the EFA AEP Group in 1999, Ewing sat with 
other European political groupings. In 1984, she sat in the “European 
Democratic Alliance group…comprised of French Gaullists, the Irish Fianna 
Fail, and Ewing” (Laible, 2008: 163). This choice highlights her promotion of 
Scotland not as just a region but as a possible new state in Europe. The SNP’s 
early choice of a TNP with statewide parties was a precursor of the distance 
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the SNP has from EFA parties today, which will be explored in section III of this 
chapter. 
In addition to MEPs, the SNP also has many other elected members who foster 
international relationships. Some individuals are empowered by institutions at 
the European Union. For example, Christina McKelvie MSP is Scotland’s 
representative on the Council of Europe, while Mairi Gougeon MSP is the 
representative on the Committee of the Regions. These opportunities often 
require politicians to take their own initiatives. Gougeon argued that access to 
the EU’s institution should be more widely advertised, because, “if we’re 
contributing to these organisations, everyone should be more aware of what 
they do or the opportunities that exist.” McKelvie’s international outlook 
predated her time in the Scottish Parliament. She explained, “Being in the trade 
union movement you get really involved in what’s happening in other countries 
and you also get involved in what’s happening from an international 
perspective.” SNP members draw on both their previous experiences and their 
ability to access institutional opportunities to develop an international outlook 
and profile.   
Other individual elected members have developed relationships with specific 
regions or countries. One example is former MP George Kerevan, who was 
instrumental in setting up the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on 
Catalonia in the UK Parliament. He has since written a book about the Catalan 
independence movement. Kerevan’s interest in Catalonia pre-dates his 
involvement with the SNP; he began visiting Catalonia in 1974 (Argemi, 2017).  
Another is former MSP and Presiding Officer Tricia Marwick who has become 
an outspoken advocate for Catalan self-determination. After being invited by 
the International Commission of European Citizens, Marwick spoke at the 
official rally the night before Catalonia’s 1 October 2017 referendum and spent 
the day in a polling station during the referendum. This experience instigated 
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numerous further visits, for the December 2017 elections, and a year later to 
mark the anniversary of the referendum. Marwick’s story shows the power of 
individual SNP elites’ relationships with Catalonia. There are numerous other 
individual SNP members with similar stories.  
The diffusion of entrepreneurship in the SNP on European issues suggests that 
party members are interacting with EFA partners, but these interactions are not 
tied clearly into the SNP as a collective party. This may hinder the transition 
from individual to collective understandings of transnational information. 
(4) Issue Contestation  
The SNP’s leaders and members display a surprising amount of agreement on 
policy issues, despite its membership increase and the party’s ‘failure’ in the 
2014 independence referendum. This can partly be explained by the nature of 
the referendum, which did not center entirely on the right to self-determination. 
Rather it was about what Mitchell called “the Scottish Question” which included 
arguments from both sides about “the kind of state and society people 
envisaged for Scotland” (2015: 90). The SNP developed a detailed plan for a 
post-independence Scotland, most obviously in the government-published 
White Paper, which influenced their campaigning during the referendum. As 
such, new members who joined the party generally supported the SNP’s policy 
platform beyond independence.  
The biggest issue of contestation in recent years has been the discussion 
around a second independence referendum. One MSP argued that the party 
membership surge led to a friction in the party between “those who just want 
another referendum right away and those who generally have been party 
members for years and years and years and I think quite importantly, have 
tasted failure. I think that makes a difference. They’re much more cautious” 
(Interview 51). Despite the First Minister’s announcement of a draft bill for a 
second independence referendum, the issue is one which continues to be 
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shifted further into the future. The announcement appeased the newer 
membership and linked Brexit with independence. However, the SNP has 
continued to make only vague commitments to a second referendum (Cairney, 
2016; Thomson, 2016).  
One senior member of staff explained, “I think you just need to keep laying on 
the realism for people which is that it’s not holding a referendum that gets you 
independence. Winning a referendum gets you independence. That’s where 
you have to remind people that we’re not there yet” (Interview 52). In some 
sense, the biggest issues of conversation in the SNP are organizational, 
especially after the membership surge. As one long-time member explained, 
“the nature of groups and organisations at a voluntary level is that most of the 
arguments we have are about party structures, the constitution” (Interview 51).  
The Brexit referendum has further narrowed the scope of the SNP’s policy 
development. Brexit allowed the SNP, through the Scottish Government and 
its MPs at Westminster, to emphasize the importance (and neglect) of 
Scotland’s voice in the UK. One longtime party member and senior staffer 
explained: 
 “The biggest political event that has happened in my time in politics has 
been Brexit…I guess the reason [the independence referendum] was 
never as huge a challenge is that the electorate voted for the status quo. 
Although we keep making the arguments and we keep doing the 
research, there’s not the mess that we have now with Brexit” (Interview 
46).  
Brexit provides a policy challenge and focus for advisers behind the scenes in 
the SNP; it was predominant in the discussions I had with interview 
respondents. As one staff member said of Brexit: “it’s the only game in town” 
(Interview 52). This focus on Brexit reduces issue contestation because the 
SNP is united in its stance on Brexit and the Brexit agenda is centrally 
controlled. As such, other than Brexit, the SNP’s policy development is fairly 
centered at the government and on existing commitments. This lack of 
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contestation within the SNP also reduces the need for elected members to seek 
solutions outside of Scotland. 
The SNP’s electoral success and power in the EFA network, its control and use 
of government resources internationally, and lack of issue contestation reduce 
the likelihood that the party will seek solutions within the EFA network. 
Furthermore, although many SNP members are internationally active, this 
activity is often diffuse and disconnected from the centralized bodies of the 
party. This suggests a disconnect between transnational interactions and the 
decisions taken in the party’s Edinburgh center.  
7.3 Transnational Interactions  
The SNP’s transnational interactions differ significantly from those of other 
parties. While members of other parties referred to many EFA partners, this is 
not the case for members of the SNP. Respondents focused on three main 
groups of partners: geographically proximate parties (Plaid Cymru and Irish 
parties), powerful parties (mostly Catalan), and social democratic statewide 
(non-EFA) parties. Members of the SNP show significantly less investment in 
the European Free Alliance network than their Catalan, Breton or Frisian 
counterparts. One senior member of the European Free Alliance explained: 
“The Scots only joined in 1989. And Winnie Ewing was [in the European 
Parliament] before EFA was founded, since 1974…there is a very close 
relationship between France and Scotland. That's why Madame Ecosse 
joined the Gaullists and why they had a very hard time to convince her 
in the end to join EFA. That was mainly due to changing situations in 
France and Scotland, rather than that EFA has become more attractive” 
(Interview 10).  
The SNP often falls outside the centre of the EFA network, despite its centrality 
in other EFA parties’ conceptions of successful nationalist and regionalist 
activism. For example, SNP leaders are “not in attendance at a lot of EFA 
conferences. They send their staff” (Interview 45). As one Westminster SNP 
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staffer explained, “[EFA parties are] not sister parties; they’re simply the group 
we choose to associate with in the European Parliament” (Interview 41). 
On the other hand, some elected members explained that the European Free 
Alliance had a role in initiating their relationships with Catalonia. One explained 
that, ten years prior, “I went to the EFA youth conference that took place in 
Barcelona…It was a real eye-opening experience” (Interview 39). Another MSP 
recalled that EFA had invited her to her first visit to Barcelona, and that this had 
begun a 20-year and counting relationship with some Catalan politicians (who 
were youth activists on her first visit) (Interview 51).  
Another noted: “it’s through [EFA] that most of the contacts were made” early 
on in the SNP’s growth (Interview 53). These respondents reported very few 
subsequent interactions with EFA. The European Free Alliance may have 
brought SNP members initially into contact with Catalonia, but they quickly built 
bilateral relationships, particularly with powerful parties.  
(1) Network Visualization  
As Figure 7.1 shows, the SNP has a limited number of relationships with other 
political parties in EFA. Within these relationships, Plaid Cymru and Esquerra 
Republicana de Catalunya are the most commonly mentioned parties. I will 
explore these relationships in the next section. Respondents also mention 
ERC’s Catalan Government partner, PDeCAT and more generally, the 
“Catalan movement.” This conflation of the Catalan independentist parties 
reveals a lack of information among SNP respondents about the politics of 
Catalan independence.  
The visualization also shows the peripheral nature of relationships with the 
Parti Quebecois and Sinn Fein and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). Notably, one of 
the mentions of EA drew on interactions with Basque activists in Catalonia. 




Figure 7.1: SNP Transnational Relationships Visualization 
 
Finally, I have included three statewide political parties. The SNP’s relationship 
with the two main Irish political parties (Fine Gael and Fianna Fail) will be 
addressed further in section V, which explores the SNP’s use of governmental 
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resources. Individuals also noted interactions with European green parties from 
various countries. These relationships were in each case individual  
interactions. No cross-party trend emerged. However, it is interesting to note 
that EFA’s relationship with the European Green Party in the European 
Parliament may have engendered some interactions with Greens for the SNP. 
(2) Key Partners  
The SNP’s closest international partners fall into two categories: those with 
power and those that are geographically in proximity. The former category 
includes Catalan parties and to a lesser extent the N-VA in Flanders and the 
Parti Québécois in Quebec. They also seek powerful connections by having 
relationships with state-wide parties. The proximate group is dominated by the 
relationship between the SNP and Plaid Cymru, although some links exist with 
Irish mainstream parties and Sinn Fein.  
Proximate Parties 
Plaid Cymru is repeatedly referred to by SNP respondents as the SNP’s “sister 
party” and as set apart from other parties in EFA. As one former Westminster 
staff member explained: “Further across Europe, I’m aware of a few things that 
aren’t really cooperation in the sense that it is with Plaid” (Interview 41). The 
relationships between the SNP and Plaid are extensive and personal, with one 
respondent asking whether the party’s cooperation is “as much sentimental as 
it is meaningful” (Interview 52). This relationship is also rooted in the shared 
problems faced in relation to the UK Government. 
Plaid Cymru MEP Jill Evans is the closest partner of SNP MEPs; one 
respondent described this relationship as “natural” (Interview 46, Interview 40). 
One SNP European Parliament staff member explained that Evans and SNP 
MEPs have the same issues: “we're being totally ignored. We've got devolved 
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Parliaments, but we're disenfranchised…Jill also believes that Wales would do 
a lot better as an independent nation” (Interview 40).  
The SNP’s relationship with Plaid Cymru was established not in EFA, but 
domestically. The parties were founded around the same time (1934 for the 
SNP; 1925 for Plaid Cymru). Both began to establish a more permanent 
representation in the UK’s House of Commons in the 1970s; at that time, “the 
leader of each party refers to the other as his party’s closest ally” (Fusaro, 1979: 
365). The Parliamentary groups also met weekly during this time. These close 
Westminster connections between the parties have continued, even with the 
sudden growth of the SNP’s Parliamentary group in 2015. Over many years, 
the Plaid-SNP relationship has become “part of the scenery” of nationalist and 
regionalist politics in the UK (Interview 52). 
In the UK Parliament, there is an institutional incentive for partnership between 
the parties. One senior Westminster SNP staff member explained:  
“As a numeric thing, the way Parliament works, we can assist them with 
getting debates or question sessions…We get guaranteed times in 
debates, so we ask, in a debate on the Swansea tidal lagoon, what do 
you want us to say? Really, the SNP does not and should not have a 
position on the Swansea tidal lagoon. As our sister party, we make the 
points for them” (Interview 41).  
Plaid Cymru and the SNP also have close links at the level of their regional 
leaders. It was noted by multiple respondents that former Plaid Cymru leader 
and SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon had a close friendship and affinity for one 
another. Plaid Cymru’s new leader, Adam Price, attended the SNP conference 
in October 2018 and delivered the traditional Plaid Cymru ‘Fraternal Address.’ 
He also met and talked with Sturgeon after the speech (Interview 52).  
There is reason to suspect that relationships between the SNP and Plaid will 
be as close as ever with Price as leader. Price previously worked closely with 
SNP MPs Angus Robertson and Stewart Hosie when they all sat as MPs. He 
has hired Robertson to lead a review of Plaid Cymru’s campaign structures 
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(Mairs, October 2018). This choice highlights the role that the SNP takes in 
‘teaching’ party professionalization in the broader EFA network (further 
discussed in section IV). It also emphasizes the power differential between the 
two. One SNP insider explained, “Plaid are still where we were 20 years ago” 
(Interview 52).  
This relationship has been complicated since Brexit. The SNP’s transnational 
relations in government often progress differently than its role as a political 
party. Nicola Sturgeon as First Minister has different relationships than in her 
role as party leader. Brexit and Scottish relations with Wales exemplify this. As 
First Minister, Sturgeon has come together with the Labour government in 
Wales. Brexit has led to “closer working relationships governmentally and 
politically with the Welsh Government than we have ever had” (Interview 49). 
This relationship is challenging for Plaid Cymru given their simultaneous 
opposition to Welsh Labour and closeness with the SNP. To ease this difficulty, 
the SNP seeks to ‘give a heads up’ to Plaid Cymru alongside discussions with 
Welsh Labour. Furthermore, “the political aspirations we have, and Plaid have, 
are still tied together” (Interview 49).  
Finally, there are also membership links between Plaid Cymru and the SNP. 
For example, one respondent explained, “if you’re an SNP member, you can 
be a Plaid member because obviously the two parties only operate in their 
respective countries so we would never be challenging each other. Even at 
SNP conference, you will find now and again there will be some Plaid 
members, there might be a Plaid delegation” (Interview 46). In the run up the 
2014 Scottish independence referendum, large groups of Plaid activists came 
to Scotland to help campaign. One Plaid member explained that the 
relationship between Plaid Cymru and the SNP particularly “reached its apogee 
during the independence referendum when there were hordes of Plaid Cymru 
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members in Scotland.”18 The referendum provided the party an opportunity to 
make arguments for Welsh autonomy and to motivate its membership. As 
Leanne Wood said at the time, “If Scotland votes yes, the genie is out of the 
bottle” (Bennhold, 2017).  
The Brexit vote in 2016 motivated relationships between the SNP and political 
parties in the Republic of Ireland. One senior SNP staff member explained, “As 
a party of government we see ourselves much more interested in Fine Gael 
and Fianna Fáil who are the Irish leaders. The two of them are battling it out 
constantly to be in the Irish Government. It makes more sense for us to be at 
that level” (Interview 46). The choice to work with Irish governing parties thus 
reflects the SNP’s position in government and access to relationships through 
institutions such as the British-Irish Council.  
Relationships with both the two leading Irish political parties and the Irish 
Government allow the SNP to have conversations on two different tracks: 
institutionally and more informally. One senior staffer explained that when SNP 
MPs Ian Blackford and Stephen Gethins visited Ireland, “there were 
conversations that were at the political level that it wasn’t quite right for the 
government ministers to have…That’s all Brexit related. Brexit has been really 
good for our relationship with the Irish” (Interview 49). SNP political leaders 
thus met both with Irish Government officials and, on a political basis, with Fine 
Gael and Fianna Fáil. 
On the other hand, the SNP has always had a cautious relationship with Sinn 
Fein. Multiple respondents noted that SNP MEPs objects to EFA parties’ 
relationships with Sinn Fein; one noted that an SNP MEP threatened to leave 
EFA if Sinn Fein became involved (Interview 21, Interview 10). One EFA staffer 
explained: “We have been told--'politically we are fine with Sinn Fein, but 
publicly we cannot say it. Because if in the North of Ireland something happens 
                                                          
18 Interview done during MSc research (2015).   
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or some of our members ask how we are dealing with 'terrorists’” (Interview 
10). 
In the SNP, the caution around having a relationship with Sinn Fein stems back 
to the time of Winnie Ewing. One respondent explained: “The SNP has really 
molded its European body since Winnie’s time in Europe. And you have to 
appreciate the fact that Sinn Fein in Winnie’s time was not something that you 
wanted to be affiliated with” (Interview 46). Another respondent explained that 
Sinn Fein was “not chapping at the door” to speak to the SNP (Interview 52).  
However, through institutional contacts, the parties engaged positively. A 
senior SNP adviser explained:  
“We had very good relationships with Martin McGuinness, particularly 
around these UK wide gatherings so British-Irish Councils and Joint 
Ministerial Committees. We would tend to be coming from a very similar 
place…When Michelle O’Neill took over, we definitely called to 
congratulate…It’s when they’re not sitting, then there’s a lot less” 
(Interview 49). 
Institutional and political opportunities made the SNP more likely to engage 
with other political parties in both Wales and Northern Ireland. The Brexit vote 
also allowed the SNP to move beyond engagement with other autonomist 
parties and shifted the focus onto more intensive cooperation with statewide 
parties: Welsh Labour, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. 
Powerful Parties 
Outside of the fraternal relationships in the UK, there are three regionalist 
movements which are referred to by SNP respondents, with the most common 
being the Catalan independence parties and less frequently, Québécois and 
Flemish nationalist parties.  
Catalan independentist parties’ power (and rise in power) has affected the 
relationship with the SNP. One former senior SNP adviser explained that, 
during the 2014 independence referendum process, “the closest relationship 
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was clearly with the Catalan independence movement because it was mature” 
(Interview 38). The relationship between the SNP and Catalans is “multi-
layered in that you have your MEP relationship, your Westminster one and your 
government one. You can have those relationships with slightly different 
parties” (Interview 49). In this section, I condense these varied interactions by 
discussing Catalan-Scottish relationships at membership, party and 
Parliamentary/governmental levels.  
It is first important to consider whether the SNP leans towards a closer 
relationship with ERC or PDeCAT. As noted in Chapter Six, both parties 
reported relationships with the SNP. Some SNP respondents could not clearly 
differentiate between the two parties; they chose to generally discuss the 
Catalan ‘movement’ rather than party links. For more involved and prominent 
respondents, the Catalan parties’ power affected the SNP’s choice of partner.  
A long time staff member explained that “originally [the relationship] was much 
more about Esquerra and then it became more about Artur Mas and 
Convergencia…the original relationship reflected where the SNP was at that 
time, which was much more leftist” (Interview 38). A senior adviser reported 
that SNP First Minister Alex Salmond had a good relationship with both Mas 
and previous leader of the CDC Jordi Pujol (Interview 49). Another senior 
respondent explained, “We tend to deal with who’s dominant at the 
time…Esquerra is our formal partner but in practical effect, it varies” (Interview 
49).  
There is also a non-partisan Catalan-Scots civil society relationship, which 
incorporates members of ERC and the SNP. Two branches of the Assemblea 
Nacional Catalana (ANC) are based in Scotland. These branches were revived 
in the run up the Catalan referendum in April 2017. The ANC had previously 
been active in Scotland, but as one organiser explained: “it went into a 
hibernation period so there was no one here to actually work” (Interview 48). 
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After the Catalan referendum, members of the Scottish independence 
movement (including but beyond members of the SNP) also founded the 
Catalan Defence Committee.  
Activists passionate about the Catalan cause can also be found at the 
membership level of the SNP. Then-SNP Youth Vice Convener Rory Steel told 
a journalist after the Catalan referendum, “The Scottish Government’s 
statement was welcome, but I don’t think it went far enough to condemn the 
actions of Madrid which are unacceptable. Activists in Scotland and Catalonia 
feed off each other’s energy” (McQuade, 2017). An SNP councillor added, 
“When the Catalan referendum was announced, we were very slow to support 
it. Because it was happening illegally, and we knew it was happening illegally, 
and because of our concerns over the Spanish veto” (Interview 45). To some 
extent, the bottom up, activist-level relationships between Scottish and Catalan 
independentists pushed the more elite levels of the SNP to be more vocal about 
Catalonia.  
At a party level, one former adviser explained, the SNP and ERC are each 
other’s closest partners; they argued that ERC sees the SNP “as a mirror of 
themselves” (Interview 53). Another staffer with experience working in Brussels 
explained that the relationship is facilitated by the European Free Alliance. 
They said: “The bread and butter of the relationship [with Catalonia] is in 
Brussels because we sit with EFA” (Interview 46). Another corroborated the 
importance of SNP MEPs in Brussels: “There’s always been an SNP-Catalan 
party relationship, depending on how the parties are behaving. A lot of that was 
managed through Brussels” (Interview 49).  
At a Parliamentary level, individual SNP MPs and MSPs have expressed 
interest in the Catalan process. For example, SNP MSP Sandra White visited 
Catalonia numerous times alongside former SNP Presiding Officer Tricia 
Marwick. Marwick also addressed the official Catalan independentist rally on 
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the night before the referendum. Former SNP MP George Kerevan was 
instrumental in setting up the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on 
Catalonia in the UK Parliament.  
MSP Mairi Gougeon explained that in her role on the Committee of the 
Regions, “the priority has been keeping Catalonia on the agenda because now 
they don’t have a representative at the Committee of the Regions so who else 
is going to fight that battle?...I think that is our responsibility to keep that on the 
agenda.” One respondent argued that this supportive relationship between 
Catalan and SNP politicians was too symbolic and that they need to have more 
of a “working relationship” rather than one focused on photo opportunities 
(Interview 42).  
The Scottish Government and Catalan Government’s relationship provides 
space for further interaction, including on specific policy issues. Through 
Government channels, the SNP again speaks to both ERC and PDeCAT 
politicians, depending on who is in power. For example, the governmental 
relationship has been further solidified by a visit from Catalan President Quim 
Torra to Scotland in July 2018. Torra is an independent, who has more links to 
the left-wing of Catalan politics, including ERC. Although the meeting was 
ostensibly about self-determination, policy topics were prominent. One adviser 
explained, “They’re very focused on getting an economic connection and 
building on that…It was an attempt to take the formal relationship, which for the 
last couple of years has come about constitutional issues, back to something 
where it’s about culture and tourism and trade and investment and education” 
(Interview 49). For example, the Catalan Government has “a national 
investment bank and asked if we would like to come and see how they did it 
and so we can share learning” (Interview 49). 
While there are close relationships, institutionally and at a more activist level, 
between the SNP and both Catalan parties, there are also barriers to the 
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relationship. For example, the Scottish and Catalan referendums hindered 
interaction because parties were more focused on domestic concerns and 
gaining states’ support. As one adviser explained, “I don’t think we ever met 
Puigdemont before everything happened. We were busy, and they were busy. 
That was a sort of phase where it was kind of, ‘you do your thing, we’ll do our 
thing and they’re different, but we’ll hold each other’s hands’” (Interview 49).  
However, the Scottish Government and its minister’s ability to interact with 
Catalan nationalists is constrained. The First Minister’s restrained support for 
the Catalan referendum reflected the need to be ‘diplomatic.’ One respondent 
explained: “being at government level, that has to be diplomatic. As much as 
she was able to speak to the Catalan Government, she was also speaking to 
the Spanish Government because you’re in government—you have to do that” 
(Interview 46). In addition to the most powerful members of EFA, the SNP, 
being in government, will also seek out more powerful, statewide parties which 
tempers their engagement even with their closest independentist allies.  
Beyond the SNP, respondents reported limited relationships with the N-VA, but 
both noted that interactions were managed through EFA and Brussels 
(Interview 49, Interview 39). One staffer explained that the relationship with the 
N-VA was constrained by the fact that “they sit within the ECR group, which fair 
enough because it reflects their politics” (Interview 46). The N-VA’s move to 
the ECR group, and meeting between the N-VA and then British Prime Minister 
David Cameron pushed the two parties further apart (Cerulus, 2013).  
Respondents also reported that, in the run up to the 2014 referendum, the SNP 
looked to the Parti Québécois (PQ) as part of their preparation. Other than the 
SNP, the party had come closest to independence with the 1995 referendum. 
It was thus perceived as the most successful party and region from which to 
glean information. One senior adviser explained, “Although I’m very careful to 
draw parallels between Québécois nationalism and Scottish nationalism, the 
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process was probably as close to being the same as any one that we’ve had 
recently” (Interview 38). The SNP’s interest in the Parti Québécois, which 
centres around the link between the Quebec referendums and the Scottish 
referendum, will be explored further in section IV.  
Statewide Parties  
As the introduction to this chapter emphasized, the SNP has long sought to act 
as a ‘normal’ country in Europe, placing Scotland among other EU member 
states and analogously, itself among statewide parties. The party has sought 
links with statewide parties, especially those with similar social democratic 
positioning. As one Breton respondent observed, “The idea of the SNP is to 
speak to states or parties in power. Not really parties with 50 members, who 
are a cultural minority” (Interview 14).  One SNP adviser explained, “It’s 
probably more the development of links with existing nation-states and the 
governments of nation-states that would’ve been the biggest effort we put in” 
(Interview 53).  
The first group of statewide parties the SNP are close to is the European 
Greens. The SNP has an institutional link to these parties through the EFA-
Greens group in the European Parliament. One senior SNP adviser explained, 
“In a lot of countries, the Greens would be our natural allies, in quite a lot of 
Nordic countries. We would have connections, again a lot of them through the 
European Parliament” (Interview 49). Relationships with Green MEPs also 
surround specific shared policy issues. One former SNP EP staffer explained 
that the Greens work on many interests that align with those in the SNP 
including LGBT and women’s equalities or rural affairs (Interview 46).  
Beyond the EP, the SNP has systematically reached out to mainstream 
statewide political parties in Europe. This was spurred by Brexit, after which 
“there was an increased international interest in Scotland’s position” (Interview 
41). Some examples of this engagement are former Westminster leader Angus 
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Robertson’s speech at the German Social Democratic Party conference and 
Europe Spokesperson and MP Stephen Gethins’ visit to Madrid, where he 
spoke with members from all parties.  
These meetings all follow a similar structure:  
“It’s just about making them understand what the SNP is about. They 
have these perceptions, these beliefs that they’ve picked up through 
their own conversations and ongoing assumptions about the SNP… It’s 
quite interesting that the meeting has a process—you start by setting 
out what the SNP is, what it’s political priorities and political goals are as 
a left of centre social democrat party, and with some of them you actually 
do start to see the penny drop…Almost like an education type process” 
(Interview 46).  
This process is similar to Catalan independentists’ post-referendum process of 
explaining which again emphasizes the role of seeking international recognition 
for these more advanced nationalist parties. However, access to statewide 
parties is more difficult than in the SNP’s relationships to regionalist and 
nationalist partners. This difficulty engenders the ‘education’ approach. One 
Scottish nationalist journalist who writes about the SNP explained, “You’ve got 
a lot of regions across Europe with an interest and a real passion for Scottish 
developments, not reciprocated. Then you have this Scottish nationalist love 
affair with Oslo and Stockholm and Copenhagen which is not developed” 
(Interview 50).  
Unlike with the Catalan referendum, Brexit has provided openings for the SNP 
to engage with high level politicians in Europe (Brown, 2016). As noted in the 
previous section on ‘proximate parties,’ the SNP also used the Brexit issue to 
gain access to Irish statewide parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail. The SNP’s 
promotion of remaining in the EU, and subsequent push for a ‘soft’ Brexit have 
given it significant common ground with Irish statewide parties. However, these 
relationships are relatively recent and focus on a collaborative approach to the 
Brexit issue rather than a ‘learning’ exchange of information. 
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(3) Barriers  
The SNP’s power in Scotland and domestic success has made it more likely 
that the party will work with powerful parties, just as we saw in the last chapter 
was true for Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. However, in contrast to ERC, 
the SNP has not continued to interact with other, smaller EFA parties. Where 
ERC is a visible leader in EFA, the SNP is not. One Breton respondent noted, 
“Esquerra had already worked enormously in EFA, especially with Jordi 
Sole…Catalan MEPs are a motor in EFA, and well, I haven’t often seen Alyn 
Smith” (Interview 14). Another explained:  
“The SNP seem to be in a position of non-engagement…[other 
regionalists] want a story of something imminent, something’s about to 
change in Scotland. They want this to shake up the EU’s ambivalence 
about sub-state independence movements. This will set a 
precedent…that would be a reason for SNP non-engagement because 
they don’t want to do that” (Interview 50).  
SNP non-engagement is related to their perception of EFA as a non-influential 
group in the European context. Furthermore, SNP respondents also have 
suspicions that some EFA members would be potentially reputation damaging. 
These two perceptions lead to the creation of barriers to interaction between 
the SNP and other EFA members. 
The European Free Alliance is perceived as a ‘fringe’ political movement by the 
SNP. One respondent explained, “If we would have our pick of European 
parties to join, it wouldn’t be EFA because they don’t have a big seat at the 
table. They don’t have much influence” (Interview 45). A senior SNP adviser 
said, “if you go back ten years or so, we very much became the poster boy for 
EFA…Not forgetting our own history here, but a lot of them are very fringe 
parties” (Interview 52).  
The SNP’s feeling that EFA is not influential leads it to seek other routes to 
lobby the EU. For example, SNP elected members work to be influential in 
institutions like the Committee of the Regions and Council of Europe, elected 
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members developed a programme of engagement to reach out to Europe’s 
state-wide parties, and the SNP-led Scottish Government practices significant 
para-diplomacy. 
In addition to EFA’s fringe status in the wider context of the EU, the SNP views 
some other EFA parties as potentially damaging due to their right wing, 
peripheral stances. One staffer explained, “From time to time we’ve had to 
almost be excusing things that were said by other parties or indeed put a block 
on some parties getting membership of EFA or threatening to leave if certain 
groups were involved” (Interview 52). There is also a perception that in some 
of these regions, like South Tyrol, “it’s very ethnically based. On the face of it, 
very much about improving the lives of people but only if they were born there” 
(Interview 45). These smaller, more radical parties are an issue for the SNP as 
the party has worked to develop their ‘competence’ strategy and image. One 
elected member explained:  
“When it gets to the level of the Cornish independence parties or some 
of the smaller political parties…it becomes an issue of having that 
legitimacy. The SNP have gone from being a party of protest who have 
now developed into being a party of government. Do they de-legitimize 
themselves by acknowledging or supporting the campaigns of other 
political parties who, in many cases, aren't even pro- independence?” 
(Interview 39). 
Even with Catalan partners, it is important for SNP elected members that 
Catalonia and Scotland are not conflated. One MSP explained, “People tend 
to lump Scotland and Catalonia together when we are two completely different 
situations. There’s no avoiding that. I’ve tried to challenge that for years and it 
always continues” (Interview 43).  
The SNP also puts up barriers to engagement with non-EFA far right parties, 
such as the 5 Star Movement. One source explained, “We said: you’re anti-
immigrant, anti-EU and you are essentially hiding far right tendencies under a 
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social platform. So, you don’t get a meeting because some of what you’re doing 
we think is despicable” (Interview 49). 
Among all the parties I have studied in this thesis, the SNP has the most limited 
relationships in the European Free Alliance. The SNP’s lack of relationships 
and boundaries in EFA limit their interactions with other nationalists and 
regionalists. As I have posited, interactions should provide a precursor for 
learning and thus it is likely that the SNP will not learn from EFA partners. 
However, they may acquire information from those social democratic parties 
and state-wide parties that they have sought relationships with. 
7.4 Learning in the Scottish National Party 
As the last section showed, the SNP sees itself as different and distant from 
the European Free Alliance. As one respondent explained:  
“It’s been very arm’s length in terms of our involvement here and indeed 
the involvement generally across the party, because it’s kind of an ‘over 
there’ thing. Other than them having a few representatives coming along 
to our conference or funding the occasional meeting or trips over to the 
European Parliament, it is a very peripheral notion” (Interview 52).  
As such, EFA is not central to the SNP’s decision making processes. EFA’s 
most meaningful connections in the SNP come through elected members with 
interests in the European Parliament or the Scots-Catalan relationship. Given 
their limited interactions in EFA, the SNP does not show any cases of learning 
from an EFA partner. One barrier to learning is the SNP’s distance from EFA 
partners, which was addressed in the previous section. At the end of this 
section, I propose a barrier to collective interpretation, which stems from the 
SNP’s diffuse transnational relationships and centralized decision-making 
process. 
Before discussing the lack of learning from the European Free Alliance, 
however, I highlight ways that the SNP does learn from non-EFA examples: 
the Nordic countries and Quebec. The SNP also seeks to teach other regions 
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and parties about professionalization. These processes show that when 
political parties have access to broader sources of information, they move 
beyond party-to-party learning in EFA and learn from different sources and in 
more complex ways (through governing institutions, direct contact with other 
political actors).  
(1) Learning and Emulation: The Nordic Model  
Scottish politics is replete with references to Nordic countries: Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Historians have documented not only 
Scotland’s long-past historical links to Nordic countries, but also its recent 
history of situating devolved Scottish politics in the Nordic sphere (Newby, 
2009). The design of Scotland’s more consensual Parliament explicitly took 
Westminster as a ‘negative template’ and the German and Scandinavian 
models as positive examples (Arter, 2004; Mitchell, 2000: 616).  
The Scottish National Party has particularly adopted Nordic countries as 
models for their policy choices. Newby argues that the Nordic exemplar was 
drawn on in the post-2007 SNP administration with proposals such as a 
‘Norwegian-style’ oil fund and a shared power grid (2009: 320-322). The SNP’s 
proposal for an independent Scotland (Scotland’s Future, otherwise known as 
The White Paper) has 42 mentions of Norway, 31 mentions of Denmark, 32 of 
Sweden, and 24 of Finland. Compared to 12 references to Germany and 9 to 
France, it is clear that the Nordic countries form a significant part of the 
conceptualization of an independent Scotland.  
However, as discussed in Chapter Six with ERC, the conceptualization of the 
‘Nordic model’ resembles a process of idealization and emulation. After the 
financial crisis, the SNP’s social justice policy documents excised Ireland and 
Iceland as examples which “gives a monopoly to the core Nordic countries, 
though no analysis is offered of the reasons for their superior record on poverty 
and inequality” (Maxwell, 2009: 129). Maxwell here suggests that policy models 
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are chosen not necessarily through ‘analysis’ but rather that, like ERC, there is 
a certain amount of symbolic and emulative attachment to the Nordic model for 
the SNP. Generally, Nordic countries have offered an ideational ‘utopia’ model 
for many on the political left. As one historical overview of this phenomenon 
noted, even those in the centre or right “people have found what they were 
looking for in the Swedish model” (Andersson and Hilson, 2009: 221). 
Although the SNP’s documents show little analysis, Maxwell also notes that the 
three elements of their social policy reflect Norwegian experience. He explains: 
“Though no attribution is offered, these three elements – early intervention to 
support and engage the most vulnerable from a baseline of high-quality 
universal services – could serve as a summary of the best practice in the Nordic 
welfare states” (2009: 129). In a November 2017 press release, the party 
trumpeted a newly released Scottish Government policy for working with Baltic 
and Nordic countries. The press release included 11 policies on which Scotland 
was engaging with from Baltic and Nordic countries, including the Finnish baby 
box. However, many of these policies were still in their early stages and were 
based more in the government than in the party. However, there is some 
evidence that the SNP does learn from Nordic governments and 
administrations.  
I will touch on the cases of the Glasgow City architect, Finnish baby box, and 
Norwegian renewables policies. It is important to distinguish these cases from 
my proposed party-to-party learning model. The party uses information from 
and access to governing institutions to learn from Nordic examples. I take two 
examples of this: the development of the SNP’s Glasgow City Council 
manifesto and the promotion of the baby box policy.  
In the development of the SNP’s Glasgow City Council manifesto in 2017, SNP 
Leader and now Glasgow City Council Leader Susan Aitken and deputy leader 
David McDonald travelled to Copenhagen. One example of a policy adopted 
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after this visit is the proposal of a ‘City Architect.’ The councillors met with 
Copenhagen’s architect and decided to develop ‘a similar role’ in Glasgow. 
McDonald explained, “The concept of a City Architect is one which many cities 
have introduced, but Copenhagen appears to have mastered…We want 
Glasgow to be a city for people, of people and by people. We want to see better 
use of buildings and public space” (Paterson, 2017). Another Glasgow City 
Councillor, Rhiannon Spear, explained the choice of drawing on Nordic 
examples. She noted: “It was kind of an organic thing. They’re doing it well, 
let’s write this into our manifesto.” Learning is thus driven both by shared 
ideologies and a perception of success in another place.  
In another case, the SNP adopted a policy of introducing a ‘baby box’ which 
was later implemented through its role in the Scottish Government. The party 
adopted the policy and explicitly compared it to the policy adopted in Finland 
(Carrell, 2016). Interestingly, in the process of implementing this policy, the 
party (through its Government connections) has built relationships with Finland.  
As one senior SNP adviser in the explained:  
“You get some [relationships] through policies. We have much better 
relationships with the Finns because we borrowed the baby box. You 
build connections in new ways. If you go back ten to twelve years, our 
international connections were who we could make friends with in the 
European Parliament…now, it’s much easier for people to engage with 
us” (Interview 49).   
This quote is indicative of the way that political parties use governing resources 
to build transnational connections. The adviser notes that previously the party 
only had political links (through the EP) but governing responsibility has 
allowed for new routes to transnational relations (consequently reducing the 
importance of the EP). As I suggest in Section V, this linkage requires more 
specific research.  
Another similar example is that “a lot of the low carbon policies we look at and 
steal from Norway, but you adapt it all for Scotland’s situation. Nothing can be 
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straight lifted and dropped in. Roseanna Cunningham is in Norway now looking 
at electric vehicles and how they’ve incentivized the use of electric vehicles” 
(Interview 49). In their aforementioned November 2017 press release, the SNP 
also noted that they were exploring “how we can learn from Norway’s success 
on carbon capture and storage.”  
These examples of the city architect, baby box and Norwegian low carbon 
policies show processes of information acquisition and interpretation from other 
governments. These are not cases of party learning as set out in this thesis but 
rather cases in which the SNP (sometimes through roles in the Scottish 
Government) learns from information from other states. The SNP does not 
discuss specific Nordic parties, but rather speaks about the administrations and 
governments in various Nordic countries. Although the source of learning is a 
government, the ‘learner’ is still the SNP. The adoption of Nordic policies in the 
Scottish Government is encouraged by SNP politicians and advisers and 
follows from SNP manifestos. Policy learning also occurs contemporaneously 
to the party’s political usages of the ‘Nordic’ as a symbol.  
The SNP’s and Scottish Government’s use of information from international 
administrations highlights that electorally successful parties can access 
information beyond the EFA network. The SNP has access to many institutional 
forums (the Scottish Government, Glasgow City Council, the Council of 
Europe). Future research and adaptation of the party learning framework 
should further account for the way that parties may access varied sources of 
learning beyond political parties.  
(2) Learning: ‘An Inverse Lesson’ 
The SNP’s interest in Quebec stems from Parti Québécois success in the 
1990s and the 1995 referendum, which the Quebec nationalist movement 
narrowly lost. In 1995, then leader of the SNP and MP Alex Salmond attended 
a briefing held by the Quebec delegation in London, during the time that the 
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Quebec government as led by the PQ. One reporter recalled that he and 
Salmond had a conversation that “was nothing short of a forensic interrogation” 
(Murray, 2014).  
However, a 2013 visit by PQ premier Pauline Marois was downplayed by the 
SNP; then First Minister Alex Salmond avoided a joint press conference 
(Carrell, 2013). Salmond and Mike Russell (now ‘Brexit Minister’) also later had 
an informal meeting with PQ deputy premier Bernard Landry (Torrance, 2012: 
26). However, the SNP’s skittishness about being seen talking to the PQ did 
not go unnoticed in Canada. One Toronto Sun report said derisively, “Pauline 
Marois went on an official mission to Scotland in January 2013 to build bridges, 
ready to wear a tartan skirt while Scottish separatist leaders didn’t want to be 
associated with two-time losers” (Duhaime, 2014). Despite this, the PQ 
remained interested in the Scottish process. During the 2014 referendum, 
Québécois activists and experts came to Scotland including a large group of 
young activists funded by the PQ and PQ members of the National Assembly 
(Duhaime, 2014; Sherwell, 2014). 
Despite the tensions and concern about the reputational effect of links with the 
PQ, the SNP did look to Quebec before the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum. As the closely lost 1995 referendum indicated, “Quebec has been 
the market-leader among secessionists in advanced industrial democracies 
since the 1970s” (Lynch, 2005: 507). In 2012, the SNP’s then-Westminster 
leader Angus Robertson MP visited Quebec, along with advisers. They met 
with “people from all sides and no sides and academics” (Interview 38). 
Representatives of the anti-independence campaign Better Together and the 
UK Government also visited Quebec to do research (BBC, April 2012).  
One senior adviser explained that the SNP concluded that there was an 
“inverse lesson from Quebec” on the issue of inclusion/exclusion of ‘new Scots’ 
(Interview 53). They explained: “the civic and inclusive approach is one that is 
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natural to the SNP, looking at examples like Quebec you can see why it’s just 
wrong. It’s just wrong anyway but it’s wrong electorally as much as morally to 
not seek to be inclusive and civic” (Interview 53). The inclusive approach was 
seen as ‘natural’ to the SNP. Through their analysis of the PQ’s choices, the 
SNP perceived that Quebec was a prime example of exclusivity’s 
undesirability.  
This lesson is based in the SNP’s perceptions of the PQ’s migration policies as 
overly exclusive. This perception is not necessarily accurate. Hepburn 
compared the SNP and PQ’s policies on immigration and found that “the PQ 
has actively sought to court the immigrant vote in Quebec and encourage 
immigrant participation in the political process” (Hepburn, 2011: 516). 
However, she notes, the PQ has been less successful than the SNP in making 
immigrants and immigrant groups a central part of their party, unlike the SNP. 
Putting aside the ‘accuracy question,’ which will be addressed again in Chapter 
Eight, the SNP’s avoidance of the PQ’s immigration policies provides an 
example of how party learning can be a ‘negative’ lesson. The respondent 
acquired information on the PQ’s different approach and interpreted it to be 
unsuccessful. This bolstered the SNP’s existing policy position.  
SNP respondents also noted strategic learning from the Québécois case. They 
found: “many of the same tactics were deployed although the issues might’ve 
been different…The key learnings were start early, build as broad of a base of 
support as possible, and the final note was extremely obvious but important: 
don’t lose” (Interview 38). As this last lesson shows, the Québécois case has 
become a cautionary tale amongst SNP members since 2014. The oft-repeated 
wisdom is: look what can happen if you lose another referendum. This 
association has gone beyond the party as well. Analyses of the SNP’s possible 
second referendum call on the Quebec concept of the ‘neverendum’ (Henley, 
2014; Capurro, 2017). As McAngus (2016) noted, the party are “keen to avoid 
‘doing a Quebec.’” 
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Despite the regular contact, any mention of the Quebec case in the SNP comes 
alongside numerous qualifications that the two parties are significantly 
different. There have long been visible tensions between the SNP and their 
Québécois counterparts which led the SNP to perceive the PQ’s example as 
negative. The interest in the Quebecois process paired with this perception led 
to an ‘inverse’ lesson. 
(3) Teaching: Professionalization  
Whereas the Catalan movement imparted information on political mobilization, 
members of the SNP see their main export to other EFA parties as their 
knowledge about professionalization. The SNP has long been seen as an 
example in the academic and political conversation around professionalization, 
given their use of updated campaigning methods and their organisational 
change over time (Lynch, 1996; Mitchell et al., 2012). As mentioned in the 
previous chapters, smaller parties of EFA have often referenced the SNP’s 
campaigning strategies as a point of learning.  
Campaign strategies have also been imparted by members of the SNP. For 
example, SNP Youth organised a workshop called “Aye: Campaign training 
session: Get Organised for Independence” for EFA and EFA Youth delegates. 
The training sessions included lessons on canvassing and imparting a political 
message. One SNP source involved in this workshop explained, “We have so 
much to teach and so much to give to EFA. I’d love to see it become more of a 
forum of sharing best practice…I think we need to accept that [EFA] is not going 
to influence large policy at a European level and therefore we should probably 
use it as a forum to talk to each other” (Interview 45).  
Other SNP elected members spoke of different forums where they shared the 
Scottish experience of peaceful independentism internationally. One MSP 
explained, “I’ve always had an affinity towards Catalonia and spoke at a 
Catalan summer university on independence movements and peaceful 
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activism, which is always a nice topic to speak about when it comes to political 
activism” (Interview 44).  
Another MSP had been involved in an anti-corruption programme in the 
Ukraine. They explained, “a lot of those people who took part in the project 
have all still stayed in touch anyway. And people who are just desperate to 
make a change and try and tackle a bit of that corruption. It was something that 
was tangible, that you feel like you contributed to and you can see a difference” 
(Interview 43). Another had met with representatives from different states in the 
Balkans about “our democratic structures” (Interview 51). As I noted earlier, 
Plaid Cymru has also hired former SNP campaign leader to review their 
campaign and organisational structures. 
Professionalization and peaceful activism are two interlinked processes for the 
SNP. The party sees itself as a promoter and teacher of a ‘normalization’ of 
nationalist and regionalist parties. In numerous venues, including but not 
exclusive to EFA, elected members of the SNP ‘teach’ or ‘export’ their 
knowledge about party professionalization to other political parties.  
(4) Barrier to Learning: Diffuse Learners, Centralized Decision Making  
The SNP does not learn from EFA in any systematic way. This can partly be 
explained by their lack of connections across the EFA network (see section III). 
However, the SNP has intensive relationships with Plaid Cymru and the 
Catalans. The lack of learning from these parties can be explained by other 
barriers to learning in the SNP, which will be explored in this section and the 
next. The first barrier to learning is rooted in the organisational structure of the 
party. As noted in section II, the SNP is a centralized party. However, when 
looking at the key transnational entrepreneurs in the party, there are a wide 




The diffusion of transnational entrepreneurship is clear in the SNP. Many 
transnationally active individuals have become active through their own 
interests or connections (for example, Angus Roberston and his German-
language connections; Linda Fabiani MSP, Sandra White MSP and Tricia 
Marwick in Catalonia; former MSP Rob Gibson and his links to Brittany). As 
one MSP explained, “Probably everybody in this place has got a personal 
interest in some place in Europe. And political interest. And it’s very nice if 
some of them come together and you can use that” (Interview 44).  
However, one MSP who had long been involved in Brussels-based 
organisations emphasized the difficulty of discussing information abroad when 
back in Scotland. They noted:  
“What I’ve always found quite frustrating is you feel like you can’t talk 
about it when you come back home…There is this perception that 
people just think you’re on a jolly and that’s what they accuse you of. 
You know: ‘Oh yeah she’s over there again, what’s she actually doing’” 
(Interview 43). 
There are not clear reporting structures within the SNP to share information 
about transnational activity once the member returns back to Scotland. Another 
transnationally active member explained that advocating for international 
standards on human rights required significant personal initiative. They 
explained:  
“It’s taken me ten years of just pushing that forward, keep pushing it on, 
on universal rights and on individual topics…That process can be 
helpful. It feels frustrating at the time but actually when you do take the 
time to look back and say well that step needed to be taken before that 
step” (Interview 44).  
Furthermore, in cases where the Scottish Government and other SNP elected 
members are working in the same regions or countries: “We will try to link that 
up. There’s no formal structure for that, it just kind of happens informally 
between all those that do international relations” (Interview 49). These 
accounts show that information sharing across the SNP occurs through 
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personal relationships and individuals’ advocacy. Even SNP Parliamentarians 
find that the process of sharing knowledge takes considerable initiative and 
perseverance. 
The lack of formal information sharing processes hinder collective SNP 
learning. Literature on organisational learning emphasises the need for both a 
shared culture and organisational routines to encourage collective learning 
(Dodgson, 1993: 382). Organisational routines for learning (the rules, 
procedures, and strategies) are underdeveloped in the SNP’s international 
relations apparatus. The informal nature of information sharing from 
transnational entrepreneurs makes it less likely that information acquired by an 
individual in the SNP will go on to be interpreted or implemented collectively. 
Learning, thus, is hindered by the lack of formal structure to channel 
information from transnationally active members to central decision makers. 
(5) Barrier to Learning: Power in the Regionalist Network 
Lack of learning can also be attributed to the SNP’s perception that they are 
the most powerful party in the EFA network, above and beyond even their next 
most powerful counterpart ERC. As such, SNP respondents did not refer to 
Catalan partners as exemplary. The SNP sees itself as the ‘big brother’ in the 
relationship. One respondent explained, “I think we have kind of become the 
grandfather party that people are kind of looking up to, thinking: ‘That would be 
good if we could have similar achievements’” (Interview 53).  
Although ERC has begun to achieve similar levels of success, the Catalans, 
respondents added, were envious of the referendum process in the UK. The 
UK Government’s acceptance of the referendum process was seen by Catalan 
parties as impossible in Spain. Furthermore, on both the SNP and ERC sides 
there was some acknowledgement that the SNP invested less in the parties’ 
relationship with one another.  
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For example, the SNP Friends of Catalonia group was founded precisely to 
address imbalances in the relationship. During the 2014 referendum, an SNP 
respondent explained: “We had a kind of discussion that [ERC members] felt 
that Catalonia knew more about Scotland than people in Scotland knew about 
Catalonia. They asked, you know, how can we try and change that. How can 
we improve the relationships between two countries, but particularly between 
SNP and ERC?” (Interview 39).  
One SNP senior adviser involved during the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum explained that they felt the Catalan process was less developed 
than the Scottish one. For example:   
“We found that during the process of writing the White Paper that in 
particular in the case of Catalonia there were questions posed to them 
from people here saying—what is your policy on defence? And they 
didn’t have one…then again, their public wasn’t concerned about those 
things. Leave it to them to defend their policy or lack thereof. It might be 
more instructive for them to look to what happened in Scotland” 
(Interview 38).  
Information exchange thus was more likely to flow from the SNP to Catalan 
partners rather than the other direction. One respondent described attending a 
Brussels event with Flemish, Catalan, Basque, Sinn Fein MEPs and yet, “they 
couldn’t really get anyone from Scotland…or any of the SNP hierarchy to attend 
and speak” (Interview 50).  
The SNP thus often does not engage with even the most powerful of other 
regionalist parties. This stems from their feeling, as the quote above says, that 
‘it might be more instructive for them to look to what happened in Scotland.’ 
Across my interviews, it was clear that the SNP sees itself as an exemplar in 
the nationalist and regionalist party network, and thus the party does not see 
seek out information from EFA partners.  
In addition to the sense that other parties are more likely to look up to ‘big 
brother’ SNP, the SNP’s power in Scotland moderates their behaviour and 
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statements internationally. Being in government alters the likelihood that senior 
SNP politicians (now members of the Scottish Government) will engage with 
EFA parties. One respondent explained: We have this governmental 
responsibility to behave as a government. Part of becoming an independent 
country is demonstrating that we recognize international obligations and 
responsibilities and that we can be trusted in the world” (Interview 49). While 
individuals from the SNP might travel abroad, as a party, in an official capacity, 
the SNP is careful with engaging in the EFA network. As such, some SNP 
individuals might invest in EFA or EFA partners, but as a collective, the SNP is 
hindered by its power and success. The SNP’s power leads them to learn from 
examples seen as more powerful or successful, whether that be the ‘precedent’ 
of Quebec or the ‘utopia’ model of the Nordic countries.  
7.5 Scottish Institutional Diplomacy and Learning  
Since the opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 and entering the Scottish 
Government in 2007, the SNP and its elites have used Scottish Government 
and Parliament resources to establish connections across Europe and the 
world more widely. Using the Scottish Government’s reputation, one adviser 
explained: 
 “We’re able to meet with politicians in Germany that wouldn’t want to 
meet the SNP. But they will meet the Scottish Government. Particularly 
post-Brexit, they very much wanted to meet with the Scottish 
Government. So, you have connections there that you wouldn’t have. 
We now meet ministers from pretty much all the European countries” 
(Interview 49).  
In this section, I consider how the SNP has mobilized through Scottish 
institutions to build transnational connections. I argue that these transnational 
linkages to other states are largely institutional rather than driven by the party, 
despite the SNP’s efforts to capitalize on them. Nonetheless, informational 
access to statewide parties and governments provides new sources of learning 
for parties beyond the EFA transnational network. 
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(1) History of Scottish Diplomacy 
Scottish diplomacy across Europe pre-dates the creation of the Scottish 
Parliament and Government. There has long been a Scottish presence in 
Brussels. Scotland Europa was opened in 1992 as a non-political, non-
governmental office in Brussels. It still holds its reputation as a ‘focal point’ in 
Scots-EU relationship. As one respondent said, its central position on Rond-
Point Schuman next to the European Commission building gives Scotland a 
central organizing space in Brussels (Interview 43; Rowe 2011: 178). In 1999, 
the then-Scottish Executive opened a representation in Brussels which 
became housed in that same central building as Scotland Europa, now branded 
as ‘Scotland House’ (Rowe, 2011: 178-180).  
Scottish representations are now located across the world in Washington DC, 
Ottowa, Toronto, and Beijing. Scottish Development International (SDI), the 
international arm of the Scottish Government’s enterprise agency Scottish 
Enterprise, has over 30 offices worldwide. These offices go beyond the 
European Union. For example, one former adviser explained: “The former First 
Minister and the current First Minister have put a lot of effort into fostering links 
with China… we try to sort of maximize Scotland’s position and clout and 
presence on the international stage” (Interview 53). 
Economic partnerships have been paired with cultural and social linkages to 
promote what the SNP’s manifesto called a ‘One Scotland’ approach to 
international relations. For example, the Scottish First Minister has always been 
involved in the Tartan Day in the United States. This has now developed into 
an entire week of ‘Scotland Week’ celebrations in New York. The SNP-led 
Scottish Government also developed a Diaspora Engagement Strategy in 2010 
to develop and maintain economic links with Scots abroad (Leith and Sim, 
2016). These examples are part of a larger process of creating Scotland as a 
‘brand’ (economically and culturally) internationally. The SNP’s 2016 manifesto 
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noted that international outreach is a benefit to “trade, investment, travel, 
education and knowledge exchange” but also a way to “help to promote our 
values, including human rights” (p. 41).  
In the cases thus far highlighted, the SNP’s diplomatic outreach was ‘by design’ 
but in some cases it was ‘by accident’ (Interview 53). One such accident was 
that Scotland’s power and profile on the international stage were no doubt 
enhanced by the Scottish Government’s choice to release Lockerbie bomber 
Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi in 2009. Interview respondents noted that this was a 
matter of law, yet in Scotland’s para-diplomatic journey the compassionate 
release also allowed the SNP Government “to articulate a distinctive Scottish 
identity with specific values of compassion and justice” (Kenealy, 2012: 569).  
The prominence of the independence referendum in the international press 
also provided a moment for the SNP to project Scotland’s brand. The Scottish 
Government used this international attention to develop a conceptualization of 
what Scotland would be like in the international system. Seeking specifically to 
reassure existing states, “in his visits to other countries and in editorials in The 
Washington Post, First Minister Salmond attempted to explain to external 
audiences, and reassure them, these reasons behind the SNP’s bid for 
independence” (Beasley and Kaarbo, 2018: 17). 
(2) Information Exchange through Diplomacy 
Diplomatic efforts in the Scottish Government increased SNP politicians’ 
access to state governments. Members of the SNP involved in the Scottish 
Government explained how these diplomatic linkages also benefited the SNP 
by empowering its elite politicians. One SNP adviser explained:  
“We now meet ministers from pretty much all the European countries. 
The Spanish are the only ones that sit on the edge there. If you look at 
[Cabinet Secretary for External Affairs] Fiona Hyslop’s travel itinerary, 
she’s with the Dutch, she’s in the Balkans. We cover the broad swathe 
of it. Then you get to build new and different relationships.  We have for 
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a couple years been building relationships with the Icelandics. The 
current Prime Minister and the current FM met a couple of times before 
this PM got elected…it’s a Green party so it’s a sort of natural alliance.” 
(Interview 49).  
This quote shows the ways that party and government transnational links align. 
As noted in Sections III and IV, the SNP has sought to align itself with ‘Nordic’ 
values and has coalesced with the Greens at the European Parliament. Once 
in Government, SNP elites have access to further institutional links with these 
partners. 
The SNP uses the Scottish Government to further specific areas of policy 
development. For example, the development of renewable energy capacity in 
Scotland provides “the opportunity to assert its territorial distinctiveness on the 
national and international stage” (McEwen and Bomberg, 2014: 79). One 
example of this is the Scottish Government’s memorandum of understanding 
with California. Through this agreement: “[California] want to figure out how to 
have offshore wind turbines and use wave and tidal power and we have the 
experts…We’re both allied on climate change so let’s get into this conversation” 
(Interview 49).  
In trying to push para-diplomacy further, the party has faced opposition from 
the UK Government and struggled with a lack of resources. One respondent 
explained:  
“Our international department is small, and our policy areas have not 
traditionally been geared up to working overseas…One of the barriers 
is still that we’re a devolved government” (Interview 49). 
Nonetheless, using the resources available, the SNP “were keen to basically 
operate as a government…we are trying to maximize Scotland’s presence on 
that stage and at that level” (Interview 53). As the examples given in this section 
show, the SNP has built up an international infrastructure, cooperation around 
policy issues, and taken advantage of key events to promote Scotland. These 
institutional means provide SNP politicians with avenues to accessing 
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statewide political parties and other state governments. One senior adviser to 
the Scottish Government noted, “There were good relationships with Catalonia, 
the Basque Country but what was quite interesting was the fostering of links 
with nation-states for the purposes of economic development, trade promotion, 
and that kind of thing” (Interview 53).  
Brexit will provide one last key example of the way that the SNP uses 
Government resources to build transnational relationships, but also how the 
party manages the boundaries between institutional and party political 
networking in Europe.  
After Brexit, the SNP launched a campaign to promote Scotland’s place in 
Europe and to emphasize the distinctiveness of the Scottish vote on Brexit. 
SNP leader and First Minister Nicola Sturgeon said at the time: “My objective 
at this very early stage is firstly to raise awareness of the fact that Scotland 
voted differently in this referendum to the UK as a whole” (Press Association, 
29 June 2016).  
The party’s effort to promote its pro-Europeanism was mobilized using the 
Scottish Government, SNP elected members at Westminster and in the 
European Parliament, and inter-regional party connections. Through the 
Scottish Government, both Cabinet Secretary for External Affairs Fiona Hyslop 
and then Minister for Europe Alasdair Allan reached out to other European 
countries to promote Scotland. One respondent explained, “I think there was a 
really interesting fact somewhere where it said something like by the Christmas 
of 2016, the Scottish Government had met with every single EU ambassador” 
(Interview 46). First Minister Nicola Sturgeon also travelled to Brussels 
numerous times to speak to leading officials including European Parliament 
President Martin Schulz, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker, and leader of ALDE Guy Verhofstadt (Brown, 2016).  
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On the one hand, the Scottish Government can explain these activities as a 
way of promoting Scotland’s place in Europe, particularly from an economic 
sense. However, for the SNP there is also a reputational factor. Alasdair Allan 
explained: “People know where we are now — and that wasn’t always the case. 
I think people have a sense that Scotland exists in the modern world, that 
Scotland isn’t just somewhere that exists as a tourist destination or something 
that exists at some point in history” (McLaughlin, 2017a). Brexit allowed the 
Scottish Government to gain more access to European elites. One respondent 
explained: “These high-level political officials in France and Germany and 
Juncker in the EU Commission suddenly wanted to open their doors to Hyslop 
and Sturgeon” (Interview 50).  
The SNP also developed a European engagement plan at a more purely party 
level. The SNP’s Westminster group undertook systematic engagement with 
other European parties. One Westminster staffer explained, “We had a 
deliberate plan of engagement with other governments and other opposition 
parties in other countries. There was a lot going on there and it was all around 
Scotland’s Place in Europe and what the Scottish Government’s position is in 
relation to Brexit” (Interview 41). Representatives from the SNP’s Westminster 
group met with all the main political parties from Ireland, France, Germany, and 
Spain.  
Furthermore, in the European Parliament, MEPs and other SNP elected 
members with European roles spread the same message. Perhaps the most 
public moment of SNP activism at the European Parliament was Alyn Smith’s 
speech on the 28th of June 2016, which received a standing ovation from the 
European Parliament. However, MEPs also played a role building transnational 
connections—largely with non-regionalist partners—behind the scenes. One 
staffer explained that MEPs’ outreach is: 
 “Initially within the EP itself just making the SNP in Europe 
approachable and accessible to all of the MEPs who perhaps in the past 
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didn’t see it as a priority. First and foremost, within the Parliament itself. 
That’s really paid off in the sense that you can see it now with Guy 
Verhofstadt in the ALDE party who has become quite a firm and close 
ally of Scotland’s case in the context of Brexit” (Interview 46). 
By renewing interest in Scotland, Brexit provided a unique opportunity structure 
for the SNP to use the Scottish Government, individual (MEP’s and MP’s) 
connections, and party resources to build transnational relationships. The SNP 
took a united approach to engagement on all these different platforms. For 
example, they have used institutions to speak to the Irish Government, but also 
sent individual MPs to Dublin to meet with Fine Gael and Fianna Fail. Party 
and para-diplomatic engagement is not mutually exclusive, but rather intimately 
related. As noted in Chapter Six, a consideration of how information acquired 
through diplomacy affects parties would be a useful space for further research. 
7.6 Conclusion  
Of all the parties studied in this thesis, the SNP is the most electorally 
successful and this affords them access to information through institutional 
access and party relationships. However, electoral success and the need to 
uphold a reputation as a responsible government means that the SNP 
separates itself from the EFA network. Thus, it has the most limited interactions 
with EFA partners of any case studied in this thesis. Even its closest partners, 
Plaid Cymru and ERC are seen as less successful than the SNP. Individual 
SNP activists and elected members have close relationships with ERC. 
However, the SNP’s centralized decision making means that these diffuse 
transnational entrepreneurs do not have a clearly defined route to informing the 
party as a collective about transnational information that is acquired. The 
combination of electoral success, governing responsibility, and party 
centralization mean that the SNP does not learn from EFA partners.  
The party does turn to regions and states that are perceived as more 
successful. Ideologically, a successful social democratic example is provided 
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by Nordic countries. Nordic countries have supplied the SNP with various 
policies (baby box, city architect, renewables) but they are also used in a 
symbolic emulative way. This provides a useful addition to the initial proposal 
of a party-to-party learning framework. Parties may also learn from state 
governments, city councils, and other institutions as well as other parties.  
The other instance of learning, an inverse lesson from Quebec, highlights that 
it is important to consider ways in which learning can be implemented through 
avoidance as well as adoption. Both the Québécois case and the Nordic case 
show the importance of perception of success: that Nordic countries are 
successful, that the Québécois case is damaging. In the conclusion, I will 
consider the issue of fallibility in learning which recognizes the fallibility of 
actors’ perceptions in learning. 
This chapter has proposed a number of reasons that the SNP may be less 
transnationally active in the EFA network and less invested in the EU. The party 
is hindered in transnational learning by its centralized decision making process, 
focus on domestic events (the 2014 referendum and Brexit), lack of resources 
in the Scottish Government, and its disproportionate power among European 
regions.  
One further factor that emerged was the role of the SNP’s position in the UK. 
The UK’s distance politically from the EU may also play a factor in the party’s 
relatively modest investment in trans-European relationships. Parties’ variant 
culture and history may influence their transnational behaviour. The following 
and final chapter will consider key findings from across the four political parties 






Chapter Eight: Discussion 
The previous four chapters explored varied experiences of the European Free 
Alliance and member party learning. Parties’ experiences were conditioned by 
a number of factors such as their electoral success (or lack thereof), their 
access to and enthusiasm for transnational relationships, internal contestation 
and organisational structures, and domestic events and policy debates. Varied 
contexts and positions within the EFA network led parties to different levels of 
learning. In this chapter, I develop key findings by comparing the four cases. 
As the foundational question of this thesis, I asked: Do interactions between 
regionalist and nationalist parties in the European Free Alliance generate 
member party learning? If so, why and how? If not, why not? I found that parties 
did learn from other EFA members on issues such as environmental 
sustainability, campaign skills, the feasibility of autonomy, and electoral 
strategy. Lessons from transnational interactions were most often 
complementary to existing policy or strategy positions or combined with other 
causal factors to cause changes. 
Having established that parties do learn, in the first section of this chapter, I 
review key findings about why and how parties progress through each stage of 
the learning process. I also identify common barriers to learning. In the stage 
of information acquisition, I find that hierarchy and institutional access greatly 
affect parties’ patterns of learning. Information interpretation can provide a 
barrier to the further progress of learning, within the complex shift from 
individual to collective interpretation. It may also be skewed by the effect of 
parties’ prior ideologies. Finally, in the implementation of information, it is clear 
that learning is one of multiple causes of change in parties. Furthermore, when 
information is implemented, it may be inaccurately adopted.  
The second section will return to the contextual factors set out in Chapter One 
and propose some adjustments, in light of the comparative analysis. I also 
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propose the addition of a dimension for the ‘depth’ or ‘extent’ of learning. In the 
third section, I shed light on alternative consequences of transnational party 
networking. These consequences include other benefits of EFA membership 
(legitimacy, capacity building, solidarity, policy internationalization) and two 
learning adjacent phenomena (emulation and collaboration).  
8.1 Key Findings 
The explorative approach taken in this thesis allows for novel findings and 
refinement of the party learning framework. In this section, I compare party 
experiences and develop common findings. Findings are separated into the 
component parts of learning: (1) transnational interactions, (2) information 
acquisition, (3) interpretation, and (4) implementation. Throughout these 
sections, I will refer back to cases of learning identified in Chapters Four to 
Seven. These cases are summarized in Table 8.1, below. 
Table 8.1: Identified Instances of Learning 
Party Instance of Learning Stage/Type of Learning 
Frisian National Party Sustainable energy  Implementation 
 Electoral strategy  Individual interpretation 
Union Démocratique 
Bretonne 
Campaign techniques Implementation  
 Autonomist policies 
(feasibility framing)  
Implementation  
 Electoral strategy  Implementation 
Esquerra Republicana 
de Catalunya 
Nordic Model  Emulation 
 Mass mobilization Teaching 
Scottish National Party Nordic model  Emulation/Learning 
 Professionalization  Teaching 





(1) Patterns of Transnational Interaction  
The starting point of my research question is the interactions between the 
member parties of the European Free Alliance. Chapter Three provided an 
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overview of EFA staff and central members and detailed how EFA organises 
and funds bilateral and multilateral interactions between EFA parties. 
Throughout the case studies, EFA events emerged as a key place for 
interaction: the FNP’s regional sustainable energy conference, SNP Youth’s 
Glasgow campaigning workshop, and EFA-supported observations at the 
Scottish and Catalan referendums.  
Often parties do not explicitly note the role EFA played in their interactions. It 
was thus necessary to consider how EFA encourages interactions between 
parties. TNP staff described their jobs as incredibly varied and emphasized the 
importance of connecting parties to one another (Interview 10, 11). Many 
respondents saw the secretariat staff as a kind of bridge in the network. 
Bridging actors allow for the exchange of information across networks by 
relaying information between actors that may not be directly connected. This 
behaviour was evident in the central role that staff played in my observations 
of EFA’s events. The TNP provides both an institutional and informal space for 
transnational relationships.  
However, parties also developed ‘sub-groups’ of interaction within EFA. These 
subgroups limit the information that might be exchanged between parties. Sub-
groups were generally organised geographically, linguistically, culturally, and 
ideologically. In each party, respondents identified a ‘type’ of party that they 
interacted with.  
For example, in the UDB, party respondents identified most closely with other 
Celtic nations and spoke of the ‘Atlantic Arc’ as a representation of this concept. 
FNP respondents saw themselves as a ‘North West’ or ‘Northern’ party, aligned 
with interests around the North Sea. The SNP meanwhile aligned with powerful 
EFA parties and identified strongly with its image as a ‘social democratic’ party. 
Interestingly, ERC’s self-image varies. Party members described ERC as both 
a leader in the Mediterranean and as a ‘Northern’ social democratic country in 
298 
 
the south. This differentiation reflects different arenas for their transnational 
party interactions. Parties may thus identify different ‘group characteristics,’ in 
different time periods or venues. Nonetheless, across all the cases, 
respondents sought sub-groups that fit with their self-image as a party. EFA 
membership provides one basis for interactions, but parties further limit the 
scope of relationships in EFA.  
There were also some systematic boundaries, implicit across all parties. For 
example, there was a strong Western/Eastern European split. Few parties 
noted any relationships or knowledge of the EU’s new accession state EFA 
members. Given that I selected parties to the left/center of EFA, an avoidance 
of more extreme right parties was also common across all parties. One 
respondent explained that “far right, anti-European and populist parties, this is 
for us probably the worst” (Interview 30).  
In addition to these self-chosen sub-groups, parties limited their relationships 
in EFA by differences in success. Less successful parties tended to have a 
wider knowledge of other EFA parties. While they focused their attention on 
more successful parties, they also worked with less successful parties (for 
example: the UDB and the Cornish, the FNP and the Lusatians). On the other 
hand, EFA’s most successful parties often sought connections only with 
powerful EFA parties and statewide, non-EFA parties. The effect of this 
hierarchically driven pattern of EFA relationships will be discussed in section 
two. 
(2) Information acquisition  
The acquisition stage is the process in which information is supplied to a 
learner; it may occur purposefully or passively. Two findings about information 
acquisition became clear throughout the cases. Acquisition was driven by a 
hierarchy of success in EFA; parties tended to look for more successful 
examples, in EFA or beyond. Second, when parties had access to transnational 
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institutions, these were used to acquire information rather than the EFA 
network.  
Hierarchies of Success 
One of the clearest patterns that emerged across all four political parties was 
the importance of hierarchy. Perceptions of hierarchy were based in 
judgements of party size, electoral success, and resources. The SNP and ERC 
are the most visible ‘success stories.’ Hierarchy affects both what information 
parties sought and what information parties can access. Parties seek 
information from more successful examples, as they attempt to achieve the 
same success. However, successful parties may be less likely to share 
information due to time constraints and concerns about legitimacy. 
One of the most straightforward statements of the hierarchical nature of the 
EFA network was from a Breton respondent. The respondent said: “We follow 
the example of Wales because, with Scotland, we are not at that level 
yet…That's really the thing: the Cornish want to be like the Bretons, the Bretons 
want to be like the Welsh, and the Welsh want to be like the Scots” (Interview 
14). One member of the FNP’s EFA Commission also explained, “[the SNP] is 
a party that is a bit ahead of us, that we're looking at, how did they manage to 
build it that way, in what way? That is also the case for the Catalans. Basically, 
the bigger players are also your examples” (Interview 5). 
The FNP’s learning on electoral strategy and the UDB’s learning on electoral 
strategy, campaigning, and autonomist policy leaned on information about 
other parties’ successful campaigns. The UDB acquired information about 
Corsican parties’ successful experience of campaigning autonomously, the 
SNP’s door knocking strategies, and the Welsh and Scottish devolved 
legislatures. These devolved legislatures were perceived by UDB members as 
a symbol of success for Plaid Cymru and the SNP. 
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Successful parties also impart information about their own successes. ERC 
and the SNP both ‘teach’ other parties. As one ERC respondent noted, “Some 
of these [EFA] parties they have few possibilities to have access to power. 
Actually, the SNP and ourselves are probably the most powerful in terms of 
internal politics” (Interview 30). Within EFA, ERC and the SNP had few clear 
successful examples outwith each other. However, as noted in Chapters Six 
and Seven, there were barriers to understanding between the SNP and Catalan 
parties. They subsequently learned from governing social democratic parties 
elsewhere.  
The SNP also sought information from Quebec. Despite their hesitancy over 
what one interviewee called its ‘exclusive nationalism,’ the Parti Québécois and 
the Quebec referendum provided one of the only other cases of a sub-state 
independence referendum. One SNP respondent said: “the process was 
probably as close to being the same as any one that we’ve had recently” 
(Interview 38).  
Interestingly, the Parti Québécois conversely was drawn to both the 2014 
Scottish independence and 2017 Catalan independence referendums. PQ 
representatives attended both events, in the latter case also attending events 
put on by EFA. This shows the more informal nature of the EFA network, which 
often reaches beyond formal members. The PQ’s interest in both these 
processes also shows how the concept of ‘success’ changes over time; while 
previously the PQ was one of the most ‘successful’ parties, over time they 
came to look to SNP and ERC as models of success.  
In addition to conditioning the information that parties seek to acquire, hierarchy 
also affects the information they are able to acquire. For example, one case of 
learning that did not draw on hierarchies of success was the environmental 
sustainability project. This project was framed around shared problems (i.e. 
climate change, state opposition to regional control of energy) rather than prior 
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policy or electoral success. However, the FNP sought information from the SNP 
for their environmental sustainability project. They saw the SNP and the 
Scottish Government as a leader on renewable energies. Their efforts to learn 
were frustrated by the SNP’s lack of information sharing. One FNP respondent 
noted:  
“The SNP have a lot of members and a lot of staff. We have one or two 
staff, but the SNP must have a lot of staff who work full time and they must, 
I assume, also have many policy groups that are working on the 
EU…They’re a party in government in a really large region. In the 
Government, they must also have people working on this so you would 
say—they’ll have someone as a contact person for EFA. But, one way or 
another, that’s not the case” (Interview 9). 
Frustration with the SNP’s distance from EFA was repeated in various 
interviews with the UDB, FNP, and ERC. However, from the SNP’s point of 
view, interaction with EFA parties was not a priority due to their relative lack of 
power. 
Inability to access information also affected powerful parties. Both the SNP and 
ERC reported difficulties engaging with statewide political parties. They 
focused their engagement on explaining their stance to combat traditional 
negative stereotypes of nationalism rather than on gaining information. Despite 
regional success, they were still forced to overcome barriers to engagement 
with ‘mainstream’ statewide parties. Hierarchies thus delineate the information 
parties want and the information they can acquire.  
Institutional Access 
In the introduction I explained that EFA parties have few governing resources 
to access European politics. As such, the EFA network becomes a key 
resource through which nationalist and regionalist parties access relationships 
in the EU. However, where EFA member parties do have access to 
transnational institutions (such as para-diplomatic bodies), they actively 
acquire information from them. This may hinder party-to-party learning, 
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because parties focus their transnational energy on learning from different 
sources.  
This finding also holds for parties without governing responsibility. The two non-
governing parties chosen in this thesis had minority language protection as a 
central tenet of their policy platforms. Minority language protection has been 
institutionalized by the EU, due to the framing of minority languages as a legal 
issue (May, 2013: 246). Minority language protection is thus integrated into 
European legal and cultural networks and institutions.  
Cross-European institutions on minority languages protection provide 
institutional access for smaller regionalist parties. For example, the FNP 
engages with other regions through the Network to Promote Linguistic Diversity 
(NPLD), of which the Frisian Province is a member, and through the Inter-
Frisian Council. Another non-party, institutional opportunity to network across 
Europe occurred through Leeuwarden’s City of Culture bid. One respondent 
explained:  
“This year San Sebastian, Donostia, in the Basque Country, is the 
Cultural Capital of Europe. One of the projects there is setting up a 
protocol of linguistic rights. There was a delegation in Leeuwarden from 
the Basque Country, and they invited a number of people to talk about 
language rights - what should be included in such a protocol” (Interview 
8). 
The Frisian cultural dimension thus provided spaces for the FNP to engage in 
information exchange. In Brittany, information about minority language policy 
was acquired through the UDB’s Nantes city councillor responsible for linguistic 
issues. He used this position to travel to Wales and Ireland to discuss language 
policies. He also met with a delegation from Plaid Cymru, which he saw as a 
‘strategic’ interaction.  
In both cases, institutions provided new resources to travel, interact with 
partners (political, administrative, civil society), and acquire information beyond 
303 
 
EFA. As the UDB and Plaid Cymru links show, institutional acquisition may 
overlap with EFA relationships. 
The most prominent use of institutional access is the SNP and ERC’s use of 
the Scottish and Catalan Governments to obtain transnational information. 
Both invested in pre-existing para-diplomatic bodies and built more 
international representations to develop transnational contacts. While these 
links are made by government bodies, elite politicians in governing parties use 
institutional connections.  
Both the SNP and ERC sought information about other governments’ choices 
using institutional connections. For example, the SNP’s Glasgow City Council 
Group met with officials from Copenhagen city council to develop ideas for their 
electoral manifesto. The SNP has regularly referred to a ‘Norway style’ oil fund 
and oil exploration credits. The party campaigned for and implemented the 
Finnish-style baby box. The party’s leaders, through their Government role, 
have sought to build relationships with Arctic Council states, for example 
through hosting the Arctic Circle Forum in Edinburgh in 2017.  
A senior SNP adviser reported that, for a “lot of the low carbon policies we look 
and steal from Norway and the Scandinavian countries… [Cabinet Secretary 
for Environment, Climate Change and Land Reform] Roseanna Cunningham 
is in Norway now looking at electric vehicles” (Interview 49). While the line 
between party and government policy learning is (purposefully) blurry, it is clear 
that SNP politician’s roles as ministers in the Scottish Government provide 
institutional means to seek information.  
In Catalonia, ERC respondents noted that politicians from other European 
countries visited the Catalan Parliament as part of Parliamentary delegations. 
ERC MPs and leaders also noted engagement abroad through Parliamentary 
cross-party groups on Catalonia (in the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Switzerland). 
One MP explained, “they have open minds to freedom processes…so we find 
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meetings with ambassadors and meet with political parties of the Parliament” 
(Interview 22). ERC used the status and institutional space of the Catalan 
Parliament to access transnational relationships.  
Acquisition through institutions is not always straightforward. Information may 
be acquired by actors in their roles as Government advisers, city councilors, 
legislators, and members of civil society organisations, but used in their political 
party roles. That is to say: the same individuals play key roles both in political 
parties and transnational institutions. Elite ERC and SNP advisers are 
influential in shaping government para-diplomatic strategies. Members of the 
UDB and FNP are often also activists in civil society and cultural organisations. 
Information acquired through transnational institutions is not only used in 
institutional spaces; it will also affect party decisions. The relationship between 
the acquisition of information in institutions and its subsequent use in party 
learning process should be further detailed in future studies. 
(3) Information Interpretation  
Information interpretation is the process through which individuals understand 
information meaning in its original context and then adapt that piece of 
information to their context. On a collective level, interpretation occurs when 
party members develop a joint understanding of the significance of information. 
I found that interpretation is affected by prior understandings and that the shift 
from individual to collective interpretation is particularly important in party 
learning. 
Effect of Prior Policy and Ideological Preferences 
Information interpretation was not built on a tabula rasa, a blank slate. As such, 
parties and their decision makers “rarely find themselves in uncharted territory” 
(Freeman, 2006: 373). Individuals and parties build their interpretations of new, 
learned information on existing understandings and ideologies. Existing beliefs 
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will affect how parties judge transnational information, whether they see it as 
valuable, and whether it is adopted/implemented.  
For example, the FNP’s regional sustainable energy was aimed at sharing 
‘best-practice’ from across Europe. However, when other parties and scientists 
shared their experiences of onshore wind turbines, the FNP rejected this 
information as not fitting with the ‘Frisian landscape.’ Their strong existing anti-
turbine policy conditioned their interest in the findings presented at the energy 
conference. In the process of adaptation to the Frisian context, some 
information was ignored. The SNP’s response to the Parti Quebecois (PQ) was 
also conditioned by the party’s existing ideology and self-image. Party 
member’s interpretation of the PQ’s immigration policies as disadvantageous 
and negative was conditioned by their strong attachment to being civic 
‘inclusive’ nationalists.  
Interpretation is biased not just by parties’ stances, but individuals’ prior 
knowledge and positions. All members of the FNP drew on the SNP example, 
but interpretations differed significantly. One respondent, for example, 
promoted a shift to the left in the FNP and referenced the bedroom tax as an 
example of linking social welfare and nationalism (Interview 5). Another 
explained, that the SNP was not based in identity politics, so that the FNP’s 
learning should be centered on economic policies (Interview 6). Others felt that 
the SNP’s success was based around ‘staying true to your roots,’ and ‘having 
a strong connection with the people’ (Interview 7, Interview 8). One respondent, 
more honestly, noted that they felt the party did not yet understand why the 
SNP was successful (Interview 8). Each of the respondents drew on their own 
skills and positionality which led to varied interpretations. 
The effect of partisanship and prior ideologies has been explored in previous 
learning studies. These find that governments and policy makers are more 
likely to learn about policies that already fit their ideological point of view and 
306 
 
partisanship (Grossback et al., 2004; Gilardi, 2010; Butler et al., 2017). Political 
parties and their members also follow this pattern.  
Individual to Collective Interpretation 
As noted in Chapter One, organizational learning scholars emphasized the shift 
from individual to collective learning (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2013: 485). The 
cases in this thesis confirm that the move from individual to collective 
interpretation is a key component to party learning. Two patterns of learning 
emerge: one in which this shift is smooth and the other in which it must be 
negotiated. The nature of the move towards collective interpretation is affected 
by issue contestation and party organisational centralization. Low issue 
contestation and high party centralization encourage collective interpretation; 
high issue contestation and low party centralization hinder collective 
interpretation. 
It is first useful to illustrate the two patterns of learning. First, the more difficult 
negotiated shift from individual to collective learning can be seen on the issue 
of electoral strategy in both the FNP and UDB. In these cases, party elites first 
changed their position on strategic choices and then sought to negotiate this 
change through the membership. Respondents reported discussing the policy 
change in collective forums and in the UDB’s case, the party’s leadership was 
changed as a result of this discussion. In the FNP, the inability to convince 
members of the change meant the party did not collectively learn. 
In other cases, collective interpretation was more straightforward. For example, 
the SNP and ERC’s use of Nordic examples fit smoothly into existing agreed 
policies. The model confirms the parties’ self-perceptions of themselves as 
socially democratic. The same was true for the FNP’s learning on sustainable 
energy; the party had agreed in previous manifestos to prioritize their 




Table 8.2 Cases of Learning and Issue Contestation 
Party Case of Learning Issue 
Contestation 
Stage of Learning 
FNP Sustainable energy Low Implementation 
 Electoral strategy High Individual interpretation 
UDB Campaigning Low Implementation 
 Autonomist 
‘feasibility’ framing  
Low Implementation 
 Electoral strategy High  Implementation 
ERC Nordic model  Low Implementation 
(emulation) 
SNP Nordic model Low Implementation 
(emulation) 
 Inclusive nationalism  Low Implementation  
 
Table 8.2 shows that most cases of learning identified in the empirical chapters 
occurred in situations of low issue contestation within political parties. It seems 
that collective interpretation and implementation occur more easily where the 
object of learning is a collectively agreed policy.  
Notably, a counter example of non-learning also occurred in the FNP. For the 
FNP, asylum and refugee policy was a contentious policy area; the issue and 
the party’s lack of clear policy emerged consistently in interviews. However, the 
issue was so contested within the FNP that it was not discussed at a 
transnational level (despite the clearly transnational nature of the issue).  
Learning on issues of low and high levels of issue contestation occurs in a 
different pattern. The key to this difference is in the move from individual to 
collective interpretation. On contested issues, learning depends far more on 
the process of elite negotiation and dissemination of transnational information 
to members. On uncontested issues, the move from individual to collective 
interpretation is easier.  
Negotiations between party members over information interpretation were 
affected by the party’s organisational structure. The parties studied in this 
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thesis varied significantly in their level of organisational centralization, from the 
FNP’s decentralization to the SNP’s centralization. The UDB and ERC 
developed territorial and sectorial commissions which led to a structured 
decentralization.  
In the cases of both the SNP and the FNP, organisational structure complicated 
learning. In the SNP, many members were interested and involved in 
transnational relations. However, there was little identifiable collective learning 
in the SNP. Transnationally active individuals in the SNP reported that there 
were no clear procedures to share information with the central elites or to 
disseminate transnational information to the party as a collective. 
In the FNP, information about transnational interactions was shared across the 
party, especially through the party’s ‘EFA Commission.’ However, the party is 
decentralized in that individual territorial branches have a lot of power. Even 
though numerous FNP elite saw the benefit of running in statewide elections, 
the general party membership resisted this and fought for the Frisian dimension 
to remain dominant. These cases show that making rules (formal) and norms 
(informal) affect individuals’ ability to share transnational information and 
influence how that information is interpreted by other party members.  
As I noted in Chapter One, contextual factors interact with one another. In the 
cases reviewed in Chapters Four through Seven, I found that the level of issue 
contestation and party centralization interact with one another by affecting party 
decision making and negotiation processes. This interaction significantly 
affects the shift from individual to collective information interpretation. 
(4) Information Implementation 
When new information is implemented, parties display a change in their policy 
or strategy options, argumentation, framing, or choice. In the implementation 
stage, I found that parties use transnational information alongside other 
reasons for a change in cognition or behaviour. Parties may also implement 
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lessons inaccurately, or in ways that suggest a lack of understanding of the 
original policy.  
Multiple Causation 
When transnational learning is implemented it leads to change. The type of 
change varies significantly across the cases, from the adoption of a new 
electoral strategy to the adoption of a new argument to support an existing 
policy. In each case, party change was also affected by other forces 
domestically. The implementation of learning should thus be understood as 
part of a wider process of changes within a party.  
Updating information in a party inevitably interacts with other factors that affect 
party choice such as internal party rules, institutions, intra-party factionalism, 
and inter-party competition. Learning provides new policy or strategy options; 
the adoption of a particular option is affected by multiple factors. Furthermore, 
learning is often iterative, so the process of change often follows a longer 
pattern of ‘enlightenment’ “whereby the findings accumulated over time 
gradually alter decision-makers' perceptions” (Sabatier, 1991: 148). 
For example, in the case of the UDB’s new electoral strategy, Breton 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the Socialist Party had long been 
stirring. The election of the Socialist French Government and subsequent lack 
of regional reform pushed party member’s discomfort with electoral alliances 
to the edge. Party elites thus turned to the option of running autonomously in 
elections. Their observations of and consultation with EFA partners 
strengthened their belief that this option would be successful.  
In the FNP, elites were concerned about the party’s stagnation in voter share 
and seeking a way to improve outcomes. The party observed locally that their 
voters often turned to other parties for their statewide votes. Elites worried that 
the FNP did not have enough of a distinctive position in the local political 
sphere. Running in statewide elections was seen as one possible solution. EFA 
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partners like the SNP and Plaid Cymru provided positive examples of this 
choice. In both contexts, party discussions with EFA parties provided an 
additional encouragement to party or individual changes in strategy. 
In the case of the emulation of the Nordic model in both ERC and the SNP, 
both parties had a pre-existing ideological consensus promoting a strong 
welfare state. These ideological choices and positions were developed over a 
long period of time, and affected by many factors, including their competitive 
positioning within the region. However, looking transnationally at Nordic 
examples provided further detail and argumentative support for the parties’ 
policy positions. Transnational information thus helped ERC and the SNP to 
further develop policies that were already shaped by domestic forces.  
Inaccurate Learning 
As noted in the literature review, learning has previously been tied to an 
‘accuracy criterion’ (Levy, 1994). In this thesis, I have not claimed that learning 
must be accurate. However, when considering the ‘lessons’ adopted by EFA 
member parties, I found that parties often implemented inaccurate or 
overinflated lessons. 
For example, the SNP’s emulation of a Nordic model does not align with a 
deeper implementation of Nordic policies. The SNP regularly used the image 
of the Nordic ‘paradise.’ Newby noted: “there are so many references to Norden 
and individual Nordic states that it is reasonable to assume that politicians 
believe that general popular perception of Nordic society to be positive – A 
Good Thing” (Newby, 2009: 323). However, the SNP often did not have the 
means to implement Nordic policies given the different needs of Scotland. I 
found in Chapter Seven that the SNP’s references to Nordic examples drew on 
a symbolic usefulness, rather than detailed adoption of new policies.   
A symbolic approach to learning which privileges a shallower understanding of 
transnational examples. Stone differentiates between those who “may adopt 
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lessons for symbolic purposes or as a strategic device to secure political 
support rather than as a result of improved understanding” (1999: 56). As such, 
in some cases, like ERC and the SNP’s adoption of a Nordic model, the 
implemented lessons did not show a changed understanding or greater 
evidence base.  
One Scottish respondent referred to a case where Basque nationalists referred 
to the Scottish independence referendum as “instrumental in them supporting 
the peace process and how their visits to Scotland had given them hope that 
there wouldn’t be a renewal of violence” (Interview 50). While Basques sought 
to attach themselves to the Scottish case, the peace process began much 
earlier than the 2014 referendum. The process was much more complex than 
this characterization. Linking the Basque process to the Scottish referendum is 
a politically useful choice, but it can lead to overinflated claims of learning and 
teaching.  
Inaccurate learning may be built on symbolic or reputational goals rather than 
a more detailed learning process. These limited findings of inaccuracy also 
suggest the importance of critically questioning claims of learning and, as 
Stone does, differentiating between types of learning. In section 8.2, I will 
suggest the addition of a measurement of ‘depth’ or ‘extent’ of learning to the 
party learning framework. 
(5) Reflections on the Learning Process 
The three-stage process of learning proved a useful stepwise description of the 
way that the parties’ exchange, adapt, and adopt transnational information. 
Parties acquired more information than was ultimately implemented. As noted 
in section three, learning was sometimes halted in the interpretive stage. The 
processes of interpretation and collective information dissemination were at the 
crux of the learning process. Learning was eased when parties had collective 
agreement on a policy issue, and the ability to communicate new information 
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to one another. In addition, one of the clearest patterns of learning was the 
focus on parties perceived as successful. Parties’ perception of ‘success’ drove 
their interest in certain transnational partners and shaped patterns of 
information exchange.  
Within the stage of implementation, cross-case patterns were less clear. 
Implementation occurred less often than the other stages of learning. 
Furthermore, the difficulty with identifying implementation was foreseen in 
Chapter One, with the discussion of the tension between studying learning as 
a process and an outcome. At the ‘outcome’ point of implementation, the 
specific effect of learning may be difficult to disaggregate from other causes of 
change (as discussed above). In future studies, the conceptual definition of 
‘implementation’ could be improved. This might be done by disaggregating 
types of implementation. That is, does learning affect policy or strategy? Does 
it affect the ultimate decision or only the framing/evidence provided? Does 
implementation occur across the party or is it isolated within smaller sub-groups 
of elites?  
Another key finding that emerged is on the object of learning. In the initial party 
framework, I left the object of learning unbounded to allow for varied types of 
objects, such as policy, strategy, or party organisational norms. In this thesis, I 
found that parties often learned on issues of strategy. Six of the ten instances 
of learning in table 8.1 involve strategic learning: the FNP and statewide 
elections, the UDB and running autonomously, the UDB and campaigning, the 
SNP and avoidance of a Quebec-like ‘neverendum,’ and ERC and SNP 
teaching on mass mobilization and professionalization. I posit three causes for 
the predominance of strategy learning: (1) it is a commonality between all 
parties; (2) it touches on the ‘performance’ dimension of learning; and (3) it may 
be an easier, shallower learning. 
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First, running in elections is common to all political parties. As such, it provides 
a useful space for interaction between parties from disparate cultural and 
political backgrounds. Furthermore, EFA parties often send representatives to 
other regions for big electoral moments and referendums. The TNP secretariat 
also focus communications efforts around these events. Electoral moments 
provide a focal point for transnational party activism.  
Second, in organisational learning, the outcome of interest is ‘performance’ 
(March, 1991: 85). Organisations seek competitive advantage through 
learning. Parties can be considered as political organisations with three goals: 
policy, office, and vote maximizing (Müller et al., 1999). As such, when parties 
seek competitive advantage, it is likely learning would revolve around 
improving their performance electorally and gaining office.  
Finally, strategic changes may be easier than changes to underlying ideological 
stances. Strategy is seen to affect a ‘shallower’ level of belief in a party. 
Learning can be separated into two types or different orders of depth from 
“shallow, tactical or instrumental learning” to “deeper social or policy learning” 
(Stone, 2004: 549). Learning on campaign tactics, professionalization, 
mobilization, and electoral strategy are less intrusive to the ‘core’ of a political 
party than ideological changes. In the next section, I propose that it would be 
useful to add a theoretical dimension to consider the ‘extent’ or depth of 
learning.  
8.2 Reflecting on Contextual Factors and Extent of Learning 
These findings and the case studies explored in this thesis have confirmed that 
there is a phenomenon of party learning in the EFA network. Having confirmed 
the existence of the process of learning, and identified findings about each 
stage of learning, I now propose some adjustments to two other dimensions of 
the party learning framework: the five identified contextual factors and the 
depth/extent of learning.  
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Each of the contextual factors identified affected party learning. I review these 
findings and the possible adjustments that could be made to each factor in this 
section. In further studies, it would be worthwhile in the future to consider 
whether there are stable patterns of interaction between factors. For example, 
is there a configuration of key entrepreneurs and party centralization that is 
most conducive of learning? Are high levels of issue contestation in a party 
mediated by strong key entrepreneurs? Future studies may also wish to control 
for some contextual factors in a more focused comparison, to test the relevance 
of each against the other.   
(1) Electoral success  
I posited that electoral success would affect what parties learned and who 
parties learned from, because electoral success indicates the ‘value’ of other 
parties’ policies and strategies. This thesis confirmed that electoral success 
was a key factor in learning. As I noted in section 8.1, it consistently influenced 
where political parties sought their information. The SNP and ERC sought 
information from statewide parties, governing parties, and one another. 
Meanwhile, the two less electorally successful parties (the UDB and FNP) 
looked to the SNP, ERC, and Plaid Cymru as successful members of EFA. 
However, it may be worthwhile in the future to move beyond electoral results 
as a measure of ‘success.’ The key factor was that party elites perceived other 
parties to be successful. Electoral results were one part of this perception, but 
respondents also considered parties’ success in achieving regional autonomy. 
For example, respondents noted that the SNP was further ‘along the path’ or 
‘on the journey’ to autonomy. The UDB studied Welsh and Scottish devolution 
processes. They linked the achievement of establishing Welsh and Scottish 
devolved legislatures with the success of Plaid Cymru and SNP (despite those 
parties’ lack of electoral success in early devolved elections). As such, at least 
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the EFA context, parties also perceive success as progress in achieving the 
party’s autonomy goal.  
In this thesis, I focus on the interactions between political parties and on those 
political parties’ characteristics. This is due to my interest in both the agents 
and process of learning, rather than the content of the lessons learned. 
However, I found that learning was affected by the performance of other 
policies in addition to parties’ electoral performance. For example, the SNP 
referred to the success of renewables policies in Norway. The FNP sought 
information from the SNP on renewable energy, because of their understanding 
that Scotland had successfully implemented renewables policies. Since the 
late 1990s, the UDB has framed its autonomist goals around the models of the 
Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament.  
The literature on policy learning and transfer notes that policy success and the 
demonstration of that success internationally facilitates policy learning (Shipan 
and Volden, 2008). Policy success is relevant to learning because “the 
underlying assumption is that policies that have been successful in one country 
will be successful in another” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 17). McConnell 
(2010) explores this assumption and the arguments about whether policy 
success is transferable. On one extreme, a policy maker might argue that 
conditions for policy success are universal. Another extreme may be that 
conditions for success differ in every context. However, McConnell posits a 
compromise, which suggests that conditions for policy success are familial. 
This argument is useful when considering learning among EFA parties. Parties 
in EFA “share similarities in a ‘family’ way” such as shared goals, geographical 
areas, and histories (McConnell, 2010: 200). This ‘familial’ link may make 
parties more likely to see one another’s policy successes as relevant to their 
own region/nation.  
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In order to learn from the success of a policy, the learner “must gather 
information and sort previous experiences into instances where the policies 
have had the desired effect and those where they have not, before emulating 
the former” (Marsh and Sharman, 2008: 232). The search for evidence is thus 
a key link between policy success and learning. The recent emphasis on 
evidence-based policy making and best-practice sharing enhance the 
importance of prior policy success in policymaking.  
Information used as evidence of success may be part of a more systematic, 
institutionalized policy evaluation (often conducted by civil servants or 
independent bodies). However, actors may also be evaluate and seek 
evidence about the strategic success of a policy, the way it was perceived by 
the public, or the way a certain policy would allow them to compete with political 
opponents (Shipan and Volden, 2012). Marsh and McConnell (2010) identify 
three possible forms of success: programmatic, process, and political. The 
evaluation of success is not a purely technocratic task; the choice of evidence 
and perception of ‘policy success’ is also inherently political (Cairney, 2017).  
Understandings of policy success are affected by the evidence and measures 
of success chosen, but also by the character of the evidence disseminators. 
The social and hierarchical position of actors affects which policies are most 
likely to be seen as successful (and thus most likely to be learned). Dunlop and 
Radaelli (2013, 2016) find that the social certification of actors is a key condition 
that affects learning. Actors have a higher certification when they “are 
perceived as competent, technically skilled, independent, or all of these” 
(Dunlop and Radaelli, 2018: 258). The inequality of actors’ social positions 
affects what is learned and from who. This was clear in the cases studied; 
certain political parties were seen as more ‘expert’ than others and thus their 
policy expertise was more sought after. There is thus an overlap between the 
factor of electoral success and policy success.  
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Those receiving the information may not be ‘equally sensitive’ to different 
measures or ways of describing success depending on their prior beliefs and 
preferences (Gilardi, 2010). Both the policy learner’s and policy exporter’s 
“policy analytical capacity” may affect the process (Howlett, 2009). Given that 
research shows that politicians and institutions often have limited analytical 
capacity, it would be useful to consider how party elites use ‘cognitive shortcuts’ 
and bounded rationality to determine success (Meseguer, 2005). 
As the policy literature emphasizes, perception matters. The importance of 
perception can be illustrated by contrasting ERC and the SNP’s status in the 
EFA network. While both have been successful electorally, the SNP was more 
often perceived as an example by other political parties. Absolute electoral 
results are not alone a sufficient measurement of success. As such, in the 
future, it would be useful to consider how parties evaluate success in a more 
complex way. This expanded contextual factor of success could consider both 
electoral (political) and policy (programmatic) success. It could also consider 
more clearly how success is bounded by the choice of evidence, positionality 
of the evidence disseminators, and analytical capacity of the learner.  
Nonetheless, within the limitations of this study, parties’ electoral success has 
proven to be a good proxy for the wider and more amorphous concept of 
success. There were differences in the patterns of learning between the more 
electorally successful parties (SNP and ERC) and the less electorally 
successful parties (UDB and FNP) with the latter two seeking information 
particularly from the former two.   
(2) Governing responsibility 
I posited that governing responsibility would bring parties additional resources 
to interact transnationally outside of EFA and that it would constrain them by 
leading to more domestic scrutiny of their choices. As reviewed in the previous 
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section, institutional resources and para-diplomacy led parties to learn from 
different sources of information.  
Governing resources allowed for non-party transnational learning, through 
para-diplomatic bodies and other cross-European institutions. ERC and the 
SNP both displayed clear interest in relationships with parties outside of EFA 
and their governing responsibility allowed them to advance these interests, 
particularly around the Catalan independence referendum and Brexit 
(respectively). Governing resources, when parties had access, did affect party 
learning by redirecting parties’ transnational interactions away from EFA. 
I also posited that governing responsibility might affect parties’ relationships 
with EFA by raising concerns of legitimacy. In the SNP and ERC, respondents 
displayed concerns of speaking to smaller, right wing parties from across 
Europe. However, this was not only an issue for governing parties. The UDB 
also expressed issues with the EFA relationships with right wing parties; they 
took this forward by proposing the suspension of parties that had allied with the 
Lega Nord. Respondents noted that the UDB did not want to be tainted by the 
radical right, given the presence of radical right wing Breton autonomist 
movements. As such, the issue of legitimacy was not clearly tied to parties’ 
governing responsibility. 
In future applications, it would be useful to further develop this variable to 
consider institutional access. As noted in section 8.1, the UDB and FNP had 
relationships across Europe based on their minority language protection 
policies. As such, the use of institutions rather than EFA to communicate 
abroad is not limited to para-diplomatic government bodies. 
It would also be useful to add more nuance to the concept of governing 
responsibility and the power of the regional decision making body. Future 
applications of the framework should allow for more variations on ‘governing 
responsibility’ to emerge. For example, the position of parties in coalitions was 
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not fully explored in this thesis. As part of the coalition agreement, the FNP 
emphasized their environmentalist policies. This then emerged as their key 
project in EFA. Analogously, the UDB’s city councillor in the Nantes City 
Council ruling coalition took on responsibility for language policies. He built on 
this position to travel to Wales, for example, and also met Plaid Cymru while 
there. Governing responsibility thus affects parties in more complex ways than 
initially proposed. 
Additionally, the power of regional governments is important. Both the SNP and 
ERC had access to powerful regional governments, with already developed 
para-diplomatic bodies. They also further invested in developing the para-
diplomatic arms of their governments. As such, not only have the parties gained 
access, they used that access to expand their regions’ transnational 
institutional power and build connections.  
Considering the varied nature of ‘responsibility’ in government, of institutional 
access and of regional institutional power (and changes over time) would 
provide a more nuanced understanding of how governing responsibility affects 
transnational relationships. 
(3) Party centralization  
I developed a three-part categorization of party’s internal organizational 
structures: centralized, structured decentralized, and decentralized. I posited 
that both centralization and decentralization would affect learning by altering 
patterns of information dissemination and decision making in a party.  
In the most decentralized and most centralized parties, these expectations 
were realized. The SNP was the most centralized case, with a ‘democratized’ 
structure but significant elite coordination and control of information. In this 
structure, the many SNP elected members with relationships to Catalonia and 
European institutions did not clearly feed this information back to the party 
leadership. Members with responsibilities in European regional institutions 
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noted that there was no clear structure to feed their transregional discussions 
back to the SNP leadership. They noted that they had to personally reach out 
to party leaders to share transnational information. There was a clear 
centralized control of decision making in the SNP, based around the Scottish 
Government and Parliamentary groups. As such, transnational information 
acquired by individuals outside of these central groups is unlikely to be clearly 
disseminated and thus collectively interpreted in the SNP.  
On the other hand, the FNP was the most decentralized case. Individual FNP 
council groups may adopt different policy positions, and consensus building 
occurs through various thematic and regional discussion forums. A number of 
elite members sought to push the FNP’s participation in statewide elections, 
drawing on the Scottish example. However, this was seen as a move away 
from the Frisian language and cultural policies that founded the party and other 
elites noted that the party membership pushed back on strategic change. This 
halted the implementation of learning, showing the effect of a lack of centralized 
control.  
I also conceptualized a midway between decentralization and centralization, 
structured decentralization. In these cases, decision-making and information 
seeking is decentralized to specialized sub-groups based around territories or 
policy areas. Structured sub-groups were evident in ERC, the UDB and the 
FNP. In each case, specific international affairs sub-groups sought information 
from abroad and from EFA partners. However, the sub-groups then interacted 
with party elites and membership differently in each case. No clear finding 
about the affect of ‘structured decentralization’ emerged.  
This suggests that my initial conceptualization of party centralization was 
ultimately too crude. Parties’ internal structures showed greater variation on 
than the three identified categories. For example, in some parties, sub-groups 
were advisory and based largely in indirect transnational research. In other 
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parties, sub-groups proposed policy changes, pro-actively sought 
relationships, and members did significant amounts of travel. Structure, skill, 
and institutional power of the sub-groups differed across each case. 
As such, the category of ‘structured decentralization’ obscured a diversity of 
arrangements. The FNP, for example, despite having policy-specific and 
territorial sub-groups, did not empower these groups. The groups did not help 
create consensus in the FNP. On the other hand, in ERC, sub-groups were 
comprised of powerful individuals. They had significant power to affect party 
policy and direct communication powerful members of the Catalan 
Government. Future studies should provide a more precise categorization and 
explicit the variation between the extremes of decentralized and centralized 
structures. 
Further detail about the range of party structures (formal and informal) might 
also answer some questions that emerged. For example: What is the role of 
policy-specific commissions in parties (particularly those with European or 
transnational remits)? To what extent is learning an explicit function of party 
sub-groups? Can the level of party centralization be measured through party 
regulatory documents or is it driven by agential behaviour and informal norms? 
A more nuanced approach would better reveal how these specific dimensions 
of party organisational centralization affect learning.  
(4) Key Entrepreneurs 
Key entrepreneurs are individuals active at both a domestic and transnational 
level, who worked to progress the TNP and connect the domestic to the 
transnational level. Contrary to my expectations, all the parties studied had 
transnational entrepreneurs. Parties varied not on the presence of 
entrepreneurs but their position and skills.  
As noted in the previous section, in situations of high issue contestation, 
individuals needed to negotiate and disseminate transnational information 
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within their domestic political party. Entrepreneurs are thus not only those with 
interest in and ability to acquire transnational information, but those who can 
disseminate it.  
A comparison between the SNP and ERC provides illustrative of the 
importance of entrepreneurs’ positions and skills. In the SNP, there were 
numerous individuals with connections across Europe and in European 
institutions like the Committee of the Regions. However, these individuals did 
not have clear positions in the SNP’s decision making process. The size of the 
party also meant that the dissemination of information required significant 
persistence and influence. Furthermore, the SNP’s entrepreneurs were not 
based in the EFA bureau or secretariat. Rather, SNP elected members have 
cultivated individual relationships in Europe (especially with Catalan partners). 
The positioning of SNP entrepreneurs outside of EFA’s central bodies results 
in the party’s more constrained relationships within the wider EFA network. 
Alternately, ERC entrepreneurs have prominent positions in EFA, such as 
Secretary General and President of EFAy. Elite ERC politicians in Catalonia 
(such as the Minister for Europe) previously held positions in the EFA bureau 
or sat as EFA MEPs. This ensures that knowledge and commitment to EFA 
remains central to ERC, despite their recent outreach to other European 
governments and statewide parties. The centrality of EFA for ERC elites has 
also ensured that ERC has been active in leading and ‘teaching’ in EFA, for 
example imparting their organizing skills around mass mobilization. 
The FNP provides a good example of the importance of institutional positions 
to entrepreneurship. EFA entrepreneurs were central to the party’s executive 
bodies, the party has a dedicated ‘EFA Commission,’ and the EFA bureau has 
an FNP member. Respondents emphasized their ability to ‘call up' their 
colleagues in Brussels. Information had a relatively short distance to travel from 
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EFA to the FNP. FNP entrepreneurs used their positions and connections 
developed through these positions to acquire information from EFA.  
However, institutional positions are not the only resource entrepreneurs 
employ. For example, UDB members do not hold any staff or bureau positions 
in EFA. However, Breton actors remain engaged in EFA at a high level.  They 
mobilize linguistic and ideological skills in order to do so. For example, one 
prominent UDB member employs their Welsh language skills. The UDB also 
builds on their ideological basis to the left of EFA to build up a sub-group of 
left-wing EFA members. 
Scholars have previously noted skills are required to perform policy 
entrepreneur roles including social acuity, team building, leadership by 
example, creativity, and flexibility (Mintrom and Norman, 2009; Mintrom and 
Luetjens, 2017). Other scholars have considered the psychological strategies 
used by entrepreneurs (King and Roberts, 1992; Timmermans et al., 2014).  
The importance of skill and position in entrepreneurship shows that 
entrepreneurship is a relative characteristic. This relational perspective could 
allow me to further integrate the concept of TNP entrepreneurship with network 
methods. After all, entrepreneurs’ skills are largely about their ability to relate 
to others. Networks measure and describe relational ties. By providing a picture 
of these ties, “an actor’s network provides a framework within which the actor 
can project power, control information flows and attempt to influence political 
outcomes or other actors” (Christopoulos, 2006: 758). Social network analysis 
(SNA) methods have been used to link network structure and the policy-
changing ability and resources of individuals (Ingold and Christopoulos, 2015). 
In future studies, it would be useful to move beyond the binary conception of 
entrepreneurship by considering the importance of institutional positions, 
entrepreneurial skills, and how the relationship between the two can be 
evaluated, perhaps using SNA. 
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(5) Issue contestation 
I posited that issue contestation may lead parties to seek solutions from 
transnational partners. However, contestation might also mean that parties 
struggle to develop collective interpretations of acquired information. In the 
case studies, I found that issue contestation affects the interpretation and 
negotiation process, as discussed in the section 8.1. As noted in that section, 
the contextual factor of issue contestation interacts considerably with other 
contextual factors, such as party centralization.  
I also found that issue contestation plays a part in the acquisition stage of 
learning. Parties are more likely to seek transnational information as part of a 
process of agreed policy development. For example, the UDB recently sought 
to restate its core policies. Part of this process was clearly articulating its 
stances and arguments for autonomism. The party’s result of this policy project 
(the book S’emanciper) drew on many transnational examples. It recommitted 
the UDB to its proposal of Welsh and Scottish-type autonomous bodies.  
FNP respondents emphasized the need to expand their policy platform, to 
‘show their colours.’ Policy development centred particularly on the agreed 
area of environmental policies. This was a common area of interest for party 
members. As such, the party expanded its policies on environmental 
sustainability, in particular by reaching out to EFA partners and developing 
comparative research. However, the party had also sought to agree on a policy 
on the salient issue of refugee and asylum seeker policy, but they failed to do 
so. Given its contentious nature, they did not seek to expand their policies in 
this area and did not engage in transnational learning on this issue. 
In cases where policy platforms are more developed, parties looked 
transnationally to develop new policy arguments or detail. For example, in the 
SNP and ERC, policy platforms were much more developed. As such, 
instances of learning in these parties elaborated on and justified existing policy 
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commitments. This specification of policy proposals and shallower use of 
transnational examples can be seen in ERC and the SNP’s emulation of Nordic 
models to detail social welfare policies.  
Issue contestation thus plays a part at two different levels of learning. Parties 
acquire information transnationally to inform policy development on agreed 
policy areas. Few instances of information acquisition centered on contested 
issues; this suggests that internal issue contestation hinders transnational 
information-seeking. Furthermore, as detailed in section 8.1, contestation 
affects the move from individual to collective interpretation and thus may also 
halt learning at this point in the process.  
(6) Extent of Learning  
One prominent finding emerges from the cases which was not anticipated in 
the proposed party learning framework. There cases showed that there is a 
wide variety in the depths or extent of learning outcomes. Learning outcomes 
discovered in this thesis range from the adoption of technical proposals around 
sustainable energy to changes in electoral campaigns to more diffuse ideas 
such as the Nordic welfare state. Some changes were easily negotiated 
through parties, whereas others were more vehemently contested. Existing 
literature on policy learning has addressed different depths of learning. It may 
be useful to consider this dimension of party learning in more focused 
applications. 
The depth of learning is often considered along a continuum from ‘thin’ to ‘thick’ 
learning, or shallow to deep learning (Checkel, 1998). Thin learning is 
strategically motivated or ‘symbolic’ with the object of learning ‘limited to coping 
strategies’ or problem solving (Radaelli and Schmidt, 2004: 371; Dunlop, 2014: 
219). It occurs when the actor “learns to cope with a problem without changing 
preferences” (Radaelli, 2008: 244). At its shallowest form, learning resembles 
imitation, a ‘non-creative’ process in which actors wholly adopt another actor’s 
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policy as a ‘black box’ (Jacoby, 2001: 174). This has also been called 
instrumental learning (May 1992) or ‘technical-strategic’ learning (Howlett, 
2012). It often reflects compliance to an external body, not internalization of 
new ideas (Börzel, 2010: 10). Thin learning may also be very rational and 
epistemic. Epistemic learning is associated with a search for those who are 
experts in a specialist subject (Dunlop, 2009; Dunlop, 2017: 24).  
Deeper learning occurs when individuals or institutions alter their underlying 
‘logic of behaviour’ (Radaelli and Schmidt, 2004: 189). This has also been 
called ‘political-experiential’ learning (Howlett, 2012) and reflexive learning 
(Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013: 603). Deep learning affects policy ends (i.e. 
underlying goals and objectives) rather than policy means (Howlett and 
Cashore, 2009: 35-36). In order to redefine underlying logics of behaviour, 
deep learning requires deliberation and discourse, “a process of 
communication, persuasion and invention” (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013: 603, 
607-608). Depth of learning is thus related to the type and length of the learning 
process. Educational psychologists have shown that there is a positive 
relationship between time (learning phases) and the shift from surface to more 
meaningful learning (Shuell, 1990).  
The depth of learning is also linked to the object of learning. Shallow learning, 
given its emphasis on rote adoption, might alter a singular policy or strategy to 
serve an existing goal. In shallow learning, the object is often more 
technocratic. In deep learning, lessons are more abstract, ‘substantive, value-
based, experiential’ (Dunlop, 2015: 263).  
Considering the extent of learning will add an extra layer on to the party learning 
framework. It may also help clarify some ambiguities. One of the issues with 
studies of learning is that there is a “tendency to conflate simpler forms of 
learning-by-observing (such as mimicry) with more complex forms (such as 
concept formation)” (Dolowitz, 2009: 318). Conceptualizing and measuring the 
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‘depth’ of learning in relation to political parties would allow for a clearer 
distinction between shallower, technocratic forms of party learning and deeper, 
negotiated forms.  
8.3 Beyond and at the Boundaries of Learning in a TNP  
This thesis proposed that applying a party learning approach helps to explain 
one possible consequence of transnational party networking. However, there 
are varied outcomes of party networking within EFA. For example, scholars 
have previously considered the role of the TNP in the European Parliament 
and their contribution to European integration. This thesis has focused on the 
effects of the TNP on the domestic member party, rather than on European 
institutions.  
In addition to learning, I found evidence of further consequences of TNP 
networking for member parties. These other consequences help to delineate 
the boundaries of the party learning concept and may provide useful avenues 
for further research into TNPs. First, membership in EFA provides benefits to 
members, namely: legitimacy, policy internationalization, solidarity, and 
capacity building. Second, the process of information exchange described in 
this thesis also stimulates two processes that are related to, but distinct from, 
learning: collaboration and emulation.  
(1) Legitimacy 
For many smaller parties, one benefit of being in EFA is legitimacy. Many of 
EFA’s member parties are marginal in their domestic political systems. For 
these smaller parties, “European cooperation often allows for party influence 
beyond the sum of its parts and can also help parties achieve political 
legitimacy” (Lightfoot, 2006: 305).  
One staff member of EFA explained that some new EFA member parties were 
drawn to the transnational party even before they became political parties. 
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They “came to talk us when they were a devolution movement…they said, 
maybe we should turn our movement into a party and with the European 
elections are upcoming, maybe we should participate in the European 
elections” (Interview 10). European politics provides a space for parties to 
legitimize themselves as electoral actors. A member of the Frisian National 
Party explained that EFA helps combat opposition claims that “you are so 
small, you can’t do that” (Interview 5). One UDB respondent explained: “It’s a 
way to show, even if we don’t have elected members, that we participate in 
European affairs and remain informed” (Interview 20). 
Attendance at EFA partners’ events can also provide legitimacy. For example, 
a large delegation from the Frisian National Party attended the 2014 Scottish 
referendum. One provincial councillor explained: “It’s important for the FNP’s 
image because then we don’t get viewed as a party that’s only active in 
Friesland. We are, in fact, very internationally active” (Interview 4). After the 
referendum, the FNP noted that “publicity about the trip reached nearly all 
Frisian and Dutch media” including national and regional radio stations and a 
3-day ‘walkalong’ by the national newspaper de Volkskrant.  
However, for more electorally successful member parties, there are fears that 
EFA may serve as a delegitimizing space. One member of ERC noted that they 
would prefer to join a TNP with mainstream, “normalised parties” (Interview 30).  
An SNP respondent noted that they took care to vet other European parties 
before arranging meetings. They explained that these parties sought legitimacy 
from the SNP: “A lot of parties that may be more nationalist in the bad way will 
say, we’ll go to Scotland…you get these random emails and you think, you’re 
not our type of nationalist” (Interview 49). Legitimacy is for some a benefit of 
EFA networking and for others a disincentive, depending on the position of the 
member party.  
(2) Policy Internationalization 
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Policy internationalization is a strategy that political parties employ to project 
domestic policy onto the international level and emphasize the international 
dimension at the domestic level. The projection of autonomist politics onto the 
international stage is a particularly important issue for EFA members. After all, 
there is a logical link between the fight for independence and gaining 
international recognition for that independence. Nationalist politicians must 
focus on “obtain[ing] international visibility, recognition and support regarding 
the legitimacy of its objectives” (Guibernau, 2013: 372).  
EFA member parties use the TNP to internationalize their autonomist cause 
and claims against the state. For example, the 2017 Catalan referendum is one 
of the most recent and prominent cases of policy internationalization in EFA. 
During my 2016 and 2017 fieldwork in Catalonia, it was clear that external 
legitimacy of the referendum was crucially important to Catalan 
independentists. They sought international observers and subsequently 110 
EFA observers attended in October 2017. Furthermore, in September 2018, a 
group of 17 MEPs visited the Catalan political prisoners as did 3 SNP MPs. 
These visits were facilitated by prominent members of EFA. EFA MEPs also 
coordinated an action in the European Parliament in which MEPs wore yellow 
shirts to protest inaction by the EU and the behaviour of the Spanish 
Government.  
One Catalan MEP explained that EFA “brings us specific benefits because EFA 
gets money from the European Commission and that allows us to co-fund for 
example different activities here in Catalonia or elsewhere” (Interview 25). The 
European Free Alliance provides scope for the internationalization of 
regionalists’ agendas by using European funding, pooled resources, and 
communication platforms to draw attention to parties’ political struggles. In the 
official wrap-up of the 2018 General Assembly, EFA put out a press release in 
which more than half of the words were specifically aimed at raising the Catalan 
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issue. They called for “all European democratic forces to mobilise for the 
liberation of all Catalan political prisoners” (EFA, April 2018).  
EFA and EFA member parties’ attempts to seek recognition through the 
European Union can be seen as stretching back to the days of the ‘Europe of 
the Regions’ idea. For example, Keating uses the example of the Catalan 
Government, which during the 1992 Olympics “placed advertisements in 
English speaking newspapers asking rhetorically 'Where is Barcelona?' The 
text corrected readers' assumption that it was merely in Spain, by explaining 
that it was in a distinct nation called Catalonia” (1999: 5). While the dream of a 
refigured ‘Europe of the Regions’ has dissipated, EFA’s member parties 
continue to seek international attention and internationalize their autonomist 
policies, in some cases through the TNP.  
(3) Solidarity  
While the party learning process has sought to trace the information exchange 
between parties, there is a more intangible object of exchange as well: 
solidarity. Relationships with other EFA member parties provide emotional 
support and solidarity. This is particularly important for EFA’s smaller member 
parties, who receive less support and have fewer resources locally. As one 
member of the UDB said:  
“When you go to an [EFA] meeting, when you meet people, it is a big 
inspiration, because for them it’s normal to be in favour of autonomy. In 
France, it’s really hard. It’s a very marginal idea” (Interview 18).  
Another UDB member explained, “I think that it [EFA] gives me a sense of 
weight” (Interview 19). Solidarity underpins the efforts that parties make for one 
another, which often take significant amounts of time and resources for parties. 
When discussing the FNP’s visit to the Scottish referendum, one participant 
explained, “It’s a sort of solidarity, that exists in all of EFA, that you help each 
other. You recognise each other’s positions…you know that if you help each 
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other then other parties also progress. So, it’s helping others but also getting 
inspired” (Interview 4).  
Earlier in this thesis, I told the story of Flemish MEP Maurits Coppetiers who 
said in a speech to Corsican autonomists: “I will be your MEP.” Multiple 
respondents referred to this moment as a fundamental part of EFA’s ethos. 
One explained: “That has become an incredible drive because it's so cooked 
into our DNA” (Interview 10). Solidarity is politically useful, explained one staff 
member of EFA. The consolidation of regionalists’ voices and concerns are 
seen as essential to EFA members, because “between 80 and 100 million 
citizens in Europe who are not really represented in the European project, 
whose voice is unheard” (Interview 11). EFA’s ‘DNA’ of solidarity encourages 
interactions between member parties. It provides a positive, if difficult to 
measure, outcome for regionalist and nationalist movements involved in 
transnational networking. 
(4) Party Capacity Building  
At a transnational level, the European Free Alliance provides support for parties 
to build their capacity by providing staffing and organisational support. One way 
to build regionalist parties’ capacity is by encouraging member parties’ 
members to work in EFAy, the EP Group, or secretariat. The secretariat also 
employs an intern for 3-6 months from an EFA member party; they seek to 
employ individuals from as many different parties as possible. These 
opportunities lead to ‘career building’ for individuals and conversely, ensure 
that EFA staff have close links to active individuals in member parties as those 
parties evolve (Interview 10). Former staff of EFA often remain in EU circles, 
working on regional issues and empowerment.  
Capacity building may also come in the form of organisational and 
communications support for smaller parties. A member of the EFA bureau 
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explained that EFA’s support can be particularly helpful for its smaller member 
parties. He explained:  
“EFA as a party tries to be useful for every of the forty-something 
members, regardless if they are small or they are bigger. For small 
parties, for example there was recently a delegation of the EFA bureau 
in Greece where we have a party representing the Turkish minority in 
Greece…we also help them in organising events, in organising 
conferences” (Interview 25). 
Party capacity building may also help parties support their stances on 
European Union issues. For example, by connecting small parties to Brussels, 
EFA staff felt: “We do have an effect on our parties to see the larger European 
picture, although Europe has been in crisis since 1999” (Interview 10). Lynch 
and DeWinter noted EFA’s role in supporting party capacity building. They 
wrote in 2008:  
“One of the defining characteristics of the EFA since its inception has 
been its involvement in party-building and alliance construction. The 
EFA staff in Brussels, and the Volksunie MEPs in particular, were active 
in assisting small minority nationalist parties to develop their policies, 
organizations and electoral capacities” (Lynch and DeWinter, 2008: 
590).  
For smaller member parties, EFA partners provide advice and inspiration. One 
FNP staff member explained that EFA’s evolving professionalism in its 
branding and communications inspired further professionalization for him in 
Friesland (Interview Six). During my observations, it was clear that the central 
organisational bodies of EFA focused time on smaller parties and their 
members. EFA’s secretariat staff emphasized the importance of vetting in EFA, 
as a way of encouraging parties to meet fundamental standards for 
professionalism.  
(5) Emulation  
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As noted in Chapter Six, emulation is a different phenomenon from the learning 
proposed at the beginning of this thesis. Emulation is more the about “a search 
for credibility, status or simple conformity with international trends” (Meseguer, 
2005: 73). I proposed that a party learning process would be triggered by 
interaction and rooted in information exchange. I adopted the term learning in 
order to emphasize the agential nature of information exchange. Emulation 
does not meet these criteria. It tends to be disembodied, with a focus on 
symbolic use of information rather than complex information processing.  
Emulation reflects a process of imitation. Imitation “involves copying the actions 
of another” as if in a black box rather than adapting the policies to a local 
context (Shipan and Volden, 2008: 842). As such, imitation uses bounded 
rationality because “mimicry of policy or the imposition of policy lessons 
provides less scope for learning or the development of consensual knowledge” 
(Stone, 2000: 551). Bounded learning and emulation are thus overlapping 
processes that share an interest in the symbolic rather than informative value 
of transnational information (Meseguer and Gilardi, 2009: 531-532). I would 
argue that emulation is a type of learning that can coincide with more complex 
types of learning.  
In the cases of the SNP and ERC’s use of the Nordic model, in particular, it is 
possible to see the adoption of Nordic/Scandinavian examples as conformity 
to international standards. Nordic welfare policies are widely believed by 
politicians on the left to be ‘A Good Thing’ (Newby, 2009: 323).). The source 
and motivation for policy learning is not a policy problem, but rather a 
reputational motivation that seeks to attach the party to that perceived ‘good 
thing’ and perceived ‘good’ government. As the SNP case showed, emulative 
instances can also be tied to deeper cases of learning. For example, the SNP’s 
communication with Norway on renewable energy shows a search and 
exchange of information, but other cases and uses of the Norwegian example 
show a shallower reference to the ‘good’ Nordic model. Emulation is clearly 
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related to processes of learning, but it should be highlighted as a distinct 
phenomenon.  
(6) Collaboration  
In some cases, parties took a collaborative approach to EFA. For example, the 
FNP organised and funded their sustainable energy project alongside EFA and 
sought to bring other EFA parties on board. Members of the UDB worked with 
ideologically aligned parties. They used these ideological similarities to drive 
collaborative action.  For example, alongside other left wing French EFA 
members they called for the suspension of a number of right wing Italian EFA 
member parties. These parties thus take a more activist approach to the EFA 
network. That activist, collaborative approach occurs when parties seek to work 
alongside and together with other parties.  
One UDB member, for example, called for more collaborative action in the form 
of joint communications. The respondent explained:  
“My objective is to do that, to make European movements a real 
European movement--not only two parties who speak to each other but 
two parties who speak together. It’s not the same thing. I think it would 
be a really important European way to think” (Interview 21). 
Such collaborative communication does occasionally occur, sometimes 
facilitated through EFA. For example, the UDB put out a joint press release 
with Plaid Cymru MEP Leanne Wood on minority language rights (UDB PR, 
12/05/17). Collaboration differs from learning because it requires working 
together towards a shared goal. Learning, on the other hand, is a more ‘give’ 
and ‘take’ relationship between parties.  
The process of collaboration may engender learning, because it requires 
significant amounts of information exchange. However, it is not synonymous 
with or directly causal to party political learning. Collaboration is: “a process in 
which autonomous or semi-autonomous actors interact through formal and 
informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their 
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relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them 
together” (Thomson et al, 2009: 25).  
In some cases, the European Free Alliance resembles a collaborative 
organisation. EFA is increasingly seeking to develop joint policies, for example 
on issues like environmental sustainability. As one EFA staff member argued, 
“We're not just a one issue political party. Peace has been always a key 
element--in all its dimensions. And, a social agenda and an environmental 
agenda have always been key and of course linguistic diversity and cultural 
diversity” (Interview 10). 
However, in this thesis, studying the relationships between individual EFA 
member parties, I have also seen ways that collaboration is difficult. The FNP, 
for example, reported that they found it difficult to get other parties to fund the 
sustainable energy project. Collaboration thus may be a goal of some EFA 
parties, but it is not clear how this becomes funded or formalized. Rather than 
a collaborative effort, the sustainable energy project was driven by the FNP 
and funded by Frisian means. As such, it ultimately became a ‘best-practice 
sharing’ activity rather than a collaborative research project.  
In Chapter One, I reviewed existing typologies of transnational political parties. 
These analyses tended to typologize TNPs as progressing along a spectrum 
of ‘integration’ from the most inter-governmental to the most supranational. 
Hanley summarized these studies and noted that, “parties can go from a stage 
of minimal contact to various degrees of active co-operation (roughly where 
most TNP are today)” (2008: 20). Collaboration seems to move one step 
beyond active co-operation and indicate co-creation of policy and strategy 
platforms. In further studies, it may be useful to consider collaborative projects 
in EFA and the extent to which this can be seen as an effort to ‘progress’ or 




























Chapter Nine: Conclusion  
This research began from personal experience and scholarly curiosity. My 
observations of transnational cooperation during the Scottish independence 
referendum spurred my interest in transnational interactions between 
nationalist and regionalist political parties. Academically, this thesis builds on 
my previous research into nationalist and regionalists’ pro-Europeanism and 
the relationship between the SNP and Plaid Cymru. It closely relates to the 
significant scholarship conducted at the University of Edinburgh, and in the UK 
more widely, on the ‘Europe of the Regions’ idea (and its end). These lines of 
inquiry led me to the limited literature on transnational political parties and the 
more developed work on political and organisational learning. Ultimately, I 
asked: do interactions between regionalist and nationalist parties in the 
European Free Alliance generate member party learning? If so, how and why? 
If not, why not? 
In the four cases studied in this thesis, I found multiple instances of learning 
between EFA member parties. Parties learned from the EFA members they 
perceived as more successful. Learning occurred most often on electoral or 
autonomist strategies. For more powerful nationalist parties, learning tended to 
come not from other EFA parties, but from other governments. In most cases, 
transnational learning occurred alongside other factors driving party change.  
The cases allowed me to test a theoretical framework for studying party 
learning in the transnational political party network. The comparison between 
the cases allowed me to explore variation in party’s experiences of learning 
and EFA. The contextual factors of electoral success, institutional access, and 
issue contestation particularly affected what was learned and from where 
parties sought lessons. Further similarities and differences in party learning 
processes were reviewed in Chapter Eight.   
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In this chapter, I briefly review the findings of this thesis. I then touch on the 
limitations of this research, both methodologically and theoretically. I also 
propose three routes for further research: a number of useful further empirical 
applications, a closer look into para-diplomatic learning, and re-incorporating 
the transnational level into the party learning framework. Finally, I conclude this 
thesis by re-contextualizing its findings.  
9.1 Summary of Findings 
Chapter Eight reflected in detail on how the empirical chapters reflected on the 
party learning framework, its attendant contextual factors, and other related 
processes that occur within transnational political parties (such as 
collaboration, capacity building, and the search for legitimacy). To conclude 
and draw together these findings, in this section, I will briefly highlight the key 
findings of the thesis.  
Empirically, I found some cases of learning in the political parties studied. 
Cases of learning are predominantly centered on strategic behaviours. The 
FNP and UDB sought to implement electoral strategies that they had observed 
in other parties (especially the SNP): running in national elections and 
canvassing, respectively. Other lessons included the use of a ‘feasibility’ 
framing for autonomy (the UDB), the application of a ‘Nordic Model’ on social 
welfare and social democratic framing (the SNP, ERC), and more technocratic 
information about sustainable energy (the FNP). It is clear that, in the four 
cases studied, party learning affects a shallower, strategic or technical level of 
party decision making. 
I also found that party learning is hindered under two main conditions: (1) when 
parties see no successful and feasible example and (2) when parties are 
preoccupied with internal matters. The first of these conditions holds true for 
the SNP and the UDB. For the SNP, no sub-state nationalist parties were 
perceived as sufficiently successful to learn from. Even the Parti Quebecois 
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was seen as having made significant policy mistakes, which engendered some 
‘negative learning.’ For the UDB, on the other hand, many successful examples 
were identified by party elites. These were encompassed in some points of 
learning such as the promotion of autonomist policies using the Scottish 
Parliament and Welsh Assembly as exemplary. However, the UDB was 
hindered in learning further policies from abroad due to their ‘feeling of falling 
behind’ which made it difficult for party members to see the feasibility of these 
policies for Brittany.  
Parties’ also struggled to initiate or make collective learning processes when 
internal politics were more salient. This was particularly noticeable in ERC, 
which during the time of data collection (2016 and 2017) was preparing for the 
Catalan independence referendum. These preparations and ERC’s coalition 
with their counterpart PDeCAT meant that a united approach to independence 
took precedence over the search for and application of new policies or 
strategies. The pressures of internal politics were also relevant in the FNP. FNP 
elites are engaged in a conversation about the nature and purpose of the party. 
Internal disagreements halted implementation of learning on national elections.   
Finally, the grounded and contextualized nature of my inquiry allowed me to 
develop an understanding of the other consequences of transnational 
networking in the four parties studied. Parties with governing responsibility 
tended to use these institutions to seek and adapt information from abroad, for 
example. Smaller, non-governing parties saw transnational networks as 
potential for other types of activities (particularly symbolic) that might help to 
increase their legitimacy, exposure, and capacity at the local level.  
These empirical discoveries allowed me to consider how useful my theoretical 
framework is for understanding transnational party networking. I found that the 
three stages of party learning were helpful tools in identifying the movement of 
information between sub-state nationalist and regionalist political parties. 
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However, the framework requires more elaboration on the concept of learning 
‘implementation,’ which was difficult to operationalize. Furthermore, it would be 
useful to dig more deeply into patterns of information interpretation. The 
negotiation around differing interpretations of information that occur when 
shifting learning from the individual to the collective level were a crucial part of 
the party learning process.  
Three contextual factors emerged as very relevant in shaping party learning 
processes: electoral success, governing responsibility, and issue contestation. 
These contextual factors conditioned which parties were seen as exemplary, 
the resources that parties’ had to network internationally, and the policy areas 
that were the center of information seeking abroad. Key individual 
entrepreneurs and the level of party decision making centralization proved 
relevant to the party learning process. However, these factors require more 
precise definition and more focused empirical applications in order to better 
determine the way that they impact learning.  
Overall, these modest findings of learning highlight a perspective on 
transnational political parties which is often overlooked. In the EU literature, 
TNPs are seen as bodies that contribute to and are part of a European 
integration process. In literature by scholars of political parties, TNPs are often 
derided as less than full political parties. This thesis has moved beyond 
discussions of TNP’s reality or integration to consider its effect on its 
constituent political parties. Taking the TNP, specifically the European Free 
Alliance, as a networked body of domestic political parties, I have traced how 
information about political parties’ policies and strategies influences other 
parties’ decision making. As emphasized in previous chapters, these 
influences are complementary to other drivers of party behaviour. However, the 
study of this phenomenon, which I have termed ‘political party learning’ 
elucidates a significant effect of the TNP and an interesting transnational 
dynamic affecting domestic political parties. In the next sections, I consider how 
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this specific study of this phenomenon is limited and how further research might 
improve upon our understanding of it.  
9.2 Limitations of Research 
Like any scholarly work, this research required compromises in terms of the 
research design. By the nature of the exercise, I focused on certain dynamics 
at the expense of others. Methodologically, the research is limited by inherent 
concerns about interview data (addressed in Chapter Two), the limitations of 
documentary data, and the problem of overdetermination. Theoretically, like 
most studies of learning, the party learning framework suffers from a lack of 
parsimony. Furthermore, I consider the missing component of time in the party 
learning framework.  
(1) Methodological  
Chapter Two proposed three sources of data: elite interviews, ethnographic 
observations, and party documents. The emphasis throughout the thesis has 
been on interviews which provide elites’ accounts of their experiences of 
transnational relationships and party decision making. These accounts and my 
interview strategy sought to trace information from its source to its effect on 
domestic parties. However, as noted in Chapter Two, there are two issues with 
interview data: (1) the reliability of the respondent and (2) the ability to ascertain 
‘truth’ from interviews.  
I noted that a solution to the ‘dishonest respondent’ issue would be to interview 
a wide range and appropriate number of respondents. Inevitably, in the case 
studies, there are relevant elites who are not interviewed. This is a result of not 
only the time constraints of a PhD but those of politicians themselves, 
especially those who hold governing positions.  
There is also a limitation in terms of the interview sample size. I sought to 
achieve saturation, defined as “the point at which there are fewer surprises and 
there are no more emergent patterns in the data” (O’Reilly and Parker, 2012: 
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192). However, the concept of saturation is necessarily vague. I felt that 
saturation was reached in each case, because stable patterns of discussion 
emerged. However, given the complexity of the concepts discussed 
(relationships to EFA, to the EU, other European states, and internal decision 
making), it is difficult to know when saturation is truly reached.  
Interviews were also affected by two major political developments: Brexit and 
the 2017 Catalan referendum. These events not only constrained politician’s 
time, but also directed the attention of interviews. This was particularly the case 
for Catalan respondents; interviews were conducted in the two summers 
leading up to the 2017 vote. However, the Catalan referendum also allowed 
me to explore how the goal of independence can dominate transnational 
relationships. I found that the uniting event of the Catalan independence 
referendum focused Catalan independentist parties’ attention on achieving 
international recognition. 
Another issue with data in this thesis is the utility, or more accurately the lack 
thereof, of documentary information. Documents were used to triangulate 
information found through interviews and observations. However, in most 
cases, documentary data did not provide enough detail to trace the movement 
of information. Party documents do not always indicate the source of 
inspiration.  
In cases where they do, it is not possible to make a claim of learning from these 
references. References to transnational examples in documents could be post-
hoc or signs of emulation or diffusion rather than agential learning. This is a 
well-established problem in learning theories. As Radaelli and Dunlop (2013: 
923) emphasize: “Measurement is also difficult in this field: how do we know 
that what we observe is learning and not something else?” In order to identify 
that learning has caused change, it is not sufficient to simply identify where 
party policy/strategy became similar to policy/strategy of other parties. It is 
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necessary to understand the reasoning and informational process 
underpinning parties’ choices.  
Such reasoning is often not documented, particularly in political parties. Parties 
do not publicly document their rationale behind strategic decisions, which 
proved to be a common area of learning between EFA members. Given these 
issues, this thesis limits its use of documentary data. To make better use of 
documents in further studies of party learning, a researcher would need to 
follow a more rigid process-tracing method within a more contained, less 
explorative case study.  
Finally, in this thesis, the research design faced the common issue of having 
too many variables (five contextual factors) and too few cases. This issue 
means that it is difficult to discern the effect of each variable. Due to the 
numerous dimensions of variation between cases, differences in party learning 
processes can be explained by numerous factors. This problem of 
“overdetermination” is common in comparative research (Lijphart, 1971; Faure, 
1979).  
As I noted in Chapter Eight, there were significant patterns of interaction 
between the contextual factors (party centralization and issue contestation, 
electoral success and governing responsibility) which made it impossible to 
conclude the extent to which contextual factors individually affect the learning 
outcomes. The different contextual factors introduced in this thesis should be 
isolated in further comparative studies and the interactions between contextual 
factors could be explored by application to further cases.   
(2) Theoretical  
Theoretically, by attempting to understand and partially explain party strategy 
and policy decisions, the study of learning falls into the trap of many policy 
approaches. Policy theories resists the traditional tests of a theory, i.e. “to 
design crucial tests that can determine if theory A fits the data better than theory 
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B” (Meier, 2009: 6). Policy theories are not easily pitted against one another in 
this way. They often address different stages of the policy process, different 
dimensions of policy (discourse, framing, adoption, implementation, success), 
and thus, multiple theoretical approaches may help explain the same choice.  
This is further complicated in a multi-level framework such as this one which 
considers the interconnections between supranational and sub-state actors. 
The parsimony of the theory is challenged only further by the inter-disciplinary 
nature of the learning approach I have adopted. I drew on sociological, 
psychological, policy, and political science approaches to the concept of 
learning. The party learning framework thus lacks the simplicity one would 
ideally achieve when developing or applying theory.  
This study has also neglected the time dimension of learning. Theoretically, 
learning, by virtue of being a process, requires a change over time. This thesis 
has considered the contemporary relationships between political parties in 
Europe. Rather than delineating a specific time period, I allowed interview 
respondents to reveal the policy areas and time periods that were relevant to 
the study. As such, time periods covered in the identified instances of learning 
varied. For example, FNP learning from the SNP was accelerated by their 
interest in and observation of the 2014 independence referendum. Alternately, 
the relationship between Quebec and Scotland has been a more sustained 
place for information exchange, with the Scots seeking information on 
Quebec’s referendum and vice versa over the span of 20 years. 
Scholars have argued that the time dimension of learning has often been 
“underestimated” and that this underestimation may lead to overstated claims 
of non-learning or arrested learning (Zito and Schout, 2009: 1119). The 
underpinning claim is that learning can take a significant amount of time and 
that learning studies should recognize this. However, tracing cases over 
extended periods of time may make it even more difficult to determine causality 
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and to argue that learning truly happened (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012: 582). 
Nonetheless, incorporating the time dimension would allow for exploration of 
new dimensions of party learning, answering questions such as “‘when’, ‘for 
how long’ or ‘in what sequence’” the party learning process occurs (Dussauge-
Laguna, 2012: 568).  
9.3 Avenues for Further Research 
The findings identified in this thesis have allowed me to refine my 
understanding of party learning. They also allow me to identify further areas of 
research. The framework would particularly be strengthened by application to 
further case studies, exploration of the relationship between parties and para-
diplomacy, and reintroduction of the transnational level.  
(1) Further Case Studies 
This study was a preliminary use of the party learning framework. As indicated 
in Chapter Eight, the theoretical framework could be expanded and refined. As 
such, I propose three further empirical tests of the framework: an application to 
radical right parties, to intra-state regionalist relationships, and a single case 
study. 
Studies of transnational parties have previously considered the relationships 
between radical right parties in Europe. These parties provide a promising case 
study for future application of the party learning framework. They are often 
excluded from domestic government, and likely to seek transnational 
relationships through more informal means, similar to small regionalist parties. 
Rydgren (2004, 2005) has studied information exchange between radical right 
wing parties in Europe. He argued that the cross national diffusion of a ‘master 
frame’ can partly explain the emergence of radical right parties.  
Interestingly, radical right parties are less likely to coalesce in the European 
Parliament due to the strategic incentive to be distant from other ‘pariah’ parties 
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(Ennser, 2012: 167-168). Given their struggles with creating a radical right 
TNP, the relationships between radical right parties might thus allow for an 
interesting exploration of the role of the transnational political party in 
information exchange.  
As I touched on in the case studies, EFA parties also create and take part in 
intra-state regionalist organisations or coalitions. In France, parties come 
together in Regions et Peuples Solidaires. In the Netherlands, parties coalesce 
legislatively in the Onafhankelijke Senaatsfractie. In Spain, parties regularly 
work together in electoral coalitions for the European Parliament.  
This thesis specifically selected cases that were active in different states. 
However, parties regularly reported close relationships with other regionalists 
in their own state (for example, Plaid Cymru and the SNP; ERC and the Basque 
Eusko Alkartasuna; the UDB and Corsican parties). Intra-state party coalitions 
and organisations suit the pre-conditions of the party learning framework 
because they engender significant interactions between non-electorally 
competing political parties. By controlling for country-specific factors, it may be 
easier to explore the effect of contextual factors on party learning. 
Finally, I would argue that a useful further empirical application of the party 
learning framework would be studying a single case study over a longer period 
of time. Comparison within a single party could explore the time dimension, the 
different roles of individuals, and the likelihood of learning in different policy 
areas. It would allow the researcher to focus on within-party change and 
variation and. Single case studies have also been tied to more in-depth process 
tracing, which could allow the researcher to explore the usefulness of 
documents in identifying party learning (Bennett and Elman, 2008). 
(2) Disentangling Party Relationships and Para-Diplomacy  
In Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, I explored and emphasized the way that 
more powerful EFA member parties use their roles in government and their 
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para-diplomatic institutions to seek transnational information. This leads to 
different patterns of party learning, because information flows from other 
governments and governmental research to the political party. This information 
affects the party level, for example, through the experiences of prominent party 
advisers and politicians. The empirical overlap between government and party 
learning processes reflects the disciplinary overlap between scholars of 
administrative policy learning and those of political learning.  
Further research should seek to explore these boundaries and overlaps in 
learning. It is important to further disentangle the relationship between political 
party and government learning. This may be done by considering the effect of 
transnational learning in a single region. Within this single case, it would be 
more feasible to study the role of transnational information in governmental 
policy making, regionalist party policy/strategy making, and the connections 
between the two.    
(3) Reincorporating the Transnational Level 
In this thesis, I have sought to understand whether the domestic political party 
displays learning, in a transnational party context. This approach treats the 
European Free Alliance as a structure or venue within which party learning 
happens. As an organisation, EFA is seen as a ‘library and communication 
system’ rather than a body with norms, cultures, and a context of its own 
(Spender, 1996: 68). Focusing on the experience of the domestic political party 
was necessary to delineate the scope of this thesis.  
However, the transnational political party as an organization itself, “can be seen 
as more than the sum of their individual or collective parts…it is important to 
consider what is involved in organizational learning at an organizational level 
of analysis” (Vince, 2001: 1330). To bring this organisational level back into the 
research, it is important to return to the initial theoretical framework. In 
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particular, at the transnational inter-organizational level there is another step of 
information processing: institutionalization.  
Institutionalization is one of possible process that can be generated from the 
introduction of new knowledge into the TNP. When knowledge is 
institutionalized, it engenders ‘standard operating procedures.’ These 
procedures “give stability to shared causal belief, they set up structures of 
meaning, they create networks of actors, they constrain the perception of 
interests” (Radaelli, 1995: 178).  
Shared norms or ways of thinking and structures within the EFA network 
emerged in this thesis. For example, EFA fosters a shared norm linking 
sustainable energy projects and regionalism/nationalism which then facilitate 
cooperation on this issue. EFA staff and events also emphasize a shared 
understanding of the meaning of certain concepts, in particular the idea of ‘self-
determination.’ The creation of meaning and procedures in EFA might condition 
parties’ behaviours and engender or constrain further learning. Further 
research may wish to explore the process of institutionalization of lessons and 
norms in EFA.  
Another way to bring the transnational level back into the analysis would be to 
study the European Free Alliance in a wider context. This research has largely 
emphasized the contemporary European Free Alliance. Kaiser (2009, 2010) 
has advocated for an approach to networks in the European Union which 
‘brings history back in.’ The historical approach would allow for a deeper 







Table 9.1 Party Learning in the Transnational Party Network 
Actor  Stage of Learning Output 
Individual Information Acquisition  New piece of 
information retained. 
 Interpretation Integration of 
information into own 
beliefs/context.  
Party  Collective Interpretation  Shared understanding 
of information and its 
meaning in party 
context.  
 Implementation Change of 
behaviour/belief. 
Transnational Party  Institutionalization  Routinization of 
member parties’ 




A historical approach could “act as a crucial corrective for any largely misplaced 
enthusiasm about the discovery of novel forms of politics and policy-making in 
the EU polity” (Kaiser, 2009: 237, emphasis added). That is, it is often easy or 
tempting to claim that networked governance in Europe is a new phenomenon. 
As I have alluded to throughout this thesis, trans-nationalist nationalism is far 
from new, but this could be further and more clearly substantiated.  
9.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter and the last, I reflected on my theoretical and methodological 
approach in light of the cases studied. I will now briefly re-contextualize the 
political party learning approach and my findings in a wider perspective. As I 
addressed in the introduction, studying party learning in EFA draws together 
three strands of research: on regionalist and nationalist parties, on the 
European Union and its transnational dynamics, and on the movement of 
information in an interconnected political world.  
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(1) The Movement of Information 
I found that political parties within a transnational political party structure learn 
from their interactions with one another. In the case of EFA, nationalists and 
regionalists often exchange information through an intentional, agential, and 
small scale process. This party learning can be seen as a part of a wider 
process of transnationalization, which is then tied to wider trends of European 
integration and globalization. Transnationalization was induced by the 
‘constitutionalization’ of the European Union but it goes beyond the EU; it is 
linked to historical, economic, and cultural links between European regions, 
states, and societies (Kaiser and Starie, 2005).  
Increasing interconnection, through information technologies and European 
cooperation, has been tied to the development of learning theories. In fact, a 
‘prompt to think seriously about learning’ was the increasingly similar adoption 
of policies across the world in the 1960s, on issues such as welfare regimes 
(Freeman, 2006: 368). Freeman argued that: “Learning has quickened to the 
extent that living has” (2006: 368).  
As political life has become increasingly interconnected, learning theories have 
been applied to governments, think tanks, business, and supranational 
organisations. Political parties have been neglected in the learning literature, 
despite their institutional and informal relationships across Europe. This thesis 
has shown that parties also take part in the phenomenon of transnationalization 
by highlighting how they learn and share ‘best-practice’ with other European 
parties to develop party strategies and policies.   
(2) Transnational parties and the European Union  
This thesis has also reflected on the nature and effect of transnational political 
parties. Transnational political parties (TNPs) have most often been studied as 
part of the European Parliament or European integration. The scholarly 
emphasis on TNPs in the EP will no doubt be rejuvenated with the 2019 
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European Parliament elections. Within these perspectives, TNPs have been 
judged in regard to their level of integration or the extent to which they resemble 
domestic parties. The TNP is tied to normative judgments and claims about 
how they should be and the extent to which they matter. The discussion has 
sometimes gone on to discuss whether transnational parties are ‘real’ parties 
or not.  
I have sought to move beyond this discussion on TNPs, which over-
emphasizes the symbolic meaning of transnational political parties. Rather, this 
thesis has focused on the specific effect that TNPs have on domestic politics. 
I have shown that EFA, as a transnational political party, developed a complex 
and dense range of connections between its member parties. These 
connections occur in physical spaces (the EP, General Assemblies, meetings 
in regions), virtual spaces (Twitter, email, Facebook), informally and formally, 
multilaterally and bilaterally.  
Although it is hard to pinpoint the TNP’s specific role in each interaction, EFA 
creates an arena for transnational party learning. Learning between member 
parties is one way that TNPs have affected the domestic level. Information from 
TNP partners affects politicians’ calculations as they make decisions, albeit 
alongside a range of other causal factors such as inter-party competition and 
intra-party conflict. 
As such, this thesis plays one part in showing how TNP membership does 
matter.  As Van Hecke argued: “A small impact on a very important process 
could generate major consequences” (2010: 407). The effect of transnational 
political parties on domestic politics has often been understated and neglected, 
but it is clear that for some parties the transnational interactions engendered 
by TNP provide both information and inspiration. 
(3) Regionalist and Nationalist Party Politics 
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Finally, this thesis reflects on the day-to-day transnational relationships 
between Europe’s nationalist and regionalist political parties. An extensive 
body of literature already existed studying the internationalism of regionalists 
and nationalists. This was most compellingly organised around a prospect of 
the “Europe of the Regions” in the 1990s. The Europe of the Regions did not 
materialize and regional participation in the EU’s supranational institutions 
remains limited. However, the apparent failure of the Europe of the Regions 
concept does not mean that the region is no longer relevant to European 
politics. In fact, “there are numerous ways in which the EU remains highly 
important for regions, and in which regional politics plays a significant role in 
shaping the nature and direction of European integration” (Elias, 2008: 487). 
This thesis explored one way that the EU remains influential in regional politics: 
through the transnational relationships engendered by EFA.  
Empirically, the referenda in Scotland and Catalonia in recent years have 
drawn attention to the role and impact of regional politics on European politics. 
The interconnection between European integration and regionalist party 
politics has only been made more visible by the SNP’s European outreach on 
Brexit and Catalan nationalists’ attempts to internationalize the issue of Catalan 
politicians’ imprisonment. 
This thesis has explored regionalist and nationalist political parties at an 
individual level, considering the way that individuals process and negotiate 
information, and at a party level, exploring the way that party decision making 
employs transnational information. It has situated that process of information 
exchange within a broader transnational context of European integration and 
transnational activism. By comparing four EFA member parties to one another, 
a wider political phenomenon of political party learning in the European Free 
Alliance has emerged. The concept of political party learning in a European 
context and the findings of regionalist and nationalist learning provide fruitful 
routes for research going forward. 
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Appendix One: List of Interview Respondents  
Interviews were conducted over the course of this research in Scotland, 
Catalonia, Brittany, Friesland and Brussels. Fieldwork was conducted 
intermittently from May 2016 to November 2018.  
Frisian National Party  
 Wolter Jetten, FNP Jongerein member, interview conducted via phone 
in May 2016. 
 Lyda Veldstra, Leeuwarden City Council member, interview conducted 
in Leeuwarden, Friesland, June 2016. 
 Johannes Kramer, Provincial Executive member, interview conducted in 
Leeuwarden, Friesland in June 2016. 
 Sybren Posthumus, Provincial Councillor, interview conducted in 
Leeuwarden, Friesland in June 2016. 
 Cees Nieboer, Chair of the EFA Commission, interview conducted in 
Sneek, Friesland in October 2016. 
 Yde Dijkstra, Provincial Group staff, interview conducted in 
Leeuwarden, Friesland in October 2016. 
 Wietske Poelman, Provincial Group staff, interview conducted in 
Leeuwarden, Friesland in October 2016. 
 Johannes Elzinga, member EFA Commission, interview conducted in 
Franeker, Friesland in October 2016. 
 Olrik Bouma, member EFA Commission, Vice President of EFA, 
interview conducted in Brussels, Belgium in April 2017. 
Union Démocratique Bretonne 
 Aurélien Boulé, staff, interview conducted in Nantes, Brittany in 
February 2017.  
 Pierre-Emmanuel Marais, Nantes City Councillor, interview conducted 
in Nantes, Brittany in February 2017. 
 Victor Gallou, Bureau Member (Head of International Affairs), interview 
conducted in Lorient, Brittany in February 2017.  
 Jean-Christophe Cordaillat-Dallara, Head of International Affairs for 
UDB Jeunes and Bureau Member, interview conducted in Auray, 
Brittany in February 2017.  
 Loïc Cheval, legislative candidate, interview conducted in Auray, 
Brittany in February 2017. 
 Laurence Dumas, Bureau Member, interview conducted in Auray, 
Brittany in February 2017. 
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 Stuart Lesvier, Spokesperson of UDB Jeunes, interview conducted in 
Rennes, Brittany in February 2017. 
 Trefina Kerrain, Bureau Member (Head of Political Education), interview 
conducted in Rennes, Brittany in February 2017.  
 Nil Caouissin, Spokesperson, interview conducted in Rennes, Brittany 
in February 2017. 
 Gaël Briand, Editor of Le Peuple Breton and Bureau Member, interview 
conducted in Rennes, Brittany in February 2017. 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
 Ferran Civit, Member of the Catalan Parliament, External Affairs 
Committee, ERC National Council, interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia 
in July 2016.  
 Jordi Sole, MEP and former Minister for Europe, EFA President, 
interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia in July 2016.  
 Anna Simó i Castelló, Member of the Catalan Parliament and former 
ERC Parliamentary Spokesperson, interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia 
in May 2017.  
 Adriana Delgado i Herreros, Member of the Catalan Parliament, 
External Affairs Committee, interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia in May 
2017.  
 Pau Morales, Leader of JERC, Mayor (Dalt), interviewed in Barcelona, 
Catalonia in May 2017.  
 Marta Rosique, International Affairs Chair of JERC, interviewed in 
Barcelona, Catalonia in May 2017.  
 Isidre Sala, President of the ERC International Relations Commission, 
Catalan Government Director of Multilateral Affairs, interviewed in 
Barcelona, Catalonia in May 2017.  
 Jordi Vilanova i Karlsson, Spokesperson of the ERC International 
Relations Commission, interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia in May 
2017.  
 David Rodríguez i González, Member of the Catalan Parliament, 




 Xavier Trias, Barcelona City Councillor, former Mayor of Barcelona, 
interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia in July 2016.  
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 Albert Batalla Siscart, Member of the Catalan Parliament, Junts pel Si 
Spokesperson, interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia in July 2016. 
 Lluis Corominas i Díaz, Member of the Catalan Parliament, interviewed 
in Barcelona, Catalonia in May 2017 
 Jordi-Miquel Sendra I Vellvè, Member of the Catalan Parliament, 
interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia in May 2017. 
 Alistair Spearing-Ortiz, Head of European Relations, Joventut 
Nacionalista, interviewed in Barcelona, Catalonia in May 2017.  
Scottish National Party 
 Luke Skipper, former Chief of Staff to SNP Westminster Group, 
interviewed in Edinburgh, Scotland in June 2016. 
 David McDonald, Glasgow City Councillor, founder of SNP Friends of 
Catalonia, interviewed in Glasgow, Scotland in October 2016.  
 Zoe Dingwall, Policy Adviser to SNP MEPs on Brexit and the Economy, 
interviewed in Brussels, Belgium in April 2017. 
 Paul Robertson, former Head of Research in the SNP Westminster 
Group, interviewed in London, England in January 2018. 
 Mairi Gougeon, MSP and former representative on the Committee of the 
Regions, interviewed in Edinburgh, Scotland in February 2018. 
 Christina McKelvie, MSP and representative on the Council of Europe, 
former Convenor of the Committee on Europe and External Relations, 
interviewed in Edinburgh, Scotland in February 2018. 
 Rhiannon Spear, Glasgow City Councillor, former Head of Young Scots 
for Independence, interviewed in Glasgow, Scotland in March 2018. 
 Emilie-Louise Purdie, Head of Research in the SNP Westminster Group, 
interviewed in London, England in March 2018.  
 Oriol Roig, head of ANC Scotland, member of JERC and SNP Youth, 
interviewed in Glasgow, Scotland in April 2018. 
 Liz Lloyd, Chief of Staff to the First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, 
intervieawed in Edinburgh, Scotland in August 2018. 
 Linda Fabiani, MSP, Deputy Presiding Officer, former Minister for 
Europe, interviewed in Edinburgh, Scotland in October 2018. 
 Ian McCann, SNP Corporate Governance and Compliance Officer, 
interviewed in Edinburgh, Scotland in November 2018. 
 Kevin Pringle, Former Special Adviser to the First Minister (Alex 
Salmond), former Strategic Communications Director of the SNP, 
interviewed in Edinburgh, Scotland in November 2018. 
European Free Alliance  
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 Gunther Dauwen, Director of the European Free Alliance, interviewed in 
Brussels, Belgium in April 2017.  
 Eva Bidania, Political Advisor to the European Free Alliance, 
interviewed in Brussels, Belgium in April 2017.  
 Roccu Garoboy, EFA EP Group Adviser on Budget Control and former 
Vice President of EFA Youth, interviewed in Brussels, Belgium in April 
2017.  
Civil Society 
 Miquel Strubell, founding member, ANC, interviewed in Barcelona, 
Catalonia in May 2017.  
 Xavier Rubio-Campillo, ANC Scotland, interviewed in Edinburgh, 
Scotland in April 2018. 
 Michael Gray, journalist and former member of National Collective, 



















Appendix Two: List of EFA Member Parties 
Full Member Parties of the European Free Alliance  
Party Name Abbreviation Region 
(State) 
Ålands Framtid AF Åland 
(Finland) 
Autonomie, Liberté, Participation, 
Écologie* 
ALPE  Aosta Valley 
(Italy)  
Bayernpartei - Bavaria 
(Germany)  
Bloc Nacionalista Valencia BLOC Valencia 
(Spain) 
Bloque Nacionalista Gallego BNG  Galicia (Spain) 
Eusko Alkartasuna EA Basque 
Country 
(Spain) 
Enotna Lista EL Carinthia 
(Slovenia) 
Erdélyi Magyar Néppárt EMNP Transylvania/ 
Szeklerland 
(Romania) 
Esquerra Republicana de Cataunya ERC Catalonia 
(Spain) 
Fryske Nasjonale Partij FNP Friesland 
(Netherlands) 
Inseme per a Corsica - Corsica 
(France)  
Lausitzer Allianz LA Lusatia 
(Germany) 
Lista za Rijeku - Rijeka 
(Croatia) 
Liga Veneta Repubblica LVR Veneto (Italy) 
Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Szövetség MKDSZ Hungarian 
minority 
(Slovakia) 
Mebyon Kernow MK Cornwall (UK) 





Mouvement Région Savoie MRS Savoy 
(France) 
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie N-VA Flanders 
(Belgium) 
Omo Ilinden Pirin OMO Macedonian 
minority 
(Bulgaria) 
Partit Occitan POc Occitania 
(France) 
Plaid Cymru PC Wales (UK) 
Partitu di a Nazione Corsa PNC Corsica 
(France) 
Partito Sardo d’Azione* PSd’Az Sardinia (Italy) 
Federació PSM-Entesa Nacionlista PSM-Entesa Balearic 
Islands 
(Spain) 
Rainbow - Macedonian 
minority 
(Greece)  
Ruch Autonomii Śląska RAŚ Silesia 
(Poland) 
Slovenska Skupnost SSK Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia (Italy) 
Scottish National Party SNP Scotland (UK) 
Südschleswigschen Wählerverbands SSW Schleswig-
Holstein 
(Germany) 
Schleswig Partei SP North 
Schlewsig 
(Denmark)  
Süd-Tiroler Freiheit - South Tyrol 
(Italy) 
Union Démocratique Bretonne   UDB Brittany 
(France) 
Unitat Catalana UC Northern 
Catalonia 
(France) 
Unser Land UL  Alsace 
(France) 




Observer Members of EFA  
Party Name Abbreviation Region  
Dostluk Esitlik Baris Partisi  DEB Turkish Minority (Greece) 
Kaszebsko Jednota  KJ Kashubian minority 
(Poland) 
Latvijas Krievu savienība RSL Russian minority (Latvia) 
L’Altro Sud - Southern Italy (Italy) 
Nueva Canarias NC Canarias (Spain) 
Pro Lombardia 
Indipendenza*  
PLI Lombardy (Italy) 
Oljka Party - Istria (Slovenia) 
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